Congress that day passed, an officer of that Board was appointed who was termed the Comptroller, and who was to be annually elected by Congress. He was to keep the treasury books and seal, to file all accounts and vouchers and to direct the manner of stating and keeping them. He was to draw bills under seal upon the Treasurer of the Board for sums due by the United States on accounts that had been audited, which bills were, however, to be countersigned by the Auditor previous to payment. He was also to draw bills in a similar way for such sums as Congress from time to time should order. He was to notify any debtor owing money to the United States of his delinquency, and fix a time for payment. In case of failure to pay he was to notify the executive of the State wherein the debtor resided. Wherever the Treasurer of the Board received money and signed a receipt he was to transmit said receipt to the Comptroller, who, after entering the same, charged the Treasurer, credited the proper accounts, indorsed the receipt, and transmitted the same to the person paying the money. Reports were ordered to be made quarterly by the Comptroller to Congress. Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., was the first Comptroller of the Board of Treasury, elected by Congress. By the act of Congress of Sept. 2, 1789, constituting the Treasury Department of the United States Government, the office of Comptroller was continued. It was declared to be the Comptroller's duty to superintend the adjustment and preservation of the public accounts; to examine all accounts settled by the Auditor and certify the balances arising therefrom to the Register; to countersign all warrants drawn by the Secretary of the Treasury which shall be warranted by law; to report to the Secretary the official forms of all papers to be issued in the different offices for collecting the public revenue, and the manner and form of keeping and stating the accounts of the several persons employed therein. He was, moreover, to provide for the regular and punctual payment of all moneys which might be collected, and was to direct prosecutions for all delinquencies of officers of the revenue, and for debts due to the United States. the accounts of the persons employed therein, and to superintend the preservation of the public accounts, subject to his revision. By the act of June 3, 1864, a Third Comptroller has been added to the Treasury Department, known as the Comptroller of the Currency. He is at the head of the Bureau charged with the execution of all laws passed by Congress relating to the issue and regulation of a national currency. He makes an annual report to Congress showing the state of the National Banks in the country, the capital embarked in those enterprises, the volume of the circulating notes, and other matters of financial interest. The office of Comptroller also exists in many of the States eo nomine. In some States the functions of a Comptroller are discharged by an officer known as a State Auditor or Auditor-General. It is usually the duty of a State Comptroller to superintend the fiscal concerns of the State, and to manage the same in the manner required by law. He exhibits to the Legislature, at stated times, accounts of the receipts and expenditures of the State, suggests plans for the improvement and management of the public revenue, keeps and states all accounts of the State, directs and superintends the collection of all moneys due it, and either draws or countersigns all warrants on the State Treasurer. The various States differ, of course, materially as to the powers and duties of this officer. In many of the counties and municipalities of the United States, the office of Comptroller exists with duties substantially similar to those above specified. The existence of the office is generally esteemed to constitute a most salutary check on improper and unlawful appropriation of the public funds. (L. L., JR.) CONANT, THOMAS JEFFERSON, D. D., an American Baptist divine and Biblical scholar, was born at Brandon, Vt., Dec. 13, 1802. He graduated in 1823, at Middlebury College, Vt.; was for a time tutor in Columbian College, Washington, D. C., and later became professor of language in the college at Waterville, Me., resigning this place in 1833. In 1835 he was made professor of Biblical literature and criticism The great increase in the business of the Treasury in the theological school at Hamilton, N. Y., and afterDepartment afterwards rendered it necessary to sub-wards studied for some years in Germany. In 1850 divide the duties of the Comptroller's office, and to he accepted a similar professorship in the seminary at appoint two Comptrollers, known respectively as the Rochester. In 1857 he removed to Brooklyn, and deFirst and Second Comptrollers of the Treasury. It is voted himself to the work of preparing a revised the duty of