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Not to disappoint the just curiosity of our English readers, we shall give a short account of the fragments before us, with a translation of a few passages in them, which have appeared to us more peculiarly deserving of attention.

The style, we should premise, is not quite in Cicero's usual manner. It is somewhat less flowing and round, more measured and stately; which he probably thought suited the subject best. After one of his usual proœmiums, the opening of which is lost, Cicero reminds a friend, to whom the Dialogues are addressed, but whose name also has disappeared, of a conversation which had been related to them, when they had been in their younger days together at Smyrna, by Publius Rutilius Rufus. This conversation, which forms the substance of the work, was brought about in the following manner. When Scipio Africanus Minor had retired from Rome to spend certain holidays in his suburban villa, there came to him early one morning Q. Tubero, the eldest son of his sister. After the exchange of a few civilities, Tubero asks his uncle what he thought of the parhelion, "isto altero sole," the appearance of which had been lately announced in the senate; and when Scipio excuses himself, on the authority of Socrates, for not having given much of his attention to such matters, Tubero reminds him how often Plato had introduced the Athenian sage discoursing on the like questions; whereupon Scipio remarks, that Plato, out of his zeal for the honour of Socrates, had attributed to him much of what he had himself learnt after the death of his beloved master, in Egypt, and Italy, and Sicily; from Archytas the Tarentine, and Timæus the Locrian; from the commentaries of Philolaus, and from the Pythagorean philosophers. At this time, L. Furius Philus and R. Rutilius enter; and when the former expresses his fear that they have broken in on their conversation, Scipio tells him what they had been talking of, and asks what his opinion was of these two suns. Again, he is interrupted by the approach of Lælius, accompanied by C. Fannius and Q. Scævola, the two sons-in-law of Lælius, and Mummius, his friend. After rising up to

meet them in the portico, and saluting them, Scipio, in turning about, contrives to put Lælius in the middle, the place of honour; and when they have taken one or two turns, talking together, proposes that they should adjourn to a sunny part of a little meadow near (for it was winter), and seat themselves there; which being agreed on, their party is further increased by the arrival of M. Manilius, a man beloved by all present, who takes his place next to Lælius.

The general discourse, which now ensues, is opened by Lælius, who, on learning what subject had been started before he came, asks whether every thing that pertained to their own homes and to the commonwealth had been inquired into, that they were seeking what was carrying on in the heavens; to which Philus prettily answers:

Do you not think that it pertains to our own homes to know what is doing at home; that home I mean, not which is included in these walls, but in this whole world, which the gods have given as a dwelling-place, and a country common to us with themselves?

After a joke passed by Lælius upon Manilius, who was a lawyer, about an order being made to secure these two suns in possession; Philus, with a view of explaining the phenomenon, proceeds to describe a sphere constructed by Archimedes, resembling, as it would seem, what we call an orrery, which Marcellus had got possession of at the taking of Syra

cuse.

In the midst of this description, there is a defect in the manuscript. When we recover it, Scipio is speaking of what he remembered to have happened when he was serving under his father in the Macedonian war; which was, that the same man, C. Sulpicius Gallus, by whom this sphere was shown to Philus, had freed the army from the terror occasioned by an eclipse of the moon, of which Sulpicius explained to them the cause on scientific principles. Tubero inquires how Sulpicius could venture to do this, when he had those to deal with who were little removed from ignorant rustics. At his answer, the manuscript again breaks off; but the hiatus is probably small, as where it is resumed, Scipio is still vindicating Sulpicius. He then goes on to remark a like instance of saga

city in Pericles, and to observe, from a passage in Ennius, that the real cause of eclipses was not unknown to their own ancestors in Rome. The manuscript again deserts us in an interesting part, where Tubero is reminding Scipio of his having a little while before undervalued studies of this kind. It would appear that Scipio in the interval had disavowed any such intention; for, when he appears again, he is making an eulogium on the excellence of knowledge. Lælius, in reply, suggests that there are more noble and useful studies than those to which Scipio has adverted; and, on Tubero's inquiring what they are, answers that they are those by which they may learn how it had come to pass that, through the factions introduced by the Gracchi, there were two senates, and almost two people in Rome; a matter of much more consequence to them than the appearance of two suns in the sky. This observation leads to an entreaty that Scipio would unfold to them the true principles of policy. Here then we enter on the subject of the dialogue. Africanus begins by saying, that it is necessary to define what it is of which he is about to speak; and this he does, not like Aristotle, by tracing up society to its first elements, but in a summary manner, thus:

A commonwealth is the affair or concern of the people: by the people, I do not mean an assembly of men brought together in any way whatever it may be, but the assembly of a multitude associated by consent of right and communion of inter

est.

