INDEX.

ALIENS.

1. The power to exclude or expel aliens is vested in the political depart-
ments of the Government, to be regulated by treaty or by act of Con-
gress, and to be executed by the executive authority according to such
regulations, except so far as the judicial department is authorized by
treaty or by statute, or is required by the Constitution, to intervene.
And this is true of the privilege of transit. Fok Yung Yo v. United
States, 296.

2. By the treaty between the United States and China, of 1894, the priv-
ilege of transit across the territory of the United States could only be
enjoyed subject to such regulations of the Government of the United
States as might be necessary to prevent the privilege from being
abused. Ib.

3. The treaty, in recognizing the privilege and providing that it should con-
tinue, proceeded on the ground of its existence and continuance under
governmental regulations, and no act of Congress was required to carry
it into effect. Ib.

4. Under existing regulations the action of the collector of customs in re-
fusing transit cannot be interfered with by the courts. Ib.

5. Fok Yung Yo ante, 296, followed. Lee Gon Yung v. United States, 306.

APPEAL.

Where the decree of a Circuit Court and the order allowing an appeal both
state that the bill was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, no separate
certificate is necessary, and the appeal may be taken at any time within
two years. Excelsior Pipe Company v. Pacific Bridge Co., 282.

CASES DISTINGUISHED.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3.

CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.

1. The facts and law of this case were so fully and satisfactorily discussed
in the Court of Claims that its opinion might well be adopted as that
of this court. United States v. Borcherling, 223.

2. That court held that the claimant Borcherling was entitled, on the facts
shown, to recover from the United States the sum of seven thousand
and nine hundred dollars, and this court holds that the conclusions of
that court were correct and affirms the judgment. Ib.

3. Section 19 of the act of May 28, 1896, c. 252, providing that "the terms
of office of all commissioners of the Circuit Courts heretofore appointed
shall expire on the thirtieth day of June, 1897, . . . and said com-

(515)

missioners shall then deposit all the records and other official papers
appertaining to their offices in the office of the clerk of the Circuit
Court, by which they were appointed,” not having authorized the fil-
ing of the writings in question, and no provision having been made for
compensating the clerk for the service of receiving them and retaining
them in his custody, the Court of Claims erred in awarding judgment
in favor of the claimant. United States v. Van Duzee, 278.

COAL MINES.

1. It is within the power of a state legislature to provide for the appoint-
ment of inspectors of mines and the payment of their fees by the
owners of the mines. St. Louis Coal Company v. Illinois, 203.

2. A law providing for the inspection of coal mines is not unconstitutional
by reason of its limitation to mines where more than five men are
employed at any one time. Ib.

3. Where the law provided for an inspection of coal mines at least four
times a year, it was held not to be objectionable by reason of the fact
that a discretion was invested in the inspectors to cause the mines to
be inspected more than four times a year, and as often as they might
deem it necessary and proper. Ib.

4. A law providing that the fees for each inspection shall not be less than
six nor more than ten dollars is not rendered unconstitutional by the
fact that, within these limits, the fees for each inspection are fixed by
the inspector. Ib.

5. The act of Congress, approved June 28, 1898, known as the Curtis Act,
did not operate to deprive the lessors of coal mines in the Choctaw
Nation of royalties due and owing to them for coal mined under valid
leases, prior to that date. Southwestern Coal Company v. McBride, 499.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. Giving to the statute of Tennessee the same meaning that was given to
it by the Supreme Court of that State, which this court is bound to do,
it is held that it violates the interstate commerce clause of the Consti-
tution of the United States. Stockard v. Morgan, 27.

2. All the cases cited in the opinion of the court deny the right of a State
to tax people representing owners of property outside the State for the
privilege of soliciting orders within it, as agents of such owners, for
property to be shipped to persons within the State. Ib.

3. Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing District, 145 U. S. 1, distinguished from
this case.
Ib.

4. Although a State has general power to tax individuals and property
within its jurisdiction, yet it has no power to tax interstate commerce,
even in the person of a resident of the State. Ib.

5. The seventh section of the act of Pennsylvania of April 27, 1855, is as
follows: "That in all cases where no payment, claim, or demand shall
have been made on account of or for any ground rent, annuity, or other
charge upon real estate for twenty-one years, or no declaration or
acknowledgment of the existence thereof shall have been made within

that period by the owner of the premises, subject to such ground rent,
annuity, or charge, a release or extinguishment thereof shall be pre-
sumed, and such ground rent, annuity, or charge shall thereafter be
irrecoverable: Provided, That the evidence of such payment may be
perpetuated by recording in the recorder of deeds' office of the proper
county the duplicate of any receipt therefor, proved by oath or affirm-
ation to be a true copy of that signed and delivered in the presence of
the payer and witnessed at the time by this deponent, which recorded
duplicate or the exemplification of the record thereof shall be evidence
until disproved; and the evidence of any such claim or demand may
be perpetuated by the record of any judgment recovered for such rent,
annuity, or charge in any court of record, or the transcript therein
filed of any recovery thereof by judgment before any alderman or jus-
tice of the peace, which record and judgment shall be duly indexed:
Provided, That this section shall not go into effect until three years
from the passage of this act." Held, that this was not an act or law
impairing the obligation of contracts within the meaning of the Con-
stitution of the United States. Wilson v. Iseminger, 55.

