ART. VII.-1. Review of Mr. Whitman's Letters to Professor Stuart, on Religious Liberty. [From The Spirit of the Pilgrims.'] With an Appendix not before published. Boston. Peirce & Parker. 1831. 8vo. pp.

84.

2. A Reply to the Review of Whitman's Letters to Professor Stuart in The Spirit of the Pilgrims' for March, 1831. By BERNARD WHITMAN. Boston. Gray &

Bowen. 1831. 8vo. pp. 84. Ji Malker.

THERE is something unspeakably ludicrous in the idea of receiving from 'The Spirit of the Pilgrims' a moral lecture on the decencies of controversy. Knowing the extreme aversion, which Unitarians have always felt and expressed for discussions necessarily involving direct and offensive personalities, the conductors of that work probably hoped and expected, that Professor Stuart's demand for the facts, with the names and dates, on which the charges against Exclusionists were founded, would be passed over without notice. In that case they would have been among the first to interpret the silence into a confession, that those charges could not be sustained; and not a few of their well-meaning readers might have thought the inference a fair one, and been misled. If Professor Stuart and his friends were sincere in demanding a specification of the crimes and misdemeanors imputed to the Exclusive party, they can hardly be so now in the pain and disgust, which they affect at the turn the controversy has taken. As for others, it will serve to correct an excessive sensitiveness to discussions of this nature, if they reflect that nothing, perhaps, is so likely to inculcate moderation, both of language and measures, on the leaders of the dominant sect, as a thorough and fearless exposition, like that which Mr. Whitman has given, of their intrigues and usurpations.

Of the general merits of the Review considered as an answer to Mr. Whitman's Letters we have heard but one opinion expressed from any quarter.* The childish array

* We stand corrected. Since writing the above, we have looked into 'The Spirit of the Pilgrims' for June, and find that the Reviewers themselves think very highly of their former effort. The general character of their review of Mr. Whitman's Reply is the same with that of their review of his Letters.

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which it makes of pretended corrections, those being rejected that originate in mere quibble or evasion, or relate to trifling verbal inaccuracies not affecting in any way the argument, dwindles to some ten or twenty. These have called out Mr. Whitman again, who in the Reply not only establishes incontestably the substantial truth and accuracy of his previous statements, but brings forward several additional facts, and a mass of entirely new evidence in support of the same general positions. It is but justice to the sagacity of his Reviewers to say, that, so far at least as respects the proof of the material facts, they appear to have foreseen, that this would be the result of the investigation. Accordingly, we find them asserting or intimating, in repeated instances, that, even if most of Mr. Whitman's statements and charges could be, shown to be well founded, it would not convict them of any thing, which they are not prepared to defend and justify. This, as it seems to us, is beyond question the most serious and alarming aspect, under which the present controversy can be viewed; not that the conduct of Exclusionists has been as Mr. Whitman represents it, but that they now think to justify such conduct, and intimate a determination to persist in it. At the risk, therefore, of repeating ourselves, and of being accounted needlessly minute, we shall proceed to analyze, and thoroughly disentangle and expose the commonplace sophistry on this subject.

'It will be insisted, doubtless,' say the Reviewers,' that in the use we make of creeds," in our "Ministerial intercourse,' our Ecclesiastical tribunals," &c. &c., we have shown ourselves the determined enemies of religious freedom, and have manifested even a persecuting spirit. It will appear, however, on examination, that were we to admit the correctness of no small part of Mr. Whitman's statements (which we do not admit) we have done no more than is perfectly consistent with our religious principles, our liberty, and rights.

'We certainly have the right to study the Scriptures for ourselves, to form our opinions in view of them, and to speak and act agreeably to these opinions, so long as we do not interfere with the rights and liberties of others. Mr. Whitman

has no more right to think for us, than we for him to prescribe and dictate our opinions, than we his. Suppose, then, that after long and careful attention to the Scriptures, we satisfy ourselves of the correctness of the Orthodox faith. believe, that the Scriptures contain and teach the doctrines of

We

the Trinity, of Divine sovereignty, of human depravity, of the atonement, of regeneration by the special influences of the holy Spirit, of justification by faith, of the perseverance of saints, of a general judgment, and of eternal retribution. Have we not a right so to believe? Have we not a right to retain and cherish our honest convictions in regard to these most important subjects? And if we have a right so to believe, have we not a right to sum up our belief on paper, and form a written confession of our faith? And if we find two, three, or half a dozen, who have come to the same conclusions with ourselves, have we not a right to associate, on the basis of a common faith, and constitute a society, a church? If we are pleased thus to associate, and do it in a peaceable manner, who shall hinder us? Have we not as much right to associate with a creed, as others have to do the same without one? May not we as properly dictate to them on the subject as they to us? And when we have associated, on the express understanding of a common faith, suppose one of our number widely departs from this faith; have we not a right to call him to an account? And if he chooses to exercise his freedom in wandering from us, and violating the express principles of the association, have we not a right to exercise our freedom, in excluding him, or withdrawing from him? Do not all voluntary associations for civil purposes consider themselves entitled to treat delinquent members after this manner? And why should religious associations be an exception? We have, indeed, no right to injure our erring brother, in his person, property, or good name, any further than to call things by their right names, and tell the truth about him when occasion requires it; and who shall deny us the liberty to do this?' Review, pp. 10, 11.

