say so, and, "They teach as we do, that although Christ be the only meritorious cause of our justice, yet as a medicine, which is made for health, doth not heal by being made, but by being applied so, by the merits of Christ, there can be no life nor justification, without the application of his merits: but about the manner of applying Christ, about the number and power of means whereby he is applied, we dissent from them." This of our dissenting from them is acknowledged. iii. In Sent. art. 6. 14. Our agreement in the former is denied to be such as I pretend. Let their own words therefore and mine concerning them be compared. Doth not Andradius plainly confess; "Our Orthod.lib. sins do shut, and only the merits of Christ open, the entering unto dist. 1. blessedness?" And Soto, "It is put for a good ground, that all, quæst. 4. since the fall of Adam, obtained salvation only by the passion of Christ howbeit, as no cause can be effectual without applying, so neither can any man be saved, to whom the suffering of Christ is not applied." In a word, who not? When the council of Trent, reckoning up the causes of our first justification, doth name no end but God's glory, and our felicity; no efficient but his mercy; no instrumental but baptism; no meritorious but Christ; whom to have merited the taking away of no sin but original, is not their opinion: which himself will find, when he hath well examined his witnesses, Catharinus and Thomas. Their Jesuits are marvellous angry with the men out of whose gleanings Mr. Travers seemeth to have taken this: they openly disclaim it; they say plainly, "Of all the catholics there is not one that did ever so teach;" they make solemn protestation, “We believe and profess, that Christ upon the cross hath altogether satisfied for all sins, as well original as actual." Indeed they teach, that the merit of Christ doth not take away actual sin in such sort as it doth original; wherein, if their doctrine had been understood, I for my speech had never been accused. As for the council of Trent, concerning inherent righteousness, what doth it here? No man doubteth, but they make another formal cause of justification than we do. In respect whereof, I have shewed you already, that we disagree about the very essence of that which cureth our spiritual disease. Most true it is which the grand philosopher hath, "Every man judgeth well of that which he knoweth ;" and therefore, till we know the things thoroughly a Bellarm. Judic. de lib. Concor. Mendac. 18. Nemo catholicorum unquam sic docuit; sed credimus et profitemur, Christum in cruce pro omnibus omnino peccatis satisfecisse, tam originalibus quam actualibus. whereof we judge, it is a point of judgment to stay our judg ment. 15. Thus much labour being spent in discovering the unsoundness of my doctrine, some pains he taketh farther to open faults in the manner of my teaching, as that, "I bestowed my whole hour and more, my time and more than my time, in discourses utterly impertinent to my text." Which, if I had done, it might have past without complaining of to the privy council. 16. But I did worse, as he saith," I left the expounding of the Scriptures, and my ordinary calling, and discoursed upon school points and questions, neither of edification, nor of truth.” I read no lecture in the law, or in physic. And, except the bounds of ordinary calling may be drawn like a purse, how are they so much wider unto him than to me, that he which in the limits of his ordinary calling, should reprove that in me, which he understood not; and I labouring that both he and others might understand, could not do this without forsaking my calling? The matter whereof I spake was such, as being at first by me but lightly touched, he had in that place openly contradicted, and solemnly taken upon him to disprove. If therefore it were a school-question, and unfit to be discoursed of there, that which was in me but a proposition only at the first, wherefore made he a problem of it? Why took he first upon him to maintain the negative of that which I had affirmatively spoken only to shew mine own opinion, little thinking that ever it would have been a question? Of what nature soever the question were, I could do no less than there explain myself to them, unto whom I was accused of unsound doctrine; wherein if to shew what had been through ambiguity mistaken in my words, or misapplied by him in this cause against me, I used the distinction and helps of schools, I trust that herein I have committed no unlawful thing. These Calv. Inst. school implements are acknowledged by grave and wise men not unprofitable to have been invented. The most approved for learning and judgment do use them without blame; the use of them hath been well liked in some that have taught even in this very place before me: the quality of my hearers is such, that I could not but think them of capacity very sufficient, for the most part, to conceive harder than I used any; the cause I had in hand did in my judgment necessarily require them which were then used when my words spoken generally without distinctions had been perverted, what other way was there for me, but by distinctions to lay them open in their right meaning, that it might appear 1. i. c. 6. sect. 9. to all men whether they were consonant to truth or no? And, although Mr. Travers be so inured with the city, that he thinketh it unmeet to use any speech which savoureth of the school, yet his opinion is no canon; though unto him, his mind being troubled, my speech did seem like fetters and manacles, yet there might be some more calmly affected which thought otherwise; his private judgment will hardly warrant his bold words, that the things which I spake "were neither of edification nor truth." They might edify some other, for any thing he knoweth, and be true for any thing he proveth to the contrary. For it is no proof to cry "absurdities; the like whereunto have not been heard in public places within this land since Queen Mary's days!" If this came in earnest from him, I am sorry to see him so much offended without cause ; more sorry, that his fit should be so extreme, to make him speak he knoweth not what. That I neither "affected the truth of God, nor the peace of the church," mihi pro minimo est, it doth not much move me, when Mr. Travers doth say that, which I trust a greater than Mr. Travers will gainsay. 