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ported by the national Congress, which is a body recognized by the Constitution, and is an effort toward the re-establishment in the country of a regular and constitutional government. You are mistaken when you say "the Chilians sympathize with it." No such thing. It desires peace in common with the whole country, but it will not sacrifice the national honor nor will it cede territory in order to obtain it. Chili desires and asks for Tarapaca, and it will recognize the government which agrees to its cession. The Calderon government will not cede it. It remains to be seen whether that of Piérola will prove more pliable. Meanwhile, under the system inaugurated in Ayacucho and carried into practice by the prefects, the Peruvians themselves are worse eneinies of the Peruvians than are the Chilians, and the efforts of the friends of Peru are paralyzed by their internal dissensions. When the United States asks Chili why it does not arrange peace, the answer is given that in Peru there is no government with which to treat. Would it not be better to put an end to this state of affairs, and that all true Peruvians should unite to support a chief of the state whom all parties and factions would join in supporting for the purpose of saving the country from imminent ruin, restoring peace, and the orderly and pacific reign of the Constitution and laws? S. A. HURLBUT.

A. GARCIA Y GARCIA, Esq., Ayacucho. The first public intimation of the views of our Government in regard to the ineffective negotiations for peace between President Calderon and the Chilian representatives was conveyed in the following communication from Minister Hurlbut to General Patrick Lynch, commander of the Chilian forces in Peru, sent in September, and here given in a translation from the Spanish original:

MR. ADMIRAL: With the object of preventing any misunderstanding as to the conversation I held yesterday with you in regard to the existing state of affairs between Peru and Chili, I thought it would be better to put in writing what I then stated. Without referring to the cause of the war, I understand the opinion of my Government to be, that all the legitimate objects of the war were realized by the disastrous defeat of the Peruvian armies, the capture or destruction of its vessels, and the occupation of the capital and all the coast. When all organized and formidable resistance has disappeared, the state of war should cease. The victory of Chili is so complete that peace is a necessity for the national existence of Peru, and it is to the interest of both countries to adjust a peace as speedily as possible. Commerce and the rights of neutrals have suffered enough, and the large interest owned in Peru by foreigners (many of whom are Americans) should not, for a longer time, be exposed to an unnecessary prolongation of the war. I must also declare that, although the United States recognize all the rights acquired by the conqueror in accordance with the law of civilized warfare, they disapprove of war which has territorial aggrandizement in view, or the violent dismemberment of a country, unless as a last resource, and in consequence of supreme emergency. As a frontier question has never arisen between Peru and Chili, because the two countries do not adjoin, and because Chili has publicly and officially repeatedly denied any intention or design to forcibly annex territory, we are clearly of the opinion that such a proceeding now would be incom; patible with the dignity and public faith of Chili, and that it would be calamitous to the future tranquillity of both countries, perpetuating a serious grievance which would constantly lead to trouble. The United States admit as a principle of public right that Chili possesses the right (in consonance with the code of war) to a complete indemnity for the costs of the war, and that Peru should pay such indemnity as might be agreed on by the two parties, or determined by

disinterested arbitration, in the event of disagreement and such means becoming necessary, should a time be stipulated for the payment. But we are also openly of the opinion that Peru should have the opportunity, with full and free discussion of the terms of peace, of offering said indemnity in a satisfactory shape, and that it is contrary to the rules which should prevail among civilized nations to proceed at once, and as a sine qua non condition, to incorporate into Chilian jurisdiction territory which is undoubtedly Peruvian, without having previously proved the incapacity or unwillingness of Peru to meet the indemnity in some other form. Such conduct on the part of Chili would meet with the most decided disapprobation on the part of the United States. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the act of taking possession of Peruvian territory and annexing it to Chili, whether it be executed simply by force of arms or similarly dictated as an imperative condition of a cessation of hostilities, in open contradiction to former declarations of Chili in this respect, will be justly considered by other nations as an evident sign that Chili has adopted an aggressive and conquering policy for the purpose of territorial aggrandizement. The United States desires, above all things, that peace should exist among the South American republics, and that commerce and industry should jointly serve to the development of their wondrous resources, to their advantage and to the benefit of the world at large; and we can not see any good reason why the state of war should be further prolonged, to the serious detriment of such rightful interests, nor can we see any well-founded cause why peace, under just conditions, should not be brought about, within a short time, without any untire satisfaction of all legitimate claims on the other. necessary humiliation on the one part, and to the enS. A. HURLBUT.

