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Congress that day passed, an officer of that Board was the accounts of the persons employed therein, and to appointed who was termed the Comptroller, and who superintend the preservation of the public accounts, was to be annually elected by Congress. He was to subject to his revision. keep the treasury books and seal, to file all accounts By the act of June 3, 1864, a Third Comptroller has and vouchers and to direct the manner of stating been added to the Treasury Department, known as the and keeping them. He was to draw bills under seal upon Comptroller of the Currency. He is at the head of the the Treasurer of the Board for sums due by the United Bureau charged with the execution of all laws passed States on accounts that had been audited, which bills by Congress relating to the issue and regulation of a were, however, to be countersigned by the Auditor national currency. He makes an annual report to previous to payment. He was also to draw bills in a Congress showing the state of the National Banks in similar way for such sums as Congress from time to the country, the capital embarked in those enterprises, time should order. He was to notify any debtor owing the volume of the circulating notes, and other matters money to the United States of his delinquency, and of financial interest. fix a time for payment. In case of failure to pay he The office of Comptroller also exists in many of the was to notify the executive of the State wherein the States eo nomine. In some States the functions of a debtor resided. Wherever the Treasurer of the Board Comptroller are discharged by an officer known as a received money and signed a receipt he was to trans- State Auditor or Auditor-General. It is usually the mit said receipt to the Comptroller, who, after entering duty of a State Comptroller to superintend the fiscal the same, charged the Treasurer, credited the proper concerns of the State, and to manage the same in accounts, indorsed the receipt, and transmitted the the manner required by law. He exhibits to the Legsame to the person paying the money. Reports were islature, at stated times
, accounts of the receipts and ordered to be made quarterly by the Comptroller to Con- expenditures of the State, suggests plans for the imgress. Jonathan Trumbull
, Jr., was the first Comptroller provement and management of the public revenue, of the Board of Treasury, elected by Congress. keeps and states all accounts of the State, directs and
By the act of Congress of Sept. 2, 1789, constitut- superintends the collection of all moneys due it, and ing the Treasury Department of the United States either draws or countersigns all warrants on the State Government, the office of Comptroller was continued. Treasurer. The various States differ, of course, mateIt was declared to be the Comptroller's duty to super- rially as to the powers and duties of this officer. intend the adjustment and preservation of the public In many of the counties and municipalities of the accounts; to examine all accounts settled by the Au- United States, the office of Comptroller exists with ditor and certify the balances arising therefrom to the duties substantially similar to those above specified. Register; to countersign all warrants drawn by the The existence of the office is generally esteemed to Secretary of the Treasury which shall be warranted by constitute a most salutary check on improper and unlaw; to report to the Secretary the official forms of lawful appropriation of the public funds. (L. L., JR.) all papers to be issued in the different offices for col- CONANT, THOMAS JEFFERSON, D. D., an Amerlecting the public revenue, and the manner and form ican Baptist divine and Biblical scholar, was born at of keeping and stating the accounts of the several Brandon, Vt., Dec. 13, 1802. He graduated in 1823, persons employed therein. He was, moreover, to pro- at Middlebury College, Vt. ; was for a time tutor in vide for the regular and punctual payment of all Columbian College, Washington, D. C., and later bemoneys which might be collected, and was to direct came professor of language in the college at Waterprosecutions for all delinquencies of officers of the ville, Me., resigning this place in 1833. In 1835 he revenue, and for debts due to the United States.
