sustained by the Glannibanta, and from that decision the present appeal is brought. The Glannibanta was a vessel of 534 tons register, and was proceeding from London to the Tyne in ballast; the Transit was of 345 tons register, and was on a voyage from Grimsby to Dieppe with a general cargo. Shortly before the collision, the Glannibanta had come through Hewitt's Channel, and had passed the St. Nicholas lightship on her course northwards, and the Transit had passed the Belle Buoy on her course southwards; the collision took place between the South Elbow and the south-west Scroby buoys, at a distance from the Scroby Sands of from a quarter to half a mile. The plaintiffs allege that, immediately after passing the St. Nicholas lightship, the Glannibanta, which had previously been steering N. by W., ported her heim so as to change her course to N. half E., and proceeded down the roads at the rate of about nine knots an hour, but shortly before one p.m., those on board her saw the Transit approaching, bearing about two points on the port bow, and at the distance of from a half to three quarters of a mile, that the helm of the Glannibanta was again slightly ported, and she was kept on her course, with the intention of passing the Transit, port side to port side; but that the Transit, instead of passing the Glannibanta on her port side, suddenly, and with the apparent intention of crossing the bows of the Glannibanta, starboarded her helm, and although the engines of the Glannibanta were immediately stopped and reversed, and her helm was starboarded, the starboard side of the Transit, abreast of her foremast, came into contact with the stern of the Glannibanta. The defendants, on the other hand, allege that when the Transit first observed the Glannibanta, the latter was about a mile ahead, that the Transit was then heading about S. by W., well over to the east side of the roads, and proceeding at the rate of about eight knots an hour; that the Glannibanta was not then approaching so as pass port side to port side, but was continuing on her N. by W. course, by which she had passed the lightship, and was apparently heading to the town of Yarmouth, and communicating with the shore by signals; that the Transit, in this belief, and expecting the Glannibanta to pass starboard to starboard, starboarded about two points, but the Glannibanta suddenly ported, then, for the first time, straightening down the roads, and the vessels were almost immediately in collision, notwithstanding the stoppage and reversal of the engines of the Transit. The defendants further allege that there was no proper or sufficient lookout on board the Glannibanta; and then, when she so ported, those on board her were not aware that the Transit was so close to them, and only discovered the fact after they had ported, and when the collision was inevitable. It is not immaterial to note that, having regard to the speed at which the two vessels were proceeding, they were nearing each other at the rate of about a mile in three minutes to three minutes and a half. Now, the substantial question which had to be decided in the court of the Admiralty Division, and which has to be decided by us in the present appeal, is as to the time at which the Glannibanta straightened her course from N. by W. to N. half E., whether she did so at the time of, or imme [CT. OF APP. diately after, passing the St. Nicholas lightship, as alleged by the plaintiffs, or whether, as alleged by the defendants, she continued on her N. by W. course for some half a mile or three quarters of a mile after she had passed the lightship, and then, and not till then, straightened her course. If the former be the correct view of the case, it is clear, upon the evidence, that the Transit was in error in starboarding when she did, and if the latter is the correct view, it is equally clear upon the evidence, that the Glannibanta ought not to have ported when in such close proximity to the Transit. This question was decided by the learned Judge of the Admiralty Division, in accordance with the plaintiff's contention, and he appears to have been much influenced in arriving at this conclusion by the course taken by another steamer, the Paradox, which was at the same time proceeding to the north, and by the evidence given by persons who were on board the Paradox, respecting the movements of the Glannibanta and the Transit. The Paradox had passed the St. Nicholas lightship somewhat in advance of the Glannibanta, and had changed her course on passing the lightship from N. by W. to N. half E., so as to straighten down the roads, and on meeting the Transit had passed her port side to port side. From this the learned Judge very justly inferred that the course so made by the Paradox was the natural and proper course for any other ship similarly circumstanced, and having stated that in his opinion the natural course for the Glannibanta was to have ported immediately on passing the lightship, he proceeded to refer to the argument which had been addressed to him on the part of the defendants, and which was the same in substance as has been addressed to us here, in the following terms: "The porting or passing the lightship is not denied to have been her natural course, but it has been contended, and with very great power, that her fault was this, that she went towards Yarmouth further than was necessary or proper, and thereby brought her starboard side open to the