who is living, make a new will, the former instrument is not revoked by the latter. 3 Ves. Jun. 321.

And where two wills are found in the possession of the testator, in order that the first will should be invalidated by the second, it is necessary that the second should expressly revoke, or be clearly inconsistent with the first, in respect to the subject matter of such will; for no subsequent disposition can revoke a prior one, unless it apply to the same subject. 1 P. Wms. 345. 7 Bro.

P. C. 344.

Where a testator devises his property by two wills, the former of which is found uncancelled and perfect at his death, and the latter cancelled, the former will operate on the disposition of his property, notwithstanding it was expressly revoked by the second. 4 Bur. 2512. But if a testator makes duplicates of his will, and cancels one part, the effect of the counterpart is destroyed; and therefore if any other will is in existence, its operation is necessarily revived. Cowp. 49. 13 Ves. Jun. 290.

As to the operation of inconsistent wills, it has been held that where two inconsistent wills are found, and it is uncertain, for want of dates, or because they are both of the same date, which was last executed, they are both void as far as they are inconsistent. 5 Bro. P. C. 57..

A codicil may also, as far as is repugnant to the particular dispositions of the will, operate as a revocation of a will. 1 Ves. 178.

As to the revocation of a will disposing of personal property, it is provided, by the 21st section of the statute 29 Cha. II. c. 3, that no will in writing, concerning any goods, chattels, or personal estate, shall be repealed, nor shall any clause, devise, or bequest therein, be altered or changed by any words, or will by word of mouth only, except the same be, in the life-time of the testator, committed to writing, and, after the writing thereof, read to the testator, and allowed by him, and proved to be so done, by three witnesses at the least.

8. Of the Construction of Wills.

In the construction of wills, it is a general rule of law, that the intention of the testator must be given effect to as far as the words will bear it out: and, therefore, the omission of legal or proper phrases has been held not to invalidate a will. Co. Litt. 376, b. n. 1; 4 Ves. Jun. 412. But though courts of law and equity dispense with the want of legal and technical phrases in wills, yet, if a testator uses them, he will be considered to understand their meaning and effect, unless the contrary is manifest from other parts of the will. 3 Bro. C. C. 60. And it is a universal rule,

that where a testator makes use of words having an obvious meaning, they are not to be rejected on a suspicion that he was not acquainted with that meaning. Milnes v. Slater; 5 Ves. Jun. 248.

But although the intention of the testator is more to be considered than the words, yet if the force of the words is such that the intent (which must be collected from the will itself, and not from any reports or evidence concerning it) cannot be complied with, then the rule of law must take place. Lord Cheney's case, 5 Co. 68. But a parol agreement is not admissible to explain a will, so as to expound it contrary to the import of the words, except when the words will bear it out, and then it is evidence; as, for instance, to ascertain a person designed to take under the will; but it will not in any case have the effect of altering the estate. Steele v. Berner, 1 Freem. 292.

If two parts of a will are totally irreconcilable, the latter over-rules the former, the subsequent words being taken as an indication of a subsequent intention. 5 Ves. Jun. 243. But the court will not go into one part of a will to determine the meaning of another, perfect in itself, and without ambiguity, and not militating with any other provision respecting the same subject matter, notwithstanding a more probable disposition for the testator to have made might be collected from such assisted construction. 9 East's Rep. 267.

To come at the intention of the testator, the order of the words may be disregarded, and a transposition be made to render a limitation or disposition intelligible; provided the operation of the devise is not altered or affected by such transposition, and that different devisees or legatees be not let in. East v. Cook, 2 Ves. 82.

A construction may also be made to support the intention even against strict grammatical rules. 11 Ves. Jun. 148. But an express disposition cannot be controlled by inference. Collett v. Lawrence, 1Ves. Jun. 269. And it is an invariable rule of construction to preserve estates in the intended channel of descents. 2 Stra. 798.

The courts will also sometimes look out of the will to the situation of the testator, for collecting inferences of intention: as, where it appeared that the testator's title to the property devised was derived through the mother, the devise was decreed to go to the heirs on the part of the mother. Harris v. Bishop of London, 2 P. Wms. 135.

With respect to the declarations of the testator, those which were contemporary with the will are of the greatest weight; and next to such contemporary declarations, those which are made after the making of the will are the most efficacious. Trimmer v. Bayne, 7 Ves. Jun. 519.

Where a devise is made to a person of the same name with another of the testator's friends or rela

tions, without any specific description appearing on the face of the will to designate the particular person meant by the testator, parol evidence is admissible to explain the testator's intention. Lepcot v. Brown, 1 Salk. 7. So, where both the christian and surname have been mistaken, if there is a certain and exact description of the person intended to take the bequest, the particularity of the description will entitle the person so described to take under it, although there should appear another of the testator's relations, whose christian and surname should coincide with that mentioned in the will. Smith v. Coney, 6 Ves. Jun. 42. A true description will also assist a wrong name. 2 Ves. 217.

But a blank left in a will for the name of a legatee or devisee cannot be supplied by any description or parol evidence. Hart v. Hart, 3 Bro. C. C. 311. But where there was a blank for the christian name only, evidence was admitted to shew the testator's intentions with regard to the person answering to the surname. Price v. Page, 4 Ves. Jun. 680. So, a blank left in the codicil may sometimes be supplied from the will. Masters v. Masters, 1 P. Wms. 423. And the initials of the person to whom a legacy is given, have been filled up from parol evidence of the person intended. Abbott v. Massee, 3 Ves. Jun. 148.