To Rear-Admiral the Hon. PATRICK LYNCH.

The publication of this memorandum occasioned no little excitement on the west coast. Among Peruvians it was believed to portend a forcible interference in their behalf by the United States, and the wildest rumors were soon afloat. By Chilians, on the contrary, Minister Hurlbut's letter was condemned as undiplomatic and improper in form and unwarrantable in tone. The excitement extended to official circles, and Señor J. M. Balmaceda, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Santiago, addressed a note on the subject to General Kilpatrick, the United States Minister to Chili. The Chilian Minister expressed his opinion that the declarations of Mr. Hurlbut's memorandum were not the "expression of the circumspect, noble, and loyal policy which the United States have observed toward the belligerents in the Pacific.... The strange publicity given to Mr. Hurlbut's document," the Minister further stated, "compels me to direct myself to your Excellency in order to obtain an answer which shall officially re-establish the truth and the sincerity of the relations which our respective governments honorably cultivate. The speech which Mr. Hurlbut pronounced on presenting his credentials to the now extinct Government of Garcia Calderon; the memorandum directed to Admiral Lynch, when diplomatic matters were not under discussion; his well-known letter against Piérola, to whom Mr. Christiancy was accredited, and whose plenipotentiaries debated in Arica, in presence and with full consent of the United States, may tend to produce

deplorable perturbation, and to inspire the enemy with vain hopes, or to promote resistance which can not effect the end of the war, but must render it more sanguinary." In reply, General Kilpatrick categorically contradicted his Lima colleague. He wrote:

In the first place, allow me, your Excellency, to assure you in the most emphatic manner that the Chilian Government has nothing to fear either from the intentions or the attitude my Government will assume with respect to the war in the Pacific. The Governinent of the United States has never interfered officiously in the affairs of other countries, even when its own interests were compromised, and much less would it do so when only the interests are involved of friendly nations, with respect to which no motive can exist which should lead us to favor either one or the other of them. I had read the memorandum of Mr. Hurlbut, also the speech delivered by him at his reception by President Garcia Calderon, both documents having been forwarded to me from Lima, and by me at once brought to the knowledge of my Government. The first of these documents can not be considered of official or diplomatic character, as its author remarks in the note of which your Excellency forwards me a copy. The instructions given me by my Government are certainly the same as those sent to Mr. Hurlbut, and it can be affirmed with certainty that they do not coincide in their spirit with that which predominates in the document referred to by your Excellency. The instructions from Mr. Blaine, the Secretary of State, can not bear a double meaning, and so certain is this, and such confidence was felt in the intelligence, justice, and generosity of the Government of Chili, that I was authorized to place them before his Excellency the President of this Republic, or his Ministers, if a moment should arrive when I might deem it advisable so to do. In order to dispel all doubts from the mind of your Excellency as to the attitude of my Government respecting the conditions of peace between Chili and Peru, and its determination not to interfere in the question, I have no hesitation in here copying a paragraph from those instructions, and which runs as folfows: "Since the Arica conference closed, the war has terminated with the complete success of Chili, and with what may be considered little less than the conquest of Peru. This Government can not persuade itself to believe that the offer of friendly intervention in the question now pending would be agreeable to the Chilian Government. But I am certain that Government will appreciate the natural and profound interest which the United States feels in the termination of a situation which is so calamitous in its consequences to the best interests of the South American republics. The Government of Chili should also be aware that, if at any time the interposition of the good offices of this Government can contribute to the reestablishment of friendly relations, the United States would promptly offer such interposition on the desire for such being manifested." These instructions also say: "In all conversations connected with this matter which may be held with members of the Government of Chili, you must conform to the known ruling of international law, and that under no circumstances shall you officially offer any advice to the Government of Chili which shall not previously have been solicited by it." Another clause refers to the provisional government of Señor Garcia Calderon, which the Washington Cabinet hoped to see established, and instructs me to encourage it only in a manner becoming the dignity and neutrality of a plenipotentiary without interfering in any manner which might appear officious. It appears to me that these extracts from the instructions given me by my Government will suffice to convince your Excellency that there is no intention on the part of my Government to interfere arbitrarily in the contest in the Pacific, and that its actions and conduct proceed from a friendly nation, which endeavors to act in the most delicate manner.

