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In addition, let me point out that in 1961 this administration secured from the general assembly the first fair employment practices legislation in the history of Illinois. The 1963 session of the general assembly made it crystal clear that the legislation was applicable to government and labor organizations.

Last July, I called a meeting of Illinois mayors and city managers in Springfield. Some 200 mayors and city managers turned out for this meeting at which time I reviewed for them our responsibilities and duties in the area of civil rights. On this day, I issued by executive order a code of fair practices governing conduct in the areas of State services and facilities, fair employment practices, State licensing, public works, State financial assistance, training and apprentice programs, State employment service and professions and trades.

Subsequent to the meeting, these mayors and city managers returned home to apprise local authorities of civil rights responsibilities and in many cases to call for local ordinances in this area.

Of great importance, our State commission on human relations has done an outstanding job and has spurred interest in this area in many of our communities. As a result, the number of local human relations commissions has increased.

Sincerely,

Re S. 1732.

OTTO KERNER, Governor.

NATIONAL COMMUNITY RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL,
New York, N.Y., August 27, 1963.

Hon. WARREN G. MAGNUSON,

Senator from Washington, Chairman, Commerce Committee,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MAGNUSON: It is my pleasure to enclose a statement on the public accommodations bill (S. 1732) submitted by six national member agencies and 66 Jewish community councils throughout the Nation, all of which are affiliated together in the National Community Relations Advisory Council.

I would appreciate your distributing a copy of this statement to each member of your committee. Our organizations are ready to render whatever assistance we can to your committee during the course of its deliberations on this legislation.

Best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

LEWIS H. WEINSTEIN, Chairman.

STATEMENT ON PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS BILL BY CONSTITUENT ORGANIZATIONS OF THE NATIONAL COMMUNITY RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL

The six national Jewish organizations and 66 Jewish community councils, all of which are affiliated together in the National Community Relations Advisory Council (NCRAC) and through which they concert their policies and programs, welcome this opportunity to submit this statement on proposed Federal legislation dealing with discrimination in public accommodations.

The constituent organizations of the NCRAC are the American Jewish Congress, Jewish Labor Committee, Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A., and the congregational bodies representing the three wings of religious Judaism: Union of American Hebrew Congregations (reform); Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, and United Synagogue of America (conservative). The 66 Jewish community councils joining in the present statement are: Jewish Welfare Fund of Akron.

Albany Jewish Community Council.

Atlanta Jewish Community Council.

Federation of Jewish Charities of Atlantic City, N.J.

Baltimore Jewish Council.

Jewish Community Council of Birmingham.

Jewish Community Council of Metropolitan Boston.

Jewish Community Council, Bridgeport.

Brooklyn Jewish Community Council.

Jewish Federation of Broome County, N.Y.

Community Relations Committee of the Jewish Federation of Camden County, N.J.

Jewish Community Federation, Canton, Ohio.
Jewish Community Relations Council, Charleston, S.C.
Cincinnati Jewish Community Relations Committee.
Jewish Community Federation, Cleveland, Ohio.
United Jewish Fund and Council, Columbus, Ohio.
Connecticut Jewish Community Relations Council.
Jewish Community Council, Dayton, Ohio.
Jewish Federation of Delaware.

Jewish Community Council of Metropolitan Detroit.

Eastern Union County, N.J., Jewish Community Council.

Jewish Community Council of Easton and Vicinity.

Jewish Community Welfare Council, Erie, Pa.

Jewish Community Council of Essex County, N.J.

Jewish Community Council of Flint, Mich.

Jewish Federation of Fort Worth, Tex.

Community Relations Committee of the Hartford (Conn.) Jewish Foundation. Indiana Jewish Community Relations Council.

Indianapolis Jewish Community Relations Council.

Jewish Community Council, Jacksonville, Fla.

Community Relations Bureau of the Jewish Federation and Council of Greater Kansas City.

Kingston, N.Y., Jewish Community Council.

Conference of Jewish Organizations of Louisville.

Community Relations Committee of the Jewish Federation-Council of Greater Los Angeles.

Jewish Community Relations Council of Memphis.

Milwaukee Jewish Council.

Jewish Community Relations Council of Minnesota.