the First Comptroller to examine all ac- English Bible, under the auspices of the American counts settled by the First Auditor except those relat- Bible Union. He was afterwards one of the American ing to the receipts from customs, and all accounts members of the Old Testament Company for revising settled by the Fifth Auditor and the Commissioner of the authorized version. Among his publications are the General Land Office, and to certify the balances annotated translations of the book of Job (1857), Matarising thereon to the Register. It is also his duty to thew (1860), Genesis (1868), the Psalms (1868), and superintend the adjustment and preservation of the Proverbs (1872). His wife, HANNAH CHAPLIN (1809-public accounts subject to his revision, to countersign 1865), a daughter of Rev. Jeremiah Chaplin, D. D., beall warrants drawn by the Secretary of the Treasury came well known as a translator and author. Her which shall be warranted by law, to superintend the chief work was A History of the English Bible (1856). recovery of all debts certified by him to be due to the CONCEPTION is a logical term, variously defined. United States, and for that purpose to direct all such | All definitions agree in giving to the word a signifsuits and legal proceedings, and to take such measures icance which corresponds to one of the ideas involved in as are authorized by law and are adapted to enforce its composition-viz. the idea of unity in multiplicity. prompt payment thereof. The First Comptroller has Conception, from con and capio, means taking or grasppower to direct the First and Fifth Auditors to audit ing several things together or at the same time. Accordand settle any particular account he may deem neces-ingly, pure Nominalism employs the word to denote any sary. He is also bound to make an annual report to complex idea, such as that of a horse. "I have the ideas Congress of those officers who have failed to make of the sensations of sight, of touch, of hearing, of smellsettlement of their accounts during the fiscal year, pro-ing, with which the body and actions of a horse have cceding in the manner directed by law. impressed me, these ideas all combined, and so closely It is the duty of the Second Comptroller to examine that their existence appears simultaneous, and one. all accounts settled by the Second, Third, and Fourth This is my idea of a horse. If I say I have a concepAuditors, and to certify the balances arising thereon tion of a horse, and am asked to explain what I mean, to the Secretary of the department in which the ex-I give the same account exactly, and I can give no pense has been incurred; to countersign all warrants drawn by the Secretaries of War and of the Navy which shall be warranted by law; to report to said Secretaries the official forms to be issued in the different offices for disbursing the public money in those departments, and the manner and form of keeping and stating other" (James Mill, Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, new ed., vol. ii. p. 284). To have a conception is thus to have several ideas together, as if they were but one. Mr. Mill-of whose doctrine J. S. Mill opines that it "is as just as it is admirably stated" is careful to use the phrase "I have a conception," rather than "I conceive," in order to exclude the notion that conception involves a special intellectual activity; according to his sensational theory, all knowledge must be regarded as merely "impressed" on the mind, rather than as resulting from an active labor of the mind itself. Thus viewed, a conception can only be particular, not general; or, at most, it can only be the name for the whole aggregate of particular complex ideas which one has actually "had," and which are held to resemble each other. According to a more universal doctrine, founded on a more experimental and concrete theory of the nature of knowledge, conception is not a mere state of mind, but also, and primarily, an intellectual activity. It denotes not simply "having together," but "putting or "grasping together.' It is a selective and discriminative act, directed at once by the laws of thought and by the nature of the immediate subject-matter about which thought may be employed. And its result is a general notion or concept, which embodies whatever is known to be universally essential to the existence and nature of the object, or class of objects, under consideration. The object of the concept is thus the universal law or nature of an object, in distinction from the purely individual peculiarities whereby one object is distinguished from another of the same kind. Concepts of the highest order of generality (pure concepts) are often termed Categories. Thus, for example, the twelve "categories" enumerated in Kant's famous table are termed by him "fundamental concepts of the understanding". e. of the understanding as