6. By the act of March 18, 1886, the city of Vicksburg was authorized to
provide for the erection and maintenance of a system of waterworks
and the contract made in accordance with its provision was within the
power of the city to make, and the subsequent legislation, state and
municipal, set forth in the bill, impair the contract rights of the water
company, within the protection of the Constitution of the United
States unless the city can point to some inherent want of legal validity
in the contract. Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. Vicksburg, 65.
7. It is one of the most valuable features of equity jurisdiction, to antici-
pate and prevent a threatened injury, where the damages would be
insufficient or irreparable; and the exercise of such jurisdiction is for
the benefit of both parties, in disclosing to the defendant that he is
proceeding without warrant of law, and in protecting the complainant
from injuries which, if inflicted, would be wholly destructive of his
rights. Ib.

8. This cause presents a controversy so arising under the laws and Consti-
tution of the United States as to give the Circuit Court jurisdic-
tion. Ib.

9. As the remedies resorted to by independent States for the determination
of controversies raised by collision between them were withdrawn from
the States by the Constitution, a wide range of matters, susceptible of
adjustment, and not purely political in their nature, was made justici-
able by that instrument. Kansas v. Colorado, 125.

10. Where a State on behalf of her citizens and in vindication of her alleged
rights as an individual owner files a bill against another State to obtain
relief in respect of being wholly deprived by the direct action of the
latter of the water of a river accustomed to flow through and across her
territory, and the consequent destruction of her property, and of the
property of her citizens and injury to their health and comfort, the
original jurisdiction of this court may be exercised. Ib.

11. If it is a case of circumstances in which a variation between them as

stated by the bill and those established by the evidence, might either
incline the court to modify the relief or to grant no relief at all, the
court, even though it sees that the granting or modified relief would be
attended with considerable difficulty, will not support a demurrer. Ib.
12. The general rule is that the truth of material and relevant matters, set
forth with requisite precision, are admitted by demurrer, but in a case
of great magnitude, involving questions of grave and far-reaching im-
portance, that rule will not be applied, and the case will be sent to is-
sue and proofs. Ib.

13. The legislation of the State of Connecticut, in respect to the taxation
of shares of stock in a local corporation, held by non-residents, which
is set forth in the statement of facts, is not in conflict with paragraph 1
of section 2 of article IV of the Federal Constitution, or the Four-
teenth Amendment to that Constitution. Travellers' Insurance Co. v.
Connecticut, 364.

14. The court below erred in dismissing this action, for want of jurisdic-
tion, as the right which it was claimed had been unlawfully invaded,
was one arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States;
and although it has been held that, on error from a state court to this
court, where the Federal question asserted to be contained in the record,
is manifestly lacking all color of merit, the writ of error should be dis-
missed, that doctrine relates to questions arising on writs of error from
state courts, where, aside from the Federal status of the parties to the
action, on the inherent nature of the Federal right which is sought to
be vindicated, jurisdiction is to be determined by ascertaining whether
the record raises a bona fide Federal question. Swafford v. Templeton,
487.

See COAL MINES;
INSURANCE, 1.

CORPORATION.

1. The Tulare irrigation district, in California, issued and sold its bonds
for the purpose of constructing its irrigation works. The proceeds
were used for that purpose by the corporation, and the works were
by means thereof constructed. The corporation then refused to pay
the bonds, and denied its liability on them upon the ground that it
was never legally organized as a corporation, and hence had no legal
right to issue any bonds. Held, on the authority of Douglas County
Commissioners v. Bolles, 94 U. S. 104, that common honesty demanded
that a debt thus incurred should be paid; and that there was nothing
in the facts in this case to set aside the application of that principle;
that if anything could constitute a de facto corporation the defendant
is one and that, being thus a de facto corporation, none but the State
can question its existence. Tulare Irrigation District v. Shepard, 1.
2. Under the circumstances stated in the opinion of the court, the land-
owner is estopped from setting up the defence of the want of notice,
as against the plaintiff in this case. Ib.

3. That the State has power to forfeit the charter of a corporation for an

abuse of its priviliges, is recognized as law in Louisiana. New Orleans
Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana, 336.

4. In Louisiana a corporation is liable to be proceeded against for taking
illegal rates by quo warranto to the suit of the State. Ib.

COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

1. The District and Circuit Courts of the United States are always open for
the transaction of some business which may be transacted under the
orders of the judge in his absence, and on such transaction rest the
plaintiff's claims in this case, which the court sustain as business which
could be transacted by the clerk in the absence of the judge, following
the departmental construction of the statutes. United States v. Fin-
nell, 236.

2. Of course if that construction were obviously or clearly wrong it would
be the duty of the court to so adjudge; but if there simply be doubt
as to the soundness of that construction, the action of the Government
in conformity with it for many years should not be overruled except
for cogent reasons. Ib.

DAMAGES.

The obligee in a bond which supersedes an order confirming a sale of real
estate, and directing the immediate execution of a deed and delivery
of possession thereof to the purchaser, is entitled, after that order has
been affirmed on the appeal, to recover as damages for the breach of the
obligation of the bond the value of the use and possession, that is to
say in this case, the rents and profits of the real estate during the time
the purchaser is kept out of the possession and use of the real estate
by the supersedeas bond, and the appeal in which it was allowed.
Woodworth v. Northwestern Life Ins. Co., 354.

EQUITY.

1. The time at which a party appeals to a court of equity for relief affects
largely the character of the relief which will be granted. New York
City v. Pine, 93.

2. A failure to pursue statutory remedies is not always fatal to the rights
of a party in possession, and if full and adequate compensation is made
to the plaintiff, sometimes the possession of the defendant will not be
disturbed. Ib.

3. A court of equity may take possession and finally end a controversy like
the present by securing the payment of adequate compensation in lieu
of a cessation of the trespass. Ib.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7.

EVIDENCE.

In this case there is nothing whatever in the bill of exceptions to show that
the evidence contained therein is all the evidence that was given on the
trial, and the court cannot presume, for the purpose of reversing the
judgment, that there was no evidence given upon which the jury might