The three kinds of government, regal, aristocratical, and popular, are all liable to objection if unqualified.

In the changes and vicissitudes of states, there are wonderful circuits and revolutions; which, as it is the part of a wise man to know, so, in the government of a state, to foresee them when they are impending, to moderate their course, and to exercise a

certain power in the direction of them, belongs to one who is not only a great statesman, but endowed with a faculty little short of divine. "I perceive," continues Scipio, "that there is a fourth kind of from the mixture and blending together of state, or commonwealth, which results the three, and which is to be preferred to them all."+

If there is such a thing as an axiom in politics, we take it to be the truth contained in this last sentence; and to the authorities referred to by the editor in confirmation of it, from the writings of the ancients, ArchyPolybius, and Tacitus, we will add, tas (in Stobæus), Aristotle, Plato, out of a host of moderns, those of two only-Macchiavelli and Algernon Sidney.

Havendo quelli che prudentemente ordinano leggi, conosciuto questo difettofuggendo ciascuno di questi modi per se stesso, n'elessero uno che participasse di tutti, giudicandolo piu fermo, e piu stabile, perche l'uno guarda l'altro, sendo in mati, ed il governo popolare. una medesima città, il principato li otti

Discorsi, 1. i. cap. 2.

was a good government in the world that If I should undertake to say, there never did not consist of the three simple species of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, I think I could make it good.

Discourses on Government, ch. ii. § 16.

In speaking of the changes to which the kingly form of government observations. is liable, Scipio makes these excellent

When a king has begun to act unjustly, that kind of government forthwith changes to a tyranny; a very evil kind, though bordering on a very good one. If the nobles succeed in crushing him, which usually happens, then follows an aristocracy, which is the next to a monarchy; for there is something resembling the power of a good king in a council of the chief men, advising for the welfare of the people. But if the people of themselves have put to death or banished the tyrant, as long as they retain sense and discretion, so long they act moderately, rejoice in that which they have

Est igitur, inquit Africanus, res publica res populi; populus autem non omnis hominum cœtus quoquo modo congregatus, sed cœtus multitudinis juris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus. Lib. i. § 25.

+ Mirique sunt orbes et quasi circuitus in rebus publicis commutationum et vicissitudinum: quos cum cognosse sapientis est, tum vero prospicere impendentis in gubernanda re publica moderantem cursum atque in sua potestate retinentem magni cujusdam civis et divini pæne est viri. Itaque quartum quoddam genus rei publicæ maxime probandum esse sentio, quod est ex his, quæ prima dixi, moderatum et permixtum tribus. L. i. § 29.

+ P. 79.

themselves achieved, and are willing to preserve a commonwealth, which has been of their own establishing. Not so, if they have done violence to a just king, or spoiled him of his kingdom; or even, as hath frequently fallen out, have tasted the blood of the nobles, and trampled the whole state under their feet; then beware, lest thou suppose it easier to still the raging of the sea, or to arrest the progress of a conflagration, than to put a stop to the fury of an unbridled multitude.*

Then follows, from the eighth book of Plato's Republic, the admirable description of a thorough ochlocracy; for it is no more to be termed a democracy, than a despotism is to be called a monarchy. From the extreme of popular liberty the natural transition is to as extreme a servitude under either one or a few.

Thus a government is tossed about and caught up, like a ball, from one to another; from kings to tyrants; from them again to the nobles or the people; from whom either factions or tyrants again receive it; so that it whirls round and round in a perpetual change.+

The conclusion is that,

Although of the three simple kinds of government, the kingly is much the best; yet this also will be excelled by the government which is equally mixed up and tempered of the three. For in a commonwealth it is well that something should be pre-eminent and royal; that something should be assigned to the authority of the principal men; that certain points should

be reserved for the will and judgment of the multitude. This constitution, in the first place, has a certain equability of right, which free men will not long be contented to want; and in the next, it has firmness and stability, because the other kinds of government are easily convertible into their opposite faults; so that out of a king we have a despot, from an aristocracy a faction, and from a democracy a misrule and anarchy; and that the kinds themselves are easily changeable into each other; which in that tempered and blended system does not happen, except it be through some great mismanagement of the principal men in a state. For here is no cause for change, where each is firmly settled in his own place and degree, and has nothing beneath that may slip from under, and betray him to his downfall and ruin. +

In the second book of these Dialogues, there is a distinction made between a state in which the three kinds are mixed, and one in which they are not only mixed but blended together. He seems to think, that although a perpetual (and if a perpetual much more an hereditary) monarchy may be mixed with the other two forms, yet it cannot be blended with them. The reason of this supposed impossibility may be discovered in what Montesquieu has observed,-that the ancients were unacquainted with the right distribution of the three kinds of power, the legislative, the judicial, and the executive, under a kingly government, and therefore could not form to them