employed about all possible objects in space and time. They denote, in other words, aspects or relations, some of which must enter into, and, pro tanto, condition, the form of all our particular conceptions of physical objects. (G. S. M.) CONCEPTUALISM, as a system of philosophy, must be viewed in its relations to other modes or stages of thought. The distinction between subject and object, familiar and esssential to modern thought, appears, in the history of philosophy, only after the lapse of ages in which the mind looked out upon the world, trying to understand it, but not perceiving that what it called the world could be only known in its relations to a sentient subject, the observer himself. In Plato, the idea, the objective counterpart of the (subjective) concept, is a permanent reality underlying all phenomena, suggested by them, not deduced from them. He assumes, rather than proves, the (objective) existence of the idea; and it would seem that the process of definition on which he lays so much stress, and which he so carefully develops, is a search for clear and distinct "ideas.' But these are not contrasted with concepts as products of the mind itself, giving unity in consciousness to manifold objects of cognition. The idea is either subjective or objective, or both in one. It may be only regulative, or, as Plato seems rather to regard it, it may be constitutive, individuals being what they are by "participation (ETám) in the idea. But psychology must be developed far beyond the point which it then had reached, before the relation of the concept to the idea could be distinctly sought. Plato we may call, however, an extreme realist." 66 The case is not very different with Aristotle. The form, eidos, or essence of things, is universal, apparently objective. The concept (if 26yos can be deemed equivalent to our modern word) defines or expresses the essence of things (karà 2óyov ovoía.) But no distinction is clearly made between thought and what it supplies to experience on the one side, and objective being on the other. Aristotle, accordingly, has been called a "moderate realist," or, again, a conceptualist." Conceptualism had a later origin. The prevailing subjectivity of some of the sophists, and, still more, of the critical Academy, and the Pyrrhonists, by awakening doubt, and demanding an answer to critical 66 questions (c. g., Is man a measure of all things? návrov xpnμátov μérрov) might have elicited a solution of the problem, if their method had not been destructive of philosophy itself. We may say that when the terms νόημα, ἐννόησις, and the like appear, we are reaching at least the possibility of conceptualism. Among the ancient Stoics, then, we may find the nearest approach which ancient philosophy makes to modern conceptualism, for the problem appears when a (subjective) criterion of truth is sought for which involves a nearer approach to the psychological methods of modern philosophy. The Stoical theory of knowledge resulted naturally from their materialism, and we may call them the unconscious, inconsistent nominalists or conceptualists of their age. The only reality is an individual, corporeal thing, which produces in the soul impressions (presentations, pavracial) like a seal on wax. These, being individual effects, must be assumed to be produced by individual objects. Chrysippus, in whom the psychological tendency begins to appear, includes among these objects of knowledge individual states and activities which can be referred only to the mind itself. Remaining in memory, these impressions produce expericnce, and are united in common notions (Kowai evvoia) by comparison, combination, analogy, etc. (Diog. Laert. VII.) The concept (rò évvónua) is therefore a mental product, a "phantasm of the understanding,' in which, somehow, truth is found. The eternal ideas of Plato are, for the Stoics, only evvonuara produced by sense-perception; as we may say, images together with the notion of a universal application, and a subjective certainty of an object represented. Ideas or concepts, as such, are neither true nor false. Truth or falsehood is found only in connecting them. (This must be logical truth.) Concepts exist in the mind only for what they are. versality consists in their application to a number of individual things whose differences generic terms do not represent to the mind. Uni The well-known passage translated by Boëthius from Porphyry presented this (undeveloped) Stoical conceptualism to the middle ages as one of possible theories: "Whether genera and species subsist by themselves, or in thoughts only, ev μóvais viλais éπivolais, (i. e., concepts of the mind subjective and abstracted), etc. When logic, and consequently the use and signification of terms, were the principal subjects of investigation, the problem could not be ignored. It was only natural that a crude nominalism should