Having regard to the two views so put forward by the parties, we are of opinion that the question of fact, upon the solution of which the decision of this appeal must depend, is that of the direction of the wind. If this be ascertained, the course of the close-hauled ship lying within six points of the wind can readily be determined. Now with reference to this question five witnesses who were on board the August-her master, mate, boatswain, helmsman, and look-out all swear most positively that the wind was from N. to N. by W.; whilst five other witnesses who were on board the Peckforton Castle-her master, first and second mates, and helmsman, and a licensed pilot-positively swear that the wind was from N.W. to N W. by N. In addition to these ten witnesses a Trinity pilot gave evidence on behalf of the appellants to the effect that he left Falmouth harbour about eleven o'clock; that at the time of the collision, which, however, he did not witness, he was some six miles from the Manacles, and that the wind was then N. On the other hand, two other Trinity pilots who saw the collision speak positively to the wind being N.W. by N. Now, apart from the circumstance that as regards the first-mentioned of these three pilots, there was nothing to cause him to notice the precise direction of the wind at the time of the collision, whilst the attention of the two latter would probably be directed to it by reason of their witnessing the collision, it is to be further noted that the latter were close upon the spot where the collision occurred, whilst the former was some miles to the eastward, and at a spot where the direction of the wind would be influenced by land currents. But there is one piece of evidence adduced on behalf of the respondents which, taken in connection with the testimony of the witnesses who have been mentioned, is, in our opinion, conclusive, and that is the official weather report of the Lizard lighthouse for July 6th, from which it appears that from three a.m. until nine p.m. of that day, the wind was continuously N.W., though it blew with varying force. We are satisfied upon this evidence that the wind, at and near the place where the collision occurred, was for some time previously to and for some time after the collision from N.W. to N.W. by N., as alleged by the respondents, and this view of the case is strongly supported by the circumstances to which we are about to advert. The course of the Peckforton Castle during the forenoon and up to twelve o'clock, whilst on her starboard tack, was admittedly W. by S. Had the wind been N., or N. by W., as asserted by the appellants, she would have made her course W.N.W., or W. by N., instead of W. by S., and would have had no occasion to go on the port tack until after she was considerably past the Lizard. Now, one effect of our having arrived at this conclusion as to the direction of the wind, in the face of the positive statements of so many witnesses who were on board the August, is to materially lessen the value which we might otherwise have been disposed to attach to their evidence upon other matters, as to which there is a conflict of testimony; but, in our opinion, it is unnecessary to enter into any particular consideration of these other controverted matters.

It being established that the direction of the wind was from N.W. to N.W. by N., the course of the Peckforton Castle on her port tack must

[CT. OF APP.

an

have been, as alleged by the respondents, N.N.E. and N.E. by N., inclined, therefore, at angle of at least five points to that of the August, and it was utterly impossible for the Peckforton Castle to have been ever seen from the August three points on the starboard quarter of the latter, or, indeed, in any direction abaft her beam. The statement of the master of the Peckforton Castle appears to be substantially correct, that, after he went about, his ship was pretty broad on the starboard bow of the August. The ship and the barque were consequently crossing vessels with the wind on the same side, and the barque, being to windward, was bound to keep out of the way; this she neglected to do, and we agree with the learned judge of the Admiralty Court in thinking that she was alone to blame. The gentlemen who have given us thoir assistance as nautical assessors concur in the views which we have expressed; but they are further of opinion that the August was guilty of a breach of the wellrecognised rule of navigation that a ship having the wind free should give way to one close-hauled. This view was probaby taken by the judge of the Admiralty Court, and by the Elder Brethren who assisted him; but we prefer to base our decision, against the appellants, upon the ground that they disobeyed the directions given in art.

12.

The appeal must be dismissed with costs.

