Opinion of the court. himself of the burden of paying rent. He chose the latter with full knowledge, and there is no injustice in holding him to the consequence of his choice. The covenant for re-entry provides that, in default of pay. ment of rent, the lessor may enter "and the said premises repossess and enjoy, as in his first and former estate." The plaintiff insists that the building is no part of such former estate, and defendant, therefore, does not become its owner by virtue of the re-entry. We have already shown that the building does become a part of the land as it is built. No such meaning was ever before attached to the use of the word estate in a legal document. It is used in reference to the nature of defendant's interest in the property, and not to the extent of improvements on the soil. As if the lessor had a fee simple estate, it reverted to him again as a fee simple. If he had a term for years, he was in again as part of his term. But it had no relation to the question of whether that estate might be more or less valuable when repossessed, or might bring to him more or less buildings. We hold, then, 1. That without the aid of a special contract, the law imposes no obligation on the landlord to pay his tenant for buildings erected on the demised premises. 2. That treating the parties to this suit as standing in the places of the original lessor and lessee, no obligation arises from the contract in this case, that the lessor shall purchase or pay for the building erected on said premises, except as an option, to be exercised at the end of each period of ten years. 3. That the act of defendant in re-entering and possessing himself of the premises for plaintiff's failure to pay rent, imposes upon him no obligation to pay plaintiff the value of the building. As the ruling of the court, to which exception was taken, was in conformity to these principles, the judgment must be AFFIRMED WITH COSTS. Statement of the case. LEVY COURT v. CORONER. 1. The Levy Court of Washington County, in the District of Columbia, if not a corporation in the full sense of the term, is a quasi corporation; and can sue and be sued in regard to any matter in which, by law, it has rights to be enforced, or is under obligations which it refuses to fulfil. 2. The fees allowed by the eighth section of the act of Congress of July 8, 1838, to the coroners of the counties of Washington and Alexandria, and to jurors and witnesses who may be lawfully summoned by them to any inquest, are payable by the Levy Court of the county, not by the Federal Government. 3. Jurors and witnesses summoned in form by the coroner's summons, regularly served, are so far "lawfully summoned" under the eighth section of the act of July 8, 1838, just named, that they may be allowed their fees, though the case of death in which they were summoned was strictly not one for a coroner's view, and though the coroner himself would be entitled to none. Fees advanced by the coroner to jurors and witnesses in such a cause may be properly reimbursed to him, and consistently with a refusal to pay him those claimed as his own. THE Coroner of the County of Washington, D. C., brought assumpsit in the Circuit Court of the District against what is called the "Levy Court" of Washington, for his fees; fees for "viewing the body," and fees which he had advanced to jurors and witnesses at inquests called by him for that purpose. Three questions arose: 1. A preliminary one; namely, whether the "Levy Court" was a body capable of being sued at all? 2. If it was, whether it was the Levy Court or the Federal Government which was bound to pay the fees of coroners and their inquests, &c. 3. If it was the Levy Court which was bound to pay them, whether the coroner could recover fees advanced to jurors and witnesses on occasions where the death, though sudden, had not occurred from other than natural causes; cases, for example, where the death came from apoplexy, fits, excessive and habitual intemperance, and other cases which the coroner. considered had occurred from "misadventure," but which Statement of the case. might not have fallen within that term as interpreted by the law. AS RESPECTED THE FIRST QUESTION,-the preliminary one, of whether the Levy Court was a body capable of being sued, it appeared that this body derived its powers from a statute of Maryland, passed A. D. 1794, entitled “An act for the establishment and regulation of the Levy Courts in the several counties of this State." This authorized them to adjust the expenses of the county, and to impose an assessment for their payment, and to appoint a collector, who shall give bond to the State. Suits were directed to be brought against the collector, and judgments entered in the name of the State. By other statutes they are charged with the expenses of the county relating to roads, bridges, the poor and poor-houses, the orphans' court, the jail, &c., and invested with power to levy such expenses by taxes. One of these statutes calls them Commissioners of the County, and some acts of Congress speak of them in the same terms. AS RESPECTED THE SECOND QUESTION—that