rather than a runway at Denver's Stapleton Airport. The flight was a scheduled domestic passenger flight between Houston and Denver. Visual meterological conditions prevailed at the time although the runways and taxiway had been plowed after a recent snowfall. There was no damage to the aircraft and no injuries to personnel.

To prevent a recurrence of this type of incident the airport management now turns on only runway lights whenever there is snow present.

The second incident took place on December 28, 1983, when a Boeing 727 operated by Continental Airlines landed on runway 13 at LaGuardia Airport in New York on a scheduled passenger flight. The crew described touchdown as firm on the main gear. They stated there was some concern on their part about the firmness of the landing, whether or not it should be written up as a hard landing, and if the aircraft may have sustained some damage.

The flight engineer said he spent at least 15 minutes performing his walk-around inspection, looking at the nose gear, the main gear, wings, and engines for any possible damage. He said that the main landing gears were his principal areas of concern, and although it was dark and raining heavily, he felt that his walkaround inspection was very thorough. He did not find any apparent damage. The consensus among the crew was that the landing was firm but not hard, and did not require any special reporting or inspections.

Subsequently, the aircraft was flown an additional six flights from December 28 through December 30 before damage to the aircraft's fuselage was discovered on December 31. After temporary repairs were made at La Guardia, the plane was ferried to Los Angeles where the damage was assessed and repaired.

The final incident occurred on March 22, 1984, on a Continental Airlines Boeing 727 operating from Chicago to Denver. The flight crew reported that, prior to taxiing at Chicago, the pilot had the ramp agent check the rear airstair because a warning light on the second officer's panel indicated that it was not secure. The ramp agent recycled the airstair and reported that it appeared to be closed; however, the light remained on. The pilot referred to the minimum equipment list [MEL] which required that the airstair be visually checked prior to flight when the warning system was inoperative.

After takeoff the airstair was observed by a flight attendant to be opened about 1 foot. All water was shut off in the rear of the aircraft to avoid possible ice buildup, and the flight continued uneventfully to Denver. Upon landing and as the aircraft slowed on the runway, the airstair opened to the full down position and was observed to drag along the runway for about 50 feet before the aircraft came to a stop. There were no injuries and no serious damage to the aircraft.

As soon as the Board has determined probable cause in these incidents, the information will be made public.

That concludes my formal statement, Madam Chairwoman. I would be happy to answer any questions you or the other committee members may have.

[Mr. Burnett's prepared statement follows:]

TESTIMONY OF

HONORABLE JIM BURNETT

CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Madam Chairwoman, I am pleased to be here today to discuss the

subject of aviation safety as it may be affected by financial difficulties

facing the airline industry. This issue

-

the need to maintain a balance

of safety and economic vitality is as old as the industry itself.

Indeed,

concern that economics could dictate safety levels is reflected in the FAA Federal Aviation Regulations, as well as the CAB functions of establishing

fitness and service restrictions.

So why all the recent clamor about aviation safety? Because Congress changed the economic rules by passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 which led to drastic alteration of the route and fare structures of commercial

aviation.

Passage of this legislation was preceded by dire predictions that

a rash of accidents would result from a lower level of safety due to cut-throat

fare wars.

While there have been highly competitive fare wars and some airlines have been put out of business or are on shaky financial ground, it cannot be concluded by me or anyone else that safety has been derogated because of economic difficulties.

If safety corners have been cut

-

and that certainly is and always

has been a possibility it is not reflected in accident data through 1983. In fact, both small and large airlines in scheduled service under Part 121 have significantly improved their accident rates between 1978 and 1983.

The reductions run as high as 50 percent in their rate of fatal accidents.

Commuter operations under Part 135 chalked up an even more impressive

record.

Their total accident rate for every 100,000 departures was down from 1978 to 1983 by 75 percent. Their fatal accident rate was cut 87 percent.

Are we to conclude then that economic deregulation has resulted in an increased level of aviation safety? Again, I don't believe there is basis for such a conclusion. The inter-relation of economics and operating

safety is very complex, as are the factors which account for accident statistics. We can and do look for trends in accident investigation data, but we cannot draw safety conclusions

good or bad

-

from airline

ledger sheets.

Even though accident statistics have been encouraging in recent years, the Safety Board remains sensitive to the industry's economic hardships in terms of their potential safety implications. Board was the occurrence in 1983 of several unsettling incidents which could

have been major aviation accidents.

Of particular concern to the

For example, on May 5th an Eastern Airlines L-1011 carrying 162 passengers and ten crew members came within 4,000 feet of ditching into the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Miami after descending 9,000 feet without power. The flight crew was forced to shut down the No. 2 engine due to an indication of low oil pressure, and subsequently lost power on the other two engines. Fortunately, the crew was able to restart the No. 2 engine and land safely at the Miami Airport.

There were no injuries or loss of life.

39-223 0-84-31

The Safety Board investigation concluded that the probable cause

was omission of all the O-ring seals on the master chip detector assemblies, leading to the loss of oil and damage to the three engines. The Board also found that there had been similar occurrences, but the airline failed to assess their significance adequately.

Another incident involved a Republic Airlines DC-9 operating from Minneapolis to Los Angeles on April 2nd with 146 persons on board. The aircraft lost all power from both engines while in cruise flight at 35,000 and about 20 miles north of Bryce, Utah. The flight crew restarted the engines near 12,000 feet after discovering that the main tank in each wing was empty and the center tank fuel boost pump switches were in the off position. The flight landed at Las Vegas as a precautionary measure, and there were no injuries or deaths associated with the incident.

The Safety Board's investigation of the incident revealed that the main fuel tank in each wing was empty and that the center tank contained all the fuel needed to complete the flight safely. Also, it was verified that all fuel system components were functioning properly. A final determination of probable cause is pending before the Board.

A third incident involved a Republic Airlines DC-9 operating out of Fresno, California to Phoenix on May 29th with 86 persons on board. The flight landed at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona instead of Phoenix after the flight crew discovered enroute that the airplane was nearly out of fuel. Again, no injuries or deaths occurred.

The Safety Board's investigation of this incident disclosed that the airplane's fuel system components functioned properly and that only 4 5/8 gallons of fuel were left in the tanks. According to flight records, the airplane had about 15,000 pounds of fuel on board when it left Phoenix for Fresno the day before. After landing at Fresno, the station agent recorded about 15,000 pounds on the fuel quantity totalizer. Since the flight

dispatch release specified 14,400 pounds of fuel for the return flight to Phoenix, the airplane was not refueled at Fresno.

A final determination of probable cause in this incident is pending before

the Board also.

The potential for disaster became a tragic reality last October when an Air Illinois Hawker-Siddeley crashed on a rainy night in a farm field near the town of Pinckneyville, Illinois, killing all ten persons on board. At the Board's public hearing on the accident, which I chaired, we uncovered a laundry list of maintenance and operational procedures which were not carried out "by the book." Subsequently, Air Illinois surrendered its operating certificate, citing inability to meet FAA standards.

The occurrences I have just described all involve operational factors, and in view of the charged atmosphere of the deregulated environment, there is concern that they are an indication that management procedures may be breaking down under economic stress. Again, the Safety Board has been unable to draw any conclusions in this regard, but it recognizes the prudence of intense scrutiny in order to eliminate some of that concern.