Cum rex injustus esse cœperit, perit illut ilico (sic) genus, et est idem ille tyrannus, deterrimum genus et finitimum optimo: quem si optimates oppresserunt, quod ferme evenit, habet statum respublica de tribus secundarium: est enim quasi regium, id est patrium consilium populo bene consulentium principum. Sin per se populus interfecit aut ejecit tyrannum, est moderatior quoad sentit et sapit, et sua re gesta lætatur, tuerique vult per se constitutam rempublicam. Si quando aut regi justo vim populus attulerit regnove eum spoliavit; aut etiam, id quod evenit sæpius, optimatium sanguinem gustavit, ac totam rempublicam substravit libidini suæ; cave putes autem mare ullum aut flamam (sic) esse tantam, quam non facilius sit sedare, quam effrenatam insolentia multitudinem. L. i. § 42.

+ Sic tanquam pilam rapiunt inter se reipublicæ statum, tyranni ab regibus; ab iis autem principes aut populi; a quibus aut factiones aut tyranni: nec diutius unquam tenetur idem reipublica modus. L. i. § 44.

Quod ita cum sit, tribus primis generibus longe præstat mea sententia regium; regio autem ipsi præstabit id quod erit æquatum et temperatum ex tribus optimis rerumpublicarum modis. Placet enim esse quiddam in republica præstans et regale; esse aliut (sic) auctoritate principum partum ac tributum; esse quasdam res servatas judicio voluntatique multitudinis. Hæc constitutio primum habet æquabilitatem quandam magnam, qua carere diutius vix possunt liberi; deinde firmitudinem, quod et illa prima facile in contraria vitia convertuntur, ut existat ex rege dominus, ex optimatibus factio, ex populo turba et confusio; quodque ipsa genera generibus sæpe commutantur novis. Hoc in hac juncta moderateque permixta conformatione reipublicæ non ferme sine magnis principum vitiis evenit. Non est enim causa conversionis, ubi in suo quisque est gradu firmiter collocatus, et non suhest quo præcipitet et decidat. L. i. § 45.

1 L. ii. § 23.

selves a just idea of a monarchy.*
Hume, who, in the English consti-
tution, saw what Cicero supposed
impracticable, the three forms of
go-
vernment, not only mixed but fused
together under an hereditary monar-
chy, saw in it also this just distri-
bution of the three kinds of power;
and was accordingly led to conclude,
and that not without reason, that an
hereditary prince, a nobility without
vassals, and a people voting by their
representatives, form the best mon-
archy, aristocracy, and democracy.t
In this second book, of which there
remains much less than of the first,
Scipio traces the Roman
ment through its different stages.

govern

We shall do no more than extract a few of the most remarkable sen

tences in it.

Cato said of the Roman government, that it excelled that of other states, inasmuch, as it had not, like them, been the contrivance of a single man, but the result

of the combined wisdom of many men, and the experience of many ages. ‡

The editor observes in a note, that the same is said by the Britons of their commonwealth." "Sic fere Britanni politici de suâ republicâ loquuntur:" and we trust they say it

with truth.

This is the very main point of civil prudence; to discern the turns and windings in the career of a commonwealth; so that when you are thoroughly acquainted with all its bearings, you may be able to keep it in its course, and not be at a loss in any emergency, but provide beforehand for the occurrences as they shall arise. ||

tizens that hard yoke of unjust servitude; who, though he was a private man, held up the whole commonwealth; and first taught us that in this city we are none of us private men.**

We do not much admire the editor's note on this latter passage, though it is well enough adapted to the meridian in which it was produced.

As soon as this king (he has been speaking of a just king) has turned aside to an unjust exercise of his power, he immediately becomes a tyrant, than which no animal can be conceived more foul and loathsome, and detestable in the sight of gods and men; who, though he be in shape a man,

yet, in the fierceness and heinousness of his demeanour, surpasses the wildest beast upon the earth. For how can he be properly termed a man, who acknowledges no communion of right with any of human kind-who would fain have nothing to associate him with humanity? ++

In the character of L. Valerius

Potitus and M. Horatius Barbatus, we have in five words a description of the most valuable members of a free state. "Hominum concordiæ causâ sapienter popularium." Men who for the sake of maintaining the general agreement, preserve, without forfeiting their wisdom, the favour of the people.

Do not let that escape you, which I said at the beginning; that unless there be this equable balancing of right, and office, and duty, so that there be power enough with the magistrates, authority in the council of the principal men, and liberty in the people, it is not possible for a state to be se

L. Brutus shook off from his fellow ci- cured from revolution and change. ++

L'Esprit des Loix, L. ii. c. 10.

+ Essay iv. Politics a Science.