at first appear; but a subtle thinker like Abélard was not likely to rest in it. Although the tract De Generibus et Speciebus may not be his, and we have not elsewhere in his authentic works any explicit discussion of the subject, it certainly represents the prevalent opinion of his school. And Abélard himself, without distinctly enunciating his conceptualism, applies it to the Christian doctrine of the Divine Trinity. As nominalism must consider "three Persons to be three individuals, so he interprets them (conceptualist) as the power, wisdom, and love of God. For the problem could not remain an abstract discussion of logic in the schools. Penetrating, as it does, to every part of philosophy, it must needs affect most those questions (e. g., the being of God) which were then most in dispute. For on its solution depends our mode of regarding politics, nature, man, the universe, God himself. In the tract De Gen. et Spec., against realism, in dividuals are the true and only substantial realities, and in them exists only the individual. Against nominalism, general words are not mere names for individuals. The words represent things. What things? It is answered (Ab. Opera, (Cousin's) Vol. III., p. 522) from Boëthius, nihil aliud species esse putanda est nisi cogitatio collecta ex individuorum dissimilium numero substantiali similitudine; genus vero collecta cogitatio ex specierum similitudine; "the species or genera are formed by the mind from individuals which ,, the signs of general ideas; and ideas become general by separating from them the circumstances of time, and place, and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence. By this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing more individuals than one, each of which has a conformity to that abstract idea. (B. III., c. 3. 26.) Names (7) are at first particular (individual), but children, observing resemblances among things, form complex ideas, imperfect as respects those individuals, but capable of representing each one. "Thus they come to have a general name and a general idea""leaving out of the complex idea they had of Peter and James, etc., that which is peculiar to each and retaining only what is common to all." Then children advance to still more general names and notions. (8.) **For, observing several things that differ from their idea of man, and yet have certain similar qualities, and uniting them into one idea, leaving out the differences, they have again another and more general idea. General notions, then, are, and words signify, “abstract and partial ideas of more complex ones taken at first from particular existences. (9.) Thus, if Locke's doctrine of mediate knowledge through “ideas" is accepted, conceptualism seems to be established on a firm and immutable basis. For "generals and universals belong not to the real existence of things, but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it for its own use, and concern only signs, whether words or ideas." (11.) This, in Locke's opinion, is not nominalism. General words do not Intel-signify barely one particular thing," or a plurality; but they do signify this "abstract idea" which is all one with the essence of the species." ( 12.) Here we pass to the consideration of the objective nature of things, which, according to the theory, is not directly known, but is individual only. Things may be similar in certain qualities, but species signifies this abstract idea, this "creature of the understanding. This, of course, is a discriminative nominalism, in peripatetic form, attempting to evade some of its consequences. Words, indeed, sensuously viewed, are but a breath of air (flatus vocis), but they are invented signs for these results of comparison, abstraction, and generalization, and they accompany each successive step of these processes, fixing each as it is accomplished. With William of Occam (d. 1347, A. D.) we may say that English nominalism and conceptualism begin the long career which they still pursue. Knowledge, he says, is of individuals only: "scientia est de rebus singularibus." Terms are signs of concepts (conceptualist), but concepts are undetermined notions, the result of abstraction from many individuals. ligible species" is a non-entity, the universal standing indifferently for many individual things, "significans univoce plura singularia.” The logical questions from which scholasticism took its rise involved the significance of terms rather than the nature of objective truths, and the mode in which the mind arrives at it. But with the advent of modern philosophy we find new questions arising, new modes of arriving at truth. Hobbes seems to stand on the dividing line between the medieval and the modern. His forms of thought are scholastic, while his nominalism is modern, ipsis nominalibus plusquam nominalior." "Nothing," he says, "is universal but