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Cap. delict. de excess.

Prælator L. per fundum

præd. et

rum divis.

xcvi. c.

ubinam.

that God delivered it written in stone; the other a testament of the Spirit, because God imprinted it in the hearts, and declared it by the tongues of his chosen apostles, through the power of the Holy Ghost, feigning both their conceits and speeches in most Divine and incomprehensible manner. Wherefore, inasmuch as the council of Jerusalem did chance to consist of men so enlightened, it had authority greater than were meet for any other council besides to challenge, wherein such kind of persons are, as now the state of the church doth stand; kings being not then that which now they are, and the clergy not now that which then they were. Till it be proved that some special law of Christ hath for ever annexed unto the clergy alone the power to make ecclesiastical laws, we are to hold it a thing most consonant with equity and reason, that no ecclesiastical laws be made in a Christian commonwealth, without consent as well of the laity as of the clergy, but least of all without consent of the highest power.

For of this thing no man doubteth, namely, that in all societies, companies, and corporations, what severally each shall be bound unto, it must be with all their assents ratified. Rusticor. Against all equity it were, that a man should suffer detriment sect. Religi- at the hands of men, for not observing that which he never osum de re- did, either by himself or by others, mediately or immediately, agree unto; much more that a king should constrain all others to the strict observation of any such human ordinance as passeth without his own approbation. In this case thereGloss. dict. fore especially, that vulgar axiom is of force, "Quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus tractari et approbari debet." Whereupon Pope Nicholas, although otherwise not admitting lay-persons, no, not emperors themselves, to be present at synods, doth notwithstanding seem to allow of their presence when matters of faith are determined whereunto all men must stand bound: "Ubinam legistis imperatores, antecessores vestros, synodalibus conventibus interfuisse ? nisi forsitan in quibus de fide tractatum est, quæ non solum ad clericos, verum etiam ad laicos et omnes pertinet Christianos." A law, be it civil or ecclesiastical, is a public obligation, wherein, seeing that the whole standeth charged, no reason it should pass without his privity and will, whom principally the whole doth depend upon. "Sicut laici jurisdictionem clericorum per

turbare, ita clerici jurisdictionem laicorum non debent minuere ;" saith Innocentius, "Extra de judic. novit." "As the laity should not hinder the clergy's jurisdiction, so neither is it reason that the laity's right should be abridged by the clergy," saith Pope Innocent. But were it so that the clergy alone might give laws unto all the rest, forasmuch as every estate doth desire to enlarge the bounds of their own liberties, is it not easy to see how injurious this might prove to men of other conditions? Peace and justice are maintained by preserving unto every order their right, and by keeping all estates, as it were, in an even balance. Which thing is no way better done, than if the king, their common parent, whose care is presumed to extend most indifferently over all, do bear the chiefest sway in making laws which all must be ordered by. Wherefore, of them which in this point attribute most to the clergy, I would demand, what evidence there is whereby it may clearly be shewed that in ancient kingdoms Christian, any canon devised by the clergy alone in their synods, whether provincial, national, or general, hath, by mere force of their agreement, taken place as a law, making all men constrainable to be obedient thereunto, without any other approbation from the king, before or afterward required in that behalf. But what speak we of ancient kingdoms, when at Boet. Epod. this day, even the papacy itself, the very Tridental council, heroic. quæst. lib. hath not every where as yet obtained to have in all points i. sect. 28. the strength of ecclesiastical laws. Did not Philip king of Spain, publishing that council in the Low Countries, add thereunto an express clause of special provision, that the same should in no wise prejudice, hurt, or diminish, any kind of privilege which the king or his vassals aforetime had enjoyed, touching either possessory judgments of ecclesiastical livings, or concerning nominations thereunto, or belonging to whatsoever right they had else in such affairs? If therefore the king's exception, taken against some part of the canons contained in that council, were a sufficient bar to make them of none effect within his territories; it follows that the like exception against any other part had been also of like efficacy, and so consequently that no part thereof had obtained the strength of a law, if he which excepted against a part had so done against the whole. As, what reason was there, but that the same authority which limited, might quite

and clean have refused that council? Whoso alloweth the said act of the catholic king's for good and lawful, must grant that the canons, even of general councils, have but the face of wise men's opinions concerning that whereof they treat, till they be publicly assented unto, where they are to take place as laws; and that, in giving such public assent as maketh a Christian kingdom subject unto those laws, the king's authority is the chiefest. That which a university of men, a company, a corporation, doth without consent of their rector is as nothing. Except, therefore, we make the king's authority over the clergy less in the greatest things, than the power of the meanest governor is in all things over the college, or society which is under him; how should we think it a matter decent, that the clergy should impose laws, the supreme governor's assent not asked?

