215; Holbrook v. Connor, 60 Me. 578; 11 Am. Rep. 212, and note 218; Smith v. Mariner, 5 Wis. 551; 68 Am. Dec. 73; McGar v. Williams, 26 Ala. 469; 62 Am. Dec. 739; Fulton v. Hood, 34 Pa. St. 365; 75 Am. Dec. 664; Bell v. Byerson, 11 Iowa, 233; 77 Am. Dec. 142; Silver v. Frazier, 3 Allen, 382; 81 Am. Dec. 662; Miller v. Howell, 1 Scam. 499; 32 Am. Dec. 36; Tryon v. Whitmarsh, 1 Met. 1; 35 Am. Dec. 339; Anderson v. Burnett, 5 How. (Miss.) 165; 35 Am. Dec. 425.

FALSE REPRESENTATIONS - PLEADING: See note to Huston v. Williams, 25 Am. Dec. 95, 96. False representations as to the condition, situation, and value of real estate, knowingly made by the vendor to the purchaser, are not actionable, unless the purchaser has been fraudulently induced to forbear inquiry as to their truth; and in such case, the means by which he has been thus induced to forbear inquiry must be specifically set forth in the declaration: Parker v. Moulton, 14 Mass. 99; 19 Am. Rep. 315; Ellis v. Andrews, 56 N. Y. 83; 15 Am. Rep. 379. Fraud must be specially pleaded under code practice: Clapp v. Cedar County, 5 Iowa, 15; 68 Am. Dec. 678; Goodrich v. Reynolds, 31 Ill. 490; 83 Am. Dec. 240; Keller v. Johnson, 11 Ind. 337; 71 Am. Dec. 355; Tift v. Harden, 22 Ga. 623; 68 Am. Dec. 512; Bartholomew v. Bentley, 15 Ohio, 659; 45 Am. Dec. 596. A general allegation that a sealed instrument was obtained by fraud is not sufficient; the fraud must be set out: Connor v. Dundee Chemical Works, 50 N. J. L. 257. Whoever sets up

frand as a cause of action must do more than allege such fraud in general terms; he must set out the specific facts which constitute the alleged fraud: Kerr v. Steman, 72 Iowa, 241.

VENDOR AND VENDEE FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS-MEAsure of DAMAGES. The measure of damages for fraudulent representations that vendor's title to slaves was absolute, when it was but a life estate, is the difference in the value of the two estates at the time of the sale: Campbell v. Hillman, 15 B. Mon. 508; 61 Am. Dec. 195. In an action by an administrator to recover the value of personalty obtained by the defendant under a fraudulent contract with plaintiff's insane intestate, the measure of recovery is the loss actually sustained, namely, the value of the property less the consideration paid and retained: Johnson v. Culver, 116 Ind. 278.

GRIFFIN V. FRIES.

[23 FLORIDA, 173.]

PLEADING AND PRACTICE - Cross-bill.

Where in a suit in equity defendant files a cross-bill praying affirmative relief, such cross-bill depends on the original suit, and can only be sustained on matters growing out of and germane to it, and such bill must seek equitable relief. PLEADING AND PRACTICE - CROSS-BILL.

- Where in an ejectment suit the plaintiff files a bill to enjoin defendant from cutting and removing timber from the land in dispute, and defendant, answering, denies plaintiff's title, and alleges title in himself, he may, at the same time, file a crossbill to enjoin plaintiff from prosecuting the ejectment suit, provided equitable relief is sought by the cross-bill, and the facts justify such relief.

BJECTMENT LOST DEED CROSS-BILL. - Where in ejectment defendant files his cross-bill praying that plaintiff be enjoined from further prose

cuting his ejectment suit, on the simple allegation that a deed which is a link in his chain of title is lost, and not asking for the re-establishment of such deed, the bill is without equity and demurrable. EQUITABLE JURISDICTION TO RESTORE UNRECORDED LOST DEED. While a court of law can afford relief in case of an unrecorded lost deed, by permitting the party claiming under it to prove its contents in a suit then pending before it, still law cannot afford adequate relief from dangers that may arise from subsequent purchasers and judgment creditors without actual notice, while equity alone is capable of affording present relief and establishing safe-guards against future exigencies; and, having entertained jurisdiction for this purpose, it will, in suitable cases, retain it, and make a final adjudication between the parties.

Fleming and Daniel, for the appellant.