names," and "universals recall one of many things. (Lev. I., i. 4.) Yet, after all, Hobbes, in his calm assumption of the objectivity of his knowledge, and his superficial psychology, is himself a schoolman out of date, and in revolt from his school. But when Locke views his "idea" (individual notion) as the only direct object of knowledge, and the medium between the sentient subject and the (assumed) objective actuality, it is plain that conceptualism is before us in a new and modern dress. Locke may be considered as the representative conceptualist of modern times, and modern idealism in general as the successor of medieval (logical) conceptualism; we will let conceptualism, therefore, state its principle through its chief exponent. We still find ourselves on nominalist ground when Locke says, "all things that exist are particulars (individuals) only." But admitting his simple ideas" of single qualities, either existent in (assumed) objective realities, or produced by them in us, it is plain to him that the mind may combine these, and will thus form a complex of qualities to which a general name is attached. The mind being furnished (by sensation and reflection) with a great number of the simple ideas, conveyed in by the senses, as they are found in exterior things, or by reflection on its own operations, takes notice also that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one thing, and words being suited to common apprehension are called, so united in one subject, by one name. (Essay on Hum. Und.. B. II., c. 23.) Words stand for ideas only (B. III., c. 2, 4), but "words become general by being made The third book of Locke's Essay is the best development of conceptualism which has thus far appeared; but it is too familiar to need more than this passing reference. The "good Berkeley," however, though retaining and developing Locke's idealism, can find in these abstract general ideas only a subtle net to ensnare the wit of man (Introd. Princ. of Human Knowledge, 22.) He can discover in his own thought only “particular ideas" (confounding conception and imagination), but they may become virtually general by representing an "indefinite number of particular ideas of the same sect. (12.) This destructive criticism evidently lands us in pure nominalism, for words (general names) signify indifferently a great number of particular ideas. We may pass on, therefore, to the final dissolution of idealism in the crucible of Hume's scepticism. Pursuing the same nominalist track on the same ground of idealism, and finding once more that "all general ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term" which represents any one of them indifferently, we reach at last the (positivist) conclusion that nothing but "ideas" can be known, simple qualities connected, correlated, under the influence of associations. We may call this indifferently nominalism or conceptualism, since any conceivable difference has vanished, but Hume expresses himself in the ordinary nominalist manner. With Reid begins the attempt to dismiss ideas altogether, and, under the guidance of "common sense, to bring the mind directly in contact with the object. In a vague way he seems to admit the conceptualism of Locke. "The power of forming abstract and general conceptions [which Berkeley so explicitly denied] is one of the most distinguishing powers of the human mind" (Intell. Powers, Ess. V., c. 6). "Common names signify common attributes," and need not actually represent any individual thing. He could understand perfectly and have a distinct conception what 66 : 66 was meant by such and such a mathematical line, of the concept of a class, we should speak of the sigwithout ever 'conceiving" in his imagination one nification of a class name. of the kind. In fact, Sir Isaac Newton reached In this brief glance at the historical progress of one the general conception of lines of the third order of the principal modes of thought we have thought before he found out the particular species of them. it best to let conceptualism speak for itself, or display But what under Reid's theory were common attributes, itself in encountering the attacks of its nearest relative, while the only existences, as he says, are individual, nominalism. he (as usual) failed to explain. The whiteness of this The question for so many ages asked in various sheet of paper, he says (c. 3), is not the whiteness of forms is briefly this: Viewing the world of phethat sheet; it is individual; but whiteness (taken nomena as presented to consciousness, and uniting those simply) implies no existence: it is general; it may be correlated in the unity of individual objects, do we predicated of many things. So then there are gen- thus terminate our knowledge of being? A crude eral conceptions signified by such names," viz. every nominalism answers, yes. Being is a plurality of inattribute