amendment so called in 1888. The section of the Constitution under consideration as originally adopted contained the following proviso: "Provided that no person shall at any time be allowed to vote in the election of the city council of the city of Providence, * unless he shall * * • have paid a tax," etc. A city charter was adopted for the city of Newport which provided for a city council to be elected by the taxpaying voters. The court held that the proviso applied only to the city of Providence and by implication preserved the right of registry voters in other cities to vote for city councils. The court said, at page 659: "It is to be remembered that the right of voting in the election of the city council of the city of Providence, as it had previously existed, was enlarged, not abridged, by the proviso; for, before the Constitution, the right was confined to freeholders and their eldest sons. Whereas, to limit the right of voting in the election of the city council of any city incorporated since the adoption of the Constitution is, in effect, to abridge a pre-existing right; for the city council not only has power, newly given by charter, to impose taxes and make expenditures, but it succeeds the town council in the prudential management of town affairs; and in the election of the town councils registry voters participate on an equality with other voters." If the The above case is clearly distinguishable from that now under consideration. proposed act vested in the members of the financial council any of the powers heretofore exercised by any officers for whom the registry voters have been entitled to vote, the above case might apply. It is, however, expressly provided in the proposed act that the town council shall continue to exercise all the powers and authority conferred upon the same by general and special laws. It is difficult to see how any rights of the registry voter have been impaired. If the proposed act goes into effect, the registry voter will cast his vote for the same officers, and for all of the same officers as he has done heretofore in the town of Warwick. Upon a careful consideration of the constitutional provision as interpreted in the case of In re Election of School Committee of the City of Woonsocket we find no unconstitutional feature in connection with this phase of the question. We find nothing in the proposed legislation which is in conflict with article 2 of the Constitution as amended by article 7 of the Amendments. We therefore answer the question propounded to us in the negative. CLARKE H. JOHNSON. Providence, R. I. April 7, 1916. HILL SAVINGS & DRAWING CLUB v. BARONOWITZ et al. (Supreme Court of New Jersey. Dec. 21, 1915.) BILLS AND NOTES 404(1), 416-DEMAND AND NOTICE "REASONABLE TIME." Notwithstanding Negotiable Instruments Act, 88 71, 193 (3 Comp. St. 1910, pp. 3744, 3757), as to time of presentment and "reasonable time," evidence that where a savings association by-law provided that four weeks arreara demand note, a notice to indorsers of a borage should constitute default by a borrower on rower, whose four weeks expired on Tuesday, was not given until Saturday and no indorser knew the exact terms upon which the note was payable, held to justify a finding that demand for payment was not made in a reasonable time, nor was due notice of the maker's default given the indorsers. Notes, Cent. Dig. 88 1091-1094, 1099, 1101[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Bills and 1103, 1164-1172, 1174-1177; Dec. Dig. 404(1), 416. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Reasonable Time.] Appeal from District Court of Newark, Action by the Hill Savings & Drawing Club against B. Baronowitz and others. From a judgment for defendants other than the named defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Argued June term, 1915, before PARKER, MINTURN, and KALISCH, JJ. Joseph Kraemer, of Newark, for appellant. Elias A. Kanter, of Newark, and Isadore Stein and S. Solomon, for appellees. PER CURIAM. The appellant is a loan association of which Baronowitz, one of the appellees was a member. Baronowitz borrowed $500 from the appellant, for which he gave his note on demand under date of April 9, 1914, with Theodore Bornstein, A. Goldeberg, Isadore Stein, and S. Solomon as indorsers. Under the by-laws of the association the note was payable in weekly installments, and if the borrower became four weeks. in arrears in such payments, he would then be in default, and the indorsers would then become liable for the balance due on the note. From the state of the case it appears that none of the indorsers was informed of the exact terms upon which Baronowitz was to pay the note. Baronowitz made payments upon the note until it was reduced to a balance due of $172. He then made default for more than four weeks. The four weeks expired on a Tuesday in November, and notice was not given of such default to any of the indorsers until Saturday of the same week. The case was tried by the court, sitting without a jury. The trial judge gave judg ment for the appellant as against Baronowitz, the maker of the note, for the balance due thereon, but found in favor of the indors ers of the note upon the ground that due notice was not given to the indorsers of the default, and that demand for payment was not made in due time. From the judgment in favor of the indorsers, the plaintiff appeals to this