was made professor of Biblical literature and criticism The great increase in the business of the Treasury in the theological school at Hamilton, N. Y., and afterDepartment afterwards rendered it necessary to sub- wards studied for some years in Germany. In 1850 divide the duties of the Comptroller's office, and to he accepted a similar professorship in the seminary at appoint two Comptrollers, known respectively as the Rochester. In 1857 he removed to Brooklyn, and deFirst and Second Comptrollers of the Treasury. It is voted himself to the work of preparing a revised the duty of the First Comptroller to examine all ac- English Bible, under the auspices of the American counts settled by the First Auditor except those relat- Bible Union. He was afterwards one of the American ing to the receipts from customs, and all accounts members of the Old Testament Company for revising settled by the Fifth Auditor and the Commissioner of the authorized version. Among his publications are the General Land Office, and to certify the balances annotated translations of the book of Job (1857), Matarising thereon to the Register. It is also his duty to thew (1860), Genesis (1868), the Psalms (1868), and superintend the adjustment and preservation of the Proverbs (1872). His wife, HANNAH CHAPLIN (1809-public accounts subject to his revision, to countersign 1865), a daughter of Rev. Jeremiah Chaplin, D.D., beall warrants drawn by the Secretary of the Treasury came well known as a translator and author. Her which shall be warranted by law, to superintend the chief work was A History of the English Bible (1856). recovery of all debts certified by him to be due to the
CONCEPTION is a logical term, variously defined. United States, and for that purpose to direct all such All definitions agree in giving to the word a signifsuits and legal proceedings, and to take such measures icance which corresponds to one of the ideas involved in as are authorized by law and are adapted to enforce its composition-viz. the idea of unity in multiplicity. prompt payment thereof. The First Comptroller has Conception, from con and capio, means taking or grasppower to direct the First and Fifth Auditors to audit ing several things together or at the same time. Accordand settle any particular account he may deem neces- ingly, pure Nominalism employs the word to denote any sary. He is also bound to make an annual report to complex idea, such as that of a horse. I have the ideas Congress of those officers who have failed to make of the sensations of sight, of touch, of hearing, of smellsettlement of their accounts during the fiscal year, pro- ing, with which the body and actions of a horse have cceding in the manner directed by law.
impressed me, these ideas all combined, and so closely It is the duty of the Second Comptroller to examine that their existence appears simultaneous, and one. all accounts settled by the Second, Third, and Fourth This is my idea of a horse. If I say I have a concepAuditors, and to certify the balances arising thereon tion of a horse, and am asked to explain what I mean, to the Secretary of the department in which the ex- I give the same account exactly, and I can give no pense has been incurred; to countersign all warrants other" (James Mill, Analysis of the Phenomena of the drawn by the Secretaries of War and of the Navy Tluman Mind, new ed., vol. ii. p. 284). To have a which shall be warranted by law; to report to said Sec- conception is thus to have several ideas together, as if retaries the official forms to be issued in the different they were but one. Mr. Mill-of whose doctrine J. S. offices for disbursing the public money in those depart- Mill opines that it is as just as it is admirably stated" ments, and the manner and form of keeping and stating /-is careful to use the phrase “I have a conception,”
rather than “I conceive,” in order to exclude the no- | questions (e. g., Is man a measure of all things ? tion that conception involves a special intellectual ac- TávtWV xpnuátwv uétpov) might have elicited a solution tivity; according to his sensational theory, all knowledge of the problem, if their method had not been demust be regarded as merely “impressed” on the mind, structive of philosophy itself. rather than as resulting from an active labor of the We may say that when the terms νόημα, εννόησις, mind itself. Thus viewed, a conception can only be and the like appear, we are reaching at least the possiparticular, not general; or, at most, it can only be the bility of conceptualism. Among the ancient Stoics, name for the whole aggregate of particular complex then, we may find the nearest approach which ancient ideas which one has actually had,” and which are philosophy makes to modern conceptualism, for the held to resemble each other.
problem appears when a (subjective) criterion of According to a more universal doctrine, founded on truth is sought for which involves a nearer approach a more experimental and concrete theory of the nature to the psychological methods of modern philosophy. of knowledge, conception is not a mere state of mind, The Stoical theory of knowledge resulted naturally but also, and primarily, an intellectual activity. It de- from their materialism, and we may call them the unnotes not simply "having together," but "putting" conscious, inconsistent nominalists or conceptualists of or" grasping together." It is a selective and discrim- their age. The only reality is an individual, corporeal inative act, directed at once by the laws of thought and thing, which produces in the soul impressions (presenby the nature of the immediate subject matter about tations, pavracial) like a seal on wax." These, being inwhich thought may be employed. And its result is a dividual effects, must be assumed to be produced by general notion or concept, which embodies whatever is individual objects. Chrysippus, in whom the psychoknown to be universally essential to the existence and logical tendency begins to appear, includes among these nature of the object, or class of objects, under consid- objects of knowledge individual states and activities eration. The object of the concept is thus the univer- which can be referred only to the mind itself. Resal law or nature of an object, in distinction from the maining in memory, these impressions produce expurely individual peculiarities whereby one object is pericnce, and are united in common notions (kouvai distinguished from another of the same kind. èvvocat) by comparison, combination, analogy, etc.
