him, was a false and forged document, which he had never signed, and never heard of until within 60 days then past. When the defendant, in the circuit court, upon the overruling of her demurrer, was called upon to answer, she set up as a plea in abatement to that suit the pendency of the action in the superior court of the city and county of San Francisco, upon the theory that, as that action, though subsequently commenced, was founded upon the assumed validity of the alleged marriage contract, and involved a determination of that question, and the action, after being removed to the federal court, had been remanded back to the state court by stipulation of parties, and was then on trial, the circuit court of the United States ought to stay its proceedings in the original suit until the state court had expressed its opinion in reference to the validity of the contract in question, and then accept its judgment as conclusive.

The plea also set up that the circuit court of the United States had no jurisdiction of the case, on the ground that the plaintiff was, and had been for more than three years, a resident and citizen of California. The plaintiff traversed both pleas, and the court held both to be bad, the first because the two suits were not identical, but for different objects, -the one proceeding upon an assumed valid contract, and asking for a divorce and a division of the community property, and the other seeking a cancellation of the contract for alleged forgery, and because the two suits were pending in courts of different jurisdiction. Stanton v. Embrey,

93 U. S. 548; Gordon v. Gilfoil, 99 U. S. 169, 178. The second plea as to the citizenship of Sharon was held to be false, no testimony impeaching the allegations of the complaint in that respect having been offered. 10 Sawy. 394, 22 Fed. Rep. 28. These pleas having been overruled, the defendant was allowed 30 days to answer to the merits, and accordingly, on the 30th day of December, 1884, she filed such answer. In the mean time, subsequent to the disposition of the special pleas of the defendant, the superior court of the city and county of San Francisco had decided the case before it, holding the said declaration or contract of marriage to be a genuine and valid instrument, by virtue of which the parties thereto had become husband and wife. In her answer, therefore, the defendant not only denied the several allegations of the complaint as to the citizenship of the plaintiff, as to the plaintiff's never having been the husband of any other person than Maria Ann Sharon, and as to her being an unmarried woman, and that her "claims were made for any other purpose but that of obtaining the recognition and support justly due" to her as wife of the plaintiff, but set up as a separate defense the action of the superior court of the city and county of San Francisco, and its judgment that the said alleged declaration of marriage was a genuine instrument by which the parties were made husband and wife. A supplemental answer averred that the state court had filed its decree and findings, reaffirming its adjudication as to the genuineness. of that instrument. One of its findings set forth the alleged marriage contract, and added, "which was the only written declaration, contract, or agreement of marriage ever entered into between said parties; and at

the time of signing said declaration plaintiff and defendant mutually agreed to take each other as, and henceforth to be to each other, husband and wife." To these answers replications were filed, whereupon proofs were taken by the parties, which occupied several months. On the 29th day of September, 1885, the cause was submitted on the pleadings and proofs, after elaborate arguments of counsel. While it was pending before the court, undecided, and on November 13, 1885, the plaintiff, William Sharon, died. The decree, when rendered, was therefore entered as of the day when the cause was submitted, in accordance with the usual practice in such cases. By that decree it was ordered and adjudged that the alleged declaration of marriage was not, nor was any part thereof, signed or executed on said 25th day of August, A. D. 1880, or at any time, by the plaintiff, William Sharon; that it was not his. declaration, contract, agreement, or other instrument; but was a false, counterfeited, fabricated, forged, and fraudulent instrument, and as such was null and void; and that the said instrument, within 20 days after notice of the decree to the defendant, or to her solicitors, should be delivered by her to, and deposited with, the clerk of this court, to be indorsed, "Canceled;" and that upon such delivery the clerk should write across the same, "Canceled," by virtue of this decree, and sign his name, and affix thereto the seal of this court; and that the document should thereafter remain in the custody of the clerk, subject to the further order of the court. The decree concluded as follows: "And it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the respondent herein, Sarah Althea Hill, her heirs, assigns, executors, administrators, and all persons claiming any interest thereunder by or through said respondent, and her and their agents and attorneys, be, and they and each and all of them are, hereby perpetually enjoined from alleging the genuineness or the validity of said instrument, and from making any use of the same, in evidence or otherwise, to support any right claimed under it, or making any claim, or setting up any right, interest, or claim of any kind, under or by virtue of said instrument or declaration of marriage, either as wife of complainant, or for any interest in property or right of any kind or nature against said complainant, his heirs, executors, administrators, or successors in interest, and that complainant recover his costs of suit." William Sharon left a last will and testament, in which he named his son, Frederick W. Sharon, and his son-in-law, Francis G. Newlands, as executors. Newlands declined to act, and to Frederick W. Sharon, as sole executor, letters testamentary were issued. As such executor he, on March 12, 1888, filed one of the bills, the titles of which are given above, to have the suit revived in his favor as such executor, so that proceedings may be had for the enforcement of the decree. He alleges that the suit and proceedings under the decree have abated by the death of Sharon; that the alleged marriage contract, adjudged to be a forgery, has not been surrendered for cancellation, as ordered by the decree, and he fears that the said defendant will claim and seek to enforce property rights, as the wife of William Sharon, by virtue of that written declaration of marriage, under the decree of another court, (the superior court