The judgment which I have just pronounced is the judgment of the court. I desire, however, to add a few observations with reference to that portion of Mr. Milward's argument which was based upon the judgment in the case of The Franconia (ubi sup.). Mr. Milward, in support of his contention that the Peckforton Castle was overtaking the August, and relying upon the evidence of his own witnesses, that she was three points on the starboard quarter of the latter, claimed the benefit of the definition of an overtaking vessel, suggested by Brett, L.J., in delivering the judgment in the case of The Franconia. What Brett, L.J. said was as follows: "It seems to me that this may seem a very good definition. I will not say that it is exhaustive, or that it may not on some occasion be found to be short of comprising every case; but I think it is a very good.rule, that if the ships are in such a position, and are on such courses and at such distances, that if it were night the hinder ship could not see any part of the side lights of the forward ship, then they cannot be said to be crossing ships, although their courses may not be exactly parallel. It would not do, I think, to limit the angle of the crossing too much, but a limit to that extent it seems to me is a very useful and practical rule, and then if the hinder of two such ships is going faster than the other she is an overtaking ship.' Mr. Milward's argument was this: If the Peckforton Castle was three points on the starboard quarter of the August she could not, had it been night, have seen any of the side lights of the August, and she was accordingly an overtaking vessel, and the 17th and not the 12th article of the regulations was applicable. This would have been a very effective, if not a conclusive, argument if it had been established that the Peckforton Castle was three points on the starboard quarter of the August; but we have held that the Peckforton Castle was not three points on the starboard quarter of the August, or in any direction

Q.B. Div.]

abaft her beam; and therefore the question whether the definition is accurate or not is not of importance in the present case. I desire however to state that, without expressing any dissent from the definition-which I am bound to say I at the time thought, unsatisfactory, though it was not in my opinion necessary for the decision of The Franconia case-I am unwilling to be considered as giving it an unqualified assent; the arguments in the present case have caused me to entertain some doubt upon the subject, and I desire to reserve to myself the right of reconsidering it when the circumstances of any case before me may require it. It is occasionally a matter of considerable difficulty to decide whether a particular vessel is crossing, overtaking, or approaching the other, within the intent and meaning of the several articles of the regulations; and the court, whose duty it is to decide such questions, must act upon the view taken by it of the special circumstances of the case under consideration, and with a due regard to the several matters provided for by the 19th article, as well as those recognised rules of navigation which, though not expressed, or fully expressed, in the regulations, are nevertheless of general application.

JAMES, L.J.-I also desire to add that the result of the argument induces me to come to the conclusion that I doubt whether the definition laid down in The Franconia case can be laid down as a rule to be so generally applicable as appears to be intimated in that case.

THESIGER, L.J.-With regard to the rule referred to, after what has fallen from the other members of the court, I have only to add that I am not prepared, in a case like the present, to express the view that it ought not to be adopted as a convenient rule of navigation. I only desire to reserve my assent to it until the occasion arises when it will have to be considered more fully whether the test given by it can be in all cases equally applied.

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Solicitors for the appellants, owners of the August, Gregory, Rowcliffe, and Co.

Solicitors for the respondents, owners of the Peckforton Castle, Cooper and Co.

[Q.B. DIV.

Dec. 21.-COCKBURN, C.J.-This was an action tried before me at the last assizes for the county of Surrey. It was an action brought against the defendants, who are a company engaged in the repair of steam vessels, for breach of a contract to furnish a new brass liner to the propeller shaft of a steam vessel of the plaintiffs, and a new brass stem brush; the allegation being that those articles were not constructed, or fitted on, in a workmanlike and proper manner, in consequence of which they became useless, and the plaintiffs were obliged to replace them, whereby they were not only put to expense, but lost the use of the vessel for nine days; and they claimed damages, not only for the cost of the new brass liner and brush, but also for the loss sustained by the detention of the vessel. The jury found for the plaintiffs as to the machinery having been defective; and it is not disputed that judgment shall be given for the cost of the new machinery, amounting to 1571. 158. 6d. ; but it was contended by the defendants that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover damages for the loss sustained by the vessel remaining unemployed during the time that the new machinery was being made and fitted.

Evidence was given by the plaintiffs that the earnings of such a vessel as the one in question would be from 261. to 271. a day. No evidence was adduced to show that the vessel would have been actually so employed; but no objection was made on this score, the contention of the defendants being based on the general proposition that the damages claimed were too remote. I reserved the question for future consideration, and it has since been argued before me by counsel.

a

On consideration I am of opinion that the damages claimed are not too remote, and fall within the rule laid down by the Court of Exchequer in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 350. It is there said: "Where two parties have made contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered as either arising naturally, ie, according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it." It appears going steam vessel, it must be in the contemplation to me that when machinery is ordered for a seaof the parties that the purpose of the thing ordered is to enable the vessel to resume her usual employment, and that, in the event of the machinery being defective, the defect will have to be made good before the vessel can be again employed, and that the detention of the vessel will be the probable result of the breach of contract.