court. We think the case is controlled by Foley v. Emerald Brewing Co., 61 N. J. Law, 428, 39 Atl. 650. The material facts in that case are similar in their legal aspects to those under review. In that case Judge Dixon speaking for the Supreme Court, 61 N. J. Law, on page 431, 39 Atl. 651, after commenting upon Chief Justice Hornblower's opinion in Perry v. Green, 19 N. J. Law, 61, 63 (38 Am. Dec. 536), says: "The doctrine thus doubted seems now to be completely repudiated in this state, and the principle to be firmly established that the signature upon a negotiable promissory note, made by a party thereto, imports a precise agreement, constructed by the law merchant upon the tenor of the note, which cannot be varied by parol evidence of any preceding or contemporaneous oral arrangement. Chaddock v. Vanness, 35 N. J. Law, 517, 10 Am. Rep. 256; Johnson v. Ramsey, 43 N. J. Law, 279 [39 Am. Rep. 119, note]; Middleton v. Griffith, 57 N. J. Law, 442 [31 Atl. 405, 51 Am. St. Rep. 617]. In case of the indorsement of such a note by the payee, one of the provisions of his agreement thus implied is: That his conditional obligation to pay the debt shall be discharged, if demand be not made of the maker according to the terms of the note." In that case it was further held that in order to make an indorser's obligation to pay absolute on a note payable on demand, the holder should make demand within a reasonable time and give notice of default to the indorser. Neither section 71, nor section 193 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 3 C. S. pp. 3744, 3757, change the legal rule laid down in Foley v. Emerald Brewing Co., supra, regarding notes payable on demand. There was evidence which justified the finding of the trial judge that a demand for payment of the note was not made within a reasonable time after the date thereof, and that due notice of the maker's default in payment was not given to the indorsers. The judgment will be affirmed, with costs. (88 N. J. Law, 521) LAMBERT v. ATLANTIC CITY et al. thereof lying within the produced lines of a public street. Hoboken v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 124 U. S. 656, 8 Sup. Ct. 643, 31 L. Ed. 543, followed. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Dedication, Cent. Dig. 88 91-94; Dec. Dig. 50.] Certiorari by Archibald S. Lambert against the City of Atlantic City and others to review a resolution of the Board of Commissioners of Atlantic City. Dismissed. Argued February term, 1915, before SWAYZE, PARKER, and KALISCH, JJ. Bourgeois & Coulomb, of Atlantic City, for prosecutor. Theodore W. Schimpf, of Atlantic City, and Lewis Starr, of Camden, for respondent Atlantic City. Babcock & Champion, of Atlantic City, for respondent Vare. PARKER, J. The writ brings up a resolution of the board of commissioners of Atlantic City, adopted on September 10, 1914, which reads as follows: "Be it resolved that the director of streets and public improvements be, and he is hereby, authorized to compel the removal of or to remove all piling and other obstructions from the ocean end of Berkeley square, and be it further resolyed that the director of public safety be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to render such aid to the director of streets as may be necessary to this end." Berkeley square is a short street 50 feet wide in the western residential section of Atlantic City. It begins at the south side of Atlantic avenue (which at this point is the nearest highway paralleling the ocean front), and runs southerly at right angles toward the ocean. How far it extends legally as a street is one of the questions in dispute. Physically it is an open street, with roadway for 269 feet south from Atlantic avenue, where the roadway becomes a grass plot some 25 or 30 feet square, the sidewalks continuing alongside of the plot, and at 307 feet the whole terminated, at the time of the resolution, in concrete bulkhead with an ornamental flight of steps leading downward some 3 or 4 feet to the natural surface of the beach sand, which slopes gradually to the ocean. On the map submitted in evidence the highwater line is placed about 30 feet south of the steps, and the boardwalk about 100 feet further, connected by a planked walk supported on piling with the easterly sidewalk of Berkeley square. Both sides of Berkeley a (Supreme Court of New Jersey. March 6, square as far as the steps are built up with 1916.) (Syllabus by the Court.) DEDICATION 50-STREETS-PARKS-WATER FRONTAGE--EXTENDED STREET LINES. By the grant dated February 13, 1907, of the riparian commission to Atlantic City, pursuant to chapter 202 of the Laws of 1903 (P. L. p. 387; 4 C. S. 1910, p. 4397), the lands granted were reserved for park purposes under the express requirement of the statute and the terms of the grant, and such reservation was superior to and exclusive of any easement of highway claimed to exist by reason of such lands or part residences of a high class. On May 11, 1914, the riparian commission made a lease to Jesse R. Turner of a tract lying between, but not bounded by, the concrete bulkhead and the boardwalk, and running from the extended east line of Berkeley square easterly to the extended west line of Kensington avenue, a distance of 165 feet. The tract is 113.3 feet wide, and its north line is some 6 or 7 feet south of the bulkhead, and its south line a few feet north of the