227 U.S. Statement of the Case. divers other cities specified in the said contracts of shipment. "That the said E. R. Bacon was, prior to and on April 1st, 1907, represented in the cities of New York, Philadelphia, and the said divers other cities in the said eastern portions of the United States by various agents, by and through whom he disposed of grain and other commodities on the eastern markets, and that all of the said grain above mentioned was purchased by him as aforesaid for the sole and only purpose of being sold and disposed of by and through his said agents in the aforesaid eastern cities, and that the said grain or any portion thereof was not at any time intended, by said original owners nor by said E. R. Bacon, for use, sale or disposition in the State of Illinois. "That at the time the said grain was sold to the said defendant, E. R. Bacon, by the said original vendors thereof domiciled in and residents of said southern and western portions of the United States, his sole and only intention regarding the said grain was that all of the said grain should be transported and carried from the place of its said original consignment to said railroad companies to the said points of destination named in the said contracts of shipment entered into between the said original vendors of said grain and the said railroad companies, as hereinbefore mentioned; "That the said grain was sold to the defendant, E. R. Bacon, by the original vendors of said grain along with the existing contracts of shipment between the said original vendors and the said railroad companies, and along with the said privilege of removing said grain from the said cars of the said railroad companies, which said privilege was reserved to the owner of the said grain in the manner and for the purposes hereinbefore mentioned; that in pursuance of the privilege which the. defendant, E. R. Bacon, was entitled to under said contracts of shipment, : Statement of the Case. 227 U. S. as the owner of said grain, he removed said grain from the said railroad cars and placed the same in his said private Wabash Elevator for the sole purposes of inspecting, weighing, cleaning, clipping, drying, sacking, grading and mixing, as specified in said contracts of shipment, and not for the purposes of changing the ownership, consignee or destination of said grain; and that said grain remained in said elevator for only such time as was reasonably necessary for the purposes of inspecting, weighing, cleaning, clipping, drying, sacking, grading and mixing; and that immediately after said grain had been inspected, weighed, cleaned, clipped, dried, sacked, graded and mixed, it was turned over again to the said railroad companies for shipment to the said eastern cities in accordance with the said provisions of the said original contracts of shipment entered into between the said original vendors of said grain and the said railroad companies, and that the said grain was thereupon forwarded by said railroad companies to its said original points of destination. "That the said grain so placed and contained in the said elevator was not, nor was any part thereof, at any time on, before or after the 1st day of April, 1907, sold or disposed of or consumed in the State of Illinois, but that said grain and each and every part thereof, was transported out of said State to the points of destination, and in the manner and form aforesaid; "That on the 1st day of April, 1907, the Board of Assessors of Cook County, Illinois, assessed a tax against the said E. R. Bacon on the said grain contained in the said Wabash Elevator on the said 1st day of April, 1907, on a valuation of $5,000 which was established by the Board of Review and which was equalized by the State Board of Equalization and that the tax levied thereon against the defendant, E. R. Bacon, for the year 1907, amounts to $360; which is the tax to recover which this suit is brought; that the defendant owns certain personal 227 U.S. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. property in the town of Lake View, County of Cook and State of Illinois, and that said personal property is contained in his said domicile and residence, and that the said defendant has heretofore paid all the taxes assessed on the said personal property on the said 1st day of April, 1907, and that the said defendant, E. R. Bacon, owned, on the 1st day of April, 1907, no other personal property taxable by the taxing bodies of the State of Illinois other than that above mentioned." Mr. Walter Bachrach, with whom Mr. Moritz Rosenthal and Mr. Joseph W. Moses were on the brief, for plaintiff in error: The grain taxed was a subject of interstate commerce at the time the assessment was made and was, therefore, by virtue of Art. I, § 8, clause 3, of the Constitution of the United States, immune from taxation by the state taxing bodies. The temporary detention of the grain while in transit. without the intention of abandoning the original movement beyond the limits of the State, which movement was ultimately completed, did not deprive the transportation of the character of interstate commerce. Coe v. Errol, 62 N. H. 303, aff'd 116 U. S. 517; Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U. S. 622; Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U. S. 1; Conn. River Lumber Co. v. Columbia, 62 N. H. 286; Prairie Oil Co. v. Ehrhardt, 244 Illinois, 634; State v. Engle, 5 Vroom (N. J.), 425; State v. Carrigan, 10 Vroom (N. J.), 36; Berwind Coal Co. v. Jersey City, 75 N. J. L. 76; Burlington Lumber Co. v. Willets, 118 Illinois, 559. The character of a shipment, whether local or interstate, is not affected by a transfer of the title during the transportation. Gulf, Colo. &c. R. R. Co. v. Texas, 204 U. S. 403; Conn. River Lumber Co. v. Columbia, 62 N. H. 286. Cases holding that property which is detained within the State on its interstate journey is taxable, are distinguishable from the one at bar and may be classified as follows: Where the produce was grown in the taxing State and had never been out of that State but was intended for exportation by the owner. Coe v. Errol, supra; Diamond Match Co. v. Ontonagon, 188 U. S. 82. Where the property, though coming from another State, was being held in actual storage to be removed for use at a more profitable time. To be held until orders for it were taken. Susquehanna Coal Co. v. South Amboy, 184 Fed. Rep. 941; Lehigh Coal Co. v. Junction, 75 N. J. L. 922. Until the owner desired to use it in his own business. Diamond Match Co. v. Ontonagon, supra; Burlington Lumber Co. v. Willets, 118 Illinois, 559. Until customers made their selection from goods being detained. Am. Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500. Where there was not a through shipment and any further movement required a new specification of the goods and new forwarding orders. General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U. S. 211. Where the goods were partially for sale within the taxing State and the part to be there sold was unascertained. Am. Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, supra. Where the goods had come to rest in the State of their ultimate destination. Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622; Pittsburg Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U. S. 577. Mr. Louis J. Behan and Mr. Gustavus J. Tatge, with whom Mr. Francis S. Wilson was on the brief, for defendant in error. MR. JUSTICE HUGHES, after making the above statement, delivered the opinion of the court. Did the enforcement of the local tax upon the grain in the elevator of the plaintiff in error amount to an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce? The Supreme Court of Illinois was of the view that if the grain was in transit in interstate commerce it was exempt from local taxation. In its opinion, that court said: "The sole question presented by this record is, was the grain upon which the tax was levied in transit on April 1, 1907? If it was so in transit it was not liable to be taxed while passing through the State to its destination. On the other hand, if it was not in transit but had a situs in this State it was subject to taxation under state authority." In this view of the issue, the court sustained the recovery of the amount of the tax. It is now contended, however, by the defendant in error that the question thus defined was an immaterial one; that even if the property was in transit and was the subject of interstate commerce, it was nevertheless liable to assessment, in common with the other personal property of the plaintiff in error, because he was a resident of the State and the property was within the limits of the county where the assessment was made. This argument proceeds upon a misconception of the ground upon which the power to tax articles actually moving in interstate transportation is denied to the States. That denial rests upon the supremacy of the Federal power to regulate interstate commerce. Its postulate is the necessary freedom of that commerce from the burden of such local exactions as are inconsistent with the control and protection of that power. The fact that such a burden is sought to be imposed by the State of the domicile of the owner, upon property moving in interstate commerce, creates no exception. That State enjoys no prerogative to make levy upon such property passing through it, because it may belong to its citizens. They, as well as others, are under the shelter of the commerce |