I therefore hold that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the loss sustained by the detention of the vessel, amounting to 2347., as well as the cost

of replacing the machinery. The judgment will therefore be entered for 391l. 158. 6d. Judgment accordingly. Solicitors for the plaintiff, Lowless, Nelson, and Jones.

Solicitors for the defendants, Thomas and Hollams.

COMMON PLEAS DIVISION. Reported by A. H. BITTLESTON and J. A. FOOTE, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law.

Friday, Dec. 7, 1877.

(Before GROVE and LINDLEY, JJ.)
STEEL V. LESTER and LILEE.

APPEAL FROM INFERIOR COURT.

Master and servant-Partnership-NegligenceShip Owner and captain of Transfer of control over-Share in profits-Registration-"Managing owner "-38 & 39 Vict. c. 88, s. 4, sub-sect. 4. The owner of a ship, who, by a verbal agreement, gives up all control over her to the captain, but retains a right to one-third of the net profits, and is subsequently to the agreement registered as managing owner under the Merchant Shipping Act 1875, is liable for the negligent management of the vessel by the captain, although occurring during her employment under a charter-party of which the owner knew nothing. (a) Fraser v. Marsh (13 East, 238) distinguished. SPECIAL CASE stated by a County Court judge.

This was an action brought by the plaintiffs, who are millers at Spalding, against the dedefendant Lester, as the owner, and the defendant Lilee as the master, of a sloop called the Anne of Goole, for damage amounting to the sum of 501. occasioned to the plaintiffs' wharf by the sloop breaking loose from her moorings under circumstances which, in my opinion, showed negligence by the defendant Lilee in the management of the vessel, and evidence being given that damage to 501. had been suffered by the plaintiffs in conse quence, I gave judgment against both the defendants to that amount with costs. From this judgment there is no appeal on the part of the defendant Lilee, but the defendant Lester alleges that he is not liable for the negligence of Lilee.

The facts bearing upon this point proved before me were as follows:

The defendant Lester, who is a merchant living and carrying on business at Stoke-upon-Trent, in the county of Stafford, purchased, in the month of May 1873, the sloop Anne, which was duly transferred to him, and registered in his name as the Owner. He was afterwards registered as the "managing owner," under the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act 1875.

For about three months after the defendant Lester purchased the vessel, he traded with her on his own account, employing the defendant Lilee as skipper, paying him standing wages. At the end of three months from his purchase of the sloop, he agreed verbally with the defendant Lilee

(a) This case turns upon the facts which are held to show that the owner had not given up all his right and control to the master, but intended to preserve his right and position as managing owner. In the United States it seems to be held that where a master has the control of a vessel sailing her on shares, and no other facts appear, this constitutes the master owner pro hac vice, and the owners are not liable for his negligence or the negligence of a crew engaged by him. (See Somer v. White, 65 Maine Rep. 542; 20 Amer. Rep. 718.)-ED.

[C.P. DIV.

that he should take the ship wherever he chose, on condition that he (Lester) should have a third of the net profits. Lilee was to be at liberty to go to any port, and to take in any cargo he chose, and to refuse any cargo. He was also to engage the men, and Lester had no control over the vessel. Lilee was to render to Lester accounts of his profits from time to time, and this state of things continued till after the collision, Lester selling the vessel in 1876. Lester, on examination, could not say what his profit was on this particular voyage. He said the account given him by Lilee was somewhere, but he had not got it with him. In the month of March 1876 the defendant Lilee entered into a charterparty, a copy of which is set out in the Appendix hereto (No. 1).

cross

The sloop arrived at Spalding in due course, and after partially discharging the cargo the vessel remained several days at the said port, and whilst so remaining the damage was occasioned to the plaintiffs' wharf, by reason of the negligence of the defendant Lilee.