Jewish Federation of New Britain, Conn.

New Haven Jewish Community Council.

Norfolk Jewish Community Council.

Jewish Community Relations Council of Oakland, Calif.

Central Florida Jewish Community Council (Orlando).

Jewish Federation of Palm Beach County, Fla.

Jewish Community Council of Paterson, N.J.

Jewish Community Council of Peoria, Ill.

Jewish Community Council, Perth Amboy, N.J.

Jewish Community Relations Council of Greater Philadelphia.

Jewish Community Relations Council, Pittsburgh.

Jewish Community Council of the Plainfields, N.J.

Jewish Federation of Portland, Maine.

Jewish Federation of Portland, Oreg.

Jewish Community Council, Rochester, N.Y.

Jewish Community Relations Council of St. Louis.

Community Relations Council of San Diego.

San Francisco Jewish Community Relations Council.
Jewish Community Council, Schenectady, N.Y.
Scranton-Lackawanna Jewish Council.

Jewish Federation, Springfield, Ill.

Jewish Community Council of Toledo.
Jewish Federation of Trenton.

Tulsa Jewish Community Council.

Jewish Community Council, Utica.

Jewish Community Council of Greater Washington.

Jewish Federation of Waterbury.

Wyoming Valley Jewish Committee, Wilkes-Barre, Pa.

Jewish Community Relations Council of the Jewish Federation of Youngstown, Ohio.

We believe that the prohibition of discrimination in public accommodations, proposed by the administration as part of its 1963 Civil Rights Act, is one of the most significant parts of that bill, and we urge its adoption.

Our Nation is now vividly conscious of an abrupt change in the civil rights climate. We have been told unmistakably that the generation of Negroes which was to be sacrificed under the concept of gradual alleviation of discrimination is not in a sacrificial mood. Massive demonstrations in the North as well as the South have clearly revealed that the time has come for an abrupt break with the "too little, too late" policy under which we have been operating.

Tensions have been particularly acute in the area of public accomodations and it is imperative that Federal legislation be passed to eliminate discrimination in hotels, restaurants, and other public facilities. It is no accident that the student sit-ins of 1961 originated at a southern lunch counter, a public facility which, it was deeply felt, had to be made available to everyone. The fact that subsequent demonstrations, sit-ins, wade-ins, and the like have affected the field of public accomodations more than any other area in which discrimination is prevalent suggests again the overwhelming need for comprehensive legislation in this field. It is the obligation of Congress to enact such legislation to insure that those who have been promised equal rights will in fact receive them.

THE NEED FOR PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LEGISLATION

President Kennedy in his civil rights message of June 19, 1963, said that "Events of recent weeks have again underlined how deeply our Negro citizens resent the injustice of being arbitrarily denied equal access to those facilities and accommodations which are otherwise open to the general public. That is a daily insult which has no place in a country proud of its heritage-the heritage of the melting pot, of equal rights, of one nation and one people. No one has been barred on account of his race from fighting or dying for America-there are no 'white' or 'colored' signs on the foxholes or graveyards of battle."

The President's recognition of the sense of outrage on the part of minority groups led him to include in his civil rights message and in the comprehensive civil rights bill of 1963 (S. 1731) a section on discrimination in public accommodations. This section of the comprehensive Civil Rights Act has also been introduced as a separate bill (S. 1732) by Senator Mansfield and 45 other Senators. We believe that there is great need for legislation of this type. Jews are not unfamiliar with the humiliation which results from approaching a facility supposedly open to the public and being turned away with either crudely antiSemitic remarks or inadequate evasions which clearly reveal the bias of the speaker. Discrimination against Jews in the area of public accommodations has, of course, diminished greatly in the last few years. Nevertheless, the possibility of insult has not been totally eliminated.

We do not pretend, of course, that the insult to us anywhere approaches the humiliation and indignity to which the Negro is constantly subjected. It is a terribble thing to approach a cafeteria, a hotel, a store, or any other place that appears to solicit the trade of everyone and then to find that this means everyone who is of the right color. From the time of the first sit-ins, demonstrators have explained that they were protesting psychic as well as physical injury. The refusal of owners of places of public accommodation to serve them, or the insistence that they be served at separate facilities, stamps them with a badge of inferiority, a constant reminder of second-rate status. The deep resentment aroused by this treatment goes far to explain the fact that laws against discrimination in public places are the oldest and most widespread form of civil rights legislation.

