hold interest of Lawrence & Martin, and designates an interest which is carved out of that estate or included in it. We do not perceive why it is not embraced in the class of instruments whose record affects subsequent purchasers and creditors with notice. Reed v. Kemp, 16 Ill. 445; Dundy v. Chambers, 23 Ill. 369; McCann v. Day, 57 Ill. 101; Harris v. Johnson, 31 N. J. Eq. 174. The Chicago Driving Park is affected with notice of the rights of appellants, because it was a purchaser pendente lite. It is claimed that the privilege accorded by Lawrence & Martin to appellants, to use the fences and buildings for advertising purposes, is a violation of the provisions in the lease from Magie & Tree, and that, for this reason, the enforcement of the agreement against the Chicago Driving Park might lead to a forfeiture of the lease. That is a matter which concerns the lessors, and of which they alone can take advantage. If the contract is a violation of the terms of the lease, the lessors might yet choose to ratify it, or consent to such use of the premises as appellants claim. Such violation, if it exists, does not make the contract void, but only voidable. Webster v. Nichols, 104 Ill. 160. The court of chancery had jurisdiction to restrain the defendants below from any interference with the exercise, by appellants, of their privileges under the contract. If the owner of a land enters into a covenant concerning the land,-concerning its use,-subjecting it to easements or personal servitudes and the like, and the land is afterwards conveyed or sold to one who has actual or constructive notice of the covenant, the grantee or purchaser will take the premises bound by the covenant, and will be compelled in equity either to specifically execute it, or will be restrained from violating it; and it makes no difference whatever, with respect to this liability in equity, whether the covenant is or is not one which in law "runs with the land." Pom. Eq. Jur. §§ 689, 692, 1295, 1342. The decree of the superior court, and the judgment of the appellate court affirming such decree, are reversed, and the cause remanded to the superior court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. (116 Ill. 92) HILL v. HARDING. 1. BANKRUPTCY-EFFECT OF DISCHARGE. A discharge in bankruptcy granted to a defendant after verdict, and before judgment, held to be ground for granting a perpetual stay of execution upon a general judgment, but no bar to the action, and will not prevent the rendition of a general judgment. 2. SAME-DISCHARGE-HOW SET UP-HOW PRESENTED AFTER REMAND OF CAUSE -How PROVED - HARMLESS IRREGULARITY IRREGULARITY IN CERTIFIED COPY. Where the defendant in a pending suit obtains a discharge in bankruptcy after the verdict, and files his certificate of discharge, with a motion for stay of proceedings, which motion is denied, and judgment entered, and the cause is appealed to this court, and afterwards to the United States supreme court, where the judgment is reversed, this court remanded the cause, with direc tions that, if it should satisfactorily appear that the discharge was obtained after verdict, the court should enter judgment on the verdict with perpetual stay of execution. This is not a remanding for new trial, and does not open the case for the filing of a plea. A plea is not necessary at that time to set up the discharge. Irregularities in the method of proving a discharge, e. g., in the certification of the copy of the certificate offered, are harmless when the fact of the discharge is not disputed. 8. SAME-ATTACHMENT SUIT-DISCHARGE AFTER VERDICT-FORM OF JUDGMENT. A discharge after verdict, and before judgment, in an attachment suit begun four months before any proceedings in bankruptcy were instituted, operates as a stay of proceedings at that point. Upon the determination that a discharge was rendered after verdict, the United States supreme court hold that it is the duty of the trial court to determine whether the plaintiff in the attachment suit is entitled to a special judgment for the purpose of preserving the rights acquired in the attachment suit. In the present case, in pursuance of such direction transmitted to the trial court by this court, the trial court entered, as such "special judgment" a general judgment against the defendant, with a perpetual stay of execution, and this court holds that this is a proper judgment in such case. Error to appellate court, First district. Brandt & Hoffman, for plaintiff in error. Harding, Wilson & Barnum, for defendant in error. CRAIG, J. This was an action by attachment, brought in 1877 by defendants in error, in the circuit court of Cook county, against George W. Hill, to recover for services rendered as attorneys. The writ of attachment was levied on certain property belonging to Hill; and for the purpose of releasing it from the levy as provided by section 15, c. 11, Rev. Laws 1874, he, with certain persons as sureties, entered into recognizance conditioned for the payment of the judgment which might be rendered against him in the cause on a final trial thereof. After entering into this recognizance the attachment was dissolved, and the property released to Hill, as provided by the section of the statute supra. Upon a trial of the cause in the circuit court, before a jury, on the twelfth day of April, 1878, the jury found the issues for the plaintiffs, and rendered a verdict in their favor for $3,500. The defendant entered a motion for a new