I con

scquently trust that the Government of your Excellency will continue to retain faith in the ancient and ship has been of so many years' duration, and which traditional policy of the United States, whose friendnever was more faithful nor intimate than at present.

The republication in this country of the memorandum addressed by Minister Hurlbut to General Lynch and General Kilpatrick's letter to Señor Balmeceda, together with the intimation that Mr. Hurlbut was preparing a rejoinder to the statements in General Kilpatrick's letter which reflected on him, furnished the text for a large number of newspaper articles, in which both ministers were severely censured for the unseemly controversy in which they had engaged. In order that the public might understand the relation of the State Department to a dispute in which the consistency and harmony of its instructions to our Ministers in South America had been called in question, Secretary of State Blaine, on December 11th, furnished for publication copies of the following documents, of which only unessential portions are here omitted:

1.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, May 9, 1881.

I. P. Christiancy, Esq., etc., Lima.

SIR: In your last dispatch you informed this department that the Chilian Government retused absolutely to recognize General Piérola as representing the civil authority in Peru, and that Señor Calderon was at the head of a Provisional Government. If the Calderon Government is supported by the character and intelligence of Peru, and is really endeavoring to restore constitutional government, with a view both to domestic order and negotiation with Chili for peace, you may recognize it as the existing Provisional Government, and render what aid you can by advice and good offices to that end. Mr. Elmore has been received by me as the confidential agent of such Provisional Government. JAMES G. BLAINE.

[NOTE.-In pursuance of the above, Mr. Christiancy, on June 26th, formally recognized the Calderon Govcrnment several weeks in advance of the arrival of General Hurlbut.]

II.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, June 15, 1881.

Stephen A. Hurlbut, Esq., etc. SIR: The deplorable condition of Peru, the disorganization of its government, and the absence of precise and trustworthy information as to the state of affairs now existing in that unhappy country, render it impossible to give you instructions as full and definite as I would desire. Judging from the most recent dispatches from our Ministers, you will probably find, on the part of the Chilian authorities in possession of Peru, a willingness to facilitate the establishment of the Provisional Government which has been attempted by Señor Calderon. If so, you will do all you properly can to encourage the Peruvians to accept any reasonable conditions and limitations with which this concession may be accompanied. It is vitally important to Peru that she be allowed to resume the functions of a native and orderly government, both for the purposes of internal administration and the negotiation of peace. To attain this end it would be far better to accept conditions which may be hard and unwelcome, than, by demanding too much, to force the continuance of the military control of Chili. It is hoped that you will be able, in your necessary association with the Chilian authorities, to impress upon them that the more liberal and considerate their policy, the surer it will be to obtain a lasting and satisfactory settlement.

The United States can not refuse to recognize the rights which the Chilian Government has acquired by the successes of the war, and it may be that a cession of territory will be a necessary price to be paid for peace. It would seem to be injudicious for Peru to declare that under no circumstances could the loss of territory be accepted as the result of negotiation. The great objects of the provisional authorities of Peru would seem to be to secure the establishment of a constitutional government, and, next, to succeed in the opening of negotiations of peace, without the declaration of preliminary conditions as an ultimatum on either side. It will be difficult perhaps to obtain this from Chili, but, as the Chilian Government has distinctly repudiated the idea that this was a war of conquest, the Government of Peru may fairly claim the opportunity to make propositions of indemnity and guarantee before submitting to a cession of territory. As far as the influence of the United States will go in Chili, it will be exerted to induce the Chilian Government to consent that the question of cession of the territory should be the subject of negotiation, and not the condition precedent upon which alone negotiation shall commence.

