Opinion of the Court. teenth Amendment, in the fact that some discretion is allowed to the inspector in determining the number of times the mines shall be inspected, and the fees fixed therefor, particularly in view of the fact that no complaint is made of the abuse of such discretion, or that the inspector has been "guilty of any act tending to the injury of miners or operators of mines during their term of office." Sec. 11 c. While it is undoubtedly true that legislative power cannot be delegated to the courts or to the executive, there are some exceptions to the rule under which it is held that Congress may leave to the President the power of determining the time when or exigency upon the happening of which a certain act shall take effect. Thus in the leading case of The Aurora, 7 Cranch, 382, it was held that Congress might make the revival of a law conditional upon a fact then contingent, and empower the President to declare by proclamation that such fact has occurred and the law revived. It has also been the immemorable policy in this country and in England to vest in municipal organizations certain local powers in respect to which they are peculiarly interested, and of the necessities of which they are much better informed than a general legislature possibly could be. Other instances are cited by Judge Cooley in his work upon Constitutional Limitations: "For the like reasons the question whether a county or a township shall be divided and a new one formed, or two townships or school districts, formerly one, be reunited, or a county seat be located at a particular place, or after its location removed elsewhere, or the municipality contract particular duties, or engage in a particular improvement, is always a question which may be with propriety referred to the voters of the municipality for decision." The last case in this court in which the question arose, is that of Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, in which it was held that while. Congress could not under the Constitution delegate its legislative power to the President, it might authorize him to suspend, by proclamation, the free introduction of sugar, coffee and similar articles, when he was satisfied that any country producing such articles imposed duties, or other exactions, upon the prod Opinion of the Court. ucts of the United States which he might deem to be reciprocally unequal or unreasonable. it may In enacting a law with regard to the inspection of mines, we see no objection, in case the legislature find it impracticable to classify the mines for the purposes of inspection, to commit that power to a body of experts who are not only experienced in the operation of mines, but are acquainted with the details necessary to be known to make a reasonable classification, although affect the amount of fees to be paid by the mine owners. It is obviously necessary that the number of inspections per year shall be determined by some one and by some executive officer. As it is clearly a matter of detail which could not be determined by the courts, it occurs to us that it could be entrusted to no one so safely as to the inspector of the district, who is appointed with great care, and who must be thirty years of age, a citizen of the State, and have a knowledge of mining engineering sufficient to conduct the development of coal mines and a practical knowledge of the method of conducting the mining for coal in the presence of explosive gases and of the ventilation of coal mines. Each one must have a practical mining experience of ten years, not interested as owner, operator, stockholder, superintendent or mining engineer of any coal mine during his term of office, and be of good moral character and temperate habits. The stipulation upon which the case was tried shows that the defendants were the owners of thirty-one mines, and that they were inspected between November 22, 1895, and June 26, 1899, two hundred and forty times, which was at the rate of about seventy-eight times per year for all of the thirty-one mines, or about two and one half times per year for each mine. As section 11 d of the act requires each inspector to inspect each and every mine in his district at least four times a year, it would seem that instead of overdoing his duty, he had been derelict in the performance of it. 4. It is also true that the fees for each inspection shall not be less than six dollars nor more than ten dollars, and that such fees shall be regulated by the class of the mine, which shall be fixed by the inspector and depend upon the length of time con Opinion of the Court. sumed and the expense necessarily incurred in the inspection of such mine. Objection is made upon the ground that it gives to each mining inspector not only the right to determine the number of times each mine shall be inspected, but the fees to be charged in each case. If his discretion were unlimited in this direction, and the fees were retained by himself, there would be much force in the suggestion; but the truth is that the amount of the fee must be in each case somewhere between six dollars and ten dollars, and must be paid to the Secretary of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and by him covered into the State treasury, to be held as a fund for the payment of the salaries of the mining inspectors. Each inspector provided for by the act receives for his services $1800 per annum, to be paid quarterly out of the funds in the state treasury received for the inspection fees, and in the event of such fees being inadequate to compensate such inspectors in the amount provided for herein, the deficiency of the salaries shall be paid out of the money in the state treasury not otherwise appropriated. It appears, then, first, that the state inspector receives a regular salary, neither increased nor diminished by the number of inspections or the amount paid for each inspection; and, second, that he receives such salary directly from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and not from the fees paid to him therefor. As his compensation is dependent neither upon the number of his visits nor upon the amount of his fees, it is difficult to see how he would gain by multiplying one or magnifying the other. We know of no reason why the legislature should deprive itself of the best attainable evidence of the facts it seeks to make determinative of these two questions. As we fail to discover any repugnancy between the acts in question and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, we are of opinion that the decree of the Supreme Court was right, and should be Affirmed. Opinion of the Court. UNITED STATES v. LEE YEN TAI. CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. CHIN BAK KAN v. UNITED STATES. CHIN YING v. UNITED STATES. APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. Nos. 503, 525, 526. Argued March 13, 14, 1902.-Decided April 21, 1902. In case statutes are alleged to be inconsistent with each other, effect must be given to both, if by any reasonable interpretation, that can be done; and like principles must control when the question is whether an act of Congress has been superseded in whole or in part by a subsequent treaty with a foreign nation. THESE three cases were all argued together. The opinion of the court is entitled only in No. 503, United States v. Lee Yen Tai. The case is stated in that opinion of the court. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Hoyt for the United States in all the cases. Mr. B. Lewinson and Mr. Max J. Kohler for the appellees in No. 503, and for the appellants in Nos. 525 and 526. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court. This case is here upon a certified question of law arising in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The facts out of which the question arose and the question. itself are shown by the following statement sent up by that court: "On the 8th day of October, 1900, complaint was made un Opinion of the Court. der oath before a commissioner of the United States for the Northern District of New York, charging that Lee Gin Moy, alias Lee Yen Tai, on the sixth day of October, A. D. 1900, 'did unlawfully come into the United States from China, he being then and there a Chinese person and laborer, and not being a diplomatic or other officer of the Chinese or any other Government, and without producing the certificate required of Chinese persons seeking to enter the United States, and that he was not entitled to be or remain within the United States.' A warrant for said defendant's arrest was issued by said United States commissioner on the same day, and after a hearing before said commissioner he issued a warrant of deportation in which the following adjudication was placed on record: "I now hereby find and adjudge that the said Lee Gin Moy is a Chinese person and laborer; that he is not a diplomatic or other officer of the Chinese, or of any other Government, and unlawfully entered the United States as charged in said complaint; and I further adjudge him, said Lee Gin Moy, guilty of not being lawfully entitled to be or remain in the United States.' "Said defendant's immediate removal to China by the United States marshal for said Northern District of New York upon said warrant was ordered by said commissioner. While the marshal had him in custody, and in process of deportation, habeas corpus was issued by the District Court for the Southern District of New York. The petition upon which the writ of habeas corpus issued averred, among other things, that said Lee Yen Tai was a merchant having an interest of one thousand dollars ($1000) in the capital of the firm, and is not a laborer, and has not been a laborer, but is a merchant and member of a firm specified in the petition, and has always been a merchant since he had any status. "Before the District Court the prisoner was produced, and a return made which included the aforesaid warrant of depor tation; said return was traversed and no evidence as to defendant's status other than the allegations in the aforesaid petition and return was before the District Court. Upon the hearing in the District Court the petitioner was discharged upon giving |