supposed interests was too great to permit of even an apparent reconciliation between them by any formula consistent with the theories of the time. A reconciliation was, on the other hand, a question of life or death to all sections of the people. It therefore became imperative that mutual sacrifices should be made at every step, and this not only in principles, but also in theories; that is, both sides. were compelled, by making concessions at variance with their principles, to be untrue to their ideal. The final result could not in consequence be a harmonious whole, complete in itself. The most that could be accomplished was a certain amount of reconciliation, the effect of which was the prevention of the dissolution of the Union and the creation of a federal power with the character of a federal government to such an extent that by it the possibility of the growth of the members of the federation into one consistent whole was secured.1 A model constitution-so far as it is allowable at all to speak of such a one-would have done poor service for the United States. Besides it is very probable that it would not have been ratified. But if it had been adopted, it would not have lasted long, for the reason that it was not at all in harmony with the actual condition of affairs. It was necessary that the constitution should be highly elastic in its nature. Its terms must be susceptible of The originators of the constitution were conscious at the completion of their work that they had accomplished no more. They say in their communication to congress, which accompanied the constitution: "In all our deliberations on this subject we kept steadily in our view that which appeared to us the greatest interest of every true American—in which is involved our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence. This important consideration, seriously and deeply impressed on our minds, led each state in the convention to be less rigid in points of inferior magnitude [? !] than might have been otherwise expected, and thus the constitution which we now present is the result of amity and of that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensable." Elliot, Deb., I., p. 305. POSSIBLE DISSOLUTION. 77 great extension or contraction of meaning, according to the want of the moment. A more brittle bond would infallibly be broken. This is not a matter of speculation. The whole history of the United States, from 1789 to 1861, demonstrates it. Almost from the very day on which the new order of things was inaugurated, the conflict between the opposing tendencies broke out anew, and before the close of the century it attained a degree of violence which suggested very serious fears. The thought of the dissolution of the Union was current among both parties. In accordance with their whole political tendency the anti-Federalists permitted themselves to be urged on more frequently and more easily to conceive of taking such extreme steps. But even in the speculations of the Federalists on the future, this constituted an element which was taken into consideration with other contingencies. It is indeed true that it was frequently only by vain threats that the minority sought to exert a pressure on the majority. The view which afterwards became gradually more general, that during the first years of the existence of the republic the thought of separation was never seriously entertained, is a historical misrepresentation made in the interests of party. Until the first part of the nineteenth century, the dissolution of the Union was a standing element in political speculation; and both previous to and after that period, it was repeatedly considered possible and even probable in moments of excitement, by either party, that it would be necessary to resort to this radical remedy. Were it not that the letter of the constitution permitted all parties to verge upon the actual dissolution of the Union, without feeling themselves responsible for a breach of the constitution, it is likely that long before 1861, a serious attempt in that direction would have been made. Thanks to this circumstance, however, the danger of ruin ous haste was considerably lessened. Time was given to passion to abate its intensity, and with every day's delay the probability increased that all parties would become conscious of the preponderance of their common interests over those which were divergent. When the opposing party yielded in the slightest particular, there was always offered the possibility of a return to the right path before the decisive step was taken. In the meantime, the prejudices and customs, the diversity of which Nathan Strong had designated as the greatest obstacle in the way of a rational regulation of national affairs, became assimilated to one another, at least in some respects. Commerce, social intercourse and custom created new material, intellectual and moral bonds, which gradually rendered a breach more difficult. 1 But contemporaneously with this, and from the very first, the material and irreconcilable differences that existed grew more marked. Yet the constitution afforded such a field for a war of words, and the field was so readily taken, that in the northern states, which were rapidly becoming united in all their interests, the erroneous view began to obtain currency in the third decade of this century that all difficulty would end in a war of tongues. There was something of a correct instinct at the foundation of this disastrous and foolish notion. While the "irrepressibleness" of the conflict became clearer year after year, the ambiguous nature of the constitution became apparent in an equal degree. The field became gradually broader and more inviting to a tournament of words; and the extraordinary dilatability of the boundaries postponed the moment of the breach. It became possible in the more populous and wealthy half of the Union, which was, morally and intellectually, the more highly developed, to build up such a solidarity of interests and for the people 1 Gibbs, Memoirs of Wolcott, I., p. 40. ORIGIN OF NULLIFICATION. 79 to realize the existence of this solidarity of interests to such an extent that they were enabled, by an appeal to the sword, to decide the one great question as to the nature of the Union, a question to which, from the terms of the constitution, no certain answer had ever before been given,and to find a solution of it in harmony with the progress of civilization and the best good of the whole country. These views are, to a great extent, very different from those prevalent on the subject; but they must accord with historical truth, for only in such case is the political history of the United States at all rational or intelligible. Calhoun and his disciples were not the authors of the doctrine of nullification and secession. That question is as old as the constitution itself, and has always been a living one, even when it has not been one of life and death. Its roots lay in the actual circumstances of the time, and the constitution was the living expression of these actual circumstances. CHAPTER III. THE INTERNAL STRUGGLES DURING WASHINGTON'S TWO ADMINISTRATIONS. ALEXANDER HAMILTON. THE FIRST DEBATE ON THE SLAVERY QUESTION. INFLUENCE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. CONSOLIDATION OF PARTIES AND GRADUAL INTENSIFICATION OF GEOGRAPHICAL DIFFER ENCES. The constitution had gone into operation in 1789, and as early as 1790 the consolidating influences of the firmer government seemed so burthensome and dangerous a load, that the anti-Federalists began to grow restless under the yoke, and to long for the loose management of affairs that had existed under the confederation. The more nearly the measures of the administration and of the majority of congress became parts of a system planned with a really statesmanlike mind, the firmer the organization of the opposition became and the more did its resistance assume the character of one based on principle. The Federalists had not expected this, although they must have been prepared for it after the struggle over the ratification of the constitution. Washington fell a victim to the illusion that it was possible to bring about the harmonious co-operation of all the forces of the country. All that was needed, he thought, was to convince the opposition that the administration had nothing but the best interests of the country at heart and the desire to do full justice to them. This illusion caused him to take a step which was accompanied at first by good results, but which, in the course of time, contributed. |