If you can aid the Government of Peru in securing such a result, you will have rendered the service which seems most pressing. Whether it is in the power of the Peruvian Government to make any arrangements at home or abroad, singly or with the assistance of friendly powers, which will furnish the necessary indemnity or supply the required guarantee, you will be better able to advise me after you have reached your post. As you are aware, more than one proposition has been submitted to the consideration of this Government, looking to a friendly intervention by which Peru might be enabled to meet the conditions which would probably be imposed. Circumstances do not seem at present opportune for such action; but if, upon full knowledge of the condition of Peru, you can inform this Government that Peru can devise and carry into practical effect a plan by which all the reasonable conditions of Chili can be met without sacrificing the integrity of Peruvian territory, the Government of the United States would be willing to tender its good offices toward the execution of such a project. As a strictly confidential communication, I inclose you a copy of instructions sent this day to the United States Minister at Santiago. You will thus be advised of the position which this Government assumes toward all the parties to this lamentable conflict. JAMES G. BLAINE.

III.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, June 15, 1881. S

Judson Kilpatrick, Esq., etc. SIR: The unfortunate condition of the relations between Chili and Peru make the mission upon the duties of which you are now entering one of grave responsibility and great delicacy. Difficult as would be any intervention of the United States under ordinary circumstances, our position is further embarrassed by the failure of the conference at Arica, undertaken at our suggestion. It is evident from the protocols of that conference that Chili was prepared to dictate and not to discuss terms of peace, and that the arbitration of the United States upon any questions of difference with the allied powers of Peru and Bolivia was not acceptable and would not be acceptable by the Chilian Government. Since that time the war has closed in the complete success of Chili, and in what can scarcely be considered less than the conquest of Peru and Bolivia.... But I am sure the Chilian Government will appreciate the natural and deep interest which the United States feels in the termination of a condition so calamitous in its consequences to the best interests of all the South American republics. It should also know that, if at any time the interposition of the good offices of this Government can contribute to the restoration of friendly relations between the belligerent powers, they will, upon proper intimation, be

promptly offered. While, therefore, no instructions are given you to tender officially any advice to the Government of Chili which is unsought, you will, on such opportunity as may occur, govern your conduct and representations by the considerations to which I shall now call your attention.

Without entering upon any discussion as to the causes of the late war between Chili on the one side and Peru and Bolivia on the other, this Government recognizes the right which the successful conduct of that war has conferred upon Chili, and in doing so I will not undertake to estimate the extent to which the Chilian Government has the right to carry its calculation of the indemnities to which it is entitled, nor the security for the future which its interests may seem to require. But, if the Chilian Government, as its representatives have declared, seeks only a guarantee of future peace, it would seem natural that Peru and Bolivia should be allowed to offer such indemnity and guarantee before the annexation of territory, which is the right of conquest, is insisted upon. If these powers fail to offer what is a reasonably sufficient indemnity and guarantee, then it becomes a fair subject of consideration whether such territory may not be exacted as the necessary price of peace. But at the conclusion of a war, avowedly not of conquest but for the solution of differences which diplomacy had failed to settle, to make the acquisition of territory a sine qua non of peace, is calculated to cast suspicion on the professions with which war was originally declared. It may very well be that at the termination of such a contest the changed condition and relation of all the parties to it may make readjustment of boundaries or territorial changes wise as well as necessary; but this, where the war is not one of conquest, should be the result of negotiation and not the absolute preliminary condition on which alone the victor consents to negotiate. At this day, when the right of the people to govern themselves, the fundamental basis of republican institutions is so widely recognized, there is nothing more difficult or more dangerous than the forced transfer of territory, carrying with it an indignant and hostile population, and nothing but a necessity, proved before the world, can justify it. It is not a case in which the power desiring the territory can be accepted as a safe or impartial judge.

