Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

goals of the Amerian dream, within the confines of the political system established by the Constitution.

This

On the issue now before this committee, compromise is not possible. committee is debating a bill which involves the fundamental moral issue of the equality of the citizens of this great Nation. This committee is not debating an issue on how to best achieve some secondary or derivative goal; it is, rather, debating whether or not this Congress and this Nation will adhere to its fundamental moral beliefs.

The issue, as such, is clear. There are no gray areas here. This Congress must choose between accepting or rejecting the basic doctrine that all American citizens are in fact to be treated equally. The Federal courts have already spoken in this field and have received now the full support of the executive branch.

Congress can no longer avoid the issue. It must either enact the proposed bill by which all Americans regardless of race or color or national origin can fully use public accommodations or else it must reject the proposition that American citizens are to receive equal treatment in public matters. Congress cannot merely sit back now. To do so to avoid the issue by procrastination— would constitute an explicit acceptance by this Congress of the present state of affairs in which American citizens are denied their birthright, a birthright granted by God to all mankind and not to be violated by governmental decree or governmental inertia.

Federal and State inaction in granting this God-given right to equality has already led to open near-revolution by minorities who have too long been denied their natural rights. The Negro revolution now occuring, it must be noted, did not begin until the Supreme Court had agreed with that minority that its right to equality had been denied. It did not gain momentum, furthermore, until time had shown that in spite of the Supreme Court's ruling, the States had nevertheless continued to deny this right and had indicated the intention of perpetuating this denial.

The measure now being considered by this committee is a direct result of the Negro movement. Consequently, it had been maintained by some that Congress is acting under coercion. It is true that coercion exists, but not from the Negro elements. The coercion results from the illegal actions of those public officials throughout this Nation, and especially in the South, who are actively engaged in the denial to American citizens of their natural and constitutional rights. The Negro movement, in short, is but the symptom of a disease; and it would be foolish indeed to maintain that the doctor is forced to take protective and preventive measures to remove the symptom, rather than to eliminate the disease itself. It is this disease-the denial to all Americans of their rights-with which this Congress must deal.

The issue before this committee is generally regarded as action to assure the rights of minorities such as the Negro. However, this proposed action assures all Americans of their rights, not merely the minorities of theirs. This action will guarantee to all Americans, whites as well as Negroes, their right to free access to the public domain.

With the permission of this committee I would like to illustrate this point with a personal story. I am sure that this story can, in its essential truth, be refashioned and retold time and again by every member of this committee.

When my father died, my mother decided to take a trip to visit her children as well as various friends who were scattered along the eastern seaboard and throughout the South. She had intended to have as her traveling companion a woman who was her closest friend, a woman who had begun working for my parents prior to the birth of their first child and who had raised all five of their children. This woman is a Negro, a second mother to myself as well as my brothers and sisters, and an individual with whom anyone would be proud to associate.

Needless to say, my mother decided to cancel the trip. For, although it would have been possible for them to travel together in the Northeast, the practical problem arose as to how they would be able to travel once they hit the southern areas. They would not be able to eat together; they would not be able to lodge in the same quarters; the inconveniences with which they would be faced, in short, would have been insurmountable.

Not only was my mother's friend being denied the right to associate with whom she wished, but so too was my mother. Southerners especially have Insisted that segregation was based on the right of the individual to select one's own companions. Yet, in this instance, the doctrine of segregation actually prohibited the individual from just this very right.

The principle of this story is obvious: the denial of persons because of the color of their skin to free access of public accommodations is as much a denial of the rights of the whites as it is of the colored. It is but a variation of the fact that whenever the rights of one individual are denied, that denial ipso facto is a denial of the rights of all individuals.

The moral issue, thus, is quite clear. This committee and this Congress must either reaffirm the basic right of equality to all American citizens, or it must deny the basic right of equality to any American citizen.

Although the moral issue is clear, there have been several objections to the action being studied by this committee, objections which have a degree of validity to them.

First, it has been argued that the proposed action is a violation of States rights. Our constitutional system, as this committee is well aware, is based upon a Federal principle: the powers of the National Government are limited, and the powers of the States are reserved. Under this separation of powers between the sovereign National Government and the several sovereign States, there has arisen the doctrine of States rights.

