These principles, sound at all times, have acquired a peculiar importance at this time in Pennsylvania, with those who consider that the action of the Congressional delegation of that state was greatly embarrassed in the adjustment of the tariff, at the last session of Congress, by legislative instructions which placed it out of their power, as is thought by many, to secure a modification as favorable to Pennsylvania interests as might have been obtained, if they had been left to their own unembarrassed action.

The Constitution of Pennsylvania provides for the removal of judicial officers, on the address of two-thirds of both houses of the Legislature. It has been the policy of one party to restrain the right of removal to cases of conviction for criminal offences, and to misdemeanors in office. While Mr. Lewis was in the Legislature, he made a report from the judiciary committee in the case of Henry O'Neal, in which the democratic principle of construction was affirmed in the following words:

"The Constitution provides that justices may be removed either by conviction of misdemeanor in office, or of any infamous crime, or on the address of both houses of the Legislature. Both modes of proceeding are open. The first is confined to cases of misdemeanor in office, and of infamous crime; the last not only embraces the same class of cases, but all others, and is limited only by the discretion of the Legislature. If a magistrate has been tried and acquitted on a charge of a crime or misdemeanor in office, it is still in the power of the Legislature to look beyond the record of acquittal, and if they believe him guilty, a false verdict in his favor, or one obtained by mistake, cannot save his office, although it may be conclusive so far as to save his person from punishment. On the other hand, it is not necessary that the Legislature should believe the officer guilty of either one offence or the other to justify a removal. It is enough, that in their opinion the interests of the community require a change. If an officer be intellectually incompetent; if from intemperate habits, or from age and infirmity of body or mind, he has become unable to discharge the duties of the office to the satisfaction of the community, he ought to retire to the walks of private life, and leave the station to be filled by one better able to discharge its duties. If, on the other hand, he is believed to be competent, but from a love of gain, a want of temper and decorum, or any other cause, he discharges the duties of the office in such a manner as to excite general and extensive doubts of the purity of his motives, and great discontent among the people, it is ample cause of removal."

This able and conclusive report was adopted by the house of representatives, and in the senate; an equally strong report in another case, which is understood to have been drawn up by the Hon. Jesse Miller, the present secretary of state of Pennsylvania, was adopted, containing the same sound constitutional doctrines upon this important subject.

In 1833, Mr. Lewis was appointed Attorney-General of Pennsylvania. The office was spontaneously conferred upon him by Governor Wolf, and was a free tribute to the high reputation he already enjoyed as a lawyer, as well as a legislator. He preceded the present distinguished Vice President of the United States, George M. Dallas, in this important trust; and the energy and great ability he exhibited as attorney-general, were such as to command the highest commendation. From this time henceforth he must be classed with the first legal talent of the country. In this capacity, too, Mr. Lewis used all his influence to promote harmony between the state and national administrations, while others around him were using their influence to disturb it. And it may, with.strict truth and propriety be said, that he did as much at that time to sustain Jackson as any man in Pennsylvania, while it is also known that that venerated President appreciated his services, and was grateful for them-spontaneous and unselfish as they were known to him to have been. As attorney-general, Mr. Lewis would never take any

fees for public prosecutions, leaving these to his deputies in every instance, considering this course as most in accordance with the dignity of the office.

In the fall of 1833 Mr. Lewis resigned the office of attorney-general, on receiving the appointment of president-judge of the eighth judicial district of Pennsylvania, composed of the counties of Northumberland, Lycoming, Union and Columbia—a station once occupied by the celebrated Judge Cooper, of South Carolina. Judge Lewis continued in the discharge of his duties as judge of this district until about two years since, when he was appointed president-judge of the 2nd judicial district, composed of the city and county of Lancaster, which responsible trust he now holds. The city of Lancaster is the residence of Hon. James Buchanan, our present distinguished Secretary of State. The county of Lancaster is one of the largest and wealthiest in the United States. With a population about equal to that of the State of Arkansas, or Rhode Island, and greater than that of Delaware, it may readily be imagined that the presidency of such a judicial district is no sinecure. The unlimited civil and criminal jurisdiction of the courts over which Judge Lewis presides-the immense amount of property constantly passing under adjudication in the settlement and distribution of estates of decedents, and the numerous and intricate questions which arise in the united authority of law and equity, constantly call for the exercise of the highest efforts of the mind.

