description of the purposes to which it is applicable by the Court of King's Bench, as supervising the conduct of inferior tribunals, extends to the case of a refusal by an inferior court to sign a bill of exceptions, where it is an act which appertains to their office and duty, and which the Court of King's Bench supposes "to be consonant to right and justice." Ib. 13. The judicial act, section thirteen, enacts that the Supreme Court shall have power to issue writs of prohibition to the District Courts, when proceeding as courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and writs of mandamus in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding offices, under the authority of the United States. A mandamus to an officer is said to be the exercise of original jurisdiction; but a mandamus to an inferior court of the United States is in the nature of appellate jurisdiction. Ib. 14. That a mandamus to sign a bill of exceptions is "warranted by the principles and usages of law," is, we think, satisfactorily proved by the fact that it is given in England by statute, for the writ given by the statute of Westminster, the second, is so in fact, and is so termed in the books. The judicial act speaks of usages of law generally, not of common law. In England it is awarded by the Chancellor; but in the United States it is conferred expressly on this court, which exercises both common-law and chancery powers, is invested with appellate power, and exercises extensive control over all the courts of the United States. We cannot perceive a reason why the single case of the refusal of an inferior court to sign a bill of exceptions, and thus to place the law of the case on the record, should be withdrawn from the general power to issue writs of mandamus to inferior courts, which is conferred by statute. 1b. 15. The judicial act confers expressly the power of general superintendence of inferior courts on this court. No other tribunal exists by which it can be exercised. Ib. 16. (Jan., 1832.) Motion for a mandamus to the district. judge of the United States for the Southern District of New York, to set aside a judgment entered by default, on an inquest finding a forfeiture of goods to the United States, against which an information had been filed for a violation of the revenue laws. BY THE COURT: This is not a proper case for the interposition of this court by way of mandamus. The application to the District Court to set aside the default and inquest was an application to the discretion of the District Court. Ex parte Roberts, 6 Pet. 216. 66 17. (Jan., 1832.) Motion for a mandamus to the district judge of the Southern District of New York, directing him to restore to the record a plea of " tender," which had been filed, by the defendant, in a suit on a bond for the payment of duties which had been ordered by the court to be struck off as a nullity. BY THE COURT: As the allowance of double pleas and defences is a matter not of absolute right, but of discretion in the court, and as the court constantly exercises a control over the privilege, and will disallow incompatible and sham pleas, no mandamus will lie to the court for the exercise of its authority in such cases, it being a matter of sound discretion, exclusively appertaining to its own practice. This court cannot say, judicially, that the District Court did not order the present plea to be struck from the record on this ground, as the record itself furnishes no positive means of information. Ex parte Davenport, 6 Pet. 661. 18. (Jan., 1832.) A rule was granted to show cause why a mandamus should not be awarded to the district judge of the District Court for the Northern District of New York, commanding him to do certain acts relative to a cause instituted in that court. Ex parte Bradstreet, 6 Pet. 774, 807. 19. (Jan., 1833.) Mandamus. In the District Court of the Northern District of New York, writs of right were prose cuted for lands lying in that district; and neither in the writs or in the counts, was there an averment of the value of the premises being sufficient in amount to give the court jurisdiction. The tenants appeared, and moved to dismiss the cause for want of jurisdiction, which motion was granted. Subsequently, the demandant moved to reinstate the cases, and to amend by inserting an averment that the premises were of the value of $500, which motion was denied by the court. The demandant also moved the court to compel full records of the judgments and orders of dismission, and of the process in the several suits, to be made up and filed, so that the demandant might have the benefit of a writ of error to the Supreme Court, in order to have its decision upon the grounds and merits of such judgments and orders. The District Court refused the motion. On a rule in the Supreme Court, for a mandamus to the district judge, and a return to the same, it was held that the refusal to allow the amendment to the writ and count, by inserting the averment of the value of the property, was not the subject of examination in this court. The allowance of amendments to pleadings is in the discretion of the judge of the inferior court; and no control over the action of the judge, in refusing or admitting them, will be exercised by this court. The court granted a mandamus requiring the district judge to have the records of the cases made up, and to enter judgments thereon, in order to give the demandant the benefit of a writ of error to the Supreme Court. Ex parte Bradstreet, 7 Pet. 634. 