trial. On the twenty-second day of February, 1878, Hill filed his petition in bankruptcy in the district court of the United States for the Northern district of Illinois, and on the trial-day of May following he was adjudged a bankrupt. On the seventh of May he filed in this. cause a certificate that he had been adjudged a bankrupt, and on the eleventh day of the same month he entered a motion for a stay of further proceedings in the cause until the court of bankruptcy should pass upon the question of his discharge. The circuit court denied the motion for a stay, overruled the motion for a new trial, and rendered judgment on the verdict. On appeal the judgment was affirmed in the appellate court, and the judgment of the appellate court was subsequently affirmed here. See Hill v. Harding, 93 Ill. 77. The construction of a statute of the United States being involved, defendant, Hill, then removed the cause by writ of error to the supreme court of the United States, and the judgment of this court was reversed, (Hill v. Harding, 107 U. S. 631; S. C. 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 404;) and the cause was remanded for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion. The order of reversal having been filed in the court on the twenty-seventh day of September, 1883, an order was entered reversing the former judgment of the circuit court, and the cause was remanded, and the circuit court was directed, if it was made to satisfactorily appear that since the rendition of the verdict Hill had received his discharge in bankruptcy, the circuit court should then enter judgment on the verdict theretofore rendered, with perpetual stay of execution. On the twenty-fourth day of November, 1883, the cause was redocketed in the circuit court, and Hill appeared, and asked leave to file a plea, in which he set up his discharge in bankruptcy. This the court denied, and the defendant excepted to the decision. The defendants in error then presented to the court what purported to be a certified copy of a certificate of discharge of plaintiff in error, Hill, in bankruptcy, granted by the district court of the United States for the Northern district of Illinois; and the court, after denying Hill's request for a jury, and his request that the case should take its proper place on the docket and wait its regular call for trial, entered a judgment on the verdict of the jury for $3,500, with perpetual stay of execution. We have been favored with an able and elaborate argument from counsel for plaintiffs in error, in which it is claimed that the judgment rendered in the circuit court is erroneous. If the judgment rendered by the circuit court followed the mandate of this court which was predicated upon the opinion of the federal court, then the judgment will have to be affirmed; if, on the other hand, the judgment of the circuit court did not conform to the order reversing and remanding, it will have to be removed. It may be observed that the cause was not remanded to the circuit court for the trial of any issue or question of fact before a jury. This court had decided that the opinion of the circuit court denying the stay of proceedings to wait the determination of the court in bankruptcy on the question of Hill's discharge was proper. The writ of error brought before the federal court held that the decision was erroneous, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings in conformity to the opinion. In the opinion, to which the proceedings were required to conform, we find the following: "The stay does not operate as a bar to the action, but only as a suspension of proceedings until the question of the bankrupt's discharge shall have been determined in the United States court sitting in bankruptcy. After the determination of that question in that court, the court in which the suit is pending may proceed to render such judgment as the circumstances of the case may require. If the discharge is refused, the plaintiff may establish his claim,-may obtain a general judgment. If the discharge is granted, the court in which the suit is pending may then determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to a special judgment for the purpose of enforcing an attachment made more than four months before the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy for the purpose of charging the sureties upon a bond given to dissolve such an attachment. 107 U. S. 633, 634, and 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 404. These were directions to be followed after the cause was remanded and placed upon the docket for final disposition, and from these directions it seems plain that if it appeared that the bankrupt court had refused Hill's discharge, then the plaintiffs in the action would be entitled to a general judgment against him for the amount the jury had found to be due them. . If, on the other hand, Hill had received his discharge in bankruptcy, it was not the duty of the court to refuse to render a judgment of any kind against him; but, in that event, the court might determine whether the plaintiffs were entitled to a special judgment for the purpose of preserving rights acquired in an action of attachment commenced more than four months before any proceedings were commenced in the bankruptcy court. In the remanding order which the court entered for the direction of the circuit court, where a final disposition of the case was to be made, the order appeared to the