In addition to his labors on the bench, Judge Lewis also discharges the duties of professor of law and medical jurisprudence in Franklin College, Lancaster, one of the oldest endowed institutions of learning in the state; and edits, in connection with those distinguished lawyers, Messrs. Trowbat and McCandless, a Law Journal, published under their united auspices. Mr. Lewis' forensic reputation stood very high in northern Pennsylvania during the period of his practice at the bar. His success in the state courts led to his early appointment as chief law officer of the commonwealth. But his attention was not wholly confined to the state courts. He had a principal agency in procuring the establishment of the U. S. District Court at Williamsport, Pennsylvania, and when at the bar had an extensive practice in that court, and was eminently successful. He is familiar with the practice in the United States courts, as the following incident may serve to illustrate: A number of years ago a fugitive slave was rescued from the possession of his owner, in the town of Dannville, Pennsylvania, through the instrumentality of a writ of homine replegiando. The Hon. David Petriken (who subsequently acquired in Congress the cognomen of "previous question,") was the prothonotary who issued the writ. An action of tres

pass, and separate actions for the penalty of five hundred dollars, under the act of Congress of February 12, 1793, were brought against him, and each of the persons engaged in the issuing and service of the writ; and after the collection of several penalties, with costs from some of the most responsible of the parties, Mr. George Sweeny, an editor of a public journal, was lodged in jail for the penalty recovered against him for the same rescue. So high was Ellis Lewis' reputation for abilities, and a knowledge of the practice in the United States Court, that Mr. Sweeny supposed he could extricate him, even after his other counsel had failed, and after judgment had been recovered against him; and he accordingly sent a distance of nearly one hundred miles to engage his professional services in his behalf. His expectations were not disappointed. In an argument of surpassing eloquence and power, which the public journals of the day noticed as having won golden opinions for its author, it was clearly demonstrated that there was a distinction between penalties imposed as a punishment, to be recovered by any one who may sue for them, and those given by statute to the party aggrieved. In the

former case, each individual engaged in the illegal act, is liable to the full penalty. In the latter, but one penalty can be recovered for one illegal act, although many might be engaged in it. Mr. Lewis also showed that the rule in the United States Court, under the act of Congress, differed from that which prevailed in the state courts, with respect to the costs, and that where the plaintiff had his election to bring joint or several suits, and elected to bring several suits, he could only recover costs in one of them. The result of these doctrines was the liberation of the imprisoned editor from his unjust and illegal confinement, to the great joy of his family and friends.

Judge Lewis was first raised to the bench about twelve years ago, and his judicial career has been a highly distinguished one. This is not the proper place for an extended notice of his labors as a jurist, though such a review would be interesting and instructive. A critical analysis of the constitution of his mind, would demonstrate his rare adaptation for the study and advancement of philosophical jurisprudence, whilst an intimate acquaintance with the rich stores of his learning, would prove that nature's prodigality had not deterred him from superadding to her gifts a perfect acquaintance with the leading principles and accredited expounders of his noble profession; that his mind was "thoroughly imbued with legal lore, and expanded and adorned by the most liberal and diversified studies." One trait in his character is too honorable to be here overlooked. Himself emphatically one of the people-sprung from their midst, and sympathising with their feelings and wants-Ellis Lewis has ever been the fast friend of the people. Whether we scan his actions as advocate, legislator or judge, the result is the same. We behold him the same fearless and able defender of the rights and interests of the masses. In this he seems to have been bent on loyalty to the stern teachings of his own early struggles, and to have kept constantly before him, as worthy models, those great republican lawyers of the English commonwealth, and of our own colonial and revolutionary era, who were on all occasions the most devoted, as their great intellects and better training constituted them the most able friends of liberty.