Doggett and Buckman, for the appellee.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. The appellee, Alexander P. Fries, brought a suit in ejectment against the appellant, George B. Griffin, for the possession of a tract of land in the county of Duval. While said suit was pending, Fries filed a bill against Griffin to restrain him from cutting and removing timber from said land. He alleged in his bill that he was the owner of the land by operation of divers tax titles from the state of Florida, and by a deed from William Alsop, the lawful owner of the same. The defendant, Griffin, filed his answer, denying that Fries was the owner of the land, and claiming title thereto by deed from Isaac Roberts, who claimed title thereto by deed from William Alsop of a date anterior to the deed from said Alsop to Fries. Griffin at the time of filing his answer also filed a cross-bill, in which he alleges his purchase from and a conveyance to him by Roberts, and that Alsop had conveyed the land in controversy to Roberts a long time prior to the alleged conveyance by him to Fries; that said deed was lost without being recorded, but that Fries had notice of the same. The cross-bill was demurred to, the demurrer sustained, and the bill dismissed. The dismissing the cross-bill is the only error assigned. It is contended by counsel for appellee that the action of the chancellor was correct, because the cross-bill was not germane to the matters set up in the original bill. It is true that the cross-bill must be germane to the bill in the original suit, but it is clear that this principle is not applicable to the bill now being considered. It is between the same parties, and touching the same subjectmatter in controversy. Fries relies on his ownership of the land to sustain his prayer for an injury to it. The cross-bill denies his ownership, and alleges that Griffin owns the land,

and in so far as that is concerned, it is matter of defense merely; but it goes further and alleges that a deed from a party from whom he deraigns title is lost,-that the existence of such deed was known to Fries, -and prays for affirmative relief against him. The title of Fries is the basis of his suit, and without which it cannot be sustained. Any matter set up in the cross-bill going to show that title was not in Fries, or that it was in Griffin, is in our opinion clearly germane. In the case of German v. Machin, 6 Paige, 288, the plaintiff filed a bill for partition of lands. The chancellor (Walworth) held that the defendant could set up as a defense that he was in equity entitled to the whole of the premises, and that in addition to this as a defense, if he wished for affirmative relief on his part by a transfer of the premises to him, that a crossbill was his proper remedy.

The relief sought must be equitable relief. The remaining inquiry is, Do the facts set up in the cross-bill, if true, entitle the plaintiff therein to relief in equity? The bill alleges that a deed which was a link in the chain of title of Griffin was lost, and that there was no record of it made. It prays that Fries may be enjoined from further prosecuting his suit at law for the recovery of the land in controversy.

The loss of a deed is not always a cause for which a court of equity will grant relief. If this is the sole ground, a defendant in a court of law where a suit is pending between the parties, in which the land described in the lost deed is in controversy, can have full relief by showing by parol proof the contents of his lost deed: Whitfield v. Faussett, 1 Ves. 387. In the case of Rogers v. Cross, 3 Chand. 34, the court say: "The loss or destruction of a deed may as well be established in a court of law as in a court of equity, and when such suit at law had been commenced, chancery will not interfere to suspend it." The bare allegation that a deed is lost is not sufficient ground to found a right to relief in equity: Fonblanque's Equity, b. 1, c. 3, note h. The bill must lay some. ground beside the mere loss of a title deed to justify a prayer for relief, as that the loss obstructs the complainant's rights at law, or leaves him exposed to undue perils in the future assertion of such rights: Story's Eq. Jur., sec. 84. A court of equity has the power to decree a re-establishment of deeds which have become accidentally lost or destroyed, on the ground that otherwise the complainant's title would be defective or embarrassed: Cummins v. Coe, 10 Cal. 529; Hoddy

AM. ST. REP., VOL. XI.—28

v. Hoard, 2 Ind. 474; 54 Am. Dec. 456; Pomeroy's Eq. Jur., sec. 1376, and note. In this case, there is no prayer for the re-establishment of the deed. When the bill alleges the former existence of a deed, its loss, with a prayer for its reestablishment, and the evidence is satisfactory to its existence, loss, and contents, a court of equity will decree in accordance with the prayer of the bill, and having jurisdiction on this ground, will retain the cause; and if all the circumstances and the prayer of the bill justify it, will make a final decree settling the respective rights of the parties, as in the case of Christy v. Burch, at the present term, in which the question of jurisdiction was conceded, or at least not raised. In that, Christy and wife had executed a deed to one Houston, which was lost, and the said Houston had conveyed to Burch. Christy having brought a suit for the recovery of the property, Burch filed his bill praying a re-establishment of the lost deed, and that Christy and wife be enjoined from prosecuting their suit against him. The court having all the parties in interest before it, and the question as to the existence, loss, and contents of the deed having been decided against the Christys, and there being no other question involved in the controversy between them, this court deemed it right to make a final decree establishing the lost deed, and enjoining the Christys from prosecuting a suit which was against good conscience.