Transit, which, on seeing the starboard side, was justified in starboarding." To this argument, and the evidence upon the subject of it, the learned Judge next addressed himself, and having stated that in the conflict of evidence he and the Elder Brethren of the Trinity House were of opinion that they might safely rely upon the testimony of those who had been on board the Paradox, he acted upon the evidence of those witnesses; and considering it to be thereby established that the Glannibanta had followed in the wake of the Paradox, he held that the Transit had starboarded when the Glannibanta was on her port bow, and had thus caused the collision, for which she was alone to blame. If this view be correct, it of course negatives the contention of the defendants that the Glannibanta continued on her course of N. by W. for some distance after she had passed the lightship. In the course of the argument on behalf of the plaintiffs we were much pressed with the language from time to time made use of by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Admiralty cases, and particularly in the cases of The Julia (Lush. 224; 14 Moore, P. C. C. 210), and The Alice (3 Mar. Law Cas. O.S. 103), to the effect that if in the court of Admiralty there was conflicting evidence, and the judge of that court, having had the oppor tunity of seeing the witnesses and observing their demeanour, had come, on the balance of testimony, to a clear and decisive conclusion, the Judicial Committee would not be disposed to reverse such decision, except in cases of extreme and overwhelming pressure, and it was urged upon us that in the present case there was no such extreme and overwhelming pressure as should induce us to reverse the decision of the Admiralty as to the question of fact upon which its decision was based. Now we feel, as strongly as did the Lords of the Privy Council in the cases just referred to, the great weight that is due to the decision of a judge of first instance, whenever, in a conflict of testimony, the demeanour and manner of the witnesses who have been seen and heard by him are, as they were in the cases referred to, material elements in the consideration of the truthfulness of their statements. But the parties to the cause are nevertheless entitled, as well on question of fact as on questions of law, to demand the decision of the Court of Appeal, and that court cannot excuse itself from the task of weighing conflicting evidence, and drawing its own inferences and conclusions, though it should always bear in mind that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses, and should make due allowance in this respect. In the present case, it does not appear from the judgment, nor is there any reason to suppose, that the learned judge at all proceeded upon the manner or demeanour of the witnesses; on the contrary, it would appear that his judgment in fact proceeded upon the inferences which he drew from the evidence before him, and which we have really the same means of considering that he had, and with this further advantage, that we have had his view of the inferences to be drawn from the evidence as well as the evidence itself made the subject of elaborate and able discussion on both sides. Having given our best consideration to the evidence in this case, we are unable to arrive at the same conclusion as that arrived at by the learned judge of the Admiralty Division. It is quite true, as has been already stated that the evidence of the captain and belmsman of the Paradox is to the effect that in their opinion the Glannibanta ported her helm immediately after she had passed the lightship, and that such evidence is in accordance with the captain and helmsman of the Glan. nibanta, but it is in our opinion clear, from the circumstances to which we are about to advert, and to which the attention of the judge of the Admiralty Division does not appear to have been directed, that these witnesses must have been mistaken The captain of the Glannibanta himself most distinctly states that he saw the Transit directly after he ported, and that she was then about half a mile or a little more from the Glannibanta; and this is supported by other persons who were on board the Glannibanta. Now, there is no dispute that the point at which the collision took place was upwards of a mile to the north of the lightship, though there is some slight difference of opinion as to the distance from Scroby Sands, and as the two vessels were approaching each other at about equal rates, the Transit must at the time when the Glannibanta passed the lightship have been at least a mile to the north of the point of collision, and at least two miles from the Glannibanta, and had the Glannibanta ported [CT. OF APP. her helm immediately on passing the lightship, the Transit, when first seen from the Glannibanta, must have been at least two miles distant instead of half a mile or three-quarters of a mile, which most of the witnesses, except those who were on board the Paradox, agree in treating as about the distance between the two ships when the Glanni banta straightened her course. If, however, as is contended by the defendants, the Glannibanta did not port her helm until she had left the lightship more than half a mile behind her, she would have been when she ported about half a mile to threequarters of a mile from the Transit, each being about a quarter of a mile from the eventual point of collision. Under