The defendant Lester was not consulted by the defendant Lilee as to the contract for taking the said cargo, and never saw or heard of the charterhe was not present at the port of Spalding when party till after the commencement of the action; the vessel arrived there, or at any time thereafter during her stay at the said port, and he did not take any part in the management of the said vessel during her voyage to, or whilst she remained at the said port. The men employed in navigating the said vessel (as on all previous voyages during the existence of the agreement between the two defendants) were hired and paid by the defendant Lilee, who found all stores required for the said ship, and paid to the defendant Lester one-third of the profit realised by the voyage.

I gave judgment on the 5th July 1877, and a copy of such judgment will be found in the appendix (see Appendix No. 2).

The question for the consideration of the court is whether, under the circumstances above stated, the defendant Lester is legally liable for the negligence of the defendant Lilee in the management of the said ship whilst lying at the port of Spalding, which occasioned the damage to the plaintiffs' wharf for which this action was brought. If he is so liable my judgment is to stand; but if he is not, then the judgment is to be against Lilee only, and judgment to be entered for the defendant Lester, with costs.

8th Aug. 1877.

JAMES STEPHEN, Judge.

APPENDIX No. 1. COPY CHARTER
PARTY.

London, 21st March 1876. It is this day mutually agreed between Lilee, master, for and in behalf of the owner of the good ship or vessel called the Anne of Goole, burthen per register 44 tons, now at London, and Lawes Chemical Manure Company (Limited), 59, Mark lane, London, that the said ship, now being tight, staunch, and strong, and every way fitted for the voyage, shall with all convenient speed sail and proceed to wharf or dock as directed by shipper, free of dock dues to vessel and there load in regular turn with other sea-going vessels (barges not to be termed sea-going ships) from the factors of the said merchants a full and complete cargo of manure in bags and or bulk at merchants' option, about 80 tons, the cargo to be brought to and taken from alongside the vessel at merchants' risk and expense, notwithstanding what she can reasonably stow and carry over and above her tackle, apparel, provisions, and

furniture, and being so loaded shall therewith proceed to Spalding or Gainsboro' as ordered on signing bill of lading and deliver the same on being paid freight at the rate of 68. 6d. per ton of 20cwt. and 21s. gratuity. Merchant paying Welland dues on cargo. If cargo be shipped in bulk the bags to be carried free of freight (the act of God, the Queen's enemies, fire, and all and every other dangers and accidents of the seas, rivers, and navigation, of whatever nature and kind soever during the said voyage always excepted); the freight to be paid on unloading and right delivery of the cargo in cash. Four working days are to be allowed the said merchants (if the ship is not sooner despatched) for discharging the said ship, and all days on demurrage over and above the said lying days at 30s. per day.

Penalty for nonperformance of this agreement, estimated amount of freight.

APPENDIX No. 2. COPY JUDGMENT.

In the case of Steele v. Lester and Lilee, which was heard at the last court, the action was against Lester the owner and Lilee the master of the ship Anne, which, having broken from her moorings in the river at Spalding in April last, damaged a wharf belonging to the plaintiffs to the extent of fifty-seven pounds six shillings and threepence, and the action was brought to recover the sum of fifty pounds, the residue being abandoned in order to bring the case within the jurisdiction of this court.

In order that either of the defendants should be liable in this action, it must be shown that there was negligence on the part of the defendant Lilee, who had the control of the vessel. And I am of opinion, on the evidence, that he was guilty of negligence in the way in which he fastened the ship after he had removed her from her first moorings, and also because he left the ship under the charge of an incompetent man, who might have avoided the accident if he had attended to what was said to him by the witness Mitchell.

No serious opposition was made to the amount of the damage alleged to have been caused by the ship, and I have therefore no difficulty in giving judgment in the action for the amount claimed.

With regard to the other defendant, the owner of the vessel, it was urged in his behalf that, though he was at the time of the transaction the registered" managing owner" of the vessel, that the relationship of master and servant did not then exist between him and Lilee so as to make him liable for his misconduct, and I was pressed with the case of Fraser v. Marshall (13 East, 238) as supporting that view. That decision, however, when I had the opportunity of reading it over carefully, I found to have been given in reference to a state of facts widely differing from those before me. In that case the owner had actually by a charter-party demised the ship for a time certain to the master at a certain rent, but here there was nothing of the kind: a verbal arrangement at the most, and that very loosely proved. And it is clear to me that the owner must be held liable in this case either as standing in the position of Lilee's master or else as his partner under the peculiar arrangement he said he made with him. And, for the purposes of the present action, it is of no importance which position he filled, as in either case he would be responsible for Lilee's acts while in conduct of the vessel. Judgment, therefore, for fifty pounds and costs must be entered against the defendants.