While the United States Government does not pretend to express an opinion whether or not sucli an annexation of territory is a necessary consequence of this war, it believes that it would be more honorable to the Chilian Government, more conducive to the security of a permanent peace, and more in consonance with those principles which are professed by all the republics of America that such territorial changes should be avoided as far as possible; that they should never be the result of mere force, but, if necessary, should be decided and tempered by full and equal discussion between all the powers whose people and whose national interests are involved. At the present moment the completeness of the victory of Chili seems to render such a diplomatic discussion impossible. The result of the conflict has been not only the defeat of the allied armies, but the dissolution of all responsible government in Peru. Its soil is occupied, the collection of its revenues transferred to the conqueror, and its executive, legislative, and judicial functions are in abeyance. It can neither enforce order within nor assure peace without. An effort, and apparently a very earnest and honest one, has been made to create a provisional government which shall gradually restore order and the reign of law. But it is obvious that, for such a government to succeed in obtaining the confidence, either of its own people or of foreign powers, it must be allowed a freedom and force of action which can not be exercised while Chili holds absolute possession and governs by military authority. This Government, therefore, has been glad to learn from its Minister in Chili, whom you succeed, that the Chilian authorities have decided to give their support to the efforts of Señor Calderon to establish on a steady foot

ing a provisional government in Peru. You will, as far as you can do so with propriety, and without officious intrusion, approve and encourage this disposition on the part of the Chilian Government, and this department will be exceedingly gratified if your influence, as the representative of the United States, shall be instrumental in inducing the Government of Chili to give its aid and support to the restoration of regular constitutional government in Peru, and to postpone the settlement of all questions of territorial annexation to the diplomatic negotiations which can then be resumed with the certainty of a just, friendly, and satisfactory conclusion.

In any representation which you may make you will say that the hope of the United States is that the negotiations for peace shall be conducted and the final settlement between the two countries determined without either side invoking the aid or intervention of any European power. The Government of the United States seeks only to perform the office of a friend to all the parties in this unhappy conflict between South American republics, and it will regret to be compelled to consider how far that feeling might be affected, and a more active interposition forced upon it by any attempted complication of this question with European politics. If at any time you shall judge it expedient and advantageous to read this dispatch to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, you are authorized to do so. The decision on this point is left to your discretion.

JAMES G. BLAINE.

In his annual message to Congress, President Arthur spoke of our relations with the west coast republics in the following terms:

This Government sees, with great concern, the continuance of the hostile relations between Chili, Bolivia, and Peru. An early peace between these republics is much to be desired, not only that they themselves may be spared further misery and bloodshed, but because their continued antagonism threatens consequences which are, in my judgment, dangerous to the interests of republican government on this continent, and calculated to destroy the best elements of our free and peaceful civilization. As in the present excited condition of popular feeling in these countries there has been serious misapprehension of the position of the United States, and as separate diplomatic intercourse with each through independent ministers is sometimes subject, owing to the want of prompt reciprocal communication, to temporary misunderstanding, I have deemed it judicious at the present time to send a special envoy, accredited to all and each of them, and furnished with general instructions, which will, I trust, enable him to bring these powers' into friendly

relations.

The special envoy alluded to by the President was Mr. William H. Trescot, of South Carolina, who sailed from New York for Panama on December 3d, accompanied by Mr. Walker Blaine, son of the Secretary of State. Reaching Lima in due time, they remained there several days, and on Christmas-day sailed from the neighboring port of Callao for Santiago. On December 12th the following dispatches from Secretary Blaine to our Ministers at Lima and Santiago were given to the press:

I.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, November 22, 1881.

To Stephen A. Hurlbut, Esq., etc., Lima.
SIR: Your dispatches to No. 23, inclusive, have
been received, and I learn with regret that a con-
struction has been put upon your language and con-
duet indicating a policy of active intervention on the
part of this Government beyond the scope of your in-
structions. As those instructions were clear and ex-

plicit, and as this department is in the possession of no information which would seem to require the withdrawal of the confidence reposed in you, I must consider this interpretation of your words and acts as the result of some strange and perhaps prejudiced misconception. My only material for forming an opinion consists of your memorandum to Admiral Lynch, your letter to Señor Garcia, the secretary of General Piérola, and the convention with President Calderon, ceding a naval station to the United States. I would have preferred that you should hold no communication with Admiral Lynch on questions of a diplomatic character. He was present as a military commander of Chilian forces, and you were accredited to Peru. Nor do I conceive that Admiral Lynch, as the commander of the Chilian army of occupation, had any right to ask or receive any formal assurance from you as to the opinions of your Government. The United States was represented in Chili by a properly accredited minister, and from his own Government the admiral could and ought to have received any information which it was important for him to have. It was to be expected, and even desired, that frank and friendly relations should exist between you; but I can not consider such confidential communication as justifying a formal appeal to your colleague in Chili for the correction or criticism of your conduct. If there was anything in your ceedings in Peru to which the Government of Chili could properly take exception, a direct representation to this Government through the Chilian Minister here was due both to the Government and to yourself.