PRECEDENTS FOR THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION

Legislation in the area of public accommodations is neither novel nor impractical. Massachusetts adopted the first public accommodations bill in 1865. In the close to 100 years following this enactment, 30 States and the District of Columbia have prohibited discrimination in places of public accommodation (Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming).

These laws have worked well wherever they have been adopted and it is perfectly apparent that they have brought none of the grave evils in their train that have been so freely predicted. The benefit they confer on the aggrieved minority groups is reflected in the continued demand for further legislation. The absence of evils is shown by the continued adoption of new laws in State after State.

Furthermore, the laws have uniformly been upheld whenever their constitutionality has been challenged on the ground that they represent an undue invasion of property rights. The courts have consistently held that State laws against discrimination in public accommodations are a valid exercise of the

police power. Darius v. Apostolos, 68 Colo. 323, 190 Pac. 510 (1920); Crosswaith v. Bergin, 95 Colo. 241, 35 P. 2d 848 (1934); Baylies v. Curry, 128 Ill. 287, 21 N.E. 595 (1899); Pickett v. Kuchan, 323 Ill. 138, 153 N.E. 667 (1926); Bolden v. Grand Rapids Operating Corp., 239 Mich. 318, 214 N.W. 241 (1927); Brown v. J. H. Bell Co., 146 Iowa, 89, 123 N.W. 231 (1910); Rhone v. Loomis, 74 Minn. 200, 77 N.W. 31 (1898); Messenger v. State, 25 Nebr. 674, 41 N.W. 638 (1889); People v. King, 110 N.Y. 414, 18 N.E. 245 (1888); Commission v. George, 61 Pa. Super. 412 (1915). Most recently, in Frank Marshall, et al., v. Kansas City, Mo. (1962), the Supreme Court of Missouri held that a municipal antidiscrimination ordinance "bears a substantial and reasonable relation to the specific grant of power to regulate restaurants and to the health, comfort, safety, convenience, and welfare of the inhabitants of the city and is fairly referable to the police power of the municipal corporation."

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Although the Supreme Court of the United States has never had this issue directly presented to it, the Court has made it clear that it regards these laws as constitutional. In District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 109 (1953), it said "*** certainly as far as the Federal Constitution is concerned there is no doubt that legislation which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in the use of facilities serving a public function is within the police power of the States."

THE TERMS OF S. 1732

S. 1732 contains six sections dealing with discrimination in places of public accommodation.

Section 1 provides that this act may be cited as the "Interstate Public Accommodations Act of 1963."

Section 2 is an elaborate set of legislative findings. It contains nine detailed paragraphs designed to establish the constitutional basis for congressional action in this area. They recite the large amount of interstate travel by Americans and the hardships resulting from discrimination against members of minority groups engaged in such travel. They state that discrimination in cultural and recreational opportunities as well as in retail stores restricts the number of persons to whom the benefits of interstate commerce are available. They state further that such discriminatory practices are "encouraged, fostered, or tolerated, in some degree" by the States "which license or protect the businesses involved" and that these practices "take on the character of action by the States and therefore fall within *** the 14th amendment to the Constitution * * *" Finally, it is asserted that the burdens on commerce can best be removed by invoking the power of Congress under the 14th amendment and under the commerce clause of the Constitution.

Section 3 creates a right to nondiscrimination in places of public accommodation. Subsection (a) prohibits discrimination in any public place furnishing lodging to transient guests, including guests traveling in interstate commerce, and in any public place of amusement or entertainment which presents movies or other entertainment or entertainers that move in interstate commerce. It also prohibits discrimination in any store or restaurant that offers goods or food or any other services or accommodations to the public if the enterprise falls within one of the following four categories: (1) The goods or services are provided to a substantial degree to interstate travelers; (2) a substantial part of the goods made available has moved in interstate commerce; (3) the activities of the enterprise otherwise substantially affect interstate commerce; or (4) the establishment is an integral part of an enterprise in one of the previous categories (for example, by being located on its premises).