There are in existence at least two versions of States rights. The first version is that our Constitution was derived from the States, not the people; that consequently the States have the ultimate right to interpose between the peoples of the States and the Federal Government; and, lastly, that the States have the right to decide when the Federal Government has overstepped its constitutionally limited powers. This concept of States rights has been denied by the Federal judiciary. In McCulloch v. Maryland the Supreme Court stated as dictum, in accordance with the Federalist papers of Hamilton and the arguments of Daniel Webster, that the Constitution was derived from the people of the United States, not from the several States. This dictum has been the law of the land ever since, and has often been reiterated by the Federal judiciary since that decision. In Ableman v. Booth the Supreme Court went even further, denying the right of any or all States to interpose between the people of the several states and the Federal Government. It might be noted here that this decision, handed down by a predominantly southern court, and written by a great southern Chief Justice (Taney), was applauded by the South. (The issue at stake had been the Fugitive Slave Act and the question of whether a Northern State might interpose to prevent the return of fugitive slaves to the South.) The denial of the right of interposition by the States has continually been upheld by the Federal courts since this decision.

Inasmuch as the States cannot interpose, they equally cannot decide for themselves the question of when and where the Federal Government has overstepped its bounds. Should the Federal Government misuse its powers, the first recourse is of course the Federal courts. The Supreme Court, has, as we all know, often restrained the actions of the Congress and the Executive. Another recourse is constitutional amendment. This recourse has also been used.

In short, this interpretation of States rights has never been legally accepted in this Nation. The full maintenance of such a concept can lead only to the dissolution of this mighty Nation and in fact was instrumental in creating the bloodiest warfare in which this Nation has ever been engaged.

A more valid interpretation of the doctrine of States rights is the doctrine that the several States are sovereign within the limits placed upon them by the Federal Constitution. Essentially, this interpretation is based upon the 10th amendment which states that "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

It should be noted first that this amendment does not grant full reserved powers to the States. It is not a carte blanche to the States to undertake any action not prohibited them by the Constitution nor granted solely to the Federal Government. Rather, it reserves such powers to the States and to the people. If this is a "States rights" amendment, it is also a "people's rights" amendment. It should be noted further that this amendment, although it does reserve powers to the States, does not mention any rights of the States. Nowhere, in fact, under our Constitution are the States explicitly granted or reserved any rights. The rights which the several sovereign States do have are the rights which any legitimate government has: the right to protect the morals, health, and safety of its citizens; and the right to use its powers legitimately for the welfare of its citizens.

In either case, the rights of the States are subservient to the interests of their citizens.

The rights of the States, furthermore, are coextensive with the duties of the States. For, if the States have the right to protect the morals of their citizenry, for example, they also have a duty to protect the morals of their populace. It is unfortunate that many of those who hide behind the cloak of States rights are willing to forget the duties and obligations of the States toward their citizens.

The doctrine of States rights is based not only upon the 10th amendment but also upon the pragmatic principle that it is preferable to leave the management of local affairs to the local units of government whenever possible. This principle rests partly upon the belief that local affairs are better managed and understood locally, and partly upon the belief that it is desirable to restrict the National Government and to strengthen the several State governments so that checks and balances might be maintained between the two elements of our Federal system. Although prudence teaches us the efficacy of such a practice, prudence also tells us that where the States are derelict in their duties it is better to have the Federal Government act, if possible under the Constitution, than to have inaction in matters of deep concern to the citizens of this Nation. Prudence teaches us, that is, that even in those areas which logically should be left to the States, Federal action is sometimes desirable.

This committee is faced with the problem of whether the action proposed to this committee is in fact a violation of the rights and duties of the States. I do not think it will be denied that the action proposed does extend into that area in which the States have prime interest and as such is a violation of States rights.

This does not, however, constitute an excuse for inaction by this Congress. Congress is confronted with a conflict between two constitutional rights: the right of the individual to equality, and the right of each State to manage its internal affairs. In such a conflict, only one solution is possible. The individual rights must take priority over the right of the States. Such a solution is logical, moral, necessary, and constitutional.

It is logical inasmuch as this Nation is composed of individuals, and each governmental body at whatever level is legitimate only to the extent that it protects the rights of the individual. The several States have been remiss in their duty to protect the rights of the individuals within their boundaries. Hence the proposed action is intended to provide that protection.