Is dicere solebat, ob hanc causam præstare nostræ civitatis statum ceteris civitatibus, quod in illis singuli fuissent fere, quorum suam quisque rempublicam constituissent legibus atque institutis suis;......nostra autem respublica non unius esset ingenio sed multorum; nec una hominis vita, sed aliquot constituta sæculis et ætatibus, &c. L. ii. § 1.

Id enim est caput civilis prudentiæ, in qua omnis hæc nostra versatur oratio, videre itinera flexusque rerumpublicarum, ut cum sciatis quo quæque res inclinet, retinere aut ante positis (possitis) occurrere. L. ii. §25.

** L. Brutus depulit a civibus suis injustum illut (sic) duræ servitutis jugum : qui cum privatus esset, totam rempublicam sustinuit; primusque in hac civitate docuit, in conservanda civium libertate esse privatum neminem. Ibid.

++ Simulatque enim se inflexit hic rex in dominatum injustiorem, fit continuo tyrannus, quo neque tætrius neque fœdius nec dis hominibusque invisius, animal ullum cogitari potest: qui quamquam figura est hominis, morum tamen immanitate vastissimas vincit belluas. Quis enim hunc hominem rite dixerit, qui sibi cum suis civibus, qui denique cum omni hominum genere nullam juris communionem, nullam humanitatis societatem velit? L. ii. § 26.

Id enim tenetote quod initio dixi, nisi æquabilis hæc in civitate compensatio sit et juris et officii et muneris, ut et potestatis satis in magistratibus, et auctoritatis in principum concilio, et libertatis in populo sit, non posse hunc incommutabilem reipublica conservari statum. L. ii. § 33.

There are but few fragments of the third and fourth books remaining in the manuscript. They were taken up with the second day of the Dialogue, during which Fannius appears to have been absent. In the third, the speakers were engaged in a discussion on the abstract principles of justice, which Plato with more propriety made the introduction to his ideal Republic than Cicero subjoined to his account of a real one. The truth is, that Cicero was to Plato nearly what Virgil was to Homer. He was willing to take from him as much as he could; but scarcely knew where to bestow his borrowed riches when he had got them. In the fourth book, the conversation turned on the manners and discipline in a state.

The fifth and sixth comprised the third and last day of the discourse. In the fifth the relics become inconsiderable indeed. Of the other, which it appears from one of Cicero's letters to Atticus, contained instructions for a statesman, there is nothing left here but the dream of Scipio,* probably the best part of it, has come down to us through other channels.

The editor has illustrated the text with notes, which are equally creditable to his diligence and learning. He has further endeavoured to supply some of the deficiencies in the Dialogues by extracts from Lactantius, Augustine, Nonius, and other writers, by whom they had been explained, or referred to in particular passages and words; but candidly

owns his belief, that there are yet other remains of them to be discovered in the writings of those two fathers of the church. Much, however as we respect the industry and erudition which have been here employed, we should recommend the printing of the fragments without any addition, and the dispersing of them widely through those nations on the continent of Europe, which have most need to be reminded of the great truths which they enforce. They seem to have emerged at the present juncture almost providentially to admonish all parties of those first principles of policy; that as, on the one hand, legitimate power cannot long be retained without wise concessions to the will and judgment of the people-for that it will otherwise inevitably lead to despotism, debasing to all, but most of all to those by whom it is exercised-so on the other, the popular will and judgment, if they be not moderated and directed by the counsels of those whose station in life, intellectual attainments, and virtues, entitle them to the name of "principes," can be productive only of universal confusion and misery.

It may naturally be asked whether every one does not already know this to be very true? No doubt every one does; but it is one thing to know this, and another to hear Cicero starting up in the Vatican from a sleep of near 2000 years, and proclaiming it afresh to the world.

It was also imitated from the Vision of Er in the last book of Plato's Republic, an inedited Commentary on which, by Proclus, is promised us by the editor in one of his notes. P. 311.

ANGLO-GERMAN DICTIONARIES.

THE German dictionaries, compiled for the use of Englishmen studying that language, are all bad enough, I doubt not, even in this year 1823; but those of a century back are the most ludicrous books that ever mortal read: read, I say, for they are well worth reading, being often as good as a jest book. In some instances, I am convinced that the compilers (Germans living in Germany) had a downright hoax put upon them by some facetious Briton whom they had consulted; what is

given as the English equivalent for the German word being not seldom a pure coinage that never had any existence out of Germany. Other instances there are, in which the words, though not of foreign manufacture, are almost as useless to the English student as if they were; slang-words, I mean, from the slang vocabulary, current about the latter end of the seventeenth century. These must have been laboriously culled from the works of Tom Brown, Sir Roger L'Estrange, Ech

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