F. T. Streeten for the appellant.-The agree

[C.P. DIV.

ment between Lester and Lilee does not show a partnership, a mere sharing of profits is not enough: (Ross v. Parkyn, 44 L. J. 616, Ch.) There is nothing here to show a partnership. Then, further, there is here no relationship of master and servant, or employer and employed, or principal and agent. [LINDLEY, J. cited Pooley v. Driver (L. Rep. 5 Ch. D. 45; 46 L. J. 466, Ch.) GROVE, J. cited Lock v. Fowler (L. Rep. 7C. P. 292; 41 L. J. 99, Ch.] If a person is injured by the negligence of another, a third person is not liable unless the relationship of servant and master can be shown to exist between the third person and the person doing the injury, or unless the act from which the mischief arises is done by the express authority of the third person: (Venables v. Smith 46 L. J. 470, Q. B.) Here nothing of the sort is shown. The case finds that Lester knew nothing of the charter-party. [LINDLEY, J.-He may have left everything in Lilee's hands, and yet Lilee only be the captain.] In Milligan v. Wedge (12 Ad. & Ell. 737) the buyer of a bullock employed a licensed drover to drive it from Smithfield; the drover employed a boy to drive it, and mischief was occasioned to the bullock through the careless driving of the boy. There the licensed drover was held to be liable, if anyone. That case shows that you can only go one step beyond the person who does the injury. [GROVE, J.-In Milligan v. Wedge (ubi sup.) Lord Denman says: "The party sued has not done the act complained of, but has employed another who is recognised by the law as exercising a distinct calling."] It is not disputed here that Lester was owner of the vessel; but it is found by the case that he had no control over it. Lilee had the possession and entire use of the vessel; but not the whole profit. Although there is no letting here, there is a parting with the use of the vessel, and therefore the case of Fraser v. Marsh (13 East, 238) is in point. The case of Fowler v. Lock (L. Rep. 7 C. P. 272; 9 C. P. 751, n. 10 C. P. 90) is also in point. [GROVE, J.-My decision in that case went on the fact that the owner gave up the use of the cab for the day, and therefore the cabman was the bailee of the cab, and not the servant of the owner, at all events inter se And I distinguished the case of Powles v. Hider (6 E. & B. 207; 25 L. J. 331, Q. B.), on the ground that the judgment in that case proceeded on the relation and responsibility of the cab proprietor to the outside public.] Byles, J., in his judgment in Fowler v. Lock (ubi sup.), says. "Suppose that in a country town, in the time of Charles I., the owner of a horse and cart contracted to allow another man to have the entire and exclusive personal use and control of them, at so much a week or so much a day, for the purpose of carrying, for the driver's profit, passengers or goods within the limits of the town, but without reserving to himself (the owner) any right to direct where the borse and cart should go, provided they were used within the prescribed limits and were returned within the agreed time; what in that case would have been the nature of the relation between the parties? I should have thought it would not have been that of master and servant, but would have been that of bailor. and bailce." Here there is an absolute parting with the control of the vessel to Lilee. Lilee hired the sailors, paid them, dismissed them, and could go wherever he pleased. [LINDLEY, J.

That is so in all cases of partnership, where there is a dormant partner.] He cited also

Reedie v. The London and North-Western Railway
Company (4 Exch. 244.)

Finlay for the respondent. This is really a question of fact, upon which the decision of the County Court judge is equivalent to the verdict of a jury. He decides upon the evidence that there was not here an absolute demise of the ship, as there was in Fraser v. Marsh (ubi sup.). [LINDLEY, J.-Have not we to decide whether his conclusion was right, on the facts found? GROVE, J.-Here the evidence is unquestioned, and we have to decide what is the proper legal inference to be drawn from these unquestioned facts.] Then, Lester is registered as the managing owner, under 38 & 39 Vict. c. 88, s. 4, sub-sect. 4. If the contention of the appellant was right, Lilee, and not Lester, would be so registered. [GROVE, J.-This is an action brought, not by Lilee against Lester, but by a third person, and is therefore distinguishable from Fowler v. Lock (ubi sup.)] That is so. The registration of Lester as managing owner is an admission of the strongest kind that the vessel was under his control. [GROVE, J.-The case finds that he had no control over the vessel. But that may be in the same way as a master exercises no direct control over his coachman.] He was stopped by the Court.