The morality of this action is undeniable. As stated previously, the moral issue is that of the equality of all peoples. This is the basis of the American system and must be upheld by this Congress.

It is necessary because to deny any action at this time will lead to bloodshed. Consequently, to deny action at this time would constitute a dereliction of duty by this Congress to protect the Nation against senseless anarchy and internal dissolution. It is necessary, furthermore, because the Federal Government is entrusted by the Constitution to guarantee the rights of citizens against unconstitutional restrictions by the States.

And it is constitutional since the Federal Government is supreme over the several sovereign States whenever a conflict arises between the powers of the National Government and those of the States. It is constitutional because, although on the face of it, it violates the principle of States rights, in fact it does not violate this principle: the Federal Government is acting only because of the inaction of the States.

It has been argued, secondly, that the proposed action is a violation of individual rights; specifically, of the right of individuals to enjoy the fruits of their labor. This argument was best presented to this committee in the testimony of the Governor of Florida wherein he presented the paradox that should this Congress enact the proposed legislation it would give to each buyer the right to buy from whom he pleased, but would deny to the seller the similar right to sell to whom he pleased.

It cannot be denied that the passage of this legislation does entail restrictions upon property rights. But here, as in the case of the rights of the States, the conflict between two rights must be settled on the basis of which right is paramount. And here again, the right of the individual to full equality in public matters must take priority.

The right to property, essential though it is, is secondary to the right to equality. It is, in fact, a derivative of the right to equality. For the individual has a right to property only because he is, first and foremost, equal to every other individual. The right to property, furthermore, may be restricted. In this country the right to property has often been restricted.

Restrictions on the right to property are legitimate when and only when they are based upon the principle of equality. All restrictions upon the right to ownership, that is, must be based upon equitable treatment. Any restriction upon this right that is not so based is by its very nature immoral and contrary to the laws of nature.

The proposed legislation is not immoral. It does fulfill the natural law. The restrictions placed upon private property in this instance are based upon the principle of equal treatment; all businesses covered by the proposed legislation will be equally restricted. This is a legitimate exercise of power.

The plaint of the Governor of Florida is a meaningless one. In all States, owners of public accommodations are already under restrictions. This new legislation will provide one further regulation, it is true. But as before, so now, the owner of public accommodations has the free choice of operating under the restrictions placed upon him by the State and the Federal Government, or not operating at all. This imposition of restrictions upon public accommodations for the protection of the morals, health, or safety of the general public is no innovation for either the States or the Federal Government.

The restriction of private property under the proposed legislation is moral and in accordance with the natural law and the Constitution. Is it justifiable? It is, since the purpose of the restriction is the maintenance of that principle of equality upon which our whole society is based.

The final argument against the proposed legislation is that the use of the commerce clause as a basis of this legislation would be a dangerous extension of the powers of Congress under that clause. With this argument I concur. Although it cannot be denied that Congress has the right and power to use the commerce clause in this manner, I think it should be pointed out that the principal purpose and intent of that clause is the regulation of commerce, and not the enactment of moral legislation. Congress has already, it is true, used the commerce clause as a basis for moral legislation: the Mann Act provides a worthy example of this use of the commerce clause. But in those instances wherein the Congress has so used this clause, it had no alternative source of power. Restraint in the use and extension of the commerce clause would appear to be a more prudent exercise of congressional power than unrestrained use of this clause.

Some have argued that Congress should use the "equal protection of the laws" clause of the 14th amendment in spite of the fact that the Supreme Court in the civil rights cases denied the power of Congress to use this clause for legislation such as is now being proposed. The argument here is that the Supreme Court today would reverse the prior decision and uphold the power of Congress under the 14th amendment. The argument again is that since the proposed legislation deals with the problem of equality, the Congress should not use subterfuge. To this argument I fully subscribe. Should the Congress use the 14th amendment as the basis of the proposed legislation it would avoid any dangerous extension of the commerce clause, it would openly support the legislation on the moral basis upon which it should rest, and it would avoid all subterfuge.

