lation had not been directed. But the 2d and 3d sections of the act provide, that this restriction shall not extend to any provision made for the payment of debts, or for the raising of portions for children, or respecting the produce of timber; nor to any disposition of heritable property in Scotland. By the 4th section, the restrictions of this act are to take effect with respect to wills made before the passing of the act, only where the devisor or testator was living, and of sound and disposing mind, after the expiration of twelve calendar months from the passing of this act. In the construction of this statute, however, it has been determined, that a trust by will for accumulation beyond the period thereby allowed, is void only for the excess; and, therefore, that where the accumulation was directed until the age of twenty-one of a legatee, not born at the testator's decease, it was valid for twenty-one years. 9 Ves.

Jun. 27.

Estates purchased or acquired after making a will. We have seen that by the statute of wills, 32 Hen. VIII. and the explanatory act of the 34th of the same king, a person may dispose of, by will, all his real or landed property; yet, as that statute expressly requires the devisor to be seised of the devised estate at the time of the publishing of his will, it follows that no lands purchased or acquired after the execution of such will will pass

under any devise in the same, even though the testator should, by express words in his will, give to the legatee under the will all the lands of which he shall be possessed at the time of his death; unless such will shall have been legally and formally republished subsequently to the purchase or contract. 2 Bos. and Pul. 500; 8 Ves. Jun. 283.

But notwithstanding all lands acquired or purchased after the publishing of a will, will not by force of the statute pass under the provision of the will; yet where a purchaser, contracting for the purchase of a real estate, makes, previous to completing the purchase, a will disposing of the same, such a devise, if the contract out of which it arises is valid, will pass the after purchased lands, without any republication, although the devisor should die before the contract is performed by conveyance; provided the equitable estate was vested in the purchaser at the time the will was made, and that the provisions of the will are sufficiently comprehensive to convey the estate. Rose v. Cunningham, 11 Ves. Jun. 540; Green v. Smith, 1 Atk. 572. And as, in equity, the estate is considered in the purchaser from the execution of the contract, under the republication of a will containing a general devise of the testator's estates, an estate contracted to be purchased after such general devise will pass. 10 Ves. Jun. 595. And

the law is the same in respect to copyhold estates, although no surrender shall have been made to the last will of the surrenderer, 55 Geo. III. c. 192.

Things affixed to the Freehold.-With respect to the effect of a will upon the appendages of the freehold, Swinburne (Test. p. 190) says, that those things which, after the death of the testator, descend to his heir, and not to his executor, cannot be devised by testament, except in such cases where it is lawful to devise the lands, tenements, and hereditaments. Therefore, heir-looms, Inst. 185, deer in an ancient park, fishes in a pond, doves in a dove-house, and the like, cannot be devised by will, for they are so annexed to the freehold, that they accompany the land wherever it rests. Co. Litt. 8. And even where things affixed to the freehold may be the subject of a devise, they will not pass by a will sufficient to carry personal property only. A devise of trees, grass, and herbage, of doors, windows, wainscot, furnaces, ovens, and the like, cannot be devised by will unattested, if they were not severed from the freehold before the testator's death. 4 Co. Rep. 64. But corn growing upon the land, at time of the testator's decease, will pass by a will sufficient to carry personal estate only. Fisher v. Forbes, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 392.

Charitable uses.-As to the devise of lands to charitable uses, ecclesiastical ingenuity having

rendered the provisions of the various statutes prohibiting dotations of religious houses (by which the circulation of landed property from man to man was impeded, and the fruits of the tenure due for such property to the lord of the fee, as the services due out of such fees for the defence of the realm, were extinguished and lost) ineffectual; the alienation of lands and tenements to companies and corporations was restrained by the stat. 9 Geo. II. c. 36, called the statute of mortmain. By this act it is enacted that no lands or tenements, or personal property whatsoever, or any estate or interest therein, or any charge or incumbrance affecting or to affect the same, shall be given or settled upon any person, body politic, or corporate, in trust, or for the benefit of any charitable uses, unless such gift be made by deed indented,-executed in the presence of two or more credible witnesses, twelve calendar months (including the days of execution and death) at least before the death of the donor or grantor, (except stocks in the public funds, which must be transferred within six months, at least, before the death of the donor, including the days of transfer and death,)—and enrolled in the Court of Chancery within six calendar months after its execution; and unless such gift be made to take effect immediately from the making thereof, and be without any power of revocation or limitation whatever; and that all other

gifts or transfers made in any other manner, shall be void. But, by the second section, gifts or transfers made for valuable consideration actually paid are excepted out of the act. And by the fourth section, the two universities, their colleges, and the scholars upon the foundation of the colleges of Eton, Winchester, and Westminster, are also excepted; and as the statute provided that no college should be at liberty to purchase more advowsons than were equal in number to one moiety of the fellows or students upon the respective foundations, the 45 Geo. III. c. 101, repealed so much of that statute as imposed such restraint as to the purchase or holding of advowsons by colleges.

In the exposition of this statute it has been determined that not only bequests of lands themselves to charitable uses are void, but also such bequests as in any manner affect or relate to interests in real property for the statute equally prohibits a charge or encumbrance upon land in trust, or for the benefit of charities, as of the land itself. Therefore a devise to a charitable use of a term of years, Finch v. Squire, 10 Ves. Jun. 41; of mortgages, Att. Gen. v. Meyrick, 2 Ves. 44; of money to be raised by sale, or otherwise, Att. Gen. v. Lord Weymouth, Ambl. 20; is not valid within the statute of mortmain. Neither can