17. Now let all this which hitherto he hath said be granted him, let it be as he would have it, let my doctrine and manner of teaching be as much disallowed by all men's judgments as by his, what is all this to his purpose? He allegeth this to be the cause why he bringeth it in; the high commissioners "charge him with an indiscretion and want of duty in that he inveigheth against certain points of doctrine, taught by me as erroneous, not conferring first with me, nor complaining of it to them." Which faults, a sea of such matter as he hath hitherto waded in, will never be able to scour from him. For the avoiding of schism and disturbance in the church, which must needs grow if all men might think what they list, and speak openly what they think; therefore by a decree agreed upon by the bishops, and confirmed by her majesty's authority, it was ordered that erroneous doctrine, if it were taught publicly, should not be publicly refuted; but that notice thereof should be given unto such as are by her highness a In the advertisements published in the seventh year of her majesty's reign: "If any preacher, or parson, vicar, or curate so licensed, shall fortane to preach any matter tending to dissension, or to derogation of the religion and doctrine received, that the hearers denounce the same to the ordinary, or to the next bishop of the same place, but not openly to contrary, or to impugn the same speech so disorderly uttered, whereby may grow offence, and disquiet of the people, but shall be convinced and reproved by the ordinary, after such agreeable order as shall be seen to him, according to the gravity of the offence: and that it be presented within one month after the words spoken." For breach of appointed to hear and to determine such causes. which order, when he is charged with lack of duty, all the faults that can be heaped upon me will make but a weak defence for him. As surely his defence is not much stronger, when he alleges for himself, that "he was in some hope that his speech in proving the truth, and clearing those scruples which I had in myself, might cause me either to embrace sound doctrine, or suffer it to be embraced of others; which, if I did, he should not need to complain: that it was meet he should discover first what I had sown, and make it manifest to be tares, and then desire their soythe to cut it down: that, conscience did bind him to do otherwise, than the foresaid order requireth; that, he was unwilling to deal in that public manner, and wished a more convenient way were taken for it: that, he had resolved to have protested the next sabbath-day, that he would some other way satisfy such as should require it, and not deal more in that place." Be it imagined, (let me not be taken as if I did compare the offenders, when I do not, but their answers only) that a libeller did make this apology for himself, I am not ignorant that if I have just matter against any man the law is open, there are judges to hear it, and courts where it ought to be complained of; I have taken another course against such or such a man, yet without breach of duty; forasmuch as I am able to yield a reason of my doing, I conceive some hope that a little discredit amongst men would make him ashamed of himself, and that his shame would work his amendment; which, if it did, other accusation there should not need; could his answer be thought sufficient, could it in the judgment of discreet men free him from all blame? No more can the hope Mr. Travers conceived to reclaim me by public speech, justify his fault against the established order of the church. 18. His thinking it meet," he should first openly discover to the people the tares that had been sown amongst them, and then require the hand of authority to mow them down;" doth only make it a question, whether his opinion that this was meet, may be a privilege or protection against the lawful constitution which had before determined of it as of a thing unmeet. Which question I leave for them to discuss whom it most concerneth. If the order be such, that it cannot be kept without hazarding a thing so precious as a good conscience, the peril whereof could be no greater to him, than it needs must be to all others whom it toucheth in like causes; then this is evident, it will be an effectual motive, not only for England, but also for other reformed churches, even Geneva itself [for they have the like], to change or take that away which cannot but with great inconvenience be observed. In the meanwhile the breach of it may, in such consideration, be pardoned [which truly I wish howsoever it be], yet hardly defended as long as it standeth in force uncancelled. 19. Now, whereas he confesseth another "way had been more convenient," and that he found in himself secret unwillingness to do that which he did, doth he not say plainly, in effect, that the light of his own understanding proved the way that he took perverse and crooked? Reason was so plain and pregnant against it, that his mind was alienated, his will averted to another course; yet somewhat there was that so far overruled, that it must needs be done even against the very stream, what doth it bewray? Finally, his purposed protestation, whereby he meant openly to make it known, that he did not allow this kind of proceeding, and therefore would satisfy men otherwise," and deal no more in this place," sheweth his good mind in this, that he meant to stay himself from farther offending; but it serveth not his turn. He is blamed because the thing he hath done was amiss, and his answer is, That which I would have done afterward had been well, if so be I had done it. 20. But as in this he standeth persuaded, that he hath done nothing besides duty, so he taketh it hardly, that the high commissioners should charge him with indiscretion. Wherefore, as if he could so wash his hands, he maketh a long and a large declaration concerning the carriage of himself; how he waived in "matters of smaller weight," and in things of "greater moment" how warily he dealt; how "naturally he took his things rising from the text;" how " closely he kept himself to the Scriptures he took in hand;" how " much pains he took to confirm the necessity of believing justification by Christ only," and to shew how "the church of Rome denieth that a man is saved by faith alone, without works of the law;" what "the sons of thunder would have done," if they had been in his case; that his " answer was very temperate, without immodest or reproachful speech;" that when he might " before all have reproved me,” he did not, “but contented himself with exhorting me" before all," to follow Nathan's example, and revisit my doctrine;" when he might have followed St. Paul's example in " reproving Peter," he did not, but exhorted me with Peter, to" endure to be withstood." This testimony of his discreet carrying himself in the handling of his matter, being more agreeably framed and given him by another than |