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$364. Issuing fraudulent certificate.— On an indictment against an officer of election for issuing a false and fraudulent certificate, it is essential to prove, as claimed, that the ballotbox was stuffed, and that such stuffing was done with the procurement or knowledge, or in consequence of the neglect, of the officers of election. It is not sufficient that the certificate was false; it must be fraudulent as well. United States v. Baldridge.* 11 Fed. R., 552.

§ 365. To warrant a conviction under section 5515, Revised Statutes, punishing officers of election who fraudulently make any false certificate of the result of an election, it must appear that the prisoners made a fraudulent certificate of the result of the election in the district, as charged. United States v. Hayden,* 52 How. Pr., 471.

§ 366. Illegal voting. Upon an indictment of a female for voting at an election for congressmen in New York, where none but males are allowed to vote for members of the most numerous branch of the legislature, under the act of May 31, 1870, providing "that if at any election for representatives in the congress of the United States, any person shall knowingly vote without having a lawful right to vote, every such person shall be deemed guilty of a crime," etc., it is no defense that the defendant voted in the belief that she had a right to vote. United States v. Anthony, 11 Blatch., 200.

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§ 367. The constitution of Oregon declares that "the privilege of an elector shall be forfeited by a conviction of any crime which is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary." The defendant having been convicted on his plea of guilty to an indictment for assault with a dangerous weapon, which offense was punishable either by fine, imprisonment in the jail, or in the penitentiary, in the discretion of the court, and having been sentenced by the court to pay a fine, was indicted under section 5511, Revised Statutes, for voting for a representative in congress without having a right to vote. It was held (1) that the defendant was "convicted" within the meaning of the above constitutional provision when he pleaded guilty, and without regard to the judgment of the court; (2) that the crime was punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary within the meaning of the constitutional provision, and that it was immaterial that it could be and was otherwise punished in the discretion of the court; and (3) that the defendant had therefore voted without having a right to vote. United States v. Watkinds,* 7 Saw., 85.

§ 368. Judges of election are not punishable criminally unless they have acted from a corrupt motive. United States v. Gillis, 2 Cr. C. C., 44. See $$ 328, 329.

§ 369. Upon an indictment charging judges of an election with neglecting their duties as such judges, contrary to section 5515 of the Revised Statutes, it must appear, in order to justify a conviction, that the inspectors of election intended to perpetrate some wrongful act or omission of duty, or were guilty of some palpable neglect that would lead to the conclusion that a violation of law was designed. The delivery of the keys of the ballot-boxes to one of the policemen attending the polls, pursuant to a custom prevailing in the district for many years, is not such a criminal neglect of duty, the character of the policeman being unimpeached. United States v. Hayden,* 52 How. Pr., 471.

§ 370. Election of members of congress.- Congress, under section 5515 of the Revised Statutes, cannot punish violations of state election laws unless such violations affect the election of members of congress. United States v. Nicholson,* 3 Woods, 215.

§ 371. On an indictment under section 5515 of the Revised Statutes, against state officers of election for doing an act intended to affect the result of an election of members of congress, it is necessary to convict to show the intent, and, as in other cases, if the acts done would have that effect it must be presumed, unless the presumption is rebutted, that they were thus intended. Ibid.

$372. Congress has the authority to provide for the punishment of any person who shall, by threats, force or intimidation, prevent any person from giving his advocacy and support in a lawful manner to the election of his favorite member of congress. United States v. Goldman, 3 Woods, 187 (§§ 2290-93).

VI. OFFENSES ON THE HIGH SEAS.

[See §§ 514, 627, 791-796, 262). As to powers of master and duties and liabilities of seamen, see MARITIME LAW.] 1. In General.

SUMMARY

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Revolt; proof of national character of vessel, § 373.-Jurisdiction; high seas, S$ 374, 375.- Master wounding or imprisoning crew; crew" defined, § 376.