Concepts of the highest order of generality (pure (Diog. Laert. VII.) The concept (Tò évvonua) is thereconcepts) are often termed Categories. Thus, for ex- fore a mental product, a "phantasm of the underample, the twelve "categories" enumerated in Kant's standing,” in which, somehow, truth is found. famous table are termed by him “fundamental concepts The eternal ideas of Plato are, for the Stoics, only of the understanding”-i, e. of the understanding as évvonuara produced by sense-perception; as we may employed about all possible objects in space and time. say, images together with the notion of a universal They denote, in other words, aspects or relations, some application, and a subjective certainty of an object of which must enter into, and, pro tanto, condition, the represented. Ideas or concepts, as such, are neither form of all our particular conceptions of physical objects. true nor false. Truth or falsehood is found only in
(G. S. M.) connecting them. This must be logical truth.) ConCONCEPTUALISM, as a system of philosophy, cepts exist in the mind only for what they are. Unimust be viewed in its relations to other modes or stages versality consists in their application to a number of of thought.. The distinction between subject and individual things whose differences generic terms do object, familiar and esssential to modern thought, ap- not represent to the mind. pears, in the history of philosophy, only after the The well-known passage translated by Boëthius lapse of
ages in which the mind looked out upon the from Porphyry presented this (undeveloped) Stoical world, trying to understand it, but not perceiving that conceptualism to the middle ages as one of possible what it called the world could be only known in its re- theories : “Whether genera and species subsist by lations to a sentient subject, the observer himself. themselves, or in thoughts only, év uovaus phais Enevolais, In Plato, the idea, the objective counterpart of the (i
. e, concepts of the mind subjective and abstracted), (subjective) concept, is a permanent reality underlying etc. When logic, and consequently the use and all phenomena, suggested by them, not deduced from signification of terms, were the principal subjects of them. He assumes, rather than proves, the objective) investigation, the problem could not be ignored. It existence of the idea ; and it would seem that the was only natural that a crude nominalism should at process of definition on which he lays so much stress, first appear; þut a subtle thinker like Abélard was not and which he so carefully develops, is a search for likely to rest in it. Although the tract De Generibus clear and distinct “ideas." But these are not con- et Speciebus may not be his, and we have not elsetrasted with concepts as products of the mind itself, where in his authentic works any explicit discussion of giving unity in consciousness to manifold objects of the subject, it certainly represents the prevalent opincognition. The idea is either subjective or objective, ion of his school. And Abélard himself, without or both in one. It may be only regulative, or, as Plato distinctly enunciating his conceptualism, applies it to seems rather to regard it, it may be constitutive, the Christian doctrine of the Divine Trinity. As individuals being what they are by participation nominalism must consider "three Persons
to be (uetá Ampes) in the idea. But psychology must be de- three individuals, so he interprets them (conceptualist) veloped far beyond the point which it then had reached, as the power, wisdom, and love of God. For the before the relation of the concept to the idea could be problem could not remain an abstract discussion of distinctly sought., Plato we may call, however, an logic in the schools. Penetrating, as it does, to every extreme realist.”
part of philosophy, it must needs affect most those The case is not very different with Aristotle. The questions (e. g., the being of God) which were then form, eidos, or essence of things, is universal, apparently most in dispute. For on its solution depends oui objective. The concept (if noyos can be deemed mode of regarding politics, nature, man, the universe, equivalent to our modern word) defines or expresses God himself. the essence of things (v katà hóyov ovoia.) But no In the tract De Gen, et Spec., against realism, in distinction is clearly made between thought and what dividuals are the true and only substantial realities, it supplies to experience on the one side, and objective and in them exists only the individual. Against nomibeing on the other. Aristotle, accordingly, has been nalism, general words are not mere names for individcalled a “ moderate realist," or, again, a "concep- uals. The words represent things. What things? tualist.'