Many of Judge Lewis' more important decisions have elicited the marked approbation of the bench and the bar, and been favorably noticed in the law journals and treatises of this country, as well as in those published abroad; and his opinions generally, are held in high estimation, and are of extensive repute. On questions of medical jurisprudence, particularly, he has acquired reputation which is noticed with commendation in Beck's Medical Jurisprudence, and elsewhere. Doctor Beck, in his standard work, speaks of Judge Lewis' opinions and charge, on the trial of Earls for murder by poison, as containing the highest evidence of the advanced state of the science in this country. The American Journal of the Medical Sciences, for October, 1846, contains two highly important decisions of Judge Lewis on this branch of jurisprudence, communicated with the approbation of Professor W. L. Atlee, of Philadelphia, himself of the highest authority on such subjects.

The decision against clerical interference with a parent's right to educate his child, has gained a celebrity for its author, which has extended not only over the Union, but beyond the Atlantic. We speak of the decision in the celebrated case of the Commonwealth versus Armstrong. It is reported in the January number of the Boston Law Reporter, with the letter of Chancellor Kent in its support, and the editor's notice of approbation; and it is also cited as authority by Kent in his Commentaries. We remember to have seen published a letter from Judge Grier, now of the Supreme Court of the United States, expressing, in the strongest terms, his approbation of Judge Lewis' opinion; and it has also elicited an elaborate letter on the ame side, from the eminent Dr. Wayland.

The decision in the case of the Lancaster Savings Institution against Reigart, has also attracted much attention, and its appearance was greeted with lively satisfaction, particularly by the press, in the chief cities of the Union. The decision was, that the state Stay Law was unconstitutional; and that decision, although against the state Supreme Court, was fully sustained by repeated decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.

The decision in the case of Spring versus Caul, that a survey cannot be impeached after the lapse of twenty years after its return into the land of fice, quieted more land titles in Pennsylvania than any other decision ever made, and did more to advance the credit and property of the state than any other decision. It had previously been the common practice to allow a younger survey to defeat the title of an older one, if the surveyor of the state failed to mark the trees on the ground. This made all titles insecure. A journal, published in Pottsville, in speaking of the prosperity of the coal regions of Pennsylvania, ascribed their unequalled prosperity to the effect of that decision, in settling the titles, and in giving confidence to the capitalists to make investments.

Notwithstanding the observations, by Mr. Justice Story, in the case of Prigg versus The Commonwealth, Judge Lewis has constantly enforced the statute of Pennsylvania relative to surrendering fugitives from servitude, holding that the sovereign states are perfectly competent to legislate on the subject, so long as their enactments do not impair the rights of the slaveholder, or interfere with the remedies provided by the constitution and laws of the Union. This construction is believed to be best calculated to preserve the peace of society, protect the free citizen from injury, and secure to the slave-holder his rights. If this construction had prevailed on a recent occasion in New-York, the interests of an innocent captain of a vessel, and the constitutional rights of the owner of the slave, would both have been protected.

In the case of Beam versus The Methodist Episcopal Church, Judge Lewis decided that a grave-yard, from the moment it was dedicated to the purposes of sepulture, was no longer subject to sale by the sheriff.

If the foregoing be but a meagre sketch of Judge Lewis' juridical labors, it is not owing to any paucity of materials; for it has fallen to his lot to decide upon a great variety of interesting and important points of law and subjects of litigation; and his written opinions will compare with those of any judge in the country, so far as relates to cogency of reasoning, extent of learning, and justness and liberality of conclusion. But that this account of his performances as a jurist is not more amply satisfactory, is owing to the difficulty of selection, and the necessarily circumscribed limits of the present article.