satisfaction of the court that Hill had been discharged with a perpetual stay of execution. This, as we understand the opinion of the federal court, was a full compliance with the directions of that court. But it is said in the argument: "If the sureties in the recognizance are compelled to pay this debt, Hill will be obliged to reimburse them, and will thus be entirely deprived of the benefit of his discharge in bankruptcy if he has one." The sureties of Hill on his recognizance are not before the court, and it will be time enough to determine their rights and liabilities, and the rights and liabilities of Hill to them, when a proper case presents that question for determination. The only question presented by this record is whether the judgment rendered in the court was proper judgment to be rendered in the case. Counsel for plaintiff in error in their argument ask this question: "Does the judgment against Hill, with perpetual stay of execution, render the sureties in the recognizance to dissolve the attachment liable for the amount of said judgment, or can any judgment be entered which will render them liable for the same?"—and it is insisted that this is a question which is necessary now to be decided. We only regard it necessary now to determine what kind of a judgment was proper to be rendered. The ultimate effect of that judgment upon parties not before the court we do not understand to be a question fairly presented by the record, and what might be said in this case upon that point would be obiter dictum in any subsequent suit or proceeding against the sureties. It is also claimed that the court erred in refusing to permit Hill's plea of bankruptcy to be filed. The cause was not remanded for trial. That was not the object or purpose of the remanding order, so that no necesity existed for making any charge whatever in the pleadings. The fact that Hill has received his discharge in bankruptcy could be made to appear as well without pleading that fact as if a plea had been filed, nor was there any fact to be tried by a jury, as claimed in the argument. It is also claimed that the court erred in admitting in evidence the paper purporting to be a copy of the discharge of Hill in bankruptcy. The objection urged to the introduction of the evidence is that the copy of discharge was not properly certified. Whether the paper was properly authenticated or not was a matter of little moment. It was a fact not in dispute that Hill had received his discharge. Counsel for Hill undertook to plead the fact by special plea; and when the same fact was proven by counsel for defendants in error, it is difficult to see upon what ground objection can be made to the evidence. That Hill had received his discharge seems to have been conceded by both sides. It is also claimed that the court erred in entering judgment against Hill. It is said there was no verdict to enter judgment upon; that it had been merged in judgment, and, when that judgment was reversed, that ended both judgment and verdict. It will be remembered, after the verdict was obtained, and before judgment upon it, Hill entered his motion for a stay of proceedings until the bankruptcy court should pass on his discharge. This application the court denied, and this decision in the federal court was held to be erroneous. Now, the correction of that error would leave the verdict standing as it was before the court overruled the application, and all the court had to do was to receive evidence of the discharge, and enter a proper judgment on the original verdict, which, as we understand the record, was the same found by the circuit court. A motion was entered to dismiss the writ of error, but we perceive no merits in the motion. Whether the court erred in the rendition of the judgment was a question which the plaintiff in error had the right to present for determination. The judgment will be affirmed. A former decree on a title to realty will be conclusive of the questions involved in that title at that time and in that suit, as between the same parties in the same litigation. 2. TRUSTEE-APPOINTMENT BY COURT-NECESSARY PARTIES-SPECIFIC PERFORM ANCE. In proceedings for the appointment of a trustee by the court, all persons beneficially interested in the trust-estate are necessary parties. But in a bill for specific performance of a contract to convey realty, in which, as an incident, it becomes necessary, to pray the court to appoint a trustee to execute the will of a decedent, for the purpose of obtaining a conveyance from such trustee, legatees under the will are not necessary parties. 8. UNKNOWN HEIRS. A living person has no heirs, known or unknown. 4. FOREIGN ADMINISTRATOR OR TRUSTEE-ADDITIONAL SECURITY DISCRETIONARY. Where a foreign administrator or trustee of a decedent's estate administers upon property here, it is in the discretion of the probate court to take additional security or not. A failure to give security will not invalidate a title made by such trustee. Appeal from superior court, Cook county. Quigg & Tuthill and Cyrus Bentley, Jr., for appellant. Ritchie, Esher & Judd, for appellee. CRAIG, J. This was a bill in equity brought by James J. West against James L. Regan to compel the specific performance of a contract in writing executed by Regan, under which he agreed to purchase from the complainant certain property in Chicago. The contract was set out in hæc verba in the bill, and it is therein stipulated that the complainant |