It is answered (Ab. Opera, (Cousin's) Vol. III., p. 522) Conceptualism had a later origin. The prevailing from Boëthius, " nihil aliud species esse putanda est subjectivity of some of the sophists, and, still more, nisi cogitatio collecta ex individuorum dissimilium of the critical Academy, and the Pyrrhonists, by numero substantiali similitudine; genus vero collecta awakening doubt, and demanding an answer to critical cogitatio ex specierum similitudine;
» the species or As for genus,
genera are formed by the mind from individuals which the signs of general ideas ; and ideas become general resemble one another. Both matter and form are in- by separating from them the circumstances of time, dividual only, but the matter (e. 9, man) is similar in and place, and any other ideas that may determine Plato and Socrates (p. 524), and that essence of man them to this or that particular existence. By this which underlies (sustinet) the individuality of Socrates way of abstraction they are made capable of repreis nowhere but in him. Species, then, is not that senting more individuals than one, each of which has essence of man which is in Socrates alone, or any a conformity to that abstract idea." (B. III., c. 3, 86.) other, but that “whole collection conjoined, of indi- Names (27) are at first particular (individual), but viduals of this nature. This whole collection, although children, observing resemblances among things, form essentially manifold, custom calls one species, one uni- complex ideas, imperfect as respects those individuals, versal, one nature; as a people, although composed of but capable of representing each one. “Thus they many persons, is called one.
each come to have a general name and a general idea"'particular essence of that collection which we call " leaving out of the complex idea they had of Peter humanity is composed of matter and form ; the matter and James, etc., that which is peculiar to each and reis animal, the form several, * but that animal which taining only what is common to all.” Then children underlies the form of humanity in one is not essentially advance to still more general names and notions. (8.) elsewhere.
“For, observing several things that differ from their This, of course, is a discriminative nominalism, in idea of man, and yet have certain similar qualities, and peripatetic form, attempting to evade some of its con- uniting them into one idea, leaving out the differences, sequences. Words, indeed, sensuously viewed, are they have again another and more general idea. but a breath of air (Aatus vocis), but they are invented General notions, then, are, and words signify, “abstract signs for these results of comparison, abstraction, and and partial ideas of more complex ones taken at first generalization, and they accompany each successive from particular existences." ( 9.) Thus, if Locke's step of these processes, fixing each as it is accom- doctrine of mediate knowledge through ideas” is plished.
accepted, conceptualism seems to be established on a With William of Occam (d. 1347, A. D.) we may say firm and immutable basis. For “generals and unithat English nominalism and conceptualism begin the versals belong not to the real existence of things, but long career which they still pursue. Knowledge, he are the inventions and creatures of the understanding, says, is of individuals only: scientia est de rebus sin- made by it for its own use, and concern only signs, gularibus.” Terms are signs of concepts (conceptu- whether words or ideas." (? 11.) This, in Locke's alist), but concepts are undetermined notions, the opinion, is not nominalism. General words do not result of abstraction from many individuals. Intel
signify barely one particular thing," or a plurality; ligible species" is a non-entity, the universal standing but they do signify this abstract idea" which is all indifferently for many individual things, “ significans one with the essence of the species." (? 12.) Here univoce plura singularia.
we pass to the consideration of the objective nature of The logical questions from which scholasticism took things, which, according to the theory, is not directly its rise involved the significance of terms rather than known, but is individual only. Things may be similar the nature of objective truths, and the mode in which in certain qualities, but species signifies this abstract the mind arrives at it. But with the advent of modern idea, this "creature of the understanding. philosophy we find new questions arising, new modes The third book of Locke's Essay is the best develof arriving at truth.