In 1837, Judge Lewis was invited by the then Secretary of War, Mr. Poinsett, to visit the U. S. Military Academy at West Point, as one of the annual board; and the report which, as chairman of the committee on the department of moral, religious and political instruction, he drew up, was remarkable for the ability with which those subjects were treated. The following extracts from that report are not without great interest at the present time, and for that reason, as well as on account of their innate excellence, are incorporated in this sketch:

"The examination on the subject of constitutional law, was also creditable to the parties concerned, considering the multifarious duties assigned to the Professor, and the limited time allotted by the regulations of the Academy to this study. The progress and improvement of the cadets, in this important branch of their education, was not so great as, under other circumstances, might have been expected. According to the distribution of time, under the present regulations of the Academy,

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science, and one hour each day for recitations in the sciences. By the regulations adopted by the proper authority, ethics is enumerated as one of the branches of knowledge required to be taught, as comprising a complete course of education at the Military Academy. By the same regulations it is declared that ethics will include moral philosophy, and the elements of national and political law.' Of the ethical instruction and improvement, your committee have already spoken as entirely satisfactory. It is regretted that, for the reasons already stated, the committee cannot express themselves entirely satisfied with the proficiency of those examined on constitutional law; while the subject of national law is, for the same reason, entirely omitted in the present course of studies. The regulations of the army, as applicable to this institution, expressly require that, in addition to a course of practical military instruction' and engineering,' the science of war' shall be taught. This branch of education may be well understood to extend, not only to those principles of the law military which regulate the rights and duties of the officer and the soldier, but to the fundamental doctrines of international law, which, having been adopted as the rules of action by all civilized nations, regulate their mode of warfare, and distinguish it from the cruel butcheries of the savage. War, under any circumstances, is one of the greatest calamities which can befall a nation. If it must exist, it is surely the duty of every people to mitigate its evils, by requiring that it shall be conducted according to the law of arms among civilized nations. Every cadet is intended to be qualified for command; and every commander may, in the ordinary prosecution of his duty, be placed in a situation where ignorance of international law would be an unpardonable disqualification for the discharge of his military duty. This disqualification might betray him into acts which would involve his country in a war, and tarnish the laurels won by his bravery. The value of this branch of education is acknowledged in civil pursuits; in military life, it appears to the committee to be of still greater importance; and that it should receive its due attention in this institution, cannot be too strongly urged upon the War Department.

"From what has already been said, it will appear that, in the opinion of your committee, the principles of military law were intended, by the regulations, to be taught at this Academy. But these, also, with the exception of the army regulafions, зeem to receive no attention whatever. A knowledge of the rights and duties incidental to military life, the powers of military tribunals for the trial of offences, and the principles governing the trial, may do more than anything else to secure to the officer the obedience due to his station, and at the same time to protect the soldier from any unauthorized acts of violence and oppression. This must be the case where discipline and subordination, necessarily rigid. are sought to be enforced over individuals possessed of a high degree of intelligence and reason. Nothing will so readily secure the assent of such minds, as a knowledge of the nature, extent, and just foundation of the authority requiring their obedience. This subject has been brought forcibly to the notice of your committee, by the opportunity which they embraced of attending the court martial which has recently been sitting at this institution, for the trial of two of the cadets, for offences against the regulations of the Academy. Witnesses were called upon to give evidence, who claimed to be excused from answering some of the questions put to them, upon the ground that they could not do so without criminating themselves, and thereby subjecting themselves to the punishment sought to be inflicted upon the accused. This privilege was not allowed, and the reason assigned was, that the witness was not himself upon trial, and, therefore could not criminate himself! If this privilege is to be denied to every witness, upon the ground that he is not himself upon trial, it can never be allowed to any witness, because no witness is ever upon trial at the same time and in the same cause in which he is giving his evidence. If a witness voluntarily consents to cover himself with infamy, upon a promise of pardon, for the purpose of convicting a companion in guilt, it is his privilege to do so. But to place him, against his consent and remonstrance, in a condition in which he must subject himself to punishment and reproach on the one side, or to the guilt of perjury on the other, is leading him into such powerful temptation to falsify, as ought not to receive favor anywhere; and more particularly, in an institution designed to establish the morals, as well as enlighten the minds, of the youth under its instruction. These observations are not designed to cast the slightest censure upon the respectable officers of the courts martial. These gentlemen, including the accomplished Judge Advoente, are highly intelligent, and conducted the trial, not only with strict impartiality.