§ 373. Proof that the ship is American property is sufficient proof of national character to support an indictment of seamen for endeavoring to make a revolt. No documentary proof, such as a bill of sale or registry, is necessary where the above fact is established. United States v. Seagrist, §§ 377-380. See §§ 385, 502.

$374. A vessel lying in the port of Palermo, not within any inclosed dock, nor actually at any pier or wharf, but lying in what is called the harbor, fastened to the shore by cable, and communicating with the land by her boats, is, within the common acceptance of the term, on the “high seas," outside of low-water mark on the coast. A revolt committed on an American vessel in such a position is therefore within the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. Ibid. See § 492.

$375. The offenses of mutiny, and the endeavor to make a mutiny, as defined by the act of 1833, are offenses against the person and authority of the master, and therefore cognizable in the proper circuit court of the United States, when committed on an American ship lying within the jurisdiction of any foreign state, un ler the act of March 3, 1825, giving the circuit courts jurisdiction in such cases where the offense is committed "by any person belonging to the company of said ship, or any passenger, on any person belonging to the company of said ship, or any other passenger." Ibid.

$376. Under the third section of the statute of 1835, providing "that if any master or other officer of an American ship or vessel on the high seas, or on any other waters, etc., shall from malice, hatred or revenge, and without justifiable cause, beat, wound or imprison one or more of the crew of such ship or vessel," etc., he shall be punished, etc., it is an offense for the master to commit the acts described upon the chief or other officer of the ship. The word "crew" includes all the officers except the master, as well as the common seamen, United States v. Winn, $$ 381-384. See § 458, 491, 499. [NOTES. See §§ 385-510.]

UNITED STATES v. SEAGRIST.

(Circuit Court for New York: 4 Blatchford, 420-425. 1860.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS.-- Indictment against seamen for an endeavor to make a revolt and mutiny on an American ship in a foreign port. They were convicted, and move for a new trial. Further facts appear in the opinion of the

court.

Opinion by BETTS, J.

The ground urged for a new trial in this case is the alleged misdirection of the court to the jury that the port of Palermo, where the offense is charged by the indictment to have been committed, is a place within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States. The objection would have been more appropriately taken in arrest of judgment, but the validity of it may well be determined in either mode of proceeding.

377. What proof of the national character of a vessel is sufficient in a trial of seamen indicted for attempting to make a revolt.

The objection that no documentary proof, such as a bill of sale or registry, was put in, establishing the national character of the vessel, cannot avail the defendants. The master testified that she was owned in this city by American citizens, and it was only necessary for the prosecution to prove that she was American property to support the indictment. It was not in any way an issue on the trial whether she was entitled to the privileges of an American bottom under our revenue laws. The only fact involved was whether she was American property, and of this there can be no doubt. 3 Kent's Comm., 130, 132, 150. The main point contested on the trial and on this motion rests on an exception to the jurisdiction of the court. The generic offense of endeavoring to make a revolt was first declared to be a crime, by the United States laws, in the crimes act of April 30, 1790 (1 U. S. Stats. at Large, 115, § 12); and the courts have recognized the offense as sufficiently described and specified under that denomination to be subject to judicial cognizance. United States v. Kelly, 4 Wash., 528; S. C., 11 Wheat., 417; United States v. Smith, 1 Mason, 147. It was decided in the first circuit that the offense, when committed within a harbor of the United States, was punishable under the act, and that it was not

a condition to the jurisdiction of the court that the offense should have been committed on the high seas. United States v. Hamilton, 1 Mason, 443. In United States v. Keefe, 3 Mason, 475, Judge Story ruled that an indictment under the act of 1790, for an endeavor to make a revolt, was triable in the circuit court, although the offense was committed in a foreign port, the criminal jurisdiction in admiralty being deemed to be, in a general sense, co-ordinate as to place with the civil jurisdiction. This last decision was made in 1824, and the argument on the present motion maintains that the act of congress of March 3, 1825 (4 U. S. Stats. at Large, 115, § 5), in giving directly to the courts of the United States jurisdiction over certain classes of offenses committed on board of American vessels in foreign ports, necessarily limits the jurisdiction to those specified cases, and that an endeavor to make a mutiny on board of a ship in a foreign port is not an offense on any person, and is, therefore, not subjected to the cognizance of the courts of the United States by the provis ions of that act. The language of the statute is: "If any offense shall be committed on board of any ship or vessel belonging to any citizen or citizens of the United States while lying in a port or place within the jurisdiction of any foreign state or sovereign, by any person belonging to the company of said ship, or any passenger, on any person belonging to the company of said ship, or any other passenger, the same offense shall be cognizable and punishable by the proper circuit court of the United States."