opment of conceptualism which has thus far appeared; Hobbes seems to stand on the dividing line between but it is too familiar to need more than this passing the mediæval and the modern. His forms of thought reference. The "good Berkeley," however, though are scholastic, while his nominalism is modern, ipsis retaining and developing Locke's idealism, can find nominalibus plusquam nominalior. "Nothing,'' he these abstract general ideas only a subtle net to ensnare says, "is universal bụt names, and "universals recall the wit of man (Introd. Princ. of Human Knowledge, one of many things. (Lev. I., i. 4.) Yet, after all, 222.) He can discover in his own thought only particHobbes, in his calm assumption of the objectivity of ular ideas” (confounding conception and imagination), his knowledge, and his superficial psychology, is him- but they may become virtually general by representing self a schoolman out of date, and in revolt from his an indefinite number of particular ideas of the same school.
sect." (& 12.) This destructive criticism evidently But when Locke views his "idea'' (individual lands us in pure nominalism, for words (general names) notion) as the only direct object of knowledge, and the signify indifferently a great number of particular medium between the sentient subject and the (assumed) ideas. objective actuality, it is plain that conceptualism is be
We may pass on, therefore, to the final dissolution fore us in a new and modern dress. Locke may be of idealism in the crucible of Hume's scepticism. considered as the representativeconceptualist of modern Pursuing the same nominalist track on the same times, and modern idealism in general as the successor ground of idealism, and finding once more that “all of mediæval (logical) conceptualism ; we will let con- general ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed ceptualism, therefore, state its principle through its to a certain term ” which represents any one of them chief exponent. We still find ourselves on nominalist indifferently, we reach at last the (positivist) concluground when Locke says, "all things that exist are sion that nothing but “ideas" can be known, simple particulars (individuals) only.”' But admitting his qualities connected, correlated, under the influence of
simple ideas” of single qualities, either existent in associations. We may call this indifferently nomi(assumed) objective realities, or produced by them in nalism or conceptualism, since any conceivable differus, it is plain to him that the mind may combine these, ence has vanished, but Hume expresses himself in the and will thus form a complex of qualities to which a ordinary nominalist manner. general name is attached. "The mind being furnished With Reid begins the attempt to dismiss ideas (by sensation and reflection) with a great number of altogether, and, under the guidance of common the simple ideas, conveyed'in by the senses, as they sense,” to bring the mind directly in contact with the are found in exterior things, or by reflection on its own object. In a vague way he seems to admit the conoperations, takes notice also that a certain number of ceptualism of Locke. "The power of forming abstract these simple ideas go constantly together ; which being and general conceptions (whích Berkeley so explicitly presumed to belong to one thing, and words being denied] is one of the most distinguishing powers of the suited to common apprehension-are called, so united human mind” (Intell. Powers, Ess. V., c. 6). "Common in one subject, by one name. (Essay on Hum. Und. names signify common attributes," and need not actB. II., c. 23.) Words stand for ideas only (B. III., ually represent any individual thing. He could underC. 2, 24), but "words become general by being made stand perfectly and have a distinct conception what was meant by such and such a mathematical line, 1 of the concept of a class, we should speak of the sigwithout ever" conceiving" in his imagination one nification of a class name. of the kind. In fact, Sir Isaac Newton reached In this brief glance at the historical progress of one the general conception of lines of the third order of the principal modes of thought we have thought before he found out the particular species of them. it best to let conceptualism speak for itself, or display But what under Reid's theory were common attributes, itself in encountering the attacks of its nearest relative, while the only existences, as he says, are individual, nominalism. he (as usual) failed to explain. The whiteness of this The question for so many ages asked in various sheet of paper, he says (c. 3), is not the whiteness of forms is briefly this : Viewing the world of phethat sheet; it is individual; but whiteness (taken nomena as presented to consciousness, and uniting those simply) implies no existence : it is general ; it may be correlated in the unity of individual objects, do we predicated of many things. So then there are gen- thus terminate our knowledge of being? A crude eral conceptions signified by such names,'' viz. : every nominalism answers, yes. Being is a plurality of inattribute common to several individuals. Nature dividuals united by no common essence or nature. has given