Yea, that which is more, the laws thus made, God himself doth in such sort authorize, that to despise them, is to despise in them, him. It is a loose and licentious opinion, which the anabaptists have embraced, holding that a Christian man's liberty is lost, and the soul which Christ hath redeemed unto himself injuriously drawn into servitude under the yoke of human power, if any law be now imposed besides the gospel of Christ; in obedience whereunto the Spirit of God, and not the constraint of men, is to lead us, according to that of the blessed apostle, "Such as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God, and not such as live in thraldom" unto men. Their judgment is, therefore, that the church of Christ should admit of no lawmakers but the evangelists, no courts but presbyters, no punishments but ecclesiastical censures. Against this sort, we are to maintain the use of human laws, and the continual necessity of making them from time to time, as long as this present world doth last; so likewise the authority of laws so made doth need much more by us to be strengthened against another sort; who, although they do utterly condemn the making of laws in the church, yet make they a deal less account of them than they should do. There are which think simply of human laws, that they can in no sort touch the conscience. That to break and transgress them cannot make men in the sight of God culpable, as sin doth; only when we violate such laws, we do thereby make ourselves obnoxious unto

external punishment in this world, so that the magistrate may, in regard of such offence committed, justly correct the offender, and cause him, without injury, to endure such pains as law doth appoint, but farther it reacheth not. For first, the conscience is the proper court of God, the guiltiness thereof is sin, and the punishment eternal death; men are not able to make any law that shall command the heart, it is not in them to make inward conceit a crime, or to appoint for any crime other punishment than corporal; their laws, therefore, can have no power over the soul, neither can the heart of man be polluted by transgressing them. St. Augustine rightly defineth sin to be that which is spoken, done, or desired, not against any laws, but against the law of the living God. The law of God is proposed unto man, as a glass wherein to behold the stains and the spots of their sinful souls: by it they are to judge themselves, and when they feel themselves to have transgressed against it, then to bewail their offences with David, "Against thee only, O Lord, have I sinned, and done wickedly in thy sight;" that so our present tears may extinguish the flames, which otherwise we are to feel, and which God in that day shall condemn the wicked unto, when they shall render account of the evil which they have done, not by violating statute-laws and canons, but by disobedience unto his law and his word.

For our better instruction, therefore, concerning this point, first we must note, that the law of God itself doth require at our hands subjection. "Be ye subject (saith St. Peter and St. Paul), Let every soul be subject; subject all unto such powers as are set over us." For if such as are not set over us require our subjection, we by denying it are not disobedient to the law of God, or undutiful unto higher powers; because, though they be such in regard of them over whom they have lawful dominion, yet having not so over us, unto us they are not such. Subjection, therefore, we owe, and that by the law of God; we are in conscience bound to yield it even unto every of them that hold the seats of authority and power in relation unto us. Howbeit, not all kinds of subjection

a Verum ac proprium civis à peregrino discrimen est, quod alter imperio ac potestate civili obligatur; alter jussa principis alieni respuere potest. Illum princeps ab hostium æque ac civium injuria tueri tenetur; hunc non item nisi rogatus et humanitatis officiis impulsus, saith Bodin. de rep. lib. i. cap. 6. non multum à fine p. 61 edit. Lugd. B. in fol. 1586.

unto every such kind of power. Concerning scribes and pharisees, our Saviour's precept was, "Whatsoever they shall tell ye, do it:" was it his meaning, that if they should at any time enjoin the people to levy any army, or to sell their lands and goods for the furtherance of so great an enterprize; and, in a word, that simply whatsoever it were which they did command, they ought, without any exception, forthwith to be obeyed? No, but whatsoever they shall tell you, must be understood in pertinentibus ad cathedram, it must be construed with limitation, and restrained unto things of that kind which did belong to their place and power. For they had not power general, absolutely given them to command all things. The reason why we are bound in conscience to be subject unto all such power is, because all powers are of God.

They are of God either instituting or permitting them. Power is then of Divine institution, when either God himself doth deliver, or men by light of nature find out, the kind thereof. So that the power of parents over children, and of husbands over their wives, the power of all sorts of superiors, made by consent of commonwealths within themselves, or grown from agreement amongst nations, such power is of God's own institution in respect of the kind thereof. Again, if respect be had unto those particular persons to whom the same is derived, if they either receive it immediately from God, as Moses and Aaron did; or from nature, as parents do; or from men by a natural and orderly course, as every governor appointed in any commonwealth, by the order thereof, doth; then is not the kind of their power only of God's instituting, but the derivation thereof also into their persons, is from him. He hath placed them in their rooms, and doth term them his ministers; subjection, therefore, is due unto all such powers, inasmuch as they are of God's own institution, even then when they are of man's creation, omni humanæ creature: which things the heathens themselves do acknowledge.

Σκηπτούχος βασιλεὺς, ᾧτε Ζεὺς κῦδος ἔδωκεν.2

As for them that exercise power altogether against order, although the kind of power which they have may be of God,

a A sceptre-swaying king, to whom even Jupiter himself hath given honour and commandment. Hom. Il. lib. 2.

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