§ 14. Certificate.- A clergyman or magistrate by whom a marriage is solemnized must furnish to either party, on request, a certificate, signed by him, stating: 1. The name and place of residence of each of the parties; that they were known to him, or had satisfactorily proved by their oaths or the oath of a person known to him, that they were the persons described in the certificate and that they had attained the age of legal consent. 2. The name and place of residence of the attending witness; or, if more than one is present, of at least two attending witnesses. 3. The time and place of the marriage. 4. That after due inquiry made, there appeared to be no legal impediment to the marriage. [R. S., 2597, pt. II, ch. 8, tit. I, § 13, L. 1873, ch. 25, without change of substance.] § 15. Filing and entry of certificate.- On the presentation of such certificate signed by such magistrate or clergyman, within six months after the marriage, to the clerk of the city or town in which the marriage was solemnized, or in which either party resided at the time of the marriage or resides when the certificate is presented, such clerk must file in his office and enter in a book kept by him for that purpose in the alphabetical order of the initial letter of the surname of each party and in the order of time in which the certificate is filed: 1. The names and places of residence of the person married. 2. The time and place of marriage. 3. The name and official station of the person signing the certificate. 4. The date of filing the certificate. [R. S., 2598, pt. II, ch. VIII, tit. I, §§ 14, 15, 16. L. 1830, ch. 320, without change of substance, except that acknowledgment of clergymen is not required.] § 16. Certificate, entry and copies evidence. Such certificate or entry, or a copy of either certified by the officer with whom such certificate is filed, is presumptive evidence of the marriage. [R. S., 2598, pt. II, ch. VIII, tit. I, § 17, § 17. Fees.- Fees for services rendered under this chapter may be collected as follows: For solemnizing a marriage including the certificate thereof, one dollar. For administering an oath and taking an examination as prescribed in section thirteen, fifty cents for each person examined. For filing and entering a certificate, twenty-five cents. For a certified copy of a certificate or entry, ten cents. [R. S., 2598, pt. II, ch. VIII, tit. I, § 18. The first two paragraphs allowing a fee of one dollar for performing a marriage and fifty cents for each witness examined, are new.] § 18. Effect of marriage of parents on illegitimates.- An illegitimate child whose parents have heretofore intermarried, or shall hereafter intermarry, shall thereby become ligitimatized and shall be considered legitimate for all purposes, entitled to all the rights and privileges of a legitimate child; but an estate or interest vested before the marriage of the parents of such child shall not be divested or affected by reason of such child being legitimatized. [L. 1895, ch. 531, without change of substance.] ARTICLE III. Certain Rights and Liabilities of Husband and Wife. Section 20. Property of married woman. 21. Powers of married women. 22. Insurance of husband's life. 23. Contracts in contemplation of marriage. Section 24. Liability of husband for ante-nuptial debts. 25. Contract of married woman not to bind husband. partition. 27. Rights of action by and against married woman for torts. 28. Pardon not to restore to marital rights. 29. Compelling transfer of trust property. Section 20. Property of married woman.- Property, real or personal, now owned by a married woman, or hereafter owned by a woman at the time of her marriage, or acquired by her as prescribed in this chapter, and the rents, issues, proceeds and profits thereof continues to be her sole and separate property as if she were unmarried, and is not subject to her husband's control or disposal nor liable for his debts, [except such debts as she contracts as his agent for the support of herself or her children; and such a debt shall not be enforced against her separate property, unless in consequence of her husband's insolvency it can not be at the end of the section.] [R. S., 2601, L. 1848, ch. 200, §§ 1, 2, Id., 2603, L. 1860, ch. 90, § 1. Laws of 1848, chapter 200, provided that the property of a married woman at the time of her marriage, or thereafter acquired, "shall not be subject to the disposal of her husband or be liable for his debts." The act of 1860, chapter 90, went as far as the act of 1848, in allowing a married woman to hold property as her separate estate, and provided that it should not be liable for the debts of her husband, "except such debts as may have been contracted for the support of herself or her children, by her as his agent." This exception has been frequently before the courts for construction. That a wife's property could be held liable for her husband's debts merely because they happened to be contracted by her as his agent has appeared to the courts to be inconsistent with the general tendency of modern legislation. In the case of Demmott v. McMullen (N. Y. Sp. C., 1869) 8 Abb. Pr., R. 335, the court argued that the Legislature had not said what it intended to say; that it intended to say, "by her husband as her agent," but the court was forced to admit that if the plaintiff had brought his case within the strict letter of the law he might have recovered. In Covert v. Hughes, 8 Hun, 305, Judge Learned says: "I suppose that the Legislature thought it would be unjust when a married woman should actually purchase food and clothing for herself and her children, that the creditor should not be allowed to collect the debt out of her property, because the purchase had been made as the agent of the husband." In 85 N. Y. 516 (Teemeyer v. Turnquist), although the recovery of the plaintiff was based upon the fact that the separate estate of the wife was charged with the debt, Judge Finch discusses this exception, declaring that it did not render the wife personally liable for the debt contracted by her as her husband's agent, but that "The sole effect of the provision is not to make her personally liable for her husband's debt, * but merely that the shield and protection thrown over her property against the debts of her husband. shall be withdrawn in a case where his debt has been contracted through her acting as his agent, and for the purpose of providing for her own support and that of the children." This case was followed in Strong v. Moul (General Term, 1889), 4 Supp. 299, where an action was brought directly against the wife for a debt of this nature, the court holding that she was not personally liable, or, in other words, that the action must first be brought against the husband, and execution returned unsatisfied before the action can be brought against her for the debt. In Edwards v. Woods (1892), 131 N. Y. 350, it was held that an execution can not issue against the wife upon a judgment for such a debt rendered against her husband, but the debt must be enforced against her in proceedings instituted for that purpose, and that the liability must first be adjudged in an action to which she is a party, and in which she has had an opportunity to be heard. It will thus be seen that in no case, unless it be that of Covert v. Hughes, has the exception been squarely before a court for adjudication. In every case the court has been able to decide the action upon other grounds. The debt is the debt of the husband, although contracted by the wife as his agent. It is difficult to see why the fact that it was contracted for the support of herself or her children should render her liable merely because she happened to act as her husband's agent. If the debt had been contracted by him personally her property would not be liable. Judge Andrews said, in the case of Edwards v. Woods: "In view of the custom of families, when the husband leaves the management of the household to his wife, and commits to her the discretion to make purchases for the house and to supply her wants and those of her children, the broad construction claimed for this section of the act of 1860 opens a wide door of departure from the policy of the acts for protecting the property of married women." It seems to the commissioners that the provision should no longer be retained in the statutes; that if the wife is to be held liable for necessaries supplied to her it should be only when they are purchased by her upon her own account; that if the credit is extended to the husband, she acting merely as his agent, his estate, and his estate only, shall be liable for the debt. If the provision should, however, be retained, the commissioners recommend that the clause should be added, in accordance with the decisions of the courts that only in the case of the insolvency of the husband, appearing from an execution returned unsatisfied, shall the wife's estate be liable. But the commission recommend that the exception be repealed without re-enactment. The recommendation of the commission was followed by the legislature, which struck out of the original bill the matter in brackets at the end of the section.] § 21. Powers of married woman.- A married woman has all the rights in respect to property, real or personal, and the acquisition, use, enjoyment and disposition thereof, and to make contracts in respect thereto with any person including her husband, and to carry on any business, trade or occupation, and to exercise all powers and enjoy all rights in respect thereto and in respect to her contracts, and be liable on such contracts, as if she |