of the city and county of San Francisco,) essentially founded thereon, which, as he is advised, is wholly subject and subordinate to the decree of this court, contrary to the true intent, meaning, and spirit of the perpetual injunction ordered, and in violation thereof. He alleges the marriage of the defendant with David S. Terry, who is joined as a defendant with her, and prays the process of the court to the end that the said suit and proceedings therein may stand revived in his favor, and be in the same condition and plight in which they were at the time of the abatement. On the 4th of November, 1885, William Sharon executed a deed of his property, real and personal, to his son-in-law, Francis G. Newlands, and his son, Frederick W. Sharon, subject to various trusts. Without specifying the details of the said trusts it may be stated generally that they are designed to secure for some years the protection and management of the property, which is of great value, amounting to several millions of dollars, and its final distribution to the children and grandchildren of the grantor, and to others related by blood or marriage to him. It reserves, however, a power in the grantor to require at any time the trustees to pay over to him "the whole or any part of the net income, rents, issues, and profits of said property" remaining after making certain monthly payments to his children, and to his son-in-law for his grandchildren. It also reserves a power in him to direct a distribution and conveyance of his property at any time during his life to the beneficiaries named, instead of at the periods designated therein. It concludes with a solemn asseveration that the said Sarah Althea Hill was not, and never had been, his wife; that he never proposed marriage to her, or married her in any form or manner whatever; that the so-called marriage contract and "dear wife" letters introduced by her in evidence in the state court were forgeries; that all her claims to wifehood were based upon forgeries and perjuries, and he "specially empowers and directs" the trustees "to vigorously contest, in every court where a contest can be made," her false claim and pretensions. Frederick W. Sharon has since resigned the duties and powers of said trust, and the execution of the trusts has devolved upon the other trustee named, Francis G. Newlands. And he, as such trustee, and other parties and beneficiaries under the trust deed, on April 14, 1888, filed the other of the bills, the titles of which are given above, which is an original bill in the nature of a bill of revivor and supplement to carry the decree in Sharon v. Hill into execution, for their benefit. It sets forth with particularity the proceedings in the suit in the circuit court of the United States, and the decree rendered therein, and its non-execution and the abatement of the suit by the death of Sharon, and the execution, and contents of the trust deed; also the commencement and prosecution by said Sarah Althea of the action in the state court, claiming to be his wife under the said declaration of marriage, and the proceedings and judgment therein. It avers that the matter in suit in the circuit court exceeded the sum or value of $500; that the property of Sharon was of the value of $5,000,000 over and above his debts and liabilities; that said Sarah Althea Hill claimed all the rights of a wife, under the laws of the state of California,

in the property of the plaintiff, and to a reasonable support from him as her husband, and to a share in the property acquired by him after the date of said declaration of marriage; that such support was of the value of at least $500 per month, if she was in fact his wife; that she also claimed and asserted a right to one-half of all the property acquired by said William Sharon after the 25th day of August, 1880, and that she is entitled as her share of such property to at least $5,000,000; that said claim was disputed as false and fraudulent by the said William Sharon, and is now disputed by his successors in interest, and that it was the object of the suit in this court to protect the property and property rights of said William Sharon, and of the complainants, as his successors in interest, against said claims, which were settled by the decree of this court enjoining her from asserting any property rights, either as the wife of complainant, or under or by virtue of said declaration of marriage.

