Irwin v. Williar, 110 U. S. 499. In the case last cited, Mr. Justice Matthews, in speaking for a unanimous court, said: "In Roundtree v. Smith, 108 U. S. 269, it was said that brokers who had negotiated such contracts, suing, not on the contracts themselves, but for services performed and money advanced for defendant at his request, though they might, under some circumstances, be so connected with the immorality of the contract as to be affected by it, they are not in the same position as a party sued for the enforcement of the original agreement. It is certainly true that a broker might negotiate such a contract without being privy to the illegal intent of the principal parties to it which renders it void, and in such a case, being innocent of any violation of law, and not suing to enforce an unlawful contract, has a meritorious ground for the recovery of compensation for services and advances. But we are also of the opinion that when the broker is privy to the unlawful design of the parties, and brings them together for the very purpose of entering into an illegal agreement, he is particeps criminis, and cannot recover for services rendered or losses incurred by himself on behalf of either in forwarding the transaction": 110 U. S. 509.

Several cases have been cited holding that money or property deposited with a third person, which was derived from or through an unlawful enterprise, may be recovered; and that the illegality of the transaction out of which the money or property arose cannot be successfully asserted as a defense by a mere agent or depositary. This rule is well settled, but it is not germane to this case. Other cases are cited holding that when the parties to an illegal transaction have accounted, as between themselves, and agreed that a definite sum belongs to each, that an action may be maintained upon the accounting or new promise, and the sum, once admitted to be due, recovered. Admitting these cases to be well decided, they do not aid the appellant. These parties have had no accounting. No admission has been made that a specified sum is due to any one of them. No promise has been made since the completion of the illegal scheme upon which a recovery is sought. On the contrary, this action is for an accounting between the parties. It is alleged in the complaint that the amount which the plaintiff is entitled to recover is unknown, and can only be ascertained by an investigation of the illegal transactions between the parties. The judgment prayed for is: "That an account may be taken of all the dealings and transactions,

purchases and sales of lard made and conducted by said defendants E. A. Kent & Co., under the agreement herein before mentioned," etc.

The relief sought would require the court to investigate all of the various transactions of these parties, from the beginning to the end of their unlawful enterprise, and adjust the differences between them. This is precisely what courts have always refused to do. The fraud which the trial court found was practiced by these defendants upon their associates cannot be too strongly condemned, but courts are not organized to enforce the saying that there is honor among law-breakers, and the desire to punish must not lead to a decision establishing the doctrine that law-breakers are entitled to the aid of courts to adjust differences arising out of and requiring an investigation of their illegal transactions.

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

PRINCIPALS-All persons are principals who are guilty of acting together in the commission of an offense: Phillips v. State, 26 Tex. App. 228; 8 Am. St. Rep. 471; Spies v. People, 122 11. 1; 3 am. St. Rep. 320; Commonwealth ▾ Campbell, 7 Allen, 541; 83 Am. Dec. 705; Commonwealth v. Gannett, 1 Allen, 7; 79 Am. Dec. 693; Lowell v. Boston etc. R. R. Co., 23 Pick. 24; 84 Am, Dec. 33; Hawkins v. State, 13 Ga. 322; 58 Am. Dec. 517.

ILLEGAL CONTRACTS. — Parties cannot be heard who ask relief from violation of law; they are left where their conduct places them, being in pari delicto: Schmidt v. Barker, 17 La. Ann. 261; 87 Am. Dec. 527, and note 53%. CONTRACTS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY, AS AFFECTING MARKETS. · Contracts made for the purpose of enabling defendants to have a monopoly of the mar ket, and to control prices, are against public policy and void: Arnott v. Pittston etc. Coal Co., 68 N. Y. 558; 23 Am. Rep. 190. Combinations to keep up wages are undoubtedly injurious to trade in the purview of a statute punishing conspiracies to do any act injurious to trade or commerce: People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9; 23 Am. Dec. 501, and note 507-512; Hooker v. Vandewater, 4 Denio, 349; 47 Am. Dec. 258, and note; compare also Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio, 434; 49 Am. Dec. 282, and note 286.

AM. ST. REP., VOL. XI.-43

RUGGLES V. AMERICAN CENTRAL INSURANCE CO. OF ST. LOUIS.

[114 NEW YORK, 415.]

ORAL AGREEMENT FOR INSURANCE IS BINDING ON COMPANY, WHEN, Where written application for insurance is made to and filed with the agents of the company, who orally agree to insure from the date of the application, provided the company is not already on the risk, there is a complete and valid contract binding from the date of the conversation, although the premium be not paid, if a usage of the business to extend a credit to the broker for the premium until the end of the month is shown. AUTHORITY OF AGENT CONTAINED IN LETTERS SENT TO HIM DATES FROM MAILING of the letters.

LETTER STATING THAT "COMMISSION OF AUTHORITY AS AGENTS OF THIS COMPANY IN THE CITY OF BROOKLYN" had been forwarded by the writer, an insurance company, to the persons addressed, constitutes the latter the general agents of the company.