$ 378. When a vessel may be considered on the "high seas."

In considering this objection it is worthy of notice that the place where the vessel lay at the time, although called the port of Palermo, was not within any inclosed dock, nor actually at any pier or wharf. She lay out in what was called the harbor, fastened to the shore by cables. She communicated with the land by her boats. This position of the vessel would leave her, within the common acceptance of the term, on the "high seas," outside of lowwater mark on the coast. United States v. Hamilton, 1 Mason, 152; The Abby, id., 360; United States v. Kessler, Bald., 15, 35 ($3 1637-39, infra).

$379. Construction of the act of March 3, 1825 (4 Stat. at Large, 115, sec. 5). The act of 1825 was not designed to abrogate or curtail the jurisdiction of the United States over crimes committed at sea, but manifestly to remove doubts whether that jurisdiction could be exercised when the locus in quo was a locked harbor, adapted by nature or artificially to cover and protect vessels from the perils of an open coastage. I do not find any construction given authoritatively by the courts of the United States, which establishes the doctrine that the act of 1825 affords the exclusive rule of decision with respect to offenses which are not alleged and proved to have been committed on or against the persons of individuals on shipboard. A case occurred in 1834, before the circuit court in Pennsylvania, in which the judges (Baldwin and Hopkinson) adopted that view of the law, but only decided that larceny within a port in the Bahamas, committed on board of an American ship, was not an offense punishable under the laws of the United States (United States v. Morel, 13 Am. Jur., 279), because it was an offense against property alone; and the court, in illustration of their conclusion, referred to the act of 1825 as omitting to extend the admiralty jurisdiction over any description of offenses within foreign ports, not committed on or against some person. Id., 287, 288. If that suggestion of the court offers the true exposition of the act of 1825, the crime charged in this indictment, and proved on the trial, may, without any impropriety of language, be defined to be one against the master of the vessel, and, being charged

in the words of the second section of the act of March 3, 1835 (4 U. S. Stat. at Large, 776), may be deemed sufficiently alleged, without any more pointed averment. Whart. Am. Cr. L., 132 (2d ed.). The first count of the indictment charges that the vessel, owned by a citizen or citizens of the United States, whereof Joseph Davis was then and there master and commander, being within a foreign port, and within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, the defendants, being four of the crew of the said vessel, did then and there endeavor to make a revolt," against the peace, etc. In the second count, after the like preliminary averments, it charges that the same parties "did then and there combine and confederate with each other to make a revolt and mutiny." The third count, after the like preliminary averments, charges that the defendants" did then and there solicit, incite and stir up each other to disobey and resist the lawful orders of the master of the said ship, and to neg lect and refuse their proper duty on board thereof, and to betray their proper trust therein." The first section of the act of 1835 defines, in very preciso terms, the crimes of revolt and mutiny, and affixes a specific punishment to them; and the second section particularizes the acts of seamen on shipboard which shall subject them to the same punishment as an endeavor to make a revolt or mutiny. It is practically unimportant whether the provisions of the second section are expounded as so many instances or methods in which the offense of an endeavor to make a revolt or mutiny may be manifested, or whether they are taken distributively, and understood to be so many separate and distinct offenses, each being sufficient of itself to sustain an indictment. The three counts of this indictment are so framed as to secure to the United States the advantage of either construction. It appears to me, therefore, that the court did not err in instructing the jury that if the acts charged in the indictment were satisfactorily substantiated by the evidence, and if the defendants committed those acts with intent to resist the master in the free and lawful exercise of his authority and command on board of the vessel, they would amount, in law, to an endeavor to make a revolt.

