benefit of the persons interested in the drain. It is claimed that under this section the landowner who is assessed is or may be deprived of his property without due process of law, contrary to the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution. This contention cannot be sustained. The contention of appellants' counsel that "no man can be compelled to pay interest or penalties on taxes or assessments until the amount has been legally charged against him or his property, and until he has had an opportunity to pay the same," has no application to the facts of this case. It has been held in cases where the legislature attempted to authorize a reassessment of real or personal property omitted from the tax rolls without fault of the taxpayer, not only for the amount of the original tax, but including the interest and penalties accruing during the omission, that acts authorizing such reassessments, while not repugnant to the constitutional provision that property shall not be taken without due process of law when a subsequent opportunity for defending in court was afforded, nevertheless are invalid, so far as they relate to back interest and penalties, as being unequal taxation, for the reason that until the amount of the tax is ascertained the owner has no opportunity of paying it, and is not in default, and a person is chargeable with interest only upon his contract to pay it, or for some default of legal duty on his part. State v. Certain Lands in Redwood County (Minn.) 42 N. W. Rep. 473; Agens v. Mayor, etc., 37 N. J. Law, 39. We have no such state of facts in this case. The statute in question merely authorizes the county commissioners, acting on behalf of the persons interested in the drain, to provide means for paying the cost of the construction of the same by issuance of bonds, and to postpone the time of payment by dividing the assessments required to pay such cost of construction into as many equal parts as the bonds have years to run. When the assessments are charged against their lands, the owners may pay the same without interest or penalty if they see fit to do so. No authority is cited to the effect that it is beyond the power of the legislature to provide for payment for the construction of drains by the issuance of bonds, and to distribute the assessments as authorized by the section in question. It is a power very frequently conferred and exercised, and, so far as we are informed, it is not open to any constitutional objection. See Hellman v. Shoulters (Cal.) 44 Pac. Rep. 915; Davidson v. City of New Orleans, 96 U. S. 100, 24 L. Ed. 618; Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 17 Sup. Ct. 966, 42 L. Ed. 270; Martin v. Tyler, 4 N. D. 289, 60 N. W. Rep. 392, 25 L. R. A. 838; Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 17 Sup. Ct. 56, 41 L. Ed. 369; People v. Swigert (Ill.) 22 N. E. Rep. 787.

But appellants further contend that the assessments are void because of certain alleged irregularities in the proceedings, to which we will next refer, and that they are, therefore, entitled to the relief which they seek in this action. It is claimed that: (1) "The right of way deeds are void"; that (2) "the assessment notice was not in proper form, and was not legally posted or published"; that (3) "the

lands of the plaintiffs were assessed for the benefits to a school section and to some forty-two other sections unjustly omitted from the assessment"; that (4) "the drain is of no special benefit to the plaintiffs; it adds nothing to the value of their lands"; and that (5) "forty-one thousand dollars, the cost of the drain, and the basis of assessment levied, includes many excessive and many illegal charges." Considering these questions in their order, we may say that it is entirely unnecessary to determine whether the fact that the right of way deeds which are objected to because they run to "the people of Cass county," instead of "Cass county," impairs their validity as conveyances. The deeds were executed and delivered by the grantors for the purpose of conveying the right of way for the drain in question, and possession was given thereunder to the county, which it still retains. The drain was constructed, and a large sum of money expended, in reliance upon such deeds, and no question as to their legal sufficiency has been raised through any direct proceedings by any of the grantors. It is entirely clear that they would be estopped from doing so by the facts recited, and it is equally clear that these plaintiffs cannot question their validity in this collateral way. If the deeds are in fact defective, or insufficient in form and substance, they nevertheless furnish a sufficient basis, in connection with the foregoing facts, to require the execution of conveyances sufficient in form through the aid of a court of equity.

Neither can the objection to the form of the notice of assessment and the sufficiency of the posting and publication of such notices be sustained. The record shows that the notice was published in a newspaper of general circulation ten days prior to the hearing, and five printed copies of such notice were posted in the township traversed by the drain at such points as were likely, in the opinion of the board of drain commisisoners, to secure the greatest publicity for such notices. This was a full compliance with the statute. No form of notice is prescribed by the statute. The form of notice prepared by the board is merely criticized as containing more details than was necessary. If such is the fact, it constitutes no just ground of complaint that the board exercised its judgment on the side of safety.