us the power of combining such simple at- Names stand only and indifferently for any one of tributes, and of giving one name to that combination, these which similarly affect the sentient subject. But and considering it as one object of thought.”' (c. iv.) genera and species are nothing but “class names,' This sounds like conceptualism, although we are told representing a plurality of objects whose resemblances again, “ each of those names signifies in general a are more or less indefinite, and which we collect into substance (individual) having a certain combination of conventional groups for our convenience in examining attributes. The name, therefore, must be common them. Realism says, no : There is a permanent to all substances in which those attributes are found," reality in genera and species. Even if these forms and now we seem to be listening to a nominalist, and have been produced by gradual development, there is may reasonably arrive at Sir Wm. Hamilton's conclu- a fixed type or plan at the end toward which that evosion that there is no essential difference between the lution has proceeded. In some manner left unextwo. Dr. Brown seems to give conceptualism a firmer plained, individuals “participate" (ueta haußávovol) foundation, pointing out also the imperfect analysis in the idea ; or, the universal is a common element made by nominalism which, in his view, leaves out objectively existing in each individual substance, and from its theory the resemblances of things. Forming in knowing it we know the essence of the thing, what general notions, he says, is discerning relations between it is; Tò ri nu sivai or being is only one, and all the many individuals. Certain things are found to have manifold is but manifestations of it, or emanations more intimate and more numerous relations than from it, having, as such, no reality. Phenomena are others. If not, John and an egg might as well be manifold, being is only one (in which case it would classed together as John and Peter. This notion of seem that either names represent collected phenomena, relations constitutes that thought which we express as or else the one is expressed under many names); or, species and name accordingly; and so the general name finally, finite beings, though many, pre-exist as one signifies “the general notion of the relation of simi- thought of one infinite Being; this thought conlarity in certain respects” (Philos. Hum. Mind, xlvii.); stitutes their unity, and the common name expresses see also Sir W. Hamilton's Metaph. Lect., xxxv.). it as suggested to human reason in its experience of
Kant, also, rejecting pure idealism which in the individuals belonging to time and space. hands of Hume was proving such a solvent of all Conceptualism, while seeming to hold an interknowledge, tried to lead thought out of the shallows of mediate position is in reality a form of nominalism pure nominalism where it must lie stranded and help- (Sir Wm. Hamilton) in which the subjective element less into a discriminative conceptualism. This, at least, of thought has come distinctly into consciousness. The if not the object, is a result of his criticism.' For, if difference is one of method only, or in the mode of rematerials of knowledge (phenomenal) are given by ex- garding the same truth. Attention is given to the mental perience only, and the forms of thought are supplied by processes involved in generalization, and to the subthe mind, it is evident that whatever universality thejective result whereby things are comprehended (conconcept possesses, and, with it, general names, is due cepta), which result is not to be found outside of the to the mind itself.' Nominalism has talked as if things mind'itself. in themselves were known. That conceit of knowledge The empirical) concept in itself does not refuse to be is rudely swept away. Such things may exist, but, referred to the (Platoníc) idea, although its mode of being unknown, Kant would hardly say that general formation is so different; but conceptualism simply names stood indifferently for any one of them. ignores the latter, if it do not deny it, and must, there
But nominalism cannot be thought to have aban- fore, be regarded as a psychological nominalism. The doned the field while it speaks so clearly against con- fundamental (negative) principle is one, viz. : a denial ceptualism as in Mill's discussion of Sir W. Hamil- of any objective validity in universals
. Objectively ton's doctrine of concepts (c. xvii.). "A concept is a viewed the only reality which they possess is actual mere part of a concrete image—has nothing that dis- or possible, past
, present or future, individuals; subcriminates itself from the other parts except a special jectively viewed, their name is the sensuous sign of an share of attention, guaranteed to it by special associa- individual mental product. tion with a name, etc.” Thus the general is elimi- Under the guidance of the one principle or the nated, or reduced to a plurality of individuals, and other, ages, parties, schools have boldly attacked or that plurality has no essential ground of unity. Simi- defended one another, seeming to solve some portion larity in our feelings as affected by the object leads to of the everlasting riddle of the Sphynx, What is a practical identification, either inward and subjective truth? Conceptualism is the special thought of a (conceptualism), or objective (Platonic idealism) subjective and introspective age. It may not be
