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according action actual adds admit affections appear approbation arise association attention awaken beauty become body Brown called cause certain circumstances colour complex conceive conception conduct consciousness consequence considered constitution desire direct distinct doctrine emotion essential excite existence experience external fact faculty feeling follow formed former give given ideas imagine immediately important individual influence intellectual involved judgment kind knowledge laws least less manner matter means memory mental mere merely mind moral nature necessary notion objects observed operation opinion organ original pain particular passions perceive perception perhaps phænomena philosophers pleasure possess preceding present principle produce properties qualities question reason reference regard Reid relation remarks render resemblance result says seems sensation sense separate simple speak statement Stewart substance succession suggestion supposed term thing thought tion truth various virtue whole writer
Página 223 - Full many a gem of purest ray serene The dark unfathom'd caves of ocean bear : Full many a flower is born to blush unseen, And waste its sweetness on the desert air. Some village- Hampden, that, with dauntless breast, The little tyrant of his fields withstood, Some mute inglorious Milton here may rest, Some Cromwell guiltless of his country's blood. Th...
Página 433 - Take heed that ye do not your alms before men, to be seen of them; otherwise ye have no reward of your Father which 10 is in heaven. Therefore when thou doest thine alms, do not sound a trumpet before thee, as the hypocrites do in the synagogues and in the streets, that they may have glory of men. Verily I say unto you, they have their reward.
Página 54 - ... the very first exercise of consciousness necessarily implies a belief, not only of the present existence of what is felt, but of the present existence of that which feels...
Página 89 - When I say, I see, I hear, I feel, I remember, this implies that it is one and the same self that performs all these operations ; and as it would be absurd to say, that my memory, another man's imagination, and a third man's reason, may make one individual intelligent being, it would be equally absurd to say, that one piece of matter seeing, another hearing, and a third feeling, may make one and the same percipient being. These sentiments are not new : they have occurred to thinking men from early...
Página 250 - But we have, moreover, a power of modifying our conceptions, by combining the parts of different ones together, so as to form new wholes of our own creation. I shall employ (the word imagination to express this power, and I apprehend that this is the proper sense of the word; if imagination - be the power which gives birth to the productions of the poet and the painter.
Página 118 - Observing that the agreeable sensation is raised when the rose is near, and ceases when it is removed, I am led, by my nature, to conclude some quality to be in . the rose which is the cause of this sensation. This quality in the rose is the object perceived ; and that act of my mind, by which I have the conviction and belief of this quality, is what in this case I call perception.
Página 408 - Volition, it is plain, is an act. of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or with-holding it from, any particular action.
Página 110 - ... means no more but that it excludes other bodies from occupying the same place at the same time. Hardness, softness, and fluidity are different degrees of cohesion in the parts of a body. It is fluid when it has no sensible cohesion ; soft, when the cohesion is weak ; and hard, when it is strong. Of the cause of this cohesion we are ignorant, but the thing itself we understand perfectly, being immediately informed of it by the sense of touch.
Página 113 - And what resemblance can either bear to the changes which take place in the state of a sentient being? That we have notions of external qualities which have no resemblance to our sensations, or to any thing of which the mind is conscious, is therefore a fact of which every man's experience affords the completes!