§ 380. The crime of endeavoring to make a revolt is one against the master of the vessel, and it is sufficient to charge it in the words of the act of 1835.

I also consider that the court was correct in further instructing the jury that the offenses of mutiny, and the endeavor to make a mutiny, specified in the act of 1835, are, as defined in that law, by necessary implication, offenses against the person and authority of the master; and that an averment of the crime in the language of the statute is all that is required to make the charge of the offense complete, within the supposed requirements of the act of 1825, so as to come within the cognizance of the court. But, independently of that view of the case, the act of 1835, in subjecting the offenses therein created or described to the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the court, gives to the court, in my opinion, in relation to those cases, a cognizance co-ordinate with what it could exercise under any antecedent law, in causes of like character. The motion is, accordingly, overruled, and judgment is pronounced against each defendant that he pay a fine of $10, and be imprisoned for thirty days.

UNITED STATES v. WINN.

(Circuit Court for Massachusetts: 3 Sumner, 200-220. 1838.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS.- The defendant was convicted under the act of March 3, 1835, of the offense of imprisoning a member of the crew. He moves for a new trial. The person imprisoned was one Bassett, chief officer of the ship, and

the alleged offense was committed at places in the Pacific Ocean. It was contended on the part of defendant that Bassett was not a member of the crew within the meaning of the act.

Opinion by STORY, J.

The words of the third section of the statute of 1835, ch. 40 [ch. 313], are as follows: "That if any master or other officer of any American ship or vessel on the high seas, or on any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, shall, from malice, hatred, or revenge, and without justifiable cause, beat, wound or imprison any one or more of the crew of such ship or vessel, or withhold from them suitable food and nourishment, or inflict upon them any cruel or unusual punishment, every such person so offending shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by fine not exceeding, etc., or by imprisonment not exceeding, etc., or by both, according to the nature and aggravation of the offense." And the question now presented for the consideration of the court is, whether the offense, when committed by the master upon the chief or other officer of the ship, is an offense within the purview and intent of the statute. In other words, is the word "crew" in the section used in contradistinction to officers of the ship, and so including the common seamen or mariners only; or does the word "crew," in the sense of the statute, embrace all the officers except the master, as well as the common mariners.

§ 381. Construction of penal statutes.

Now, I do not think anything material in the construction of this statute can turn upon the rule so ably and strenuously expounded at the bar, that penal statutes are to be construed strictly. I agree to that rule in its true and sober sense; and that is, that penal statutes are not to be enlarged by implication, or extended to cases not obviously within their words and purport. But where the words are general, and include various classes of persons, I know of no authority which would justify the court in restricting them to one class, or in giving them the narrowest interpretation, where the mischief to be redressed by the statute is equally applicable to all of them. And where a word is used in a statute, which has various known significations, I know of no rule that requires the court to adopt one in preference to another, simply because it is more restrained, if the objects of the statute equally apply to the largest and broadest sense of the word. In short, it appears to me that the proper course, in all these cases, is, to search out and follow the true intent of the legislature, and to adopt that sense of the words which harmonizes best with the context, and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legis lature. I adopt on this subject the doctrine laid down in the case of the Schooner Industry, 1 Gall., 117, and which, I am persuaded, is in perfect consonance with the general authorities most considered and most relied on in cases of this sort. The court there said: "We are undoubtedly bound to construe penal statutes strictly, and not to extend them beyond their obvious meaning by strained inferences. On the other hand, we are bound to interpret them according to the manifest import of the words, and to hold all cases which are within the words, and the mischiefs, to be within the remedial influence of the statute." The most restricted sense, then, is not, as a matter of course, to be adopted as the true sense of the statute, unless it best harmonizes with the context, and stands best with the words and with the mischiefs to be remedied by the enactment.

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