The bill also sets forth that the state court expressly found and adjudged that the declaration of marriage (which the circuit court has held to be a forgery, and annulled) was the only written declaration, contract, or agreement of marriage ever entered into between the parties, and upon such findings and adjudication rendered its judgment, declaring that Sarah Aithea was his wife, and granting her a divorce from such marriage, and awarding her one-half of all the community property accumulated by him after August 25, 1880, and ordering an accounting to ascertain the community property; that the defendant, now Sarah Althea Terry, is threatening and endeavoring for the first time to proceed with an accounting under her judgment of divorce, for the purpose of enforcing a division of the property acquired by William Sharon after August 25, 1880, and that she is seeking to discover and inspect the books of account kept by him, to the great injury and harassment of the complainants. The bill also sets forth that the state court made an allowance of alimony by its order, as follows: "It is hereby ordered that the defendant, William Sharon, pay to the plaintiff, Sarah Althea, or her order, on or before the 9th day of March, 1885, the sum of $7,500, as alimony herein; and the further sum of $2,500 on or before the 8th day of April, 1885; and the same amount on or before the 8th day of each and every month hereafter as alimony, until the further order of this court," that this judgment was afterwards modified, on appeal, by the supreme court of the state, on the 31st day of January, 1888, by striking out therefrom the words, "the sum of $7,500, as alimony herein, and the further sum of $2,500 on or be fore the 8th day of April, 1886," and inserting in the stead and place of those words, "the sum of $1,500, as alimony herein, and the further sum of $500 on or before the 8th day of April, 1885;" that the said defendant Sarah Althea Terry is seeking to enforce that judgment, as modified, to the injury and harassment of the complainants; that the said judgment of alimony was founded upon and subsists essentially by virtue of the said declaration of marriage, adjudged by this court to be forged and fraudulent and fabricated, and that its execution and enforcement ought in equity to be restrained, as an infringement of the decree and prior jurisdiction of this court, and of the rights of the complainants there

under. The complainants therefore pray that the decree in the original suit, and the proceedings in enforcement and execution thereof, may stand revived, and be in the same state, plight, and condition in which the same were at the time of the death of the said William Sharon; and that it may be declared that the complainants, as trustees and beneficiaries, as aforesaid, are entitled to revive the said decree and proceedings thereunder for the enforcement thereof, and to have the full benefit thereof, and to fully enforce and execute the same; and that the decree may be construed and adjudged to forbid and enjoin any and all proceedings in execution or enforcement of the said judgment of the said superior court for alimony; and for an accounting and division of the community property; and that said judgments may be declared void and of no effect as against the complainants, so far as they authorize any recovery of property or property rights; and that the defendants may be restrained, pending the suits, by an injunction, from taking any further proceedings to enforce or execute the said judgment for alimony, or the the said judgment for an accounting and division of community property, and from commencing or maintaining any further suit or suits, proceeding or proceedings, of any kind, under or upon either of said judgments, against the complainants, or any of them; and that such injunction, upon the hearing, may be made perpetual; and that they may have such other or further relief in the premises as may be just.

To these two bills, to revive and enforce the decree in the case of Sharon v. Hill, the defendants have appeared and demurred. The principal grounds of the demurrer in each case are that the court has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the suits, or to grant the relief prayed; that the plaintiffs do not show any right or title to maintain their respective suits; and that there is ambiguity and uncertainty in the bills, in that they fail to show what particular property is involved.

W. F. Herrin, for complainant.

Stanley, Stoney & Hays, for respondents.

FIELD, Justice, (after stating the facts as above.) As appears by the statement herewith filed, the decree of this court in the case of William Sharon v. Sarah Althea Hill, entered as of the 29th of September, 1885, adjudged the alleged declaration of marriage between the parties, purporting to be executed on the 25th of August, 1880, to be a forgery, and ordered it to be surrendered and canceled, and enjoined the defendant, and all parties claiming under her, from making any use of the same, as evidence or otherwise, to support any claim advanced under it, as wife of William Sharon, or to any interest in property of any kind against him, or his heirs, executors, or successors. William Sharon having died, Frederick W. Sharon, as the executor of his last will and testament, has filed one of the bills before us to revive and carry that decree into execution. Francis G. Newlands, as acting trustee, under a deed of trust executed by William Sharon a few days before his death, and certain beneficiaries under that deed, have filed the other bill before us, which is an original bill in the nature of a bill of revivor and supplement. It also