Having said this, I must add that the language of the memorandum was capable of not unnatural misconstruction. While you said nothing that may not fairly be considered warranted by your instructions, you omitted to say with equal emphasis some things which your instructions supplied, and which would, perhaps, have relieved the sensitive apprehensions of the Chilian authorities. For, while the United States would unquestionably "regard with disfavor" the imperious annexation of Peruvian territory as the right of conquest, you were distinctly informed that such annexation might become a necessary condition this Government could not refuse to recognize that in a final treaty of peace. And the main purpose of your effort was expected to be, not so much a protest against any possible annexation as an attempt by lian authorities (with whom you were daily associated) friendly but unofficial communications with the Chito induce them to support the policy of giving to Peru, without the imposition of harsh and absolute conditions precedent, the opportunity to show that the rights and interests of Chili could be satisfied without such annexation. There is enough in your memorandum, if carefully considered, to indicate this purpose, and I only regret that you did not state it with a distinctness and, if necessary, with a repetition which would have made impossible anything but the most willful misconception.

As at present advised. I must express disapproval of your letter to Señor Garcia, the secretary of General Piérola. I think that your proper course in refeither entirely to ignore it as claiming an official charerence to Garcia's communication would have been acter which you could not recognize, or, if you deemed that courtesy required a reply, to state that you were accredited to the Calderon Government, and could, therefore, know no other, and that any communica tion which General Piérola thought it his duty or interest to make must be made directly to the Government at Washington. You had no responsibility in the matter, and it was injudicious to assume any. The recognition of the Calderon Government had been duly considered and decided by your own Government, and you were neither instructed nor expected to furnish General Piérola or the Peruvian public with the reasons for that action. The following language in your letter to Señor Garcia might be misunderstood: "Chili desires and asks for Tara

paca, and will recognize the Government which agrees to its session. The Calderon Government will not cede it. It remains to be seen whether that of Piérola will prove more pliable." It might easily be supposed, by an excited public opinion on either side, that such language was intended to imply that the Government of the United States had recognized the Government of Calderon because of its resolution not to cede Peruvian territory. No such motive has ever been declared by this Government. The Government of Calderon was recognized because we believed it to be to the interest of both Chili and Peru that some respectable authority should be established which could restore internal order and initiate responsible negotiations for peace. We desired that the Peruvian Government should have a fair opportunity to obtain the best terms it could, and hoped that it would be able to satisfy the just demands of Chili without the painful sacrifice of the national territory. But we did not make, and never intended to make, any special result of the peace negotiations the basis of our recognition of the Calderon Government. What was best and what was possible for Peru to do we were anxious to the extent of our powers to aid her in doing by the use of whatever influence or consideration we enjoyed with Chili; further than that the Government of the United States has as yet expressed neither opinion nor intention.

I must also express the dissatisfaction of the department at your telegram to the Minister of the United States near the Argentine Confederation, suggesting that a Minister be sent by that Government to Peru. This would have been clearly without the sphere of your proper official action at any time, but, as there then existed a serious difference between Chili and the Argentine Confederation, you might naturally have anticipated that such a recommendation would be considered by Chili as an effort to effect a political combination against her. The United States was not in search of alliances to support a hostile demonstration against Chili, and such an anxiety might well be deemed inconsistent with the professions of an impartial mediation.