these circumstances, having given our best consideration to all the evidence in the case, and having had the benefit of the advice of the nautical assessors, by whom we have been assisted on the present occasion, we have arrived at the following conclusions, in which they entirely concur: 1. That the Glannibanta continued on her course for more than half a mile after she had passed the lightship, whether or not she did so for the purpose of interchanging signals with Yarmouth, as suggested by the defendants, it is immaterial for us to consider. The fact is proved to demonstration by the evidence of the captain of the Glannibanta, and it follows from this, 2. That by keeping on this course she led those on board the Transit to believe, and that they were justified in believing, that she was making for Yarmouth, and would pass them starboard to starboard. 3. That, having regard to these circumstances, the Transit was fully justified in starboarding when the Glannibanta was first seen from her deck, and that the Glannibanta was not justified in porting when in such close proximity to the Transit. 4. That the collision was occasioned by such improper porting of the Glannibanta, it being practically impossible to avoid a collision after the course of the Glannibanta had been changed. In arriving at these conclusions, we are donbtless dissenting from the view expressed by the captain and helmsman of the Paradox, upon which the Judge of the Admiralty Division relied, but we can well understand how in such a case persons desiring to speak with the most perfect honesty and accuracy, may have been mistaken. There was nothing in the surrounding circumstances prior to the collision to direct the attention of the people on board the Paradox to the movements of the Transit and the Glannibanta, so as to induce them to watch such movements with any particular nicety, and the want of accuracy in such casual notices as were taken is exemplified by the circumstance that the captain of the Paradox states that the Glannibanta, after she had straightened her course, was a quarter of a mile astern of him, whilst his helmsman makes the distance 200 yards only, and the captain of the Glannibanta says he was as much as half a mile, or nearly so, astern. We cannot part with this case without expres sing our surprise that there should have been no proper or sufficient look-out on board the Glanni banta, for had there been a proper look-out, and the Transit had been seen from the Glannibanta, as in such case she must have been before the latter ported, we cannot for a moment suppose that that change of course would have been made. The captain of the Glannibanta, in his examination, stated that it was not a customary thing to keep a man on the look-out in the daytime on board ships belonging to his owners, and, on the occasion in question, until after she had ported, the captain was the only person on the look-out, and he was on the bridge, with his view forward limited by reason of the sails on his own ship to four points on the starboard bow. A very different course was pursued by the Transit, on board of which an efficient look-out was kept by her captain and mate on the bridge, and by a seaman well forward in the bows. We have only further to remark, that having regard to the fact that the Transit had a proper and sufficient look-out in every direction, the course pursued by her of starboarding when she first saw the Glannibanta would be quite inexplicable if the vessels had been approaching each other port side to port side, as contended for by the plaintiffs. It appears to us impossible to adopt the suggested explanation of the plaintiffs, that by crossing the bows of the Glannibanta the Transit might save a little distance in her course to the south, and that that was her object in starboarding. On the other hand, we can well understand that the Glannibanta, having no sufficient look-out, ported her helm in ignorance of the position of the Transit, and simply with the view of straightening her course down the roads. The Transit was, in our opinion, very carefully and cautiously handled. The Giannibanta was carelessly and recklessly managed in changing her course in ignorance of the position of another vessel which was only half a mile off. It is possible, no doubt, that the careful ship may have blunderingly gone wrong, and that the careless ship may by accident have gone right, but the burthen of proof on the latter is then very heavy, and the Glannibanta has certainly not discharged it in this case. It may be well to add, that having regard to the position of the Glannibanta and Paradox in passing the lightship, and their position when the Glannibanta sighted the Transit, the Glannibanta, the faster ship, must have lost instead of gaining ground, which can only be accounted for by the one having taken a straight and the other a devious course. Upon the whole, we are of opinion that the Glannibanta was alone to blame, and that, consequently, the appeal must be allowed, the order of the court below discharged, and the usual order of reference made for assessing the damage sustained by the Transit. The costs both of the court below and of the appeal must follow the result. Judgment reversed. Solicitors for the Transit, Pritchard and Sons. Solicitors for the Glannibanta, Stokes, Saunders, and Co. [CT. OF APP. Where a master in a colonial port unable to procure or pay for necessaries otherwise draws a bill of exchange upon a firm of shipbrokers in this country who accept and pay the bill, such shipbrokers can proceed against the ship as for necessaries supplied in default of payment of the amount due by the shipowners. The Onni (Lush. 154) followed. THIS was an action in rem brought by Lloyd, Lowe, and Co., shipbrokers, of London, against the Norwegian vessel Anna, her owners intervening, to recover an amount alleged to be due to the plaintiffs as appeared by the following: STATEMENT OF CLAIM. 