pression or postponement of action. As we have already seen, the normal and primitive series is (1) sense-stimulus; (2) certain nerve-processes in the brain which are associated with perception and emotion; and (3) certain resulting activities. By the suppression of action the mind comes to occupy itself more and more completely with the central processes. Perception blossoms forth into conceptual thought; emotion blossoms forth into æsthetics.

"Throughout the whole range of sensations, perceptions, and emotions which we do not class as æsthetic,' says Mr. Herbert Spencer, the states of consciousness serve simply as aids and stimuli to guidance and action. They are transitory, or, if they persist in consciousness some time, they do not monopolize the attention; that which monopolizes the attention is something ulterior, to the effecting of which they are instrumental. But in the states of mind we class as aesthetic the opposite attitude is maintained towards the sensations, perceptions, and emotions. These are no longer links in the chain of states which prompt and guide conduct. Instead of being allowed to disappear with merely passing recognition, they are kept in consciousness and dwelt upon, their natures being such that their continued presence in consciousness is agreeable.' The action which is the normal consequent on sensation is here postponed or suppressed; and thus we are enabled to make knowledge or beauty an end to be sought for its own sake; and thus, too, we are able to make progress, otherwise impossible, in science and in art. Sensations and perceptions are the roots from which spring the sturdy trunk of action, the expanded leaves of knowledge, and the fair blossoms of art. The leaves and the flowers are the terminal products along certain lines of development; but the function of the leaves is to minister to the growth of the wood, and the function of the flowers is to minister to the continuance and well-being of the race. So, too, in human affairs. Knowledge and art are justified by their influence on conduct; truth and beauty must ever * I should add, "or as conceptual thought."

guide us towards right living; and æsthetics are true or false according as they lead towards a higher or a lower standard of moral life." *

To sum up, then, concerning this difficult subject, the following are the propositions on which I would lay stress: (1) What we term an æsthetic sense of beauty involves a number of complex perceptual, conceptual, and emotional elements. (2) The fact that a natural object excites in us this pleasurable emotion does not carry with it the implication that the object was evolved for the sake of its beauty. (3) Even if we grant, as we fairly may, that brightly coloured flowers, in association with nectar, have been objects of appetence to insects; and that brilliant plumage, in association with sexual vigour, has been a factor in the preferential mating of birds;-this is a very different thing from saying that, either in the selection of flowers by insects, or in the selection of their mates by birds, a consciously æsthetic motive has been a determining cause. (4) In fine, though animals may be incidentally attracted by beautiful objects, they have no æsthetic sense of beauty. A sense of beauty is an abstract emotion. Esthetics involve ideals; and to ideals, if what has been urged in these pages be valid, no brute can aspire.

What applies thus to æsthetics applies also to ethics. Few, however, will be found to contend that animals can be moral or immoral, or have any moral ideas properly so called. Mr. Romanes does indeed state, in the table he prefixes. to his works on Mental Evolution, that the anthropoid apes and dogs are capable of "indefinite morality." He leaves this to be explained, however, in a future work. In the published instalment of "Mental Evolution in Man" he seems to contend,† or, at least, admit, "that the fundamental concepts of morality are of later origin than the names by which they have been baptized." But he says nothing of indefinite morality, which still remains for con

*This paragraph is quoted from the author's "Springs of Conduct," p. 263. + Page 347.

sideration in another work. In the mean while we may, I think, confidently assume that ethics, like conceptual thought and æsthetics, are beyond the reach of the brute. Morality is essentially a matter of ideals, and these belong to the conceptual sphere.

I have now said enough to indicate what I mean by advocating the exercise of extreme caution in our inferences concerning the emotional states of animals. We must remember, first, how liable to error are our inferences in these matters; we must remember, next, how complex and essentially human are our own emotions. I do not for one moment deny that in animals are to be found the perceptual germs of even the higher emotional states. Nevertheless, if we employ, in our interpretation of the actions of animals, such terms as "consciousness of guilt," "sense of right and wrong," "idea of justice," "deceitfulness," "revenge," "vindictiveness," "shame," and the rest, we must not forget that these terms stand for human products, that they are saturated with conceptual thought, and that they must be to a large extent emptied of their meaning before they can become applicable to the emotional consciousness of brutes.

I have said nothing about the emotions of invertebrates, because I have nothing special to say. They have, no doubt, emotions analogous to fear, anger, and so on. But it is difficult to interpret their actions. The “angry” wasp is, perhaps, a good deal more frightened than furious. Sir John Lubbock's interesting experiments seem to show that ants have what is termed the instinct of play. But this admirable observer has rendered it probable that sympathy and affection in ants and bees have been somewhat exaggerated.

CHAPTER XI.

ANIMAL ACTIVITIES: HABIT AND INSTINCT.

So soon as one of the higher animals comes into the world a number of simple vital activities are already in progress or are at once initiated. Some of these are what are termed "automatic actions," or actions which take their origin within the organ which manifests the activity; such are the heart-beat and the rhythmical contractions of the intestines by which the food is pushed onwards through the alimentary canal. Some are reflex, or responsive, actions, taking origin from a stimulus coming from without; such are the contraction of the pupil of the eye under bright light, the pouring forth of the secretions on the presence of food in the alimentary canal, taking the breast, sneezing, and so forth. Some are partly automatic and partly reflex; such is the rhythm of respiration.

In addition to these vital activities, there is a vast body of more complex activities, for the performance of which the animal brings with it innate capacities. Some of these, which we term "instinctive," are performed at once and without any individual training, as when a chicken steps out into the world, runs about, and picks up food without learning or practice. Others, which we term "habitual," are more or less rapidly learnt, and are then performed without forethought or attention. The store of innate capacity is often very large; and a multitude of activities are ere long performed with ease and certainty so soon as the animal has learnt to use the organization it thus inherits. And lastly, built upon this as a basis, by recombining of old activities in new modes, and by special applica

tion of the activities to special circumstances, we have the activities which we term "intelligent;" and here again the activities are sometimes divided into two classes, answering respectively to the reflex and the automatic, but on a higher plane, according as they are responsive to stimuli coming more or less directly from without, or spontaneous and taking their origin from within. But it is probably rather the remoteness and indirectness of the responsive element than its absence that characterizes these spontaneous activities.

Another classification of activities is into voluntary and involuntary. Voluntary actions are consciously performed for the attainment of some more or less definite end or object. Involuntary actions, though they may be accompanied by consciousness, and though they may be apparently purposive, are performed without intention. Notwithstanding the conscious element, they may, perhaps, be regarded as rather physiological than psychological. The simple vital activities belong to this class. But some are much more complex. If, when I am watching the cobra at the Zoo, it suddenly strikes at the glass near my face, I involuntarily start back. The action is apparently purposive, that is to say, an observer of the action would perceive that it was performed for a definite end, the removal from danger; it is also accompanied by consciousness; but it is unintentional, no representation of the end to be gained or the action to be performed being at the moment of action framed by the mind. On the other hand, if I perform a voluntary act, such as selecting and lighting a cigar, there is first a desire or motive directed to a certain end in view, involving an ill-defined representation of the means by which that end may be achieved; and this is followed by the fulfilment of the desire through the application of the means to the performance of the act.

In the carrying out of voluntary activities, then, both perception and emotional appetence are involved. There are construction and reconstruction, memory and anticipation, and interwoven therewith the motive elements of