Junius Brutus, p. 83. Pag. 85. the people, in whom it doth lie to put by any one, and to prefer some other before him better liked of, or judged fitter for the place, and that the party so rejected hath no injury done unto him, no, although the same be done in a place where the crown doth go dia yévos, by succession, and to a person which is capital, and hath apparently, if blood be respected, the nearest right. They plainly affirm in all wellappointed kingdoms, the custom evermore hath been, and is, that children succeed not their parents till the people after a sort have created them anew, neither that they grow to their fathers as natural and proper heirs, but are then to be reckoned for kings when at the hands of such as represent the king's majesty, they have by sceptre and a diadem received as it were the investiture of a kingly power. Their very words are, “That where such power is settled into a family or kinVindic. dred, the stock itself is thereby chosen, but not the twig that springeth of it. The next of the stock unto him that reigneth are not through nearness of blood made kings, but rather set forth to stand for the kingdom. Where regal dominion is hereditary, it is notwithstanding (if we look to the persons which have it) altogether elective." To this purpose are selected heaps of scriptures concerning the solemn coronation or inauguration of Saul, of David, of Solomon, and others, by the nobles, ancients, and people, of the commonweal of Israel; as if these solemnities were a kind of deed, whereby the right of dominion is given. Which strange, untrue, and unnatural conceits, set abroad by seedsmen of rebellion, only to animate unquiet spirits, and to feed them with possibility of aspiring to thrones, if they can win the hearts of the people, what hereditary title soever any other before them may have I say, these unjust and insolent positions I would not mention, were it not thereby to make the countenance of truth more orient; for unless we will openly proclaim defiance unto all law, equity, and reason, we must (there is no remedy) acknowledge, that in kingdoms hereditary birth giveth_right unto sovereign dominion; and the death of the predecessor putteth the successor by blood in seisin. Those public solemnities before specified do but serve for an open testification of the inheritor's right, or belonging unto the form of inducting him into possession of that thing he hath right unto therefore in case it doth happen that without right of blood a man in such wise be possessed, all these new elections de Offic. and investings are utterly void, they make him no indefeasible estate, the inheritor by blood may dispossess him as a usurper. The case thus standing, albeit we judge it a thing most true, that kings, even inheritors, do hold their right in the power of dominion, with dependency upon the whole body politic over which they have rule as kings; yet so it may not be understood as if such dependency did grow, for that every supreme governor doth personally take from thence his power by way of gift, bestowed of their own free accord upon him at the time of his entrance into the said place of his sovereign government: but the case of dependency is that first original conveyance, when power was derived from the whole into one; to pass from him unto them, whom out of him nature by lawful births should produce, and no natural or legal inability make incapable. "Neither can any Tally man with reason think, but that the first institution of kings, a sufficient consideration wherefore their power should always depend on that from which it always flows by original influence of power, from the body unto the king, is the cause of the king's dependency in power upon the body." By dependency we mean subordination and subjection. A manifest token of which dependency may be this; as there is no more certain argument that lands are held under any as lords, than if we see that such lands in defect of heirs fall unto them by escheat in like manner it doth follow rightly, that seeing dominion when there is none to inherit it returneth unto the body, therefore they which before were inheritors thereof did hold it with dependency upon the body, so that by comparing the body with the head, as touching power, it seemeth always to reside in both, fundamentally and radically in the one, in the other derivatively; in one the habit, in the other the act of power. May a body politic then at all times withdraw, in whole or in part, the influence of dominion which passeth from it, if inconveniences do grow thereby? It must be presumed, that supreme governors will not in such case oppose themselves, and be stiff in detaining that, the use whereof is with public detriment: but surely without their consent I see not how the body by any just means should be. able to help itself, saving when dominion doth escheat; such things therefore must be thought upon beforehand, that power may be limited ere it be granted, which is the next thing we are to consider.' 1 In what measure. IN power of dominion, all kings have not an equal latitude. Kings by conquest make their own charter; so that how large their power, either civil or spiritual, is, we cannot with any certainty define farther, than only to set them in the line of the law of God and nature for bounds. Kings by God's own special appointment have also that largeness of power which he doth assign or permit with approbation. Touching kings which were first instituted by agreement and composition made with them over whom they reign, and how far their power may extend, the articles of compact between them is to shew: not only the articles of compact at the first beginning, which for the most part are either clean worn out of knowledge, or else known to very few, but whatsoever hath been after in free and voluntary manner condescended unto, whether by express consent (whereof positive laws are witnesses), or else by silent allowance, famously notified through custom, reaching beyond the memory of man. By which means of after-agreement, it cometh many times to pass in kingdoms, that they whose ancient predecessors were by violence and force made subject, do by little and little grow into that sweet form of kingly government