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two remaining defendants is unknown; but that neither are citizens of the state of Illinois.

We think the theory on which a removal is sought is erroneous, and that the cause is not removable, for the following reason: It does not appear to us that there are several controversies involved in the suit, one of which is wholly between citizens of different states, and may be fully determined as between them without the presence of the other defendants. In our view of the case, there is but a single controversy; and, that being so, the case is clearly not removable under the third clause of section 2 of the act of March 3, 1887. Barney v. Latham, 103 U. S. 205; Hyde v. Ruble, 104 U. S. 407; Fraser v. Jennison, 106 U. S. 191, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 171; Ayres v. Wiswall, 112 U. S. 187, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90; Railroad v. Wilson, 114 U. S. 60, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 738; Telegraph Co. v. Brown, 32 Fed. Rep. 337. The bill in this case charges, in substance, that the plaintiff and the four individual defendants were copartners, and as such owned certain mining property; that two of the partners (Messrs. Horner and Cornell) were deputed to sell the property, and succeeded in making a sale to the Montrose Placer Mining Company. The bill alleges that defendant Horner, on the consummation of the sale, received for the ⚫ property certain money, and also 125,000 shares of stock in the purchasing company, but that he has failed to account to plaintiff and one of the other partners, who is made a defendant, for their just proportion of the money and stock so received. The bill also alleges that the Montrose Mining Company still owes about $10,000 of the purchase price. The bill thereupon prays that Horner may be compelled to account for what was received for the mine, and for a general accounting as between the partners; that the stock which Horner received on the sale of the mine may be decreed to belong to the partnership, and may be sold, and the proceeds divided; and that, inasmuch as Horner is insolvent, and has no property besides the stock, and is threatening to sell and dispose of the same, that he be enjoined from so doing, and that the Montrose Mining Company be enjoined from permitting transfers of the stock on its books pending this suit. There is also a prayer that a receiver be appointed to take possession of the stock in controversy, and all other partnership assets, including the $10,000 said to be due to the partnership from the Montrose Mining Company. We think that in all of these averments there is but a single controversy or cause of action disclosed; that it is substantially a bill to have certain property adjudged to be partnership property, and to obtain a decree liquidating the affairs of the partnership. It does not appear that, in addition to the suit to discover firm assets and wind up the partnership affairs, there is another and separate controversy involved between the mining company on the one hand and the plaintiff and his copartners on the other. The mining company may or may not admit that it owes the firm a balance of $10,000 on account of its purchase of the mine. The bill does not aver that there is any controversy on that point; but, whether there is or is not such a controversy, it cannot properly be tried and determined in this action. In the nature of things, that is an issue when it arises, that must be settled by a

suit at law, brought by a receiver of the firm, or by the partners themselves, and such suit may or may not be removable, according to the citizenship of the parties litigant as it may then appear. It is sufficient to say that a controversy of that nature is not involved in this action, and that the only apparent object of making the mining company a party defendant to this bill was to obtain an injunction against it, restraining it from permitting transfers of the stock in dispute, during the pendency of the litigation between the plaintiff and his copartners as to its ownership. We think it clear that the mere fact that the bill shows that in a certain event the plaintiff and his copartners may have a right of action at law against the mining company, (which right of action, however, is not properly cognizable in this suit,) does not entitle the corporation to remove the cause to this court as one involving a separable controversy. The motion to remand is accordingly sustained.

BREWER, J., concurs.

ROBB et al. v. Vos et al.

(Circuit Court, S. D. Ohio, W. D. August 28, 1888.)

1. EQUITY-JURISDICTION-INADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW.

In an action against life-tenants. to subject their interest to the claims of creditors, an unauthorized and fraudulent appearance was entered for the reversioners, and, without their knowledge or consent, a decree was filed that the land be sold divested of their interest. The attorney fraudulently appearing for them converted the proceeds. Held, that the reversioners had no adequate remedy at law, and that equity had jurisdiction to relieve against the fraud.

2. FEDERAL COURTS-JURISDICTION-JUDGMENT OF STATE COURTS.

Federal courts have jurisdiction to relieve against a title fraudulently obtained by proceedings in a state court by enjoining the assertion of the fraudulent title.

In Equity.