Subsection (b) of section 3 provides an exception for bona fide private clubs. Section 4 provides that no person shall deny or interfere with the rights guaranteed in section 3. It specifically applies to all persons "whether acting under color of law or otherwise." Hence, it applies to private individuals and companies as well as to persons acting under governmental authority.

Section 5 provides for a civil action to prevent violations of section 4. (There are no criminal penalties.) Under this section, an action for preventive relief may be brought by the person aggrieved. It may also be brought by the Attorney General if he has received a written complaint from a person aggrieved and he certifies that the aggrieved person "is unable to initiate and maintain appropriate legal proceedings" and that the purposes of the title will be furthered by his bringing an action.

A person is to be considered unable to maintain a proceeding (1) if he cannot bear the expense of litigation or obtain a lawyer "either directly or through other interested persons or organizations" or (2) if there is reason to believe that bringing a suit would jeopardize his economic standing or result in injury or economic damage to himself or his family.

If a complaint is filed with the Attorney General involving an enterprise in a State having an applicable law against discrimination, the Attorney General is directed to give the local officials opportunity to handle the matter. The Attorney General is however not required to refer the matter to local authorities if he certifies to the court that the delay involved in such a referral would adversely affect the interests of the United States or that in the particular case "compliance would be fruitless."

Before bringing an action, the Attorney General is required to use the services of any Federal agency which may be available to secure voluntary compliance, if he believes that "such procedures are likely to be effective in the circumstances." Section 6 gives the U.S. district courts jurisdiction to hear cases brought under this title whether or not the complainant has already exhausted his other administrative or legal remedies. It also provides that this legislation does not preclude State or local agencies from enforcing their own antidiscrimination laws.

COMMENTS ON THE BILL

We suggest two major ways in which the protections provided by S. 1732 might be substantially broadened. The first is by resting the bill not only on the commerce clause but also on the 14th amendment; the second is by allowing the Attorney General to bring suits in the name of the Federal Government, and not as a substitute for an individual aggrieved party.

(1) S. 1732 rests on the commerce clause (see section 3). We suggest that the bill should rest on the 14th amendment as well, so as to include establishments which are licensed by the State, whether or not these establishments in some way operate in interstate commerce.

Justice Douglas, concurring in Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 181-5, said that it is impermissible for a State to exercise its power to license businesses either "in terms or in effect to segregate the races in the licensed premises."

"One can close the doors of his home to anyone he desires. But one who operates an enterprise under a license from the Government enjoys a privilege that derives from the people *** [the] necessity of a license shows that the public has rights in respect to those premises. The business is not a matter of mere private concern. Those who license enterprises for public use should not have under our Constitution the power to license it for the use of only one race. For there is a constitutional requirement that all State power be exercised so as not to deny equal protection to any group." (368 U.S. 184-5.)

It is, of course, State action which is prohibited by the 14th amendment, and not the action of individuals. But it is clear to us (as it has been to courts and legislatures) that there are certain establishments which are affected with a public interest, and which have a public consequence.

Section 2(h) of the bill (the findings of fact) recognizes that the discriminatory practices are fostered to some degree by the States, "which license or protect the businesses involved by means of laws and ordinances * * *. Such discriminatory practices * * * take on the character of action by the States and therefore fall within the ambit of the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United States."

This proposition should be made an explicit basis for bringing an establishment within the purview of the act. A possible formulation is suggested by a bill (H.R. 6720) introduced in the House of Representatives by Representative Lindsay which would prohibit discrimination in any enterprise "authorized by a State or a political subdivision of a State *** providing accommodations, amusements, food, or services to the public ***."

(2) Under the terms of S. 1732 the Attorney General is authorized to act only if he finds that aggrieved individuals are unable to do so, or that interested organizations are not available or are unable to sponsor this case. Aside from the fact that it imposes a means test on individuals and conceivably on civil rights organizations as well, this approach is unsound in theory. It conceives of racial segregation and discrimination as a private rather than a public wrong. It ignores the fact that Federal officials have the responsibility of seeing that public officials adhere to the law of the land. We suggest, therefore, that the bill should authorize the Attorney General to bring suits in this area directly in the

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