| Thomas Reid - 1822 - 432 páginas
...contrary to the irresistible conviction of every man. When I say, I see, I hear, I feel, I remember, this implies that it is one and the same self that...feeling, may make one and the same percipient being. These sentiments are not new : they have occurred to thinking men from early ages. Cicero, in his Tusculan... | |
| Thomas Reid - 1827 - 706 páginas
...contrary to the irresistible conviction of every man. When I say, I see, I hear, I feel, I remember, this implies that it is one and the same self that...feeling, may make one and the same percipient being. These sentiments are not new ; they have occurred to thinking men from early ages. Cicero, in his Tusculan... | |
| Thomas Cogswell Upham - 1832 - 610 páginas
...doctrine] of mental identity. " When I say,JI see,' I hear,'I fee), (says the same judidious author,) this implies, that it is one and the same self, that...be equally absurd to say, that one piece of matter :_seeing, another hearing, and a third feeling, may make one and the same percipient being."* Although... | |
| Thomas Cogswell Upham - 1832 - 622 páginas
...doctrine of mental identity. " When I say, I see, I hear, I feel, .(says the same judidious author,) this implies, that it is one and the same self, that performs all these operations. And as it would he absurd to say that my memory, another man's imagination, and a third man's reason may make one individual... | |
| Thomas Cogswell Upham - 1839 - 476 páginas
...doctrine of mental identity. "When I say, I see, I hear, I feel, (says the same judicious author,) this implies, that it is one and the same self that...feeling, may make one and the same percipient being."* Although the opinion, that sensation is not in the mind but in the body, is unfounded, it is perhaps... | |
| Thomas Cogswell Upham - 1841 - 474 páginas
...doctrine of mental identity. " When I say I see, I hear, I feel," says the same judicious author, " this implies that it is one and the same self that...feeling, may make one and the same percipient being."* * Reid's Intellectual Powers, Essay ii. Although the opinion that sensation is not in the mind, hut... | |
| Thomas Reid - 1846 - 1080 páginas
...self that («rforms all these operations; and, as it uoi:ld be absurd to кау that my memorv, mother man's imagination, and a third man's reason, may make...be equally absurd to say that one piece of matter seei:j;i, another hearing, and a third feeling, may make one and the ваше percipient being. These... | |
| Thomas Reid - 1850 - 496 páginas
...is contrary to the irresistible conviction of every man. When I say, /see, /hear, /feel, / remember, this implies that it is one and the same self that...feeling, may make one and the same percipient being. 2. A second law of our nature regarding perception is, that we perceive no object, unless some impression... | |
| Thomas Reid - 1855 - 516 páginas
...contrary to. the irresistible conviction of every man. When I say, I see, I hear, I feel, I remember, this implies that it is one and the same self that performs all these op- 1 erations ; and as it would be absurd to say, that my memory, another man's imagination, and a... | |
| Thomas Cogswell Upham - 1857 - 474 páginas
...hear, I feel," says the same judicious author, " this implies that it is one and the same self tnat performs all these operations. And as it would be...feeling, may make one and the same percipient being."* * Reid's Intellectual Powers, Essay ii. Although the opinion that sensation is not in the mind but... | |
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