Mill, like other nominalists, ignores the law that no richly loaded with the fruits of ideal genius, but it has empirical concept exists without an image in represen- met the demands of the severe logic of the critical tation, and these two so distinct in their characteristic understanding. marks are confounded. "To say that we think by It is evident, however, that so long as we travel the concepts is a circuitous way of saying that we think empirical road to knowledge, we shall be fenced in by by means of general or class names. It is “a mis- nominalism and conceptualism on either side. When fortune that the words concept, general notion, or any reason attempts to leap over the fence, we may find other phrase to express the supposed mental modifica- ourselves in the limitless fields of the ideal. And tion corresponding to a class name, should ever have Plato and Parmenides, or Porphyry and Proclus, or been invented.”. Mill, as we see, would erase the the mediæval realist will appear under the flag of term "Begriff” from the German Lexicon. Instead Hegel or Schelling. But for all the ends of empirical science, whether of matter or of spirit, conceptualism the British commander in Boston, hoped to destroy has proved, and, doubtless, will prove, a sufficient and these stores, and also to seize the persons of Hansatisfactory theory, since the concept itself is an cock and Adams, who were supposed to be at Lexempirical product, and the question of its objective ington, on the road from Boston to Concord. He reality belongs to ontology and not to any special therefore sent out the detachment above mentioned science.
(J. J. E.) of 800 men on the evening of April 18, and followed CONCORD, the capital of New Hampshire, and this up with a supporting party of 1100 men under seat of justice of Merrimack co., is on the Merrimack Hugh, Earl Percy, a brigadier-general, who, however, and chiefly on its W. bank. It is 73 miles by rail N. got no farther than Lexington, six miles east of ConN. W. of Boston, and is the converging point of the cord. The first detachment was confronted at Lexfollowing railroads: the Concord, the Concord and ington before sunrise, April 19, by the minutemen Portsmouth, the Northern, the Boston, Concord, and of Lexington, who, when fired upon, dispersed after Montreal, the Concord and Claremont, and the Peter- a few scattering shots in return. By this time the borough Railroad. Across the Merrimack there are 7 whole country was alarmed by the vigilance of Paul bridges, 3 of them railway bridges. Concord has a Revere (whose famous ride extended no farther than handsome granite State-house standing in a fine park, Lexington), and at Concord a force of 180 men had a State prison, a State insane asylum, a city hall
, 2 gathered before the British 800 came in sight at seven orphanages, a home for the aged, 7 hotels, 3 national o'clock in the morning. Rev. William Emerson of and 4 savings banks, 4 weekly and 2 daily newspapers, Concord, grandfather of Ralph Waldo Emerson, urged 3 large libraries, 18 churches, public, high, and graded immediate resistance with this small force, but more schools ; also St. Paul's school, a celebrated private cautious counsels prevailed, and Col. Barrett ordered school for boys. Concord has a large number of fac-a retreat across the North Bridge to await reinforcetories and shops, a part of them run by water-power, ments. Meantime, the British began to seize and burn although the motive power of the Merrimack, natur- the military stores in the village, and were supposed to ally very great, is here not extensively utilized. Cot- be destroying the town; whereupon the American miton goods, woollens, furniture, castings, and carriages litia, now increased to 300, were formed in colunın by are the leading articles of manufacture. Here are Lieut. Joseph Hosmer of Concord, who acted as adjualso extensive quarries of fine white granite, also stone- tant, and began marching toward the village square to dressing works, machine works, and the shops of two prevent the burning of the place. As they approached of the railroads. The city has water- and gas-works; the North Bridge, which was guarded by a British property is assessed for taxation at $10,000,000, and company, they were fired upon, and several Americans the city debt is $175,000 net, besides the water-works were killed. The Concord and Acton minutemen, by debt of $630,000. The streets are well laid out and order of Major Buttrick, returned the fire, killing three effectively sewered. Population in 1870, 12,241 ; in British soldiers and wounding seven more. The Brit1880, 13,843. Concord was settled by Massachu- ish at once retreated, but were not then pursued, and setts people in 1726 ; was incorporated as the town of this ended the actual fight at Concord bridge. But Rumford in 1733; was named Concord in 1765, and when the whole British force began their retreat about received a city charter in 1853.