1. The said barque or vessel is a Norwegian vessel belonging to the defendants, and arrived in the port of Liverpool, in the month of Dec. A.D., 1875. 2. The plaintiffs are shipbrokers, carrying on business in co-partnership, in London. 3. About the end of Oct. or beginning of Nov. A.D. 1875, the said vessel was lying at the port of Quebec, bound for some safe port on the West Coast of Great Britain. 4. The master of the said vessel was at Quebec aforesaid, then and there obliged to make certain necessary disbursements to the extent of 2931. 8s. 2d. for and on account of and for the use of the said vessel, and for the supply of necessaries thereto; and being himself without funds and without credit, procured the said sum of 2931. 8s. 2d. for the said necessaries, by means of a bill of exchange for the said amount then and there drawn by him upon the plaintiffs; and the said master thereupon advised the plaintiffs of the same by a letter, which was in the words and figures following: "Quebec, 6th Nov. 1875. Messrs. Lloyd, Lowe, and Co., London. Dear Sirs, I have this day taken the liberty to value on you at thirty days' sight for 2931. 8s. 2d. sterling-Two hundred and ninety-three pounds eight shillings and two-pence-in favour of Mr. Francis Gunn, of Quebec, being for the necessary disbursements of my vessel, the barque Anna of Christiana, which I hope you will duly honour or presentation, and please charge to account of said vessel and owners. P. Hernandsen, Esq., of Christiana. Your obedient servant, H. W. HANSEN, Master of the barque Anna." P.S. The above amount is duly insured from Quebec to Liverpool. Policy enclosed. 5. The plaintiffs duly accepted and paid the said bill of exchange at maturity. 6. The said bill of exchange was accepted and paid by the plaintiffs as aforesaid in the necessary service of the said vessel as aforesaid, and upon the credit of the said vessel, and not on the personal credit of the said master; and the said sum of 2931. 8s. 2d. still remains wholly due and owing to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs claim: 1. Judgment for the said sum of 2931. 8s. 2d. 2. The condemnation of the said vessel and the defendants and their bail therein, and in the costs of this suit. 3. A reference, if necessary, of the claim of the plaintiffs to the registrar, assisted by assessors, to report the amount thereof. 4. Such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require. To this statement the defendants demurred upon the grounds that a foreign ship cannot be made answerable for a claim in respect of necessaries supplied in a foreign port, and that the plaintiffs were, under the circumstances stated in the statement of claim, in no better position than the persons who supplied or advanced the alleged necessaries at Quebec aforesaid. March 7. Myburgh for the defendants in support of the demurrer. If The Watuga (Swab. 165) is still to be considered as of binding authority, where it decided that necessaries supplied in a colonial port are within the jurisdiction, this point must be taken against me. But that decision can be supported upon the ground alone that the ship was upon the high seas at the time of the supply. Moreover, that decision is not consistent with Dr. Lushington's decisions in The Ocean (2 W. Rob. 368), and The India (12 L. T. Rep. N. S. 316; 1 Mar. Law Cas. O. S. 390), where it was held that the statute did not give jurisdiction over necessaries supplied to a foreign ship in a foreign port. There is nothing in the act to show any distinction between a colonial and a foreign port, and all the argument in the judgment of The India (ubi sup.) covers colonial as well as foreign ports. [Sir R. PHILLIMORE.-No points for argument have been delivered. I consider that as this court now has demurrers before it, the practice prevailing in the Common Law Divisions should prevail here also, and that in all cases to be argued on demurrer, the points for argument should be delivered.] The second point is that there is no allegation in the statement of claim, that at the time the money advanced was expended for necessary supplies, the owners of the ship were without credit; thirdly, the plaintiffs accepted the bill of exchange on the personal credit of the owners of the ship, as appears by the master's letter set out. Hence there is no claim against the ship, the plaintiffs having elected to proceed against the owners. E. C. Clarkson for the plaintiffs. Since the decision in The Wataga (Swab. 165), acquiesced in since 1856, the Legislature has dealt with the whole question by the Admiralty Court Act 1861, (24 Vict. c. 10), and has not seen fit to enact anything with respect to necessaries supplied to foreign ships in colonial ports. Hence it must be taken that the Legislature left the law as defined by this court intentionally as it then stood; secondly, the plaintiffs are at liberty to show the circumstances under which the necessaries are supplied, and it is sufficient for them to allege in their statement of claim, that the supplies were necessary. The jurisdiction does not depend upon whether credit is given to the owner or to the ship. The 3 & 4 Vict. c. 65, s. 6, gives jurisdiction independently of the question of credit. It must be presumed that the ship is liable, inasmuch as the necessaries were for her use: (The Perla, Swab. 353.) He also referred to The Ella A. Clark, B. & L., 32. Myburgh in reply. Sir R. PHILLIMORE.