Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

Cambridge University Press, Sep 23, 2015
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The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the 'tragedy of the commons' argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.

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I am surprised that there’s little review activity going on for this book, even though the author has won the “fake nobel” prize (i.e. the “price in memory of alfred nobel” for economy). Regardless of ... Leer comentario completo


The metaphorical use of models
A challenge
Interdependence independent action and collective action
Studying institutions in field settings
Huerta irrigation institutions
Zanjera irrigation communities in the Philippines
The entrepreneurship game
California groundwater basins with continuing CPR problems
The fragility of Nova Scotian inshore fisheries
A framework for analyzing institutional choice
A challenge to scholarship in the social sciences
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