common to several individuals. "Nature dividuals united by no common essence or nature. has given us the power of combining such simple at Names stand only and indifferently for any one of tributes, and of giving one name to that combination, these which similarly affect the sentient subject. But and considering it as one object of thought." (c. iv.) genera and species are nothing but "class names,' This sounds like conceptualism, although we are told representing a plurality of objects whose resemblances again, “each of those names signifies in general a are more or less indefinite, and which we collect into substance (individual) having a certain combination of conventional groups for our convenience in examining attributes. The name, therefore, must be common them. Realism says, no: There is a permanent to all substances in which those attributes are found,' reality in genera and species. Even if these forms and now we seem to be listening to a nominalist, and have been produced by gradual development, there is may reasonably arrive at Sir Wm. Hamilton's conclu- a fixed type or plan at the end toward which that evosion that there is no essential difference between the lution has proceeded. In some manner left unextwo. Dr. Brown seems to give conceptualism a firmer plained, individuals " participate (μεταλαμβάνουσι) foundation, pointing out also the imperfect analysis in the idea; or, the universal is a common element made by nominalism which, in his view, leaves out objectively existing in each individual substance, and from its theory the resemblances of things. Forming in knowing it we know the essence of the thing, what general notions, he says, is discerning relations between it is; rò rim eiva or being is only one, and all the many individuals. Certain things are found to have more intimate and more numerous relations than others. If not, John and an egg might as well be classed together as John and Peter. This notion of relations constitutes that thought which we express as species and name accordingly; and so the general name signifies the general notion of the relation of similarity in certain respects" (Philos. Hum. Mind, xlvii.); see also Sir W. Hamilton's Metaph. Lect., xxxv.). manifold is but manifestations of it, or emanations from it, having, as such, no reality. Phenomena are manifold, being is only one (in which case it would seem that either names represent collected phenomena, or else the one is expressed under many names); or, finally, finite beings, though many, pre-exist as one thought of one infinite Being; this thought constitutes their unity, and the common name expresses it as suggested to human reason in its experience of individuals belonging to time and space. Kant, also, rejecting pure idealism which in the hands of Hume was proving such a solvent of all Conceptualism, while seeming to hold an interknowledge, tried to lead thought out of the shallows of mediate position, is in reality a form of nominalism pure nominalism where it must lie stranded and help- (Sir Wm. Hamilton) in which the subjective element less into a discriminative conceptualism. This, at least, of thought has come distinctly into consciousness. The if not the object, is a result of his criticism. For, if difference is one of method only, or in the mode of rematerials of knowledge (phenomenal) are given by ex-garding the same truth. Attention is given to the mental perience only, and the forms of thought are supplied by the mind, it is evident that whatever universality the concept possesses, and, with it, general names, is due to the mind itself. Nominalism has talked as if things in themselves were known. That conceit of knowledge is rudely swept away. Such things may exist, but, being unknown, Kant would hardly say that general names stood indifferently for any one of them. But nominalism cannot be thought to have abandoned the field while it speaks so clearly against conceptualism as in Mill's discussion of Sir W. Hamilton's doctrine of concepts (c. xvii.). "A concept is a mere part of a concrete image has nothing that discriminates itself from the other parts except a special share of attention, guaranteed to it by special association with a name, etc.' Thus the general is eliminated, or reduced to a plurality of individuals, and that plurality has no essential ground of unity. Similarity in our feelings as affected by the object leads to a practical identification, either inward and subjective (conceptualism), or objective (Platonic idealism). Mill, like other nominalists, ignores the law that no empirical concept exists without an image in representation, and these two so distinct in their characteristic marks are confounded. "To say that we think by concepts is a circuitous way of saying that we think by means of general or class names. It is "a misfortune that the words concept, general