THE VETO POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The Federal Constitution has established, as far as written language can do so, a boundary line between the sovereignty of the States and the sovereignty of the United States; the line where State sovereignty ends, and where federal sovereignty begins. As along that line it was foreseen, because language is not perfect, and man is finite-doubtful questions might arise between them, which might lead to conflicts of force to be decided by arms, it established,

A supreme court, as the appellate tribunal of last resort to decide those doubtful questions in all cases at law or in equity arising under the constitution, laws and treaties made under its authority.

That tribunal holds the balance, and decides when a law made by the federal government invades the rights reserved to the States, and when a law made by the States invades the sovereignty of the United States.

That tribunal holds the greater veto or tribunitian power in our system-greater than that of the president. He has power to require a law to be passed by two-thirds of each house of congress. That court has power to veto a law if passed by both houses unanimously. It vetoes the laws of the federal legislature not authorized by the constitution, and it vetoes laws made by State legislatures when they encroach upon the domain of national sovereignty. It does this whenever a case is presented at law or in equity for decision in regular form.

As I have already said,

NO OTHER JUDICIAL TRIBUNAL OF THE WORLD EVER HELD SUCH

A VETO POWER.

In the Roman republic ten tribunes were annually chosen. Dressed in simple garb, with no warlike emblems about them, their appearance was modest and humble, but their persons were sacred and inviolable. Their force was negative rather than positive. It was suited rather to defend than to assail— rather for opposition than for action. "They were instituted to defend the oppressed; to pardon offenses, to arraign the enemies of the people; and when they judged it necessary, to stop by a single word the whole machinery of government." (1 Gibbon, 80.) That word was veto.

They held office for a single year, but during that time they held the pardoning power; they constituted in their day the committee of investigation and of impeachment; and they exercised that great power of the veto, which is necessary to be somewhere in every great republic-a power not to make aggressions, but to resist them; a power, not to attack, but to defend; a shield, but not a sword.

Under our complex system, where two forces or tendencies are ever at work, one to draw all powers to the federal sovereignty, and the other to draw all powers to the State, it is absolutely essential to its preservation that such a tribunal should exist; and to our supreme court is confided the power to decide all cases arising under the constitution in judicial form; and from its decision in the case before it, there is and can be no appeal. It is final in that case, whether in favor of federal or State authority. Do not understand me to say that its decision is always right. That would assume the judges to be more than men. But from its constitution that tribunal is more likely to be right than any other we could select. In ninety-nine cases in a hundred its decisions are right.

But in case it decides wrong, it is better even then to have that decision final, as to the parties in that case, than to leave the matter undecided, and, for the want of such a tribunal, to leave things to float, it may be into a conflict of force, which might end in civil war.

Do not understand me, either, as saying that the decision

of that court, in any case, prevents the same question from being raised and discussed in another case; or, that if that tribunal becomes satisfied a former decision was erroneous, it has no power to reverse it in another case. This, in fact, does occur, sometimes, in that tribunal; though, from its wisdom, prudence and deliberation, it occurs very seldom.

IT IS THE DUTY OF THAT COURT

to guard and defend the reserved rights of the States, as much as it is to assert the rights and authority of the Union. Its greatest office and duty is to hold an even balance between them, leaning, in doubtful cases, in favor of the States; and, by their decisions, to annul all laws, orders and decisions made under State authority in conflict with the constitution; and, also, while enforcing constitutional laws and orders made under federal authority to annul and veto all in conflict with the same constitution; and thus to mark and to establish the boundary line between independent and distinct, but united sovereignties, and by peaceful arbitrament to redress and to restrain the invasion of either.

It is no part of my purpose to point out that line, or boundary; to show what powers have been delegated to the federal government, and what have been reserved to the States; to show how much of sovereignty belongs to the United States, and how much of sovereignty is reserved to the States.

It has been my purpose rather to show that each is sovereign; but neither is absolute. Both are limited sovereignties.

The truth is our great republic is neither a confederacy, nor a centralized despotism, but it is something far better than either, it is a federative republic; the only form of government under which a nation may become great among the powers of the earth-continental if you please-and at the same time, preserve republican or self-government by the people.

It will be observed that these views do not accord with the views of those who maintain that all sovereignty belongs to the United States, and that the States have no reserved rights which the federal government is bound to respect; nor do they accord with the views of those who maintain that all

sovereignty belongs to the States, and that the federal government has no sovereignty, rights or powers which the State is bound to respect, and which it cannot at its own sovereign will and pleasure refuse to obey.

These views are as far removed from the one extreme as from the other. They are as much opposed to the doctrine of centralism as to the doctrine of secession. The one leads to empire, the other to disunion.

This is their

Extremes often meet. The reasoning of the centralist and that of the secessionist is, at bottom, the same. syllogism:

The centralist says: There can be but one sovereignty over one people, and that must be absolute. It cannot be limited or divided. I am for the Union, therefore in the name of the Union, and for the sake of the Union, I demand all sovereignty for the federal government.

The secessionist says: I agree with the centralist; there can be but one sovereignty over one people and that must be absolute. It cannot be limited or divided. The liberties of the people cannot be maintained without republican or self-government by the people in every State. Therefore, in the name of liberty and for the sake of liberty, I demand all sovereignty for the State. Without that no liberty is possible.

THE FAULT OF THIS REASONING OF THE CENTRALIST

and secessionist is the same, viz.: That sovereignty cannot be divided, bounded or limited by a written constitution. There can be no such thing as a balance or equilibrium of forces established for civilized man.

The true and fundamental theory of our system is that the United States is clothed with national, but limited sovereignty to make us one people and one power among the nations, and to maintain free trade and commerce among the States, while the States hold distinct and independent sovereignty as to all other political powers not committed to the federal government, nor prohibited to the States.

The syllogism upon which its reasoning is based is this: The sovereignty over the same people may be divided, a portion be committed to the federal government, under the con

stitution, and the remainder be reserved to the States by the same constitution. We demand sovereignty for the United States to preserve union and peace at home, and to maintain our nationality abroad. We demand, also, the sovereign right of the people of each State to a republican form of government in order to secure the liberties of the people. We demand union and liberty. We maintain therefore, that both the union of the States and the independence of the States are secured under the constitution.

Not only Madison, whose wise counsels did so much to form the constitution, but Hamilton, whom the modern centralists profess to follow, in one of his ablest papers supported this theory. "The State governments," said he, "would clearly retain, after adopting the constitution, all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not by that act delegated to the United States." Hamilton and Madison differed, it is true, as to the powers delegated and reserved, but they never doubted that, as to the powers delegated, the federal government was sovereign; and, as to the powers reserved, that the States still remained sovereign under the constitution.

I have thus, upon this great and fundamental question of constitutional law, endeavored to show that the reasoning of the centralist is as false as that of the secessionist. While that

of the secessionist would destroy our Union under the constitution, and make it a mere rope of sand, that of the centralist would destroy the rights of the States, reserved by it, and with them, the liberties of the people. To render these conclusions more satisfactory to the professional mind, I will offer a few cases decided by the supreme court of the United States; by that tribunal which was created to speak, and to speak with authority on this question.

We shall find, as we look into them, that the balance of power between national and State sovereignty has been steadily held by the supreme court on many occasions.

THE UNIFORMITY OF ITS DECISIONS

for three-fourths of a century is unbroken. According to these decisions the United States are not subordinate, but sovereign as to all the powers which are delegated by the con