A third alternative is open to Congress. The ninth amendment states that "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Certain it is that one right not enumerated in the Constitution, but basic to our structure of government and society, is the right to equality. The ninth amendment can be and should be used (either in conjunction with the 14th amendment or by itself) as the basis of this legislation.

I would like to indulge this committee with one further thought. It has become common knowledge that should this committee submit the proposed legislation to the full Senate a group of Senators will use their prerogatives and indulge in a lengthy and destructive filibuster.

It must be noted that in 1957 and in 1960 when Congress enacted "civil rights" legislation, filibusters had been used in which the arguments against such legislation were fully expounded. Furthermore, since the Brown decision of 1954 this Nation has continuously heard arguments against that decision and against proposals for granting full equality to all American citizens. And, lastly, since the demonstrations of last spring these arguments have been reiterated with even greater vociferation.

I would not deny the right of any Senator to fully expound his position on the floor of the Senate. But I believe that the issue of the equality of all Americans presented by this legislation is of such moral impact that to allow any Senator or any group of Senators the right to abuse their prerogative of

full debate is in itself immoral. The right of any minority, such as represented by those Senators who intend to filibuster, must not be denied; yet the right of the majority to have its way after full deliberation cannot be denied either. In short, the Southern Senators should be allowed a respectable time for debate. But the indulgence of filibuster should not be tolerated. For 100 years now the Negro has been supposedly free and yet for 100 years he has been denied his constitutional rights. Nearly 10 years ago the Federal courts reaffirmed the fact that the Negro has been denied his rights. And, as noted elsewhere, the denial of the rights of the Negro has essentially been equally a denial of the rights of all other Americans. Further delay is clearly unwarranted.

No Senator can today hide behind the argument that Senators have a prerogative to filibuster. This fiction was destroyed last year when the Senate invoked cloture upon a small group of Senators after reasonable debate had occurred. If the Senate could invoke cloture then, it can and must invoke cloture after reasonable debate has taken place on this proposed legislation.

In view of the gravity of the issue, I would say to this committee-and to the full Senate that those Senators who refuse to overthrow the proposed filibuster are morally incompetent and are deserving of the contempt of the American people.

I want to thank this committee for the opportunity of presenting my views. I sincerely hope that this committee, this Senate, and this Congress will enact the proposed legislation. I fully believe that only such action will be in keeping with the ideals of our Nation and will be commensurate with the problems now besetting this Nation internally.

Thank you.

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, Springfield, Ill., September 20, 1963.

Hon. WARREN G. MAGNUSON,

Chairman, Committee on Commerce,

U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MAGNUSON: The Civil Rights Act of the State of Illinois has been in existence since 1885. It is not possible to review case by case the record of the past 78 years. The Commission on Human Relations of the State of Illinois has had considerable experience in investigating complaints under this law. Their experience would be of help.

The public accommodations law of the State of Illinois, chapter 38, article 13, has been a good law.

The State human relations commission investigates all complaints brought to its attention. The commission's policy and procedure is simple and effective. Respondents are consulted with a view toward compliance under the law. A statement of policy is sought which is affirmative with respect to the law. Failure to secure voluntary compliance means that the complaint is submitted to the local State's attorney or to the attorney general. These two offices have fixed responsibility to act under the law.

The significant point is that voluntary compliance with the law is the rule rather than the exception. Of 73 cases filed with the commission in 1962, none went to court. Two cases did go directly to the State's attorney where the matter was adjusted in a pretrial conference. Utilization of the human relations commission to secure compliance develops a better understanding of the nature of the problem, insofar as the respondent is concerned. Thus, in a practical way, the law can become the framework, which was referred to earlier.

Often respondents have fear of loss of business or of status and prestige. Although unfounded in reality, nevertheless these fears have a powerful meaning to a businessman. Every citizen has a right to know why he should obey any particular law. Indeed, government has a responsibility to make all of the necessary interpretations. Utilization of the human relations commission staff meets this test.

There is no case in Illinois where an open nondiscriminatory policy has been to the detriment of the proprietor. Negroes do not take over, nor do whites stay away in droves from any establishment under the law.

In summary, a public accommodations law speaks effectively on a problem solving level. Its force and impact is increased substantially when utilized in conjunction with professional human relations agencies and it develops, among other things, a climate most beneficial for all Americans.

« AnteriorContinuar »