notion, or any other phrase to express the supposed mental modification corresponding to a class name, should ever have been invented." Mill, as we see, would erase the term "Begriff" from the German Lexicon. Instead 66 processes involved in generalization, and to the subjective result whereby things are comprehended (concepta), which result is not to be found outside of the mind itself. The (empirical) concept in itself does not refuse to be referred to the (Platonic) idea, although its mode of formation is so different; but conceptualism simply ignores the latter, if it do not deny it, and must, therefore, be regarded as a psychological nominalism. The fundamental (negative) principle is one, viz.: a denial of any objective validity in universals. Objectively viewed the only reality which they possess is actual or possible, past, present or future, individuals; subjectively viewed, their name is the sensuous sign of an individual mental product. Under the guidance of the one principle or the other, ages, parties, schools have boldly attacked or defended one another, seeming to solve some portion of the everlasting riddle of the Sphynx, What is truth? Conceptualism is the special thought of a subjective and introspective age. It may not be richly loaded with the fruits of ideal genius, but it has met the demands of the severe logic of the critical understanding. It is evident, however, that so long as we travel the empirical road to knowledge, we shall be fenced in by nominalism and conceptualism on either side. When reason attempts to leap over the fence, we may find ourselves in the limitless fields of the ideal. Plato and Parmenides, or Porphyry and Proclus, or the medieval realist will appear under the flag of Hegel or Schelling. But for all the ends of empirical And science, whether of matter or of spirit, conceptualism the British commander in Boston, hoped to destroy has proved, and, doubtless, will prove, a sufficient and satisfactory theory, since the concept itself is an empirical product, and the question of its objective reality belongs to ontology and not to any special science. (J. J. E.) CONCORD, the capital of New Hampshire, and seat of justice of Merrimack co., is on the Merrimack and chiefly on its W. bank. It is 73 miles by rail N. N. W. of Boston, and is the converging point of the following railroads: the Concord, the Concord and Portsmouth, the Northern, the Boston, Concord, and Montreal, the Concord and Claremont, and the Peterborough Railroad. Across the Merrimack there are 7 bridges, 3 of them railway bridges. Concord has a handsome granite State-house standing in a fine park, a State prison, a State insane asylum, a city hall, 2 orphanages, a home for the aged, 7 hotels, 3 national and 4 savings banks, 4 weekly and 2 daily newspapers, 3 large libraries, 18 churches, public, high, and graded schools; also St. Paul's school, a celebrated private school for boys. Concord has a large number of factories and shops, a part of them run by water-power, although the motive power of the Merrimack, naturally very great, is here not extensively utilized. Cotton goods, woollens, furniture, castings, and carriages are the leading articles of manufacture. Here are also extensive quarries of fine white granite, also stonedressing works, machine works, and the shops of two of the railroads. The city has water- and gas-works; property is assessed for taxation at $10,000,000, and the city debt is $175,000 net, besides the water-works debt of $630,000. The streets are well laid out and effectively sewered. Population in 1870, 12,241; in 1880, 13,843. Concord was settled by Massachusetts people in 1726; was incorporated as the town of Rumford in 1733; was named Concord in 1765, and received a city charter in 1853. See Vol. VI. CONCORD, a town of Middlesex co., Mass., 20 miles N. W. of Boston by the Fitchburg p. 214 Am. Railroad. Population, 3922. It was the ed. (P. 240 seat of an Indian village previous to its Edin. ed.). settlement by Rev. Peter Bulkley and Major Simon Willard in 1635, who gave it the name "Concord" from the Christian union and concord among the first settlers, and their peaceful dealings with the Indians, of whom they bought the land. The river on which it stands was called by the Indians "Musketaquid," or "Meadow River," from the great grassy meadows beside it. The apostle Eliot often preached to the Indians here, and there was a village of Christian Indians on the border of the township, But the colonists could not avoid Indian wars, and many of them were killed from 1648 to 1730 in these wars. It soon became an important inland town, and maintained a military company, which took part in the overthrow of Sir Edmund Andros at Boston in 1689. As early as 1767 the Concord people became active in opposition to British taxation, and in 1774 were ready for the separation from the