boardwalk, and coincident with the line of dedication. the "public park" tract granted to Atlantic | position quite inconsistent with acceptance City as hereinafter stated. The legal effect for a street, even assuming the “extended" of this instrument will be considered later on. The resolution in question was due to the fact that Lambert, the prosecutor, acting apparently in right of Turner, undertook to bulkhead and fill in, not only the tract embraced within the lines of his description, but land to the west of it as far as the extended center line of Berkeley square, with the avowed purpose of making a roadway thereon to give access to the tract described in the riparian lease. The resolution was passed at the instance of property owners on Berkeley square. But there is a still more fundamental objection to prosecutor's claim. Pursuant to Acts 1903, p. 387, permitting certain cities that have laid out a public park along tidewater, and having streets extending to tidewaters, to apply for and obtain from the riparian commission a grant of lands under water within the limits of such park, and the land in front of such streets or highways (C. S. p. 4397), Atlantic City obtained a grant in 1906 of a park tract consisting of many parcels. Parcel 18 is a tract bounded east by the "extended" line of Kingston (then called Milledgeville) avenue, west by the "extended" line of Berkeley square, and north by what is the south or outer line of the Turner tract above mentioned. In 1907 by another grant under the same statute the commission granted to Atlantic City, inter alia, the tract bounded north by high-water line, east and west by the extended lines of Berkeley square, and running some 1,572 feet to the exterior commissioners' line. This in The prosecutor's main attack on said resolution is based on two propositions: First, that the land he has undertaken to fill in within the extended lines of Berkeley avenue is part of a public street; and, secondly, that by reason of that fact and his ownership or control of abutting land he is owner to the center, and entitled to fill it up to his own grade to obtain access with wagons, etc., to his premises, or, if he does not own the fee therein to the center, is nevertheless entitled as abutting owner to obtain such access includes the locus in quo; and therefore Turnthis way. It may be assumed that application was made to the city authorities to grade up to the higher level, and that they refused to do so. What the prosecutor asserts is therefore, on his own showing, the individual right of an abutting owner to change the existing grade of a street to meet his individual convenience. We do not concede such right in any respect, but find it unnecessary to deal with or decide the point, as we reach a result adverse to the prosecutor on another ground, viz., the status of the disputed territory as a street. er, whose lease came seven years later, could acquire no right to the fee as an abutting owner, even if his riparian lease be regarded as a deed. Furthermore, in conformity with the statute, the grant to Atlantic City expressly provided: "That the land under water herein before described is granted and conveyed for park uses and purposes, and none other, and shall be kept and maintained as an open public park or place for public resort and recreation, and that no building or other structures shall be erected on such park or on the lands under water hereby granted and conveyed inconsistent with its use as a public park or place for public resort and recreation: Provided, however, that public walks and drives may be constructed along and upon any portion of the said lands under waafter such public park or the land under water ter: And also provided that, if at any time herehereby granted shall cease to be used as such park or place for public resort and recreation, then and in that event this grant, and all the right, title, and interest in said lands under wa ter hereby granted, shall cease and determine, and the lands under water hereinbefore described shall forthwith thereupon revert to the state." There seems to be no proof whatever of the dedication or laying out or municipal acceptance of Berkeley square as a street south of the concrete bulkhead already mentioned. The paving.ordinance of October 10, 1906, is not printed, and apparently was, not introduced into evidence, though its purport was stipulated; and it appears to be undisputed that at that time the high-water line beyond which the paving naturally would not run was about 275 feet from Atlantic avenue. It is, of course entirely optional with the Prosecutor relies on the doctrine of Hoboken city, as grantee, whether public walks and Land & Imp. Co. v. Hoboken, 36 N. J. Law, drives shall be constructed on this property. 