1. The absence of a sewer to connect with the cellar of a dwelling house, in consequence of which water ran into the cellar, not shown in the case to render the house not fit for occupation by human be- ings. Torreson v. Walla, 481.
2. The putting in of a sewer connection does not come within the mean- ing of the word "repairs," "delapidation," or "deterioration," but pertains more to an addition or improvement of an original character. Torreson v. Walla, 481.
I. The defendant seeks to compel the plaintiff to specifically perform the covenants of a written contract wherein the plaintiff agreed to purchase and the defendant to sell and convey certain real estate owned by the latter. Held, on the facts stated in the opinion, that there was no rescission of the contract; also, that the defend- ant, who had fully complied with his covenants, was entitled to a decree of specific performance. Arnett v. Smith, 55.
2. A court of equity will not extend the relief afforded by specific per- formance to a purchaser of real estate who has been grossly negligent of his rights or has abandoned his contract. Mahon v. Leech, 181.
3. Where the evidence establishes that the rights of the purchasers under a contract for the sale of real estate, were voluntarily and unconditionally relinquished and abandoned, the court properly re- fused to decree specific performance. Mahon v. Leech, 181.
1. Chapter 161, Laws 1901, construed and held unconstitutional. Angell v. Cass Co., 265.
2. Where the subject of a statute is single, and the same is expressed in its title, the act will not be invalidated by the fact that the title announces a plurality of subjects. Eaton v. Guarantee Co., 79.
3. Laws 1901, chapter 5, held to be constitutional under § 61 of the state constitution. Eaton v. Guarantee Co., 79.
4. The legislature may properly classify subjects for purposes of meth- odical legislation, but all the objects of the law, situated in like conditions and circumstances, must be embraced within the pur- view of the law; otherwise the law becomes obnoxious as special legislation. Angell v. Cass Co., 265.
5. When a particular section of a statute is amended by retaining some of the provisions of the original section without change, and com- plete in themselves, and omitting other provisions which in no way affect the parts retained, and there is no express repeal of the sec- tion, the provisions which are retained will not be deemed to have been repealed and re-enacted, but to have been continued in force from their first enactment, with such modifications as have been made by subsequent acts; and the omitted portions only will be deemed to be abrogated and repealed. City of Fargo v. Ross, 369. 6. Construing chapter 149, Laws 1901, held, that the amendatory act only repeals that part of § 2496, Rev. Codes, which authorizes county treasurers to retain a commission, and that the remaining portions of said section were in no way affected. City of Fargo v. Ross, 369. 7. Held, that the said amendatory act did not, by implication, repeal § 1260, Rev. Codes 1899. City of Fargo v. Ross, 369.
8. Chap. 25, Laws 1901, is unconstitutional and void, for the reason that the subject of the act is not expressed in its title. Turnquist v. Commissioners, 514.
9. Sections 1444 to 1474 inclusive, Rev. Codes 1899, known as the "Drainage Law," inasmuch as a hearing for landowners is provided for upon notice before assessments for benefits become final, is not vulnerable to the objection that it deprives owners of their prop- erty without due process of law. Erickson v. Cass Co., 494.
10. Chapter 79, Laws 1899, which amends section 1466, Rev. Codes, rela- tive to the establishment of drans, does not violate § 61 of the state constitution. It is not necessary that the propositions em- bodied in the amendment shall relate directly to the particular provisions contained in the section amended. It is sufficient if the subject-matter of the amendment is germane to the subject of the act amended and is within the title of the original act. Erickson v. Cass Co., 494.
11. Chapter 25, Laws 1901, held to be unconstitutional under § 61 of the state constitution, the real subject of the act not being expressed in the title. Erickson v. Cass Co., 494.
STATUTES CITED AND CONSTRUED.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. SEE PLEADING, 3.
STREETS. SEE MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 5-7; INJUNCTION, 2; EMINENT DOMAIN.
SUCCESSION. SEE EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
TAXATION. SEE INJUNCTION, I.
I. Personal property not in this state on April 1st, under chapter 126, Laws 1897, is not taxable for the current year. Gaar, Scott & Co. v. Sorum, 164.
2. In an action for the recovery of money paid under protest for an alleged tax assessed on property brought into the state after April Ist, the court erred in sustaining a general demurrer to the com- plaint. Gaar, Scott & Co. v. Sorum, 164.
3. A tax levied by the county commissioners on the roadbed, franchise, rails, rolling stock and other property of a railway company within their county, pursuant to the action of the state board of equaliza- tion as certified to them by the state auditor under § 179, Cons., held to be a tax upon personal property under § 1228, Rev. Codes. Railway Co. v. Dickey Co., 107.
4. Certiorari is not proper remedy for the annulment of taxes. Duluth Elevator Co. v. White, 534.
5. The district court is adequate to afford full relief in tax cases. Duluth Elevator Co. v. White, 534.
TELEPHONES. SEE MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 5-7; EMINENT DOMAIN, 2.
When an answer in an action at law presents issues which are cog- nizable only by a court of equity, proper practice requires that the equitable issues shall be tried and determined by the court before submitting the common-law issues to the jury. Arnett v. Smith, 55.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
1. Evidence reviewed in an action on account stated, wherein plaintiff agreed to purchase and defendant to sell real estate, a rescission of the contract being alleged. Held, that the contract was not rescinded by the plaintiff, neither was there a mutual rescission. Arnett v. Smith, 55.
2. Where the assignment of a contract to sell land shows on its face that it was made to secure advances, and also contained a provision that authorized the vendor to convey to the assignee when the conditions of the contract were fully complied with, held, that the fact that the assignment was given as security is no defense to the vendor, and does not entitle him to refuse to convey. Ross v. Page, 458.
3. In an action by the assignee of a contract to sell land against the vendor for specific performance, held, under the evidence narrated in the opinion, and the reasons given therein, that the vendor had waived all violations of the terms of the contract by retaining moneys paid by the assignee to the agents of the vendor under circumstances charging the vendor with notice of the conditions under which it was pad. Ross v. Page, 458.
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