The Reviewers know, that their right to study the Scriptures for themselves, to form their own opinions on religious subjects, and to speak and act agreeably to these opinions, so long as they do not interfere with the rights and liberties of others, has never been disputed by Unitarians. The truisms and solemn interrogatories with which the discussion is introduced, are adapted, and perhaps were intended, to blind or mislead the reader as to the real question at issue. The question is not, whether Exclusionists have a right to speak and act agreeably to their opinions, so long as they do not interfere with the rights and liberties of others; but whether they have a right to speak and act agreeably to their opinions, when, as it is believed, they do interfere with the rights and liberties of others.

Considerable adroitness is also shown by the Reviewers in managing the transition, when, from insisting on universally acknowledged principles, they begin to touch on debatable ground. Have we not a right,' they ask, 'to sum up our belief on paper, and form a written confession of our faith?' Certainly they have, if by a confession of faith, or creed, is meant a record of their convictions for the time being, and nothing more. But if this confession of faith, or creed, is regarded, not only as a simple record of the convictions of the individual at the time of drawing it up, but as a rule of his own faith afterwards, or as a rule of faith to others, then does it become a fetter, an imposition. And if we find two, three, or half a dozen, who have come to the same conclusions with ourselves, have we not a right to associate, on the basis of a common faith, and constitute a society, a church?' Here the fallacy originates in confounding the church with a mere voluntary association, like a debating club, a masonic lodge, or a manufacturing company. Even if we were to admit, that Exclusionists have a right to form themselves into as many voluntary associations as they please, on the basis of a common faith, it would not follow that these associations, thus constituted, would have a right, jointly or severally, to call themselves the church, or assume the prerogatives of a church, or any one of these prerogatives. But, say the Reviewers, ' May not we as properly dictate to Unitarians on the subject, as they to us? Just as properly. The truth is, that in a particular congregation neither party has a right to dictate to the other; and therefore neither party is at liberty to act on the assumption of such a right, and exclude the other. But they ask again, 'Do not all voluntary associations for civil purposes consider themselves entitled to treat delinquent members after this manner? And why should religious associations be an exception?' Because in civil matters some umpire is always acknowledged or recognised by both parties, by which, in cases of difference, the question is authoritatively determined; but in religion, so far as mere opinion is concerned, Protestants deny the existence of such an umpire. We have, indeed, no right,' the Reviewers allow, 'to injure our erring brother, in his person, property, or good name, any further than to call things by their right names, and tell the truth about him when occasion requires it; and who shall deny us the liberty to do this?

Unitarians will not, most assuredly. What we complain of, is, that Exclusionists, while the questions, who is the erring brother, and what is the truth about him, are still pending, proceed to speak and act as if they had been definitively settled.

The Reviewers go on;

'But it will be said, "If you form your church with a creed, then all who cannot adopt the creed will be kept out of it." And what if they are? Is there no church in the world, except ours? If persons cannot agree to walk with us, then let them seek those with whom they can walk. Or if they cannot find any with whom they are agreed, then let them be content to walk alone.

'It will also be objected, that by excluding the member who wanders from us, we render him unpopular, excite suspicion, and inflict an injury. This may be so, or it may not be, according to the character of our association, and the circumstances under which he is excluded. But if he does receive injury, whose fault is it? The society, surely, are not to blame; and if he is a reasonable man, he will never blame them.' — Review, p. 11.

The answer to the question, 'Is there no church in the world, except ours?' must depend on what is understood by 'church. If the term is used to signify the household of faith,' then there is, strictly speaking, but one church, and he who does not belong to that, belongs to none. If, on the other hand, by a church is intended the communicants belonging to a particular congregation, it is true there are many churches; but if an individual has a right to belong to any one of them, it would seem that he has a right to belong to that where he lives and worships. To drive a sincere believer from the Lord's table in Berkshire County, for example, and then to think to reconcile him to the privation by telling him that probably there are churches in Boston, or London, or Pekin, which would admit him to communion, seems to us, we must confess, very much like adding insult to injury. Of course we would not compel a person to communicate with his fellow-worshippers, if he can find more comfort or edification in communicating with others. If persons,' to borrow the language of the Reviewers, cannot agree to walk with us, then let them seek those with whom they can walk.' What we complain