This was a bill in equity by James Hampton Robb and Charles E. Strong against August Vos, William Stix, and Moritz Loth to enjoin the defendants from asserting a fraudulent title to real estate.

Harmon, Colston, Goldsmith & Hoadly, for plaintiffs.

A. B. Huston and Wilby & Wald, for defendants.

HAMMOND, J. The demurrer in this case must be overruled. As to the jurisdiction of the court, it is very clear that it cannot be defeated on the ground that the purpose of the bill is to set aside, as if upon error or appeal or some such review, the decrees of a state court for irregularities or the like, nor upon any equitable consideration for which a court of competent jurisdiction might grant a new trial as at law for some fraud, accident, or mistake entitling a party to such relief. It is not that kind

of a bill, but is one attacking the title of the defendants to certain real. estate, which it is alleged they have procured by a fraudulent judicial proceeding. The relief asked would leave the proceedings of the state court intact as judicial proceedings, and it is not necessary in granting effective relief to interfere with them in the sense of setting aside the decrees by directing that they should be vacated or corrected in whole or in part, as under some circumstances a state court of equity might do, if essential to be done, but as to which this court could not act upon the records of a state court. All that need be done is to enjoin the defendants from asserting their alleged fraudulent title against the paramount title of the plaintiffs, because of the alleged frauds in procuring that title. This is just as effective as vacating the decree could be, but yet it is not, technically, vacating the decree in the sense already mentioned. That this jurisdiction exists to prevent the parties from relying on a fraudulent title procured by judicial proceedings, in whatever court they may have been taken, is beyond question. A state court of equity could so act as to titles procured through fraudulent proceedings in a federal court, and so may the federal courts as to those acquired in the state courts. If the parties and property were in a foreign court, the relief would also be available. Says Mr. Justice BRADLEY, in Johnson v. Waters, 111 U. S. 640, 667, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 619:

"The court of chancery is always open to hear complaints against fraud, whether committed in pais or in or by means of judicial proceedings. In such cases the court does not act as a court of review, nor does it inquire into any irregularities or errors of proceeding in another court, but it will scrutinize the conduct of the parties, and, if it finds that they have been guilty of fraud in obtaining a judgment or decree, it will deprive them of the benefit of it, and of any inequitable advantage which they have derived under it."

Nor is the ground of demurrer well taken that the court has no jurisdiction, because the plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law. Briefly, the bill alleges that the plaintiffs were the owners of certain valuable real estate which was in possession of certain tenants under a lease for the life of two persons for whom the plaintiffs are trustees, with peculiar covenants, not necessary to here mention. Those tenants for the life of another being involved, their judgment creditors sought by the judicial proceedings aforesaid to subject their interest in the lands to their debts, and had the right to do this. But one Kebbler, an attorney at law, conceived the scheme of using those proceedings to divest the plaintiffs (the trustees) of their interest in the land by its sale, he embezzling the proceeds, which he did. These trustees were parties to the record; and Kebbler, without their knowledge or consent, made an unauthorized and fraudulent appearance, filed a cross-bill for them, and consented to the sale of the real estate, divested of their interest; he pocketing the money. He had no authority, express or implied, to appear for them, and they never heard of the transaction until after the sale. The defendants were the purchasers, and this bill seeks to avoid the title so acquired.

It is suggested that the transaction was really a mortgage for investment of funds, and not a lease, but this is immaterial here. Whatever the rela

tion, there is no adequate remedy at law. A suit for the rent not paid, and the right to which is denied, if available at law by proof of the facts constituting the fraud, would leave the muniment of title still outstanding, and always threatening; and the process of collecting the rent by suit might be, and would probably have to be, repeated at every rent-day, while witnesses might die and proof be destroyed. So of ejectment, if that be possible in the complications of the case. The muniments of title would still be outstanding and uncanceled. Moreover, the purchasers, being entitled to the interest of the original tenants for life of the cestuis que vie, it may be doubtful if ejectment would lie as a trial of title. But if it did, no such action would afford the adequate and plenary relief asked by this bill. It is not sufficient that there is a remedy at law,-that remedy must be full, complete, and adequate; and, under the peculiarities of this case, it clearly is not. It is not necessary to consider whether on the allegation of the bill it appears that the defendants are innocent purchasers, or have any other defense which may be available; such, for example, as that the action of Kebbler was binding on the plaintiffs, and that their remedy is against him. If the defendants had such knowledge, actual or constructive, of this fraud as would protect the plaintiffs from their title, they might recover on this bill, possibly, notwithstanding Kebbler's authority to bind them. All these matters are more properly cognizable on the issues made by answer or plea. The bill is good on it face, substantially. Demurrer overruled.

