Stark. Crim. Pl. 186, 187. Com. Dig., title Indictment, G. 3. 2 1 Ch. Cr. CLENDENIN, All'y Gen., contra. The proof as to value of the property stolen, is matter of form, not substance, (Arch. Cr. L. 50, 101, 176,) and under the statute (Dig. ch. 52, sec. 98,) the judgment cannot be arrested or stayed for such defect. Mr. Justice SCOTT delivered the opinion of the Court. It is conceded in this case that it was not incumbent upon the State to establish the precise value of the horse in question, as laid in the indictment; but it is insisted that there is no evidence in the record to prove any value at all, and therefore the verdict and judgment are unsustained. It is true that there is no evidence of value in express terms; but there certainly is evidence going to establish facts, on which the jury might have reasonably found the main fact of value by the common process of ascertaining one fact from the existence of another, so common in the ordinary affairs of human life. The accused declared that he had borrowed the horse, and also that he had stolen him. It would be out of the common course of human affairs, either for a man to borrow a horse that was totally valueless, or for a thief to encumber himself with such an animal. The circumstance that one witness got another to go with him on a trip of over one hundred miles "to hunt the horse," immediately after he was missing, was one, in connexion with others, from which value was legitimately inferable. Men do not usually go off on such trips (in general expensive) without some strong motive, and if the horse was of no value, they went on a bootless errand, both as to the horse and the supposed thief, who in that case had committed no larceny. And the like ground of inference for the jury is presented in the fact shown in evidence that the horse had traveled from Sevier county into Scott, a distance of about one hundred and thirty-six miles, and was trav eled back again into Sevier county, by the witnesses, the next morning after the capture of the accused. Upon applying their knowledge and experience to these facts and circumstances, so shown in evidence, the jury, in their sphere unlimited by any boundaries but those of truth in the ascertainment of facts from evidence, might have well found the horse in question of some value, according to the convictions of their own understanding. And we think that some of the decisions of this court, as well as decisions elsewhere, warrant us in refusing to disturb the verdict and judgment. In the case of Walker v. The State, (4 Ark. R. 89,) which was a larceny case, this court held that "the presumption is in favor of the verdict," and that, unless the record affirmatively overthrows this presumption in such a manner as to show that manifest wrong aud injustice has been done, the verdict ought not to be disturbed. In the gaming case of Stevens v. The State, (3 Ark. R. 66,) the objection was taken that the evidence in the record failed to show that the playing was for money or any valuable thing, but this court held that, as the evidence in that case showed "that the accused sat behind a table commonly called a faro table, dealing or drawing out cards from a box and using pieces of bone for carrying on the game-although no money was used, nor did the witness know whether he was playing for money or amusementa conviction on this evidence should not be disturbed," because the jury had the right to infer, by applying to this evidence “their experience" and knowledge in the manner of conducting such games, that the checks were valuable or represented money. In that case, like the case at bar, there was no evidence of value in express terms, but that essential ingredient in the of fence proceeded for, was ascertained by the jury from the exist ence of other facts shown in evidence. So in the case of John Cummings v. The Commonwealth, (2 Virginia Cases 128,) in a prosecution for the larceny of a bank note, proof that the accused "passed it away as genuine," was held not only sufficient evidence of value, but of the other essential ingredient of the offence, that the note was genuine, on objection taken to the testimony as insufficient to show these two essentials. And if the jury in the case at bar believed from the the testimony, as we think they were authorized to believe, that the accused dealt with the horse in question as a valuable horse, this case comes up in principle to the Virginia case. We feel no difficulty in sustaining this verdict and judgment, especially as the necessity of showing the value of the stolen property does not exist to the same extent in this State, where, under our statute, the distinction between grand and petit larceny is not regarded as it is elsewhere. Let the judgment be affirmed with costs. PATTERSON VS. JONES, ADR. Where a party covenanted to deliver cord wood to another, on a particular day, but no place was specified in the contract, the law fixed the residence of the party agreeing to furnish the wood as the place of delivery. In an action on such a covenant, it is not necessary to allege a demand of the wood-readiness and offer of performance on the part of the obligor, is matter of defence to be interposed by plea. Appeal from St. Francis Circuit Court. This was action of covenant brought by Jones, administrator of Crumbaugh, against Patterson, in the St. Francis circuit court. The action was founded on an instrument, bearing date 26th of June, 1849, by which Patterson "covenanted and bound himself to pay to Crumbaugh, or order, on or before the first duy of June, 1850, two hundred cords of ash wood or its equivalent." The Patterson vs. Jones, adr. (JANUARY declaration set out the instrument, and alleged, as a breach, simply the non-payment of the cord wood or its equivalent. The defendant demurred to the declaration, on the ground that no notice to deliver, or demand of the wood was averred in the declaration. The court overruled the demurrer, defendant rested, inquest of damages and final judgment, from which defendant appealed. ENGLISH, for the plaintiff. There being no place of delivery specified in the obligation, the law fixes the usual residence of the obligor, as the place of delivery, (Goodwin v. Hilrook, 4 Wend. 377. Chip. on Con. 25, 28. Walton v. Patton, 2 Bibb 280. Currier v. Currier, 2 N. Hamp. 75. Rawson et al. v. Johnson, 1 East 203,) and the plaintiff should have averred a demand and offer to receive the wood. PIKE & CUMMINS, contra. The contract being silent as to the place of delivery, the debtor must apply to the creditor and know where he will receive the property; otherwise he is in default. No demand or notice from the creditor is necessary. 1 Greenl. Rep. 120. 5 lb. 192. 2 Kent 507. The debtor must be ready and call upon the creditor to fix the place of delivery. Vance v. Bloomer, 20 Wend. 196. 2 Kent 508. 8 J. R. 476. Mr. Justice WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court. The defendant covenanted to pay two hundred cords of ash wood or its equivalent on a given day. As no place of payment is mentioned in the contract, the law fixed that at the residence of the party by whom the payment was to be made. The contract was unconditional, and when time and place were thus fixed, the question is, did it at once devolve upon the party promising to pay, to do so or excuse himself by showing a readiness and offer on his part at the time and place thus ascertained, or was it necessary for the plaintiff, in order to maintain his action, to demand of the defendant the property, and in addition to his statement of the contract, and alleging its breach, should he be so. required also to aver and prove a demand and refusal to pay the property? It is sufficient in pleading, for the plaintiff to show a legal obligation on the defendant, and to aver that he has failed to perform it. And we think, in this instance, that he has done The obligation on the defendant to pay was complete and unconditional. To demand of him to pay the cord wood was but to require of him to do what the law enjoined and what his contract required of him. His legal liability having been fixed by law, he was required to perform or tender and offer to perform. This is matter of defence to be interposed by the defendant. Hoys & Pattees v. Tuttle, 3 Eng. 129. Id. 146. 4 Bibb 226. Id. 97. 5 Yerger 410. The circuit court therefore did not err in overruling the demurrer to the plaintiff's declaration. Let the judgment be affirmed. ROBINSON VS. SWIGART. Under our statute, where an obligation is assigned, it is subject to any set-off held, by the obligor against the obliges before the assignment, as held in Smith v. Capers ante. The verdict in this case being contrary to the evidence, falls within the rule of Drennen v. Brown, 5 Eng. Rep. 138, and a new trial is directed. Appcal from Johnson Circuit Court. On the 26th September, 1850, William S. Swigart, assignee of Reuben W. Brown, sued Edward Robinson, before a justice of the peace of Johnson county, on a writing obligatory, executed by Robinson to Brown, on the 6th day of December, 1849, for |