physicial antecedent. However strange, the miracle is after all but a physical event introduced just as naturally -just as much in accordance with physical law as any event produced by the will of man. So explicit is Canon Row on this head that, he anticipates the difficulty of reconciling such a miracle as that of the loaves and fishes with this doctrine, by declaring that not even here need we affirm the exercise of creative power. "All the materials were at hand, either in the earth, the air, or the water. The ordinary action of God's Providence makes bread and fish in one way; in a miracle he produces them in another." 1

Nor is there anything to choose between this view and that of Bishop Butler. When Butler says, " that things lie beyond the natural reach of our faculties is no sort of presumption against the truth and reality of them," he asserts what none will deny. When he pleads for the probability of miracles by comparing them to "the extraordinary phenomena of nature," and adds, "then the comparison will be between the presumption against miracles, and the presumption against such uncommon appearances, suppose, as comets, and against there being any such powers in nature as magnetism and electricity," 2 he and the Archbishop of York stand on the very same ground; which comes to this: Our knowledge of nature is too imperfect to settle the question. But if we cannot distinguish the natural from the supernatural, what can we learn from the manifestation of the latter?

Had Butler contended that every ultimate fact, which admits of no explanation in any possible state of our knowledge, is miraculous, his position would be unassailable. For, as no knowledge could ever be brought to prove, so none could ever be brought to disprove, the affirmation. In this shape the argument is tenable enough. Mr. Francis Newman, quoting Newton in support of it, says: "He [Newton] justly regarded the 2 Analogy, Part ii., chap. ii.

1 P. 70.

force of gravitation as a divine action; certainly not as a material, but necessarily as a spiritual force," &c. "Divine agency, as in gravitation and other forces, which cannot belong to brute matter, is no hypothesis, but an undeniable present fact," &c.1

Sir John Herschel held the same opinion. Speaking of terrestrial gravity, he says: "All bodies with which we are acquainted, when raised into the air and quietly abandoned, descend to the earth's surface in lines perpendicular to it, which it is but reasonable to regard as the direct or indirect result of a consciousness and a will existing somewhere though beyond our power to trace, which force we term gravity." " 2

This, however, is beside the purpose. I do not deny that gravity may be miraculous, in the sense that its exhibition as a force may ultimately depend upon a conscious will. But, if I am to regard this property of "all bodies" as miraculous, I must regard all properties of all bodies as miraculous. I am quite prepared to do so. But to accept every phenomenon as miraculous, or to reduce every miracle to "a part of the system of the universe," equally robs the miracle of that which alone would be adequate to prove a Creator of such a system. It is like cutting away the masts to save the ship; the ship is useless for its destined purpose until the masts are restored: the plight of the miracle is pretty much the same. This, which is the real difficulty, has been gallantly faced by Dr. M'Cosh. "The peculiarity of a miracle," says he, “is, that it has not a cause in the natural powers operating in the Cosmos. Though not falling in with the uniformity of nature'—which is by no means an ultimate principle, or a principle without exception (there is, e.g., the creation of new species of plants and animals as revealed by geology), it is by no means inconsistent with what is truly the ultimate and intuitive principle, that 'every effect has a 1 Contemporary Review. October 1878.

2 Outlines of Astronomy. Ed. 1875, chap. viii.

cause;' for it has an adequate cause in the power of God."1 He here assumes certain acts of creation to show that the uniformity of nature is not irrefragable;―a postulate which the defender of miracle is obliged to make. But in a later note he says: "It should be added that they [miracles] ought never to be represented (as they have been of late by some persons friendly to religion) as natural; for their peculiarity is, that they do not proceed from the scheme of physical powers operating in the cosmos, but from a supernatural cause known otherwise to exist." 2

These little words, "known otherwise to exist," are the weightiest in the whole discussion. Whatever may be the strength of an argument in favour of miracles, one weakness is inherent to it, and fatal to it. Every plea for miracles starts with the foregone conclusion of a Power able and disposed to perform them. Miracles never can prove the existence of a supernatural Being, for the simple reason that, "unless a God is already recognised, the apparent miracle can always be accounted for on a more probable hypothesis than that of the interference of a Being of whose very existence it is supposed to be the sole evidence." 3