-This is a discussion which relates to the admissibility of a demurrer to a statement of claim. The Norwegian vessel Anna arrived in the port of Liverpool in the month of December 1875, and the master, finding himself without funds, had carried on board goods to the amount of 2931. 88. 2d. for the purpose of supplying necessaries to the vessel, and had borrowed the money by means of a bill of exchange, which is in these words: Quebec, 6th Nov. 1875. Messrs. Lloyd, Lowe and Co., London. Dear Sirs, I have this day taken the liberty to draw on you at thirty days' sight for 2931. 8s. 2d. sterling (two hundred and ninety-three pounds eight shillings and two pence, in favour of Mr. Francis Gunn, of Quebec, being for the necessary disbursements of my vessel, the barque Anna, of Christiana, which I hope you will duly honour on presentation, and please charge [CT. OF APP. to account of said vessel and owner, P. Hernandsen, Esq., of Christiana.-Your obedient servant, H. W. HANSEN, Master of the barque Anna. P.S.-The above amount is duly insured from Quebec to Liverpool. Policy enclosed. Now these points have been made in support of this demurrer, and it will be convenient to take the first point last, because it is one of the greatest importance. The first of the two latter points is that it appears upon the statement of claim the money which had been paid by the bill of exchange had been expended in necessaries, and was obtained on the captain's personal credit, he being without funds ready. I am of opinion that that point is untenable. The third point is that the bill was accepted on the credit of the owners. That depends on the construction in some measure of the letter I have read. It is said that there is no claim upon the ship, and that the master of the vessel supplied the necessaries, and has to look only to the owners. Now in the first place it is distinctly pleaded in the sixth article that "the bill of exchange was accepted and paid by the plaintiffs for the necessary supplies of the vessel, and not on the personal credit of the master." It is contended that this written document cannot receive any construction from the statement contained in the 6th paragraph. I am by no means certain that it would not be proper in this case, in order to understand the letter to which I have referred, to take into consideration the surrounding circumstances. But I do not think it necessary to place the rejection of the demurrer upon that ground. I consider the question that was raised by my learned predecessor in the case of The Onni (Lush 154) is substantially the same as the point raised here to-day. In that case he says: "I must now consider my jurisdiction entirely governed by the 3rd and 4th of Vict. c. 65, sect. 6. That section merely says that the court shall be authorised to decide all cases for necessaries supplied to any foreign ship or seagoing vessel, and to enforce payment thereof. It makes no distinction whether the necessaries were furnished on personal credit or not. I have held that the advance of money for the procuring of necessaries is within the equitable construction of the statute. Can the present case be considered as a case of that kind? I can only judge by the information afforded me, and according to that affidavit the master obtains the money to procure necessaries by means of this bill, and the money so procured was duly expended for the benefit of the ship. I think in these circumstances I am justified in allowing this claim." In this case the money was obtained by means of a bill of exchange to provide necessaries for the benefit of the ship. I am unable to find any substantial distinction on the matter between the two cases. I consider that case, therefore, is a precedent for the court in the present case. I have only to advert to the first point raised in the discussion to which I referred, namely, the question as to whether the court has any jurisdiction in the circumstances of this case, the cir cumstances of this case being briefly that a Norwegian vessel has obtained necessaries when lying in the port of Quebec, and the plaintiffs, the ship's brokers, bring this suit under the 6th sect. of 3 & 4 Vict. c. 65, which enacts that "the High Court of Admiralty shall have jurisdiction to decide all claims and demands whatever in the nature of salvage services rendered to a seagoing vessel in the nature of tonnage, or for necessaries supplied to a foreign vessel, and to enforce the payment thereof, whether such ship or vessel may have been in the body of a county, or upon the high seas." It was very properly admitted by Mr. Myburgh in the course of the argument that this point as to the question of jurisdiction was in reality, so far as necessaries are concerned, decided by Dr. Lushington in the case of The Wataga (Swa. 165). It is not necessary to read the whole of that case, but that learned judge considered fully the effect of the