540, that, when a street is dedicated to an ex- If it does not exercise that option, prosecutor isting high-water line, the dedication will ex- has no legal ground of complaint. He certend to a new high-water line created by fill- tainly has no right to make a walk or drive ing out, etc. But it is not clear that this himself without the city's leave. The doc claim can be proved by an individual in the trine of access to a highway is not applicable absence of an acceptance of dedication by the in such a case, for the simple reason that public. In the Hoboken Case, supra, as in there is no highway. The intent of the state, the recent case of Camden v. McAndrews & as expressed in the statute and grants, being Forbes Co., 85 N. J. Law, 260, 88 Atl. 1034, to reserve the land for park purposes without the municipality, representing the public, reference to street ends, the rule of dedication sued in ejectment, and the bringing of the of a street to a new high-water line is insuit was held to constitute an acceptance. In applicable. Hoboken v. Penn. R. R., 124 U. 1. The first error relied on is that counsel for the state was allowed to ask leading questions on crucial points. Some of the questions undoubtedly came near the border line of the discretion necessarily allowed in this matter, but we are not pursuaded that there was abuse of that discretion. claim that dedication arose out of the lan- | that Worman represented the prosecutor of guage of the grants by mention of street lines the pleas, and for money could secure imis without substance, as they are called "ex-munity from arrest and freedom from prosecutended" lines throughout, and the effect of tion. that word is settled for us by the Court of Errors and Appeals in McAndrews & Forbes Co. v. Camden Nat. Bank, 87 N. J. Law, 231, 238, 94 Atl. 627. See, also, M. & E. R. R. v. Jersey City, 63 N. J. Eq. 45, 64, 51 Atl. 387. | The prosecutor therefore, by constructing the bulkhead in question within the extended lines of Berkeley square, was a mere trespasser upon the park property, and as such not entitled to a hearing preliminary to the resolution. It may be doubted whether a resolution was necessary, as it would be plainly within the scope of authority of the official or department having charge of the park to prevent and remove unlawful obstructions to its proper use. We consider that the prosecutor has not shown any illegality injurious to himself in the resolution brought up, and the writ will therefore be dismissed, with costs. (88 N. J. Law, 463) STATE V. WORMAN. (Supreme Court of New Jersey. March 6, 1916.) 1. FALSE PRETENSES 10. ELEMENTS FALSE PRETENSES TO AGENT. False representations to an agent, inducing action by his principal, are not distinguishable from those made directly to the principal. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see False Pretenses, Dec. Dig. 10.] [1] 2. Knipper was asked why he gave Worman the note, and answered, "Because, as I understood my grandfather, I had to do it to protect myself." As Worman's first attempt was made with the grandfather, the actual manager of the hotel, and was followed by a conversation with Knipper, we think the inquiry was permissible. It tended to prove the fact that Knipper was influenced to give the note by Worman's false pretenses. We cannot distinguish between what was said to the agent to induce action by the principal and what was said to the principal himself. 3. We see no objection to the statement of the prosecutor to the witness Bowers that she did not have to give the exact date. However important it may have been to fix the date when the crime was committed, it was not necessary that every witness should be able to testify to the exact date of every fact. 4. The defendant was not prevented from fully explaining his defense. The truth of the affidavits procured by him, and his ex 2. FALSE PRETENSES 4- ELEMENT-PRO-planation of his failure to have warrants TECTION OF OTHER THAN COMMERCIAL DEAL INGS. The act as to obtaining property by false representations is not confined to the protection of persons in commercial dealings. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see False Pretenses, Cent. Dig. § 1; Dec. Dig. 4.] Error to Court of Quarter Sessions, Morris County. Elwood W. Worman was convicted of false pretenses, and brings error. Affirmed. Argued November term, 1915, before GUMMERE, C. J., and SWAYZE and BERGEN, JJ. Elmer King, of Morristown, and Frederic B. Scott, of New York City, for plaintiff in error. Charlton A. Reed, of Morristown, for the State. issued for the arrest of the proprietor of the hotel, did not bear upon the issue in the case, which was whether he had procured the cash and note by falsely pretending that he represented the prosecutor, and could secure Knipper immunity from arrest and freedom from prosecution. 5. We think a reasonably honest or ordinarily prudent man might have parted with his money on the faith of the false pretense. The question is not whether Knipper and in the affidavits submitted by Worman were false. The question is whether they might reasonably believe Worman's own statement that he represented the prosecutor and could secure them immunity. There can be no doubt that the jury was justified in finding that their belief in these pretenses was the moving cause that led to the payment of the cash and the giving of the note. It was not essential to prove that the cash was Knipper's property; it was enough to prove that he was induced to give the note by the false pretenses. There was, however, enough in the case to justify the finding that the cash Drecher knew that the statements contained SWAYZE, J. The defendant was convicted of obtaining by false pretenses cash and a note from Knipper. Knipper was proprietor of a tavern where dances took place. Drecher, his grandfather, was his agent in actual charge. Worman suggested to Drecher and afterward to Knipper that he had evidence which would justify criminal proceedings against them and exhibited to them