Neither does the fact that school section No. 16, Wiser township, which lies adjacent to the drain in question, and concededly is benefited by it, was not assessed, furnish any legal ground for complaint. Being school land, it was not assessable, under sections 153, 158 and 163 of the state constitution. This tract is a portion of the lands granted by the United States to the state in trust for school purposes. The provisions of the grant and its acceptance forbid the imposition of assessments. In Edgerton v. School Tp. (Ind. Sup.) 26 N. E. Rep. 156, the court, in considering this question in a case where a drainage assessment was sought to be imposed, said: "It 'will thus be seen that these lands came to us as a sacred trust, to be applied exclusively to school purposes, and that the people, by their fundamental law, have placed it beyond the power of even the legis

lature of the state to make any provision by which the principal of the funds arising from such lands shall be diminished. The state has no power to tax such lands, for, if it were permitted to do so, it could tax them out of existence, and divert them to the use of the state in the payment of ordinary expenses; and

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assessments should be made against such lands only as are subject to taxation." See, also, City of Chicago v. People, 80 Ill. 384; People v. Trustees of Schools of Tp. 19 (Ill.) 7 N. E. Rep. 262.

The question as to whether the plaintiffs' lands were benefited by the construction of the drain to the amount of their assessment, and whether other assessable lands were omitted from the assessment, is one we cannot consider. There is no allegation or evidence to the effect that in including or excluding any lands from the assessment the board acted fraudulently. If the facts are as appellants claim they merely establish errors of judgment in the tribunal clothed with authority to pass upon the question of benefits. The legislature had the undoubted power to commit to the drainage board the ascertainment of the lands to be assessed, as well as the apportionment of benefits; and it is well settled that the decisions of such boards on questions within their jurisdiction are not open to collateral attack, and, "if not corrected by some of the modes pointed out by statute, they are conclusive, whatever errors may have been committed in the assessment." Stanley v. Board, 121 U. S. 535, 7 Sup. Ct. 1234, 30 L. Ed. 1000; Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 17 Sup. Ct. 966, 42 L. Ed. 270-289; Railroad Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421, 14 Sup. Ct. 1114, 38 L. Ed. 1031; Davidson v. City of New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. Ed. 616; Board v. Tregea, 88 Cal. 334, 26 Pac. Rep. 237; Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 167, 17 Sup. Ct. 56, 41 L. Ed. 369; In re Prospect Park & C. I. R. Co., 85 N. Y. 489. We find that the jurisdiction of the board to act was established by the filing of a sufficient petition for the construction of the drain. As has been seen, the hearing upon assessments provided by the statute meets the requirements of due process of law. Due notice of the hearing was given, and the appellants were thus afforded an opportunity of contesting their assessments before the tribunal created by law to pass upon the same. The jurisdiction of the board being established and there being no claim of fraud, its determination must, therefore, be accepted as conclusive. See Shuttuck v. Smith, 6 N. D. 56, 69 N. W. Rep. 5, and cases cited.

Neither do we find that charges for unauthorized items were included in the cost of the drain, as alleged by appellants. The items objected to are bridges, attorneys' fees, interest, incidental expenses, publishing notices, clerks' fees, office rent, furniture, printing, books, and supplies. It is patent that a work of the magnitude of this ditch might very properly involve expenditures such as are objected to. It was plainly the intention of the legislature to provide for the allowance and inclusion of all items of expense which would fairly contribute to the establishment, construction, and maintenance of drains, -a course which is absolutely necessary under any practical drain

age law. Drains cannot be constructed unless funds are provided to pay such expenses as properly enter into their construction, and no other source exists for obtaining funds than assessments of benefits. Section 1466, Rev. Codes, provides that the cost of the drain shall include all the expense of locating and establishing the same, including the cost of the right of way, the drain commissioners' fees, cost of survey, cost of building bridges and culverts, interest on warrants issued or to be issued, amount of the contracts, and "all other expenses." This section is broad enough to include all of the items. to which appellants object, and all of which we find contributed to the establishment and construction of the drain, and were, therefore, legitimate charges to be contracted for and allowed by the board in the exercise of a sound and reasonable discretion. Whether the sums allowed in each instance were correct, we need not inquire. They met the approval of the tribunal created by law to pass upon them. The board acted within its jurisdiction in making the allowances, and there is no claim that they acted fraudulently. That the items were proper expenditures cannot be doubted. See Butler v. City of Toledo, 5 Ohio St. 225. It hardly need be said that the authority of drainage boards is not arbitrary or unlimited, and that landowners and others interested are not remediless against usurpations of jurisdiction. They may invoke the same remedies against attempted usurpations of authority as are available as against other inferior boards acting in excess of their jurisdiction.

