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ceedings, whether the lien dates from the entry of the judgment, from the attachment before judgment, or, as in some States, from the levy of execution after judgment. But the statute was not intended to lessen rights which already existed, nor to defeat those inchoate liens given by statute, of which all creditors were bound to take notice and subject to which they are presumed to have contracted when they dealt with the insolvent.
Liens in favor of laborers, mechanics and contractors are of this character; and although they may be perfected by record or foreclosure within four months of the bankruptcy, they are not created by judgments, nor are they treated as having been “obtained through legal proceedings,” even when it is necessary to enforce them by some form of legal proceeding. The statutes of the various States differ as to the time when such liens attach, and also as to the property they cover. They may bind only. what the plaintiff has improved or constructed; or they may, extend to all the chattels of the debtor, or "all the property involved in the business.” In re Bennett, 153 Fed. Rep. 673.
In some cases the lien dates from commencement of the work, or from the completion of the contract. In others, prior to levy they are referred to as being dormant or inchoate liens, or as "a right to a lien.” In re Bennett, 153 Fed. Rep. 677; In re Laird, 109 Fed. Rep. 550. But the courts, dealing specially with bankruptcy matters, have almost uniformly held that these statutory preferences are not obtained through legal proceedings, and, therefore, are not defeated by $ 67f, even where the registration, foreclosure or levy necessary to their completion or enforcement was within four months of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.
Similar rulings have been made where the landlord has only a common law right of distress. In re West Side Paper Co., 162 Fed. Rep. 110. This is often referred to as a lien, Opinion of the Court.
225 U. S.
but it is "only in the nature of security.” 3 Black. Com. 18. The pledge, or quasi-pledge, which the landlord is said to have is, at most, only a power to seize chattels found on the rented premises. These he could take into possession and hold until the rent was paid. Doe ex dem Gladney v. Deavors, 11 Georgia, 79, 84. But before the distraint the landlord at common law has "no lien on any particular portion of the goods and is only an ordinary creditor except that he has the right of distress by reason of which he may place himself in a better position.” Sutton v. Reese, 9 Jur. (N. S.) 456. A right fully as great is created by the Georgia statute here in question. For while giving the owners of agricultural lands a special lien on the crops, there was no intention to deprive the proprietor of urban and other real estate of the lien for rent which there, as in other States, is treated as an incident growing out of the relation of landlord and tenant.
The Code (§ 2787) expressly “establishes liens in favor of landlords.” It (§ 3124) gives them "power to distrain for rent as soon as the same is due." It declares ($ 2795) that landlords "shall have a general lien on the property of the tenant liable to levy and sale ... which dates from the levy of the distress warrant to enforce the same." It is true that prior to levy it covers no specific property, and attaches only to what is seized under the distress warrant issued to enforce the lien given by statute. But in this respect it is the full equivalent of a common law distress—the lien of which is held not to be discharged by $ 67f. In re West Side Paper Co., 162 Fed. Rep. 110; Austin v. O'Reilly, 2 Wood, 670.
The fact that the warrant could be levied upon property which had never been on the rented premises does not change the nature of the landlord's right, though it may increase the extent of his security. The statutory restrictions as to date, rank and priority may be important in a controversy with other lienholders, but was wholly
t is the
immaterial in this contest between the landlord and trustee, where the latter was only representing general creditors. As against them the landlord had from the beginning of the tenancy the right to a statutory lien, which had completely ripened and attached before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. The priority arising from the levy of the distress warrant was not secured because Mayer had been first in a race of diligence, but was given by law because of the nature of the claim and the relation between himself as landlord and Burns as tenant. In issuing the distress warrant the justice acted ministerially. Savage v. Oliver, 110 Georgia, 636. The sheriff was not required to return it to any court, and no judicial hearing or action was necessary to authorize him to sell for the purpose of realizing funds with which to pay the rent. Such a lien was not created by a judgment nor "obtained through legal proceedings."
Decisions to the same effect were made under the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 (14 Stat. 517, 522, § 14), which dissolved attachments or mesne process within four months prior to the filing of the petition. In Austin v. O'Reilly, 2 Wood, 670, decided in 1875, it appeared that in Mississippi the landlord had no lien, but as in Georgia was authorized to seize (but by attachment) the tenant's goods wherever found. Justice Bradley, presiding at Circuit, said that the landlords' right to a distress at common law was not a strict lien, “but being commonly called a lien, and being a peculiar right in the nature of a lien, . .. the Supreme Court of the United States, and most of the District and Circuit Courts have regarded it as fairly to be classed as a lien, within the true intent and meaning of the Bankrupt Act,” and that the statutory attachment being in the nature of a common law distress was not nullified or discharged by the bankruptcy proceedings.
There is nothing in the act of 1898 opposed to this conclusion. On the contrary, its general provisions indicate a
purpose to continue the same policy and an intent, as against general creditors, to preserve rights like those given by the Georgia statute to landlords, even though the lien was enforced and attached by levy of a distress warránt within four months of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.
ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY
COMPANY v. UNITED STATES.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR
THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS.
No. 716. Argued April 30, 1912.—Decided June 7, 1912.
Public policy requires that the mail be carried subject to postal regu
lations, and that the Department and not the railroad shall, in the absence of contract, determine what service is needed and the con
ditions under which it shall be performed. A railroad company, not required so to do by its charter, is not bound
to furnish postal cars of the kind demanded or to accept terms named. by the Postmaster General, but if it does carry the mail, it does so as an agency of the Government- and subject to the laws and the
regulations of the Department. A railroad company cannot, by using a larger railway postal car than
that authorized by the Department, recover the greater value of the
car. The Postmaster General can establish full railway postal lines, and
as the greater includes the less, he can also establish half lines; he can abolish between two points a full line in one direction and a half line in the other.
The facts, which involve claims made by a railroad company for furnishing railway post-office cars to the Government, are stated in the opinion.
Argument for Plaintiff in Error.
Mr. Robert Dunlap, with whom Mr. Wm. R. Smith, Mr. Lee F. English, Mr. James L. Coleman and Mr. Gardiner Lathrop were on the brief, for plaintiff in error:
The parties were agreed upon the value of 60-foot postal car lines as the maximum rate prescribed by Congress, and as such car lines were in fact used by the Government it must be held as having agreed to pay that value. Minneapolis &c. Ry. Co. v. Columbus Mill Co., 119 U. S. 149, is in no sense analogous.
The Government in fact accepted and used 60-foot cars during the entire period in question. There was no controversy between the parties as to the amount of pay which was proper for the use of a 60-foot car.
The railway company very plainly offered to the Government the use of 60-foot railway post-office cars. The use was for both directions, going and returning, upon the same route. The Government sought to force the railway company to furnish to it a 60-foot postal car in one direction and a 50-foot postal car on the return. The railway company, declining to divide the car line defined in the act of Congress, upon which it was entitled to base its pay, the attempt to reduce the compensation, not upon the ground that $40.00 per mile per annum was not the proper charge for a 60-foot car, but solely upon the ground that the Government only wished to use on the return trip of such car fifty feet of space therein, will not avail.
The Government having in fact accepted and used the car is bound to pay for such use what throughout this case it admits such car is worth. Thompson v. Sanborn, 52 Michigan, 141; Griffin v. Knisely, 75 Illinois, 412, 417, 418; Conway v. Starkweather, 1 Denio, 113.
The half lines R. P. O. cars order made by the Postmaster General, effective July 23, 1907, was made without authority, is evidently contrary to the act of Congress, is oppressive and unreasonable, and therefore, invalid. Congress provided a system for computing the pay and