But this case differs from that in this, that there is no prayer to re-establish the lost deed which was necessary to give this court jurisdiction. On the bare allegation of the loss of a deed, it prays for an injunction to enjoin the plaintiff from prosecuting his suit at law, and, lastly, it appears from the record that the deed from Alsop was not the only ground on which he based his claim to a recovery in the ejectment suit. The record shows that he claims title, also, by virtue of certain tax titles. We would say further, that in our opinion, that where a deed is lost and not recorded, that while a court of law can afford relief by permitting the party claiming under it to prove its contents in a suit then pending before it, that it is inadequate to afford relief from future dangers that may arise from subsequent purchasers and judgment creditors without actual notice, and that a court of equity is alone capable of dealing with such a case, not alone by affording present relief, but by establishing safeguards against future exigencies, and, as we have said, that, having jurisdiction for

this purpose, it will in suitable cases retain the cause and make a final adjudication between the parties.

Decree affirmed.

PLEADING. - CROSS-BILLS must be confined to the subject-matter of the bill: May v. Armstrong, 3 J. J. Marsh. 260; 20 Am. Dec. 137; Tarleton v. Vietes, 1 Gilm. 470; 41 Am. Dec. 193; Dill v. Shahan, 25 Ala. 694; 60 Am. Dec. 540; Andreios v. Kebbee, 12 Mich. 94; 83 Am. Dec. 766; Hurd v. Case, 32 Ill. 45; 83 Am. Dec. 249, and note.

LOST DEEDS. The loss of an unregistered deed entitles the grantee to the aid of chancery to have it vest the legal title in him, or to have the deed set up and established, as in other cases of lost deeds: Hord v. Baugh, 7 Humph. 576; 46 Am. Dec. 91, and note 92; Hoddy v. Hoard, 2 Ind. 474; 54 Am. Dec. 456, and note 457; King v. Gilson, 23 Ill. 348; 83 Am. Dec. 269. EQUITY JURISDICTION - MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS. The preventing the multiplicity of suits is a favorite object of the courts of equity; and in furtherance of this object they settle and adjust in a single suit rights and interests which, in courts of law, result in various issues incapable of trial in one action: Fellows v. Fellows, 4 Cow. 682; 15 Am. Dec. 412; compare Morgan v. Morgan, 3 Stew. 383; 21 Am. Dec. 638; Hughlett v. Harris, 1 Del. Ch. 349; 12 Am. Dec. 104; Fitzhugh v. Custer, 4 Tex. 391; 51 Am. Dec. 728; Doggett v. Hart, 5 Fla. 215; 58 Am. Dec. 464; Schley v. Dixon, 24 Ga. 273; 71 Am. Dec. 121; Bryson v. Rayner, 25 Md. 424; 90 Am. Dec. 69.

NORRIS v. SAVANNAH, FLORIDA, AND WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.

[23 FLORIDA, 182.]

LIABILITY OF CARRIER FOR LOSS OF FREIGHT BY UNAVOIDABLE DELAY.An extraordinary and unprecedented flood causing a delay in transportation and loss of perishable freight is such act of God as will excuse the carrier from liability for the loss, provided he has been guilty of no negligence nor departure from duty contributing to the occurrence of such loss. LIABILITY OF CARRIER FOR FAILURE TO GIVE NOTICE OF DELAY IN DELIV

Ery of Freight. Where the delivery of perishable freight is delayed by an unprecedented flood, constituting an act of God, a mere failure to notify the consignor or consignee of the detention is not, of itself, negligence rendering the carrier liable for the consequences of such delay, especially in the absence of proof that if notice had been given the loss would have been lessened, or to what extent.

C. P. and J. C. Cooper, for the appellant.

RANEY, J. The appellant, who was plaintiff in the circuit court, delivered to the appellee at Jacksonville, in this state, February 2, 1884, 301 boxes of oranges destined for Cincinnati, Ohio, and consigned to the Grange Supply Company.