noon they were fired upon along the road from Concord CONCORD, a town of Middlesex co., Mass., 20 to Lexington, and lost many men within the limits of See Vol. VI. miles N. W. of Boston by the Fitchburg the town. At Lexington they were reinforced by Gen. p. 214 Am. Railroad. Population, 3922. It was the Percy and his brigade, with two field-pieces; but the edin Ped340 seat of an Indian village previous to its whole body then retreated to Charlestown, pursued all
settlement by Rev. Peter Bulkley and the way, and losing in the whole day's engagement 73 Major Simon Willard in 1635, who gave it the name killed, 172 wounded, and 26 missing—271 men out of “Concord” from the Christian union and concord 1900.' The loss of the Americans was 49 killed, 36 among the first settlers, and their peaceful dealings wounded, and 5 missing—or one-third as many as the with the Indians, of whom they bought the land. British lost. Two captains and two privates of the The river on which it stands was called by the Indians Concord men were wounded. This was the first battle "Musketaquid,” or Meadow River," from the great of the war, and was the last time Concord was invaded grassy meadows beside it. The apostle Eliot often by armed enemies. preached to the Indians here, and there was a village Exactly eighty-six years after the above battle the of Christia: Indians on the border of the township: Concord militia, commanded by Capt. Prescott, left But the colonists could not avoid Indian wars, and town to join in the defence of Washington against the many of them were killed from 1648 to 1730 in these Southern rebels (April 19, 1861). During both these wars. It soon became an important inland town, and wars the Concord people kept a large number of solmaintained a military company, which took part in the diers in the field, and were liberal in their contributions overthrow of Sir Edmund Andros at Boston in 1689. of money and supplies. Two monuments have been As carly as 1767 the Concord people became active in erected to commemorate the fight at the North Bridge opposition to British taxation, and in 1774 were ready --one erected in 1836, on the spot where the British for the separation from the mother-country, which stood, -a granite shaft
, with an inscription describing took place, so far as Massachusetts was concerned, in the event; the other a bronze statue of a minuteman 1775. At that time the population of Concord (includ- standing where the first American soldier fell
, on the ing the parish of Carlisle) was 1900, out of which it west bank of the Concord River, and erected in 1875. furnished 174 men for the army of Washington. In the village square stands a "soldiers' monument
The town's own experience of the Revolutionary to commemorate the Civil War of 1861-65; and in the War was limited to the so-called “battle of Concord, Sleepy Hollow Cemetery, not far off, are the monuwhich took place April 19, 1775, betwcen two regi; ments of Emerson, Hawthorne, Thoreau, and other ments of colonial militia and minutemen, commanded famous citizens of Concord, who are buried there. by Col. James Barrett, but led in the engagement by Since 1834, when Emerson went there to live in the Major John Buttrick' (both citizens and farmers of “
of his grandfather Dr. Ripley, where he Concord), and a detachment of British infantry, grena- wrote his first book, Nature, the town has been the home diers, and marines, commanded by Licut.-Col. Smith or the resort of many persons celebrated in literature and Major Pitcairn. The occasion of the encounter and philosophy-of Bronson Alcott, Margaret Fuller, was the accumulation of colonial military stores at Ellery Channing, Mrs. Sarah Ripley, Miss Hoar, Miss Concord, where the provincial congress of Massachu- Alcott, Thoreau, Hawthorne, Miss Peabody, Mrs. Jane setts had been in session in October, 1774, and March, Austin, Prof. Harris, etc: Emerson, Thoreau, Chan1775, with John Hancock as president and Samuel ning, and Hawthorne have made the scenery of Co.7Adams as one of its leading members. Gen. Gage, cord' familiar by their descriptions, and the social chub