Streeten in reply.

GROVE, J.-I am of opinion that the County Court judge was right, and that his decision must be affirmed. The action was commenced against Lilee and Lester for injury occasioned by the negligence of Lilee in the conduct of a ship of which Lilee was the master and Lester the registered owner. The question we have to decide is, whether the relationship of master and servant existed between Lester and Lilee, or, to put it more widely, whether Lester had or had not divested himself of his responsibility for the acts of Lilee.

The case that seemed most in favour of the appellants' contention was Fraser v. Marsh (13 East, 238). There it was held that the regis tered owner of a ship having chartered her to the then captain at a rent for a certain number of voyages, is not liable for stores furnished to the ship by order of the charterer during the charter-party. But there was there an absolute demise and parting with the vessel; nor was the registration there of the same kind as the regis tration of the managing owner under the Merchant Shipping Act 1875, which has for its object that there shall be some one responsible for the seaworthiness and proper management of the vessel. There are, therefore, two distinctions between Fraser v. Marsh and the present case; and I draw the same inference as the County Court judge did, that there was here no absolute parting with the vessel, but that Lester still in a certain sense retained the management of the vessel through the captain.

[C.P. DIV.

no control over the driver after leaving the yard. The majority of the Court of Common Pleas held that the relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff was not that of master and servant, but that of bailor and bailee, and consequently that the defendant was under a legal obligation to furnish the plaintiff with a horse that was reasonably fit to be driven in a cab. The Exchequer Chamber, being divided in opinion, and considering the statement of facts upon which they had to decide imperfect, ordered a new trial. Upon the action again being tried, in answer to questions put to them by the judge, the jury found that the horse was not reasonably fit to be driven in a cab; that the plaintiff did not take upon himself the risk of its being reasonably fit to be so driven; that the defendant did not take reasonable precautions to supply the plaintiff with a reasonably fit horse; and that the horse and cab were intrusted to the plaintiff as bailee, and not as servant. A verdict having been thereupon entered for the plaintiff, the Court refused to disturb it. If the present action had been one by Lilee against Lester, by the master of the vessel against the owner, Fowler v. Lock might have had a very strong application, but that is not so. The action here is brought by one of the public, and is consequently within the express distinction taken in Fowler v. Lock between that case, which involved the nature of the contract between the cabowner and the cabman only, and a case involving the relation and responsibility of the cab proprietor to the public, a distinction supported by the previous decision in Powles v. Hider (6 E. & B. 207; 25 L. J. 331, Q. B.) Assuming, therefore, Fowler v. Lock to be rightly decided, it does not govern this

case.

Then Venables v. Smith (L. Rep. 2 Q.B. Div. 279) is, as far as it goes, in favour of the decision of the County Court judge. It may be distinguishable from the present case, but, at all events, it supports the contention of the respondents rather than of the appellants.

The

There was one part of the case which at first seemed to me to be very strongly in favour of the appellants' contention-namely, the finding that Lester had parted with all control over the vessel. Because it seemed that, if that was so, the case was brought within Fraser v. Marsh (ubi sup.). But though it is true in a certain sense to say that Lester had no control over the vessel, he still remained the responsible owner and manager of her as regards the outside public. There are two important matters that lead me to this conclusion. first is that by sect. 4, sub-sect. 4, of the Merchant Shipping Act 1875, it is provided that "the owner of every British ship shall from time to time register at the custom-house of the port in the United Kingdom at which such ship is registered the name of the managing owner of such ship, and, if there be no managing owner, then of the person to whom the management of the ship is intrusted by and on behalf of the owner; and in case the owner fail or neglect to register the name of such managing owner or manager as aforesaid he shall be liable, or, if there be more owners than one, each one shall be liable in proportion to his interest in the ship, to a penalty not exceeding in the whole 500l. each time that the said ship leaves any port in the United Kingdom, after Nov. 1, 1875, without the name being duly registered as aforesaid." Now it is found by this