which phiArist. Pol. losophers define, "Regency willingly sustained, and endued with chiefty of power in the greatest things." Many of the ancients, in their writings, do speak of kings with such high and ample terms, as if universality of power, even in regard of things, and not of persons, did appertain to the very being of a king. The reason is, because their speech concerning kings they frame according to the state of those monarchs to whom unlimited authority was given; which some not observing, imagine that all kings, even in that they are kings, ought to have whatsoever power they judge any sovereign Pythago ruler lawfully to have enjoyed. But the most judicious philosopher, whose eye scarce any thing did escape which was to be found in the bosom of nature, he considering how far the power of one sovereign ruler may be different from another regal authority, noteth in Spartan kings, "that of all others they were most tied to law, and so the most restrained power." A king which hath not supreme power in the greatest things, is rather entitled a king, than invested with real so lib. iii. cap. 1. ras apud Erdant. de Regno. vereignty. We cannot properly term him a king, of whom it may not be said, at the leastwise, as touching certain the chiefest affairs of the state, ἄρχειν, ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ οὐδενός, his right in them is to have rule, not subject to any other predominancy. I am not of opinion that simply in kings the most, but the best limited power is best both for them and the people: the most limited is that which men deal in fewest things, the best that which in dealing is tied unto the soundest, perfectest, and most indifferent rule, which rule is the law: I mean not only the law of nature, and of God, but the national law consonant thereunto." Happier that people whose law is their king in the greatest things, than that whose king is himself their law. Where the king doth guide the state, and the law the king, that commonwealth is like a harp or melodious instrument, the strings whereof are tuned and handled all by one hand, following as laws the rules and canons of musical science." Most divinely, therefore, Archytas maketh unto public felicity these four steps and degrees, every of which doth spring from the former, as from another cause, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς νομίμος, ὁ δὲ ἄρχων ἀκόλου θος, ὁ δὲ ἀρχόμενος ἀπόλυπος, ἡ δὲ ὅλη κοινωνία εὐδαίμων, the king ruling by law, the magistrate following, the subject free, and the whole society happy.-Adding on the contrary side, that where this order is not, it cometh by transgression thereof to pass that a king groweth a tyrant; he that ruleth under him abhorreth to be guided by him, or commanded; the people subject unto both, have freedom under neither, and the whole community is wretched. In which respect, I cannot choose but commend highly their wisdom, by whom the foundation of the commonwealth hath been laid; wherein though no manner of person or cause be unsubject unto the king's power, yet so is the power of the king over all, and in all limited, that unto all his proceedings the law itself is a rule. The axioms of our regal government are these, "Lex facit regem:" the king's grant of any favour made contrary to the law is void; "Rex nihil potest nisi quod jure potest." Our kings, therefore, when they are to take possession of the crown they are called unto, have it pointed out before their eyes, even by the very solemnities and rites of their inauguration, to what affairs, by the same law, their supreme power and authority reacheth; crowned we see they are, enthronized and anointed; the crown a sign of military dominion; Stapl. de cip. lib. iii. c. 17. the throne of sedentary or judicial; the oil of religious and sacred power. It is not on any side denied, that kings may have authority in secular affairs. The question then is, "What power they may lawfully have, and exercise in causes of God." A prince, a magistrate, or a community (saith Dr. Stapleton), may have power to lay corporal punishment on them which are teachers of perverse things; power to make laws for the peace of the church: power to proclaim, to defend, and even by revenge to preserve dogmata, the very articles of religion themselves from violation." Others, in affection no less devoted unto the papacy, do likewise yield, that the civil magistrate may by his edicts and laws keep all ecclesiastical persons within the bounds of their duties, and constrain them to observe the canons of the church, to follow the rule of ancient discipline. That if Joash was commended for his care and provision concerning so small a part of religion as the church-treasure; it must needs be both unto Christian kings themselves greater honour, and to Christianity a larger benefit, when the custody of religion and the worship of God in general are their charge. If, therefore, all these things mentioned be most properly the affairs of God's ecclesiastical causes; if the actions specified be works of power; and if that power be such as kings may use of themselves, without the fear of any other power superior in the same thing; it followeth necessarily, that kings may have supreme power, not only in civil, but also in ecclesiastical affairs, and consequently that they may withstand what bishop or pope soever shall, under the pretended claim of higher spiritual authority, oppose themselves against their proceedings. But they which have made us the former grant, will never hereunto condescend; what they yield that princes may do, it is with secret exception always understood, if the bishop of Rome give leave, if he interpose no prohibition; wherefore somewhat it is in show, in truth nothing, which they grant. Our own reformers do the very like, when they make their discourse in general concerning the authority which magistrates may have, a man would think them to be far from withdrawing any jot of that which with reason may T. C. lib. i. be thought due, "The prince and civil magistrate (saith one of them) hath to see the laws of God touching his worship, and touching all matters, and all orders of the church to be executed, and duly observed; and to see every ecclesiastical P. 192. |