affidavits he had procured. The false pretenses were [2] 6. A novel contention is made that the was his. act as to obtaining property by false pretenses | pany. On motion for distribution of fund was purely for the protection of persons in in the hands of the receiver of defendant. commercial dealings. Some countenance is Distribution directed. given to this contention by the decision of the New York Supreme Court in People v. Clough, 17 Wend. 35, 31 Am. Dec. 303. Judge Cowen admits that the words of the statute are broad enough to include the case of alms secured by the false pretenses of a beggar, but he held, speaking for the court, that the meaning of the words was to be limited by the preamble to the statute. We have no such preamble in our statute, and the argument fails. The decision in People v. Clough is opposed to the great, and otherwise unanimous, weight of authority. Commonwealth v. Whitcomb, 107 Mass. 486; Queen v. Jones, 19 L. J. M. C. 162; Queen v. Hensler, 11 Cox C. C. 570; State v. Styner, 154 Ind. 131, 56 N. E. 98. Corwin Howell and John R. Hardin, both of Newark, for receiver. John B. Vreeland, of Morristown, opposed. HOWELL, V. C. The New Jersey & Penn sylvania Railroad Company owned a short line of railway constructed from Whitehouse to Morristown. It became insolvent and Frederick V. Pitney was appointed receiver in proceedings taken to wind up the affairs of the company. He found it necessary in the progress of his work to have more money than he could obtain from the ordinary transaction of the company's business, and in order to obtain funds in January, 1913, he made application to the court for leave to borrow money to the extent of $7,000 on re 7. There was no abuse of discretion in receiver's certificates. Notice of the applicafusing to allow the case to be reopened for new evidence after the counsel for defendant had summed up to the jury. 8. The criticism of the charge is not warranted. The judge charged that there must be a false pretense with intent to defraud; that if the intent and the false pretense is made out the case is brought within the statute; that whenever a person fraudulently represents as an existing fact that which is not a fact, and so gets money, that is an offense within the statute. His subsequent remark that the intent is all that is required must be read in connection with what immediately preceded it. He also charged that the false verbal representations must be sufficient in reason to be the means of defrauding a person of ordinary understanding. 9. The suggestion that an issue to be tried was that of a conspiracy to convict the defendant does not merit any comment. The judgment is affirmed. (86 N. J. Eq. 68) JEFFERS v. NEW JERSEY & P. R. CO. (No. 35/796.) tion appears to have been given to every one in interest by the ordinary order requir ing creditors and stockholders to show cause why the petition of the receiver should not be granted. On January 28, 1913, on the receiver's motion it was ordered that he have authority to borrow money by the issue of receiver's certificates of indebtedness maturing not later than 12 months from their date, and not at any one time to exceed the sum of $7,000, carrying interest at a rate not exceeding the legal rate, which certificates of indebtedness should be a first lien on the property real and personal of the defendant company in preference to mortgage, judg ment, or other liens or claims thereon, except only a mortgage held by the Vail estate. In pursuance of this authority on February 14, 1913, he borrowed from a bank the sum of $3,000, and on June 13, 1913, he borrowed from the same bank the further sum of $4,000, for which several amounts he issued his certificates, one for $3,000 and the other for $4,000, which, after reciting the authority given to him in that behalf, certified that he as such receiver had received from the bank the said several sums of money to be used in the administration of his trust as such receiver under the direction of this court, and which as such receiver he prom (Court of Chancery of New Jersey. Feb. 17, ised to pay to the bank within twelve months, RECEIVERS PRIORITY. 1916.) 128-CERTIFICATES-PAYMENT Where the property of a railroad in receivership is sold in foreclosure of receiver's certificates under a decree that from the proceeds the certificates be paid first, the proceeds are applicable first to pay in full the receiver's fees and expenses, including counsel fees, and then to pay pro rata the receiver's certificates on a par with claims against him for car service and damages to shippers. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Receivers, Cent. Dig. 88 205, 210, 219-222; Dec. Dig. —128.] Action by William H. Jeffers against the New Jersey & Pennsylvania Railroad Com with interest at the rate of 6 per cent., payable quarterly, out of the property of the railroad company or the proceeds thereof prior to any other debt or demand of any kind or character whatsoever. The form of the two certificates is the same, except that the junior certificate purports to be made subject to the prior certificate of $3,000 then held by the bank. The receiver continued to pay interest on the certificates until October 1, 1913. There is now due on them the sum of $7,000, with interest from the last-named date. In the latter part of 1914 and the early part of 1915 proceedings were taken by the bank |