is to say, whether the fees of the coroner, his inquests and witnesses, were payable by the Federal Government, or by the Levy Court itself, it is necessary to state the history of the legislation under which the claim was made. Prior to the year 1838, there was no compensation allowed in the District by law to jurors and witnesses for attending inquests on the coroner's summons. They were compelled to attend by due process for the public good. The coroner' himself, however, by an old statute of Maryland, passed A. D. 1779, but in force in the Distriet, had a fixed fee-two hundred and fifty pounds of tobacco-for each inquest, without-regard to the time which he might be required to give to it, or the trouble which it cost. This fee the statute made payable, in the first place, out of the estate of the decedent, and, in the absence of such estate, by the Levy Court. On the 7th of July, 1838, Congress passed an act,* the * 5 Stat. at Large, 306. Statement of the case. criminal court for main purpose of which was to create Washington County, and transfer to it from the Circuit Court the jurisdiction of criminal causes. This Circuit Court had been in existence for many years,* and, from the date of its establishment, the marshal of the District, and also jurors and witnesses, had been paid from the treasury of the United States. The third section of the new act-the act, to wit, of 1838— provides that the district attorney, marshal, and clerk of the Circuit Court, shall attend the criminal court, and perform the same duties, in relation to criminal causes, which had been required of them in the Circuit Court; and shall receive the same compensation therefor. Like provision is made for witnesses and jurors. Then came an eighth section in these words: "There shall hereafter be allowed and paid to the coroners of the counties of Washington and Alexandria, in said District, and to the jurors and witnesses who may be lawfully summoned by them in any inquest, the same fees and compensation as are now paid to the marshal of said District, and the jurors and witnesses attending said Circuit Court in said county, for simila services." These fees were construed, by the parties concerned, to be such as the marshal received for summoning, swearing, and impanelling jurors, swearing witnesses, and returning inquisitions. But the statute did not say who was to pay either the fees given by the third section to the district attorney, marshal, and clerk of the Circuit Court, or those given by the eighth section to the coroner, his jurors and witnesses; the same with the former. THE THIRD QUESTION depended upon the expression of this same section, that these fees were to be paid to jurors and witnesses who might be "lawfully summoned" by coroners to "any" inquest; and on the fact, whether or not an inquest and witnesses, who received a summons, in form and on its face wholly regular, were "lawfully summoned" to any inquest which the law, rightly interpreted, would not consider a proper case for the coroner's jurisdiction. It was established by act of February 27, 1801;. 2 Stat. at Large, 103. Argument for the Levy Court, plaintiff in error. The court below thought, on the first point, that the Levy Court was a body which could properly be sued; on the second, that it, and not the Federal Government, was the party to pay the coroner's fees. On the third,-while it thought that in no case of death from apoplexy, fits, or excessive and habitual intemperance, or of sudden death proceeding from natural causes and the visitation of God, it was proper to hold an inquest, and accordingly disallowed the coroner's claim in such cases to fees for himself,-it yet allowed him reimbursement of fees advanced by him to inquests and wit nesses. Judgment having been given accordingly, the correctness of the views taken below was now the matter in error here. Mr. W. S. Cox, for the Levy Court, plaintiff in error : I. On the preliminary point. There is no act of Maryland or of Congress which makes the Levy Court a corporation, or endows it with the capacity of suing and being sued. Even if it could be considered a quasi corporation, it could not sue or be sued without an enactment to that effect. Accordingly, the only reported cases in this District, to which the Levy Court was a party, were cases of a special character; one the case of a rule to show cause, * and the other a special and summary application, under an act of Congress. English cases indicate that the justices of the county in England exercise functions analogous to those of our Levy Court, and cannot be proceeded against by suit, but only by mandamus. II. But the court below also erred in their construction of the act of 1838. In the third section, it directs that the district attorney, marshal, and clerk of the Circuit Court shall attend the Criminal Court, and perform all the duties by law required of them in relation to the criminal business of the Circuit Court, and shall receive the same fees and compensation therefor, and that the jurors and witnesses attend *Levy Court v. Ringgold, 2 Cranch's Circuit Court, 659. |