As to the convention with regard to a naval station in the Bay of Chimbole, I am of opinion that, although it is a desirable arrangement, the time is not opportune. I would be very unwilling to ask such a concession under circumstances which would almost seem to impose upon Peru the necessity of compliance with our request; and I have no doubt that, whenever Peru is relieved from present embarrassment, she would cheerfully grant any facilities which our naval or commercial interests may require. Nor, in the present excited condition of public opinion in Chili, would I be willing to afford evil-disposed persons the opportunity to intimate that the United States contemplated the establishment of a naval rendezvous in the neighborhood of either Peru or Chili. The very natural and innocent convenience which we require might be misunderstood or misapprehended; and, as our sole purpose is to be allowed, in a spirit of the most impartial friendship, to act as mediator between these two powers, I would prefer, at present, to ask no favors of the one, and to excite no possible apprehensions in the other.

Having thus stated with frankness the impression made upon the department by such information as you have furnished it, it becomes my duty to add that this Government is unable to understand the abolition of the Calderon Government, and the arrest of President Calderon himself, by the Chilian authorities, or, I suppose I ought to say, by the Chilian Government, as the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of that Government has, in a formal communication to Mr. Kilpatrick, declared that the Calderon Government "was at an end." As we recognized that Government, in supposed conformity with the wishes of Chili, and as no reason for its destruction has been given us, you will still consider yourself accredited to it, if any legitimate representative exists in the place of President

Calderon. If none such exists, you will remain in Lima until you receive further instructions, confining your communications with the Chilian authorities to such limits as your personal convenience and the maintenance of the rights and privileges of your legation may require.

The complicated condition of affairs resulting from the action of the Chilian Government, the time required for communication between the legations in Chili and Peru and this department, and the unfortunate notoriety which the serious differences between yourself and your colleague in Chili have attracted, have, in the opinion of the President, imposed upon him the necessity of a special mission. This mission will be charged with the duty of expressing the views of the President upon the grave condition of affairs which your dispatches describe, and, if possible, with due consideration of the rights, interests, and responsibilities of both nations, to promote a settlement which shall restore to the suffering people of Peru the benefits of a well-ordered government, deliver both countries from the miseries and burdens of a protracted war, and place their future relations upon a foundation that will prove stable, because just and honorable. I am, sir, your obedient servant,

II.

JAMES G. BLAINE.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, November 22, 1881.

Judson Kilpatrick, Esq., etc., Santiago.

SIR: Your dispatch, No. 8, conveying a copy of your reply to Señor Balmaseda has been received. The communication to which it was a reply should have accompanied it, in order that the department could properly judge of your answer. Your letter is not approved by the department. You had had ample opportunity, and, as you have before stated, availed yourself of it, to make known to the Government of Chili the scope of your instructions, and to give it abundant assurance of the friendly disposition of your own Government. If the conduct of Mr. Hurlbut in Peru had given sufficient ground for complaint to the Chilian Government, that complaint should have been made in Washington. Mr. Hurlbut's presentation speech to President Calderon, his memorandum to Admiral Lynch, his letter to Garcia, and telegraphic reports from Buenos Ayres, were not subjects upon which you were called to pass judgment, nor upon which you should have been interrogated by the Chilian Governinent. Nothing in your conduct or language had excited its apprehensions, and no explanation was due, or could have been expected from you, of the language or conduct of your colleague in Peru. I should have been glad if it had occurred to you to call the attention of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the impropriety of such a communication, and in referring to the fact that your instructions, which you were authorized to communicate to him, gave all the assurance which he could either desire or ask of the friendly feeling of the United States. I should have much preferred that you had furnished him with a copy of those instructions, instead of submitting a paraphrase which does not fully represent their spirit and meaning. Indeed, I find it difficult to understand how the Chilian Government could have been under any misapprehension as to the disposition or purpose of the United States, when the instructions both to yourself and to Mr. Hurlbut had, in fact, been already frankly communicated-the fornier, according to your dispatch No. 3, to the outgoing Administration; and the latter, by this department to Mr. Martinez, the representative of the present Government in Washington. It is still more difficult to understand the abolition of the Calderon Government, and the arrest of the President himself, in the face of your assurance, in your dispatch No. 3, where you quote the following as having been addressed to you by Señor Valderana, to wit: "You are, therefore, authorized to say to your Government that every effort will be given

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