20. (Jan., 1834.) The writ of mandamus is subject to the legal and equitable discretion of the court, and it ought not to be issued in cases of doubtful right. But it is the only adequate mode of relief where an inferior tribunal refuses to act upon a subject brought properly before it. Life and Fire Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 8 Pet. 291. 21. (Jan., 1834.) A motion for a new trial is always addressed to the discretion of the court, and this court will not control the exercise of that discretion by a Circuit Court, either by a writ of mandamus or on a certificate of division between the judges. Ib. 22. (Jan., 1834.) Motion for an attachment against the judge of the Northern District of New York, for a contempt of this court, in refusing to obey its mandamus, directing him to reinstate certain suits which had been dismissed from the docket of the court, and to proceed to adjudicate them according to law. The motion also asked for a rule to show cause why a mandamus should not issue to the district judge. BY THE COURT: A judge must exercise his discretion in those intermediate proceedings which take place between the institution and trial of a suit; and if, in the performance of this duty, he acts oppressively, it is not to this court that application is to be made. Ex parte Bradstreet, 8 Pet. 588. 23. (Jan., 1834.) A mandamus, or a rule to show cause why a mandamus should not issue, is asked in this case, in which a verdict has been given, for the purpose of ordering the judge to enter up judgment upon the verdict. The affidavit itself shows that judgment is suspended for the purpose of considering a motion which has been made for a new trial. The verdict was given at the last term, and we understand it is not unusual in the State of New York for a judge to hold a motion for a new trial under advisement till the succeeding term. There is then nothing extraordinary in the fact that the judge should take time till the next term to decide on the motion for a new trial. This court entertains no doubt of his power to grant it. The attachment and the rule to show cause why a mandamus should not issue were refused. Ib. - 24. (Jan., 1835.) LOUISIANA. Mandamus. Although no rule to show cause why a mandamus should not issue to the district judge of Louisiana had been granted by the court, the district judge had agreed to appear, as if a rule had been granted by this court and had been served upon him; and copies of the papers on which the motion for the mandamus was founded had been served on the district judge and on the parties in the suit in which the mandamus was to operate, during the vacation. The district judge filed an answer, as if the rule had been served on him, and appeared by counsel, waived a formal rule on notice, and stated his readiness to show cause. BY THE COURT: Under such circumstances, there is no necessity for directing a rule to be entered and notice to be given; all the purposes of the rule are accomplished. Life and Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. Adams, 9 Pet. 571. 25. (Jan., 1835.) Mandamus. In the District Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana, the district. judge refused to extend a judgment previously entered in the District Court, so as to cover other instalments due to the plaintiffs, which became due after it was entered; and to enter a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, mortgagees, upon a proceeding which had been entered into with the mortgagor in relation to the debt due to the mortgagees, in which it was stipulated that judgment should be entered for certain instalments to be paid to the plaintiffs on the non-payment of the same; the district judge not considering the plaintiffs entitled to have the judgment entered according to the terms of the proceeding, without notice to the debtor and his syndics, into whose hands his property had passed, under the insolvent law of Louisiana, after the execution of the transaction, and after a judgment for part of the debt had been entered ; which was the judgment asked to be extended. The district judge was also required to receive a confession of judgment. against the mortgagor and the insolvent, by an agent of the plaintiffs, and whose powers to confess the judgment the district judge did not consider adequate and legal for the purpose. An execution had been issued for a part of the debt, upon the previous judgment in the District Court, and the execution was put into the hands of the marshal of the United. |