It is also claimed that the act under consideration authorizes assessments for benefits arising from the construction of drains which are conjectural or speculative, and that it is, therefore, invalid. No. time need be spent on this point. Section 1452, Rev. Codes, which is the governing section, will not admit of any such construction. This section authorizes assessments against lands for benefits to accrue "either directly or indirectly by reason of the construction of such drain, whether such lands are immediately drained thereby, or can be drained only by the construction of other and connecting drains." It requires no argument to show that benefits from the immediate draining of lands are not speculative, and it is well settled that the benefits afforded for draining lands through connecting or lateral drains are special, and not speculative, and will support assessments. "Where the construction of a large drain enables property owners to carry their lateral ditches into it, and thus secure good drainage without encroaching upon the rights of others, there is special benefit." Lipes v. Hand, 104 Ind. 503.

The conclusion necessarily follows, from what has already been said, from which it appears that the proceedings of the drainage board were under a valid law, and were not invalid for irregularities or for jurisdictional reasons, that the plaintiffs must fail in this action.

Another reason, which lies at the very foundation of the relief sought, compels the same conclusion. The plaintiffs have united their interests in one complaint, and are seeking the aid of a court of

equity to defeat the collection of assessments imposed upon their lands, and to have the entire proceedings of the drainage board declared void, and of no effect. The facts of this case are such as to require a denial of this relief on purely equitable grounds. It appears that 27 of the plaintiffs signed the petition which induced the location and construction of the drain. Five of them executed conveyances of the right of way for the drain, and were paid therefor. Two of them had a contract for constructing one-half mile of it. The drain is 10 miles in length, and its construction necessarily covered a considerable period of time, and, as we have seen, involved the expenditure of large sums of money and the contracting of many obligations. The period of time covered and the character of the work being done makes it necessary to assume that the plaintiffs whose lands are adjacent to the ditch were fully cognizant of all these facts. No steps of any kind were taken by any of the plaintiffs to arrest the progress of the work, or to challenge its legality in court, by notice to the board or to contractors, or otherwise. This action was not instituted until the drain had been fully completed, and after all of the benefits accruing therefrom had been conferred. Under such circumstances a court of equity will not stop to inquire into questions of regularity or irregularity. The cases are numerous, and the courts unanimous, we believe, in denying equitable relief on facts such as are here presented. In Kellogg v. Ely, 15 Ohio St. 64, which was an action to restrain drainage assessments on the ground that the proceedings were irregular and ilegal, the court said: "We do not find .it necessary to determine any one of the many questions made and argued by counsel in the case as to the legality or illegality of the proceedings by which this ditch was established, because, if we take for granted all that plaintiff's appeal claims in this respect, we are of opinion that he does not make such a case as to entitle him to a remedy by injunction at the hands of a court of equity. It is not for every threatened violation of the legal rights of a party that a court of equity will interpose with its preventive remedy by injunction, even in a case where that remedy would be efficient. A party appealing to a court of equity must make a case which can commend itself to the conscience of the court. * * * It does not appear from the record that he ever warned the contractors or laborers that he intended for himself to resist the collection of the assessment which must follow to raise the money to pay them, but, remaining inactive and silent until his swamp lands were drained by a ditch of nearly a mile in length, he then for the first time asks the interposition of a court of equity. We think he comes too late,"-citing Wiggin v. Mayor, etc., 9 Paige, 24, In Patterson v. Baumer, 43 Iowa, 477, the court said: "While the work of constructing the ditch was undertaken because demanded by the public interests, yet the petitioners, being landowners in the vicinity of the improvement, were interested therein. They must all be presumed to have had notice of the action of the county in ordering the work and in causing it to be prosecuted. Some of them signed the petition to the supervisors