statute, and came to a distinct conclusion. There an American ship had been supplied with necessaries, and had been arrested. It was a question of jurisdiction when brought into this court. The judgment was given in 1856, and as far as I know the question was decided at that time. I think, also, that it has received confirmation from the subsequent statute, 24 Vict. c. 10, sect. 5. I think that the argument which has been addressed to me by Mr. Clarkson upon that point is a sound argument, but in any case I should not think it right if I entertained an opinion which I by no means express, that Dr. Lushington had erred in his judgment, and had not taken the right view, to take upon myself to reverse his judgment, which I understand he had long considered, and I should leave the parties to resort, if aggrieved by my adhering to his decision, to the Court of Appeal. I am therefore of opinion that I ought to overrule the demurrer, and I so do. I give leave to the defendants to appeal. From this judgment the defendants appealed. May 18.-Myburgh (Milward, Q.C. with him). -Has the court jurisdiction over claims for necessaries supplied to a foreign vessel in a colonial port? When the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 65 was passed the Admiralty Court had no jurisdiction over causes of necessaries supplied whether in an English or a foreign port, and the words of that Act by which jurisdiction is given, whether the "within the body of a county or upon supply was the high seas,' can only give jurisdiction over claims where the necessaries are supplied either in this country or on the high seas. The Act does not cover supplies made in all parts of the world or in any port out of England. Dr. Lushington so decided in The Ocean (2 W. Rob. 368), and though The Wataga (Swab. 165) makes an exception from this ruling in favour of necessaries supplied in a colonial port that latter decision ought not to be foliowed by this court. There is no essential difference between a foreign and a colonial port, and neither are within the words of the statute: The India, 12 L. T. Rep. N. S. 316; 1 Mar. Law The Ella A Clark, B. & L. 32. [JAMES, L.J.-Would not foreign owners suffer if the defendants were to succeed? Their masters could not obtain the necessary supplies. They would have no security to give the merchants]. Masters have without this power too much facility for spending money. E. C. Clarkson, for the respondent, was not called upon. JAMES, L.J.-This case does not require a ormal judgment. Dr. Lushington, twenty years [CT. OF APP. ago, in a very elaborate judgment, decided upon the construction of the statute, and that judgment has been acted upon ever since. The Legislature has since that time continually dealt with the matter, and if there had been any notion that the decision was wrong they would have made an alteration accordingly. We have no hesitation in coming to the same decision to which Dr. Lushington came twenty years ago. It is too late to raise questions of jurisdiction after that lapse of time. Upon the other points it is perfectly clear what the decision should be. BAGGALLAY, J.A., and LUSH, J., concurred. Appeal dismissed with costs. Solicitors for plaintiffs, H. W. Collins, and Robinson. Solicitors for defendants, Gregory, Rowcliffe, and Co., for Hull, Stone, and Fletcher, Liverpool. ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMIRALTY DIVISION. Thursday, May 4, 1876. CARGO EX WOOSUNG. Salvage-Government ship as salvor-Agreement Validity of Merchant Shipping Act 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 104), sect. 484. Although the captains, officers, and crews of Government ships are entitled to be remunerated for salvage services to the same extent as officers and crews of merchant vessels would be rewarded under similar circumstances, they are not entitled to impose terms upon the persons whose property they salve, and refuse to render assistance unless those terms are accepted. An agreement so imposed by the captain of a Government ship upon the master of a ship in distress, by which the latter becomes bound to pay a fixed sum for services to be rendered, not merely by the officers and crew, but by the Government ship also, is invalid, as the services of the ship are not to be rewarded under the Merchant Shipping Act 1854, sect. 484. Semble, that the officers and crew of a Government ship, ordered by Government to render salvage assistance, have no right to make any agreement with the master of the distressed vessel as to the amount of their reward. A vessel owned by the Bombay Government, and manned by uncovenanted servants of that Government, whose officers carry no Queen's commission, is a "ship belonging to Her Majesty," within the meaning of the Merchant Shipping Act 1854, and no salvage reward is recoverable in respect of services rendered by such a vessel. This was an appeal from a decree of the High Court of Admiralty of England, in a cause of salvage instituted on behalf of Capt. Elton and the officers and crew of the Kwangtung, of the Bombay Marine, against the cargo of the steamship Woosung. Capt. Elton and the other plaintiffs were uncovenanted servants of the Bombay Government, the officers not holding a Queen's commission, but performing duties analogous to those of the officers and crews of despatch boats. The Woosung was wrecked in the Red Sea, and news of the wreck was sent to London, when application was |