Whether the miracle be presented to us at first or at second hand, how are we to know that it is a miracle? (1.) The effect or event might (as Mill suggests) be the product of some natural agencies that we know nothing about. (2.) The event may be erroneously interpreted, either by illusion due to subjective conditions, or by delusion wrought with the contrivance of others. Touching the first difficulty, it would seem that we could never rely thoroughly upon our judgment until our knowledge of physical laws was exhaustive; which, assuming the infinity of the universe, it could never be. With regard to the second, so long as hallucination continues matter of daily experience, it is not impossible for any one to be the subject of it.

1 The Method of the Divine Government, 8th edition, p. 114.

VOL. I.

2 Page 156.

3 John Mill, Theism, p. 232.

M

According to these views, there does not appear to be any test by which we could recognise a miracle even were we ourselves to witness one. How much more cogent are these reasons for discrediting the miracles on which the revelation of the New Testament depends. The same difficulties we should have to dispose of, affect those who are said to have seen the Christian miracles, in an immensely magnified degree. "It has now become necessary to show, not only that the reporters of miracles believed that they actually witnessed them, but also that it was impossible that, in accordance with the explanations which an eminent scientific authority [Dr. Carpenter, Mental Physiology] has given of some well-attested spiritualistic phenomena, the belief could have originated in mistaking subjective impressions for external realities."1

Just think what the "reporters" of the New Testament miracles were. So far from being qualified judges, they were avowedly ignorant men, in an age which, considering its comparatively advanced civilisation, was one of exceptional credulity and superstition. In their eyes every phenomenon they could not otherwise explain was caused by the will of some being superior to nature. The consequence was, miracles were to them-what they still are to all people similarly situated-a part of the ordinary occurrences of life. Every illness, mental or bodily, was the work of evil spirits; and the chief remedy was in the hands of the magician who could exorcise these spirits. When the doctrine of a personal devil had taken root, the miracles performed by him were more numerous than those of divine agency. "As to miracles," says M. Renan, "they passed at that epoch for the indispensable mark of the divine, and for the sign of the prophetic, calling." "The founders of Christianity lived in a state of poetic ignorance at least as complete as that of Saint Claire and the tres socii. They found it quite simple that their master 1 Canon Row, ubi supra, p. 35.

should have interviews with Moses and Elias, that he should command the elements, and heal the sick." 1

In fact, the character of thaumaturgist was forced upon Jesus from the moment that he appeared as the Messiah. As the successor of Moses he was expected to work miracles. Hence was it that the Pharisees were always taunting him for a sign of his divinity (Matt. xii. 38; xvi. 1). Hence, after the expulsion of the money-changers from the Temple, the Jews ask him, "What sign showest thou unto us, seeing that thou dost these things?" (John ii. 18); and (John vi. 30) in the synagogue at Capernaum, the Jews again ask, "What sign showest thou then, that we may see and believe thee? What dost thou work? Our fathers did eat manna in the desert, as it is written, He gave them bread from heaven to eat." With these traditions before them, the Jews made fresh miracles the condition of their belief. Jesus had to choose between two courses either to renounce his mission or become a thaumaturgist." 2 It is evident that Jesus himself had no relish for the part assigned him. On the occasion just referred to, he declares, the only bread he has to give is his own presence amongst them. Elsewhere he answers, "An evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign; and there shall no sign be given to it but the sign of the prophet Jonas;"-this he is made to refer to the miracle of his resurrection. At Mark viii. 11, his grief is shown at the importunate demand for miracles. "He sighed deeply in his spirit, and said, Why doth this generation seek after a sign? Verily I say unto you, No sign shall be given unto this generation." The reluctance, in fact, is everywhere apparent. Nevertheless, as M. Renan observes, "Jesus not only believed in miracles, but had not the least idea of a natural order regulated by laws." If we are to put faith in Mark (xvi. 17, 18), Jesus himself expected his disciples to be gifted with miraculous powers, 1 Vie de Jesus, p. 256.

2 Ibid.