mother-country, which took place, so far as Massachusetts was concerned, in 1775. At that time the population of Concord (including the parish of Carlisle) was 1900, out of which it furnished 174 men for the army of Washington. these stores, and also to seize the persons of Hancock and Adams, who were supposed to be at Lexington, on the road from Boston to Concord. He therefore sent out the detachment above mentioned of 800 men on the evening of April 18, and followed this up with a supporting party of 1100 men under Hugh, Earl Percy, a brigadier-general, who, however, got no farther than Lexington, six miles east of Concord. The first detachment was confronted at Lexington before sunrise, April 19, by the minutemen of Lexington, who, when fired upon, dispersed after a few scattering shots in return. By this time the whole country was alarmed by the vigilance of Paul Revere (whose famous ride extended no farther than Lexington), and at Concord a force of 180 men had gathered before the British 800 came in sight at seven o'clock in the morning. Rev. William Emerson of Concord, grandfather of Ralph Waldo Emerson, urged immediate resistance with this small force, but more cautious counsels prevailed, and Col. Barrett ordered a retreat across the North Bridge to await reinforcements. Meantime, the British began to seize and burn the military stores in the village, and were supposed to be destroying the town; whereupon the American militia, now increased to 300, were formed in column by Lieut. Joseph Hosmer of Concord, who acted as adjutant, and began marching toward the village square to prevent the burning of the place. As they approached the North Bridge, which was guarded by a British company, they were fired upon, and several Americans were killed. The Concord and Acton minutemen, by order of Major Buttrick, returned the fire, killing three British soldiers and wounding seven more. The British at once retreated, but were not then pursued, and this ended the actual fight at Concord bridge. But when the whole British force began their retreat about noon they were fired upon along the road from Concord to Lexington, and lost many men within the limits of the town. At Lexington they were reinforced by Gen. Percy and his brigade, with two field-pieces; but the whole body then retreated to Charlestown, pursued all the way, and losing in the whole day's engagement 73 killed, 172 wounded, and 26 missing-271 men out of 1900. The loss of the Americans was 49 killed, 36 wounded, and 5 missing-or one-third as many as the British lost. Two captains and two privates of the Concord men were wounded. This was the first battle of the war, and was the last time Concord was invaded by armed enemies. Exactly eighty-six years after the above battle the Concord militia, commanded by Capt. Prescott, left town to join in the defence of Washington against the Southern rebels (April 19, 1861). During both these wars the Concord people kept a large number of soldiers in the field, and were liberal in their contributions of money and supplies. Two monuments have been erected to commemorate the fight at the North Bridge -one erected in 1836, on the spot where the British stood, a granite shaft, with an inscription describing the event; the other a bronze statue of a minuteman standing where the first American soldier fell, on the west bank of the Concord River, and erected in 1875, In the village square stands a "soldiers' monument The town's own experience of the Revolutionary to commemorate the Civil War of 1861-65; and in the War was limited to the so-called "battle of Concord," Sleepy Hollow Cemetery, not far off, are the monuwhich took place April 19, 1775, between two regiments of Emerson, Hawthorne, Thoreau, and other ments of colonial militia and minutemen, commanded famous citizens of Concord, who are buried there. by Col. James Barrett, but led in the engagement by Since 1834, when Emerson went there to live in the Major John Buttrick (both citizens and farmers of old manse of his grandfather Dr. Ripley, where he Concord), and a detachment of British infantry, grena- wrote his first book, Nature, the town has been the home diers, and marines, commanded by Lieut.-Col. Smith or the resort of many persons celebrated in literature and Major Pitcairn. The occasion of the encounter and philosophy-of Bronson Alcott, Margaret Fuller, was the accumulation of colonial military stores at Ellery Channing, Mrs. Sarah Ripley, Miss Hoar, Miss Concord, where the provincial congress of Massachu- Alcott, Thoreau, Hawthorne, Miss Peabody, Mrs. Jane setts had been in session in October, 1774, and March, Austin, Prof. Harris, etc: Emerson, Thoreau, Chan1775, with John Hancock as president and Samuel ning, and Hawthorne have made the scenery of ConAdams as one of its leading members. Gen. Gage, cord familiar by their descriptions, and the social cha |