GENERAL AGENT MAY BIND HIS PRINCIPALS BY ACT CONTRARY TO HIS SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS, if such act be within the scope of his authority. ACTION on a contract of insurance.

case.

J. Stewart Ross, for the appellant.
A. C. Aubery, for the respondent.

The opinion states the

BROWN, J. The court properly submitted to the consider. ation of the jury the question whether there was a binding agreement for insurance between the plaintiff's broker and the firm of Sedgwick and Hammond.

The testimony of the witness Barker was positive that the agreement was full and complete. Written application for the insurance, specific in all its details, had been filed with Sedgwick and Hammond, and the premium upon the risk was agreed upon, and there was evidence that the usage of the business was to extend a credit to the broker for the premium until the end of the month. As to the oral agreement, the evidence of this witness was, that, after Hammond had shown to him the letter from the company appointing his firm agents, and had stated that he "would bind the risk, provided the company was not on," he said to Hammond, "It is understood that the policy is binding, provided the company is not on the risk," and Hammond replied, "Yes." Asked, "When it was binding from," he answered, "From the sixteenth; from that time; from that conversation."

If this evidence was to be credited, it justified the inference of a complete binding agreement from the date of the

conversation. It was for the jury to draw the inference, and such a contract, if made, was a valid agreement for insurance upon which a recovery could be had: Ellis v. Albany Ins. Co., . 50 N. Y. 402; 10 Am. Rep. 405. A more serious question is presented as to whether the agreement thus made was binding upon the company.

At the close of the testimony the counsel for the defendant asked the court to dismiss the complaint, upon the ground that it appeared that the letter appointing Sedgwick and Hammond agents for the defendant limited them against insuring special risks, and risks within what was called "the shore line," which motion was denied, and to such denial defendant excepted.

The court was also asked to charge the jury that the plaintiff's premises were within the shore line; and also, if the jury should find that the risk was a special risk, that the agents had no authority to bind the defendant, and it was not liable.

Both requests were refused, and defendant excepted to each refusal. The location of the shore line was a disputed fact on the evidence. By the map called Higginson's map, the plaintiff's property was within the line. According to the location of the line by other witnesses, it was not. The determination of this fact, if it was a material one, was properly left to the jury. No question can arise on this appeal upon that branch of the case. The request to charge that if the jury should determine that the risk was special, the defendant was not liable, raised no other or different question than that presented by the motion to dismiss the complaint, as the risk was conceded to have been a special one, and the jury would have been bound so to find. The request was, therefore, equivalent to asking for a direction of a verdict for defendant. The point of the appellant's contention was, that the court should have decided upon the letter, which contained the agent's delegation of authority, that they possessed no power to bind the defendant upon a special risk, and this question is the most serious one presented upon this appeal. It may be conceded that the commission of authority had not, at the time of making the agreement, reached the agents. It had, however, been mailed from St. Louis, as the letter of the secretary of the company, dated October 13th, refers to it as having been forwarded by mail on that day. It may also be sonceded that it did not reach the agents until October 20th,

the day after the fire, as Hammond in his letter to the plaintiff, under date of October 21st, speaks of the agents not having power to bind the company "until yesterday"; and Sedgwick testified that the two letters introduced in evidence were the only communications they had received from the company with reference to their acting as agents prior to the fire, which occurred on October 19th. The evidence upon the question of power is therefore to be found entirely in the two letters last mentioned. The first of these letters bears date October 11th, and was written to Sedgwick and Hammond by Mr. Van Valkenburgh, a general agent of the company. In it he says: "If your appointment is confirmed, your jurisdiction will be the city of Brooklyn, outside the shore line, but we shall expect you to write no large risks for us until you know for certain that we are not in through our New York office. As we are now on all Brooklyn specials of any size that we will write, please do not undertake to write any specials for us at present." The second letter was written by the secretary of the company from St. Louis, dated October 13th, and addressed to Sedgwick and Hammond. It states: "We take very great pleasure in forwarding to your address by mail to-day a commission of authority as agents of this company in the city of Brooklyn. We deem it unnecessary to enter into any detailed instructions as to the conduct of our business at your agency, as our Mr. Van Valkenburgh has written you upon that subject," etc. Whatever authority the agents had they derived from these letters. The risk was a special one, and so admitted by the plaintiff upon the trial.

Was authority to insure such a risk withheld from the agents? We do not so interpret the letters. It is true that Van Valkenburgh wrote that the agents should not write any large risks until they knew that the company was not on through their New York office, and should not undertake to write any specials for the company, but this limited authority is not confirmed in the letter from the company. In that letter, the authority is broadly stated to be "agents of the company in the city of Brooklyn." There was no exception in the territory named, nor limitation as to the character of the risks to be insured. The other expression in the letter, that "we deem it unnecessary to enter into any detailed instructions as to the conduct of our business at your agency, as our Mr. Van Valkenburgh has written upon that subject," does not in any way limit the agents' power. Its plain reference is to the man