FARGUSON et al. v. JOHNSTON et al.

(District Court, N. D. Mississippi. June Term, 1888.)

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FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES MORTGAGE DEED ABSOLUTE WITHHOLDING AGREEMENT TO RECONVEY FROM RECORD.

A deed to land, absolute on its face, duly acknowledged and recorded, for the consideration of $2,000 in cash paid, expressed in the deed, when it was really a security for a past indebtedness of $400, and future advances, in all to the amount of $2,000, and the grantee at the same time gave to the grantor his obligation to reconvey the land upon the payment of the amount, with the understanding that the obligation to reconvey was not to be recorded or made known for the purpose of preventing injury to the credit of the grantor, and to prevent his property from being attached, held fraudulent and void as to the then existing creditors of the grantor.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

In Equity. Hearing on pleadings and proofs.
E. Mayes, for complainant.

Sullivan & Whitfield, for defendants.

HILL, J. This cause is submitted upon bill, amended bill, answers, exhibits, and proofs, from which the following facts appear: Complainants were commission merchants, in the city of Memphis, Tenn.; and

defendant H. M. Johnston was a country merchant, doing a small retail business in the town of Courtland, Miss., in the early part of 1885, and was indebted to complainants for advances theretofore made in the sum of four to five hundred dollars, and applied to complainants for further advances to enable him to continue his business for that year, which complainants declined to furnish unless secured, when, after negotiations had commenced between them, it was agreed that Johnston should, to secure the payment of that already due, and for further advances to be made, execute to said Farguson a deed in fee-simple, absolute on its face, to the tract of land described in the bill, and to receive from said Farguson his obligation to reconvey the land to Johnston upon the payment of the amount that might thereafter remain due, upon six-months' notice of a demand of payment. The business was done, and the transactions were had, by Johnston under the name and style of H. M. Johnston & Co., though he was the only party interested. To carry out this agreement, Johnston and his wife, Emma O. Johnston, on the 10th day of March, 1885, or bearing that date, executed a deed of conveyance to said land to said Farguson for the expressed consideration of $2,000 cash in hand then paid, which deed was acknowledged on the 14th day of the same month, and filed for record in the proper office on the 16th of March, 1885. From a letter bearing date the 5th of March, 1885, written by Johnston to complainants, and received by them, as appears from a letter written by complainants bearing date March 7th, the deed and note were inclosed by Johnston at Courtland, Miss., to complainants in Memphis. How the deed was sent before the date of its execution is not explained. To carry out the arrangement, H. M. Johnston, in the name and style of H. M. Johnston & Co., signed and sent or delivered to complainants his note, which is as follows:

"COURTLAND, MISS., Feby. 19th, 1885. "On 1st Jan., 1886, we promise to pay to J. T. Farguson & Co. two thousand dollars, for value received, bearing interest at ten per cent. per annum from maturity, and payable at their office in Memphis, Tenn. "H. M. JOHNSTON & CO."

[Signed]

The presumption is that the note was written on the day it bears date; but at what particular time it was signed and delivered, does not satisfactorily appear. In further carrying out the agreement entered into, said Farguson executed and delivered to H. M. Johnston the written agreement as follows:

"MEMPHIS, TENN., March 28, '86.

"H. M. Johnston, and wife, Emma O. Johnston, conveyed to me by deed dated March 10, 1885, the north-east quarter of section nine, township ten, range seven, in the Second court district of Panola county, Miss., for the stated consideration of two thousand dollars. This deed was made to secure the firm of J. T. Farguson & Co., of Memphis, Tenn., in any amounts that are now or may hereafter be due the said firm of T. J. Farguson & Co. by H. M. Johnston, or by H. M. Johnston & Co.; and I now agree and bind myself to reconvey to said H. M. Johnston, and his wife, Emma O. Johnston, the above-described lands whenever requested by them to do so, provided all of the indebtedness of the said H. M. Johnston & Co. has been paid, with in

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