The foregoing is the actual patronage of the Directors individually. How the reviewer could make half a million, or £600,000 out of it is another question, for not only is the sale of all offices in the Company's service strictly prohibited by Act of Parliament,* but every Director is under the most sacred obligation of an oath, that he "will not directly, or indirectly, accept or take any perquisite, emolument, fee, present, or reward upon any account whatever, or any promise or engagement for any perquisite, emolument, fee, present, or reward whatsoever, for or in respect of the appointment or nomination of any person or persons, to any place or office in the gift or appointment of the said Company, or of himself as a Director thereof." Indeed the discussions before Parliament and the public shew the watchfulness with which this oath is attended, were it not taken by men who stand as high for honourable principles as any community in the world. Not only is there the check of the public on this oath, but the vigilance of the Court of Directors themselves, in preventing the most remote or indirect infringement of it is deserving notice. In 1827 the Court suspecting that a sale of patronage had occurred, they immediately brought before the public the whole of the parties concerned in the transaction, notwithstanding that one of the parties implicated was a member of their own body; some of the accused were convicted and imprisoned;—and several years ago a Director was thrown out of his situation, in consequence of being engaged in some trafficking in his patronage. Whenever the Court have surmised that any negotiation has been on foot for the obtainment of patronage, they have left no means untried to discover the source, and the individuals concerned; they have even recalled several of their * 49 Geo. III. c. 126. civil and military servants from India, and dismissed them entirely from their service, in consequence of discovering that their appointments were unduly obtained, although the young gentlemen themselves were unconscious of it; while their friends or parents who had entered into the penalty bonds of £3,000 sterling, forfeited the same, in consequence of such discoveries! But it may be asked, how then is the patronage of the Directors distributed? A Director is generally a retired civil, military, or commercial Indian gentleman; he has passed the greater part of his life in the east, and destines his sons for the same country, probably it is that of their birth; his family claims, if he have provided for them, are succeeded by the claims of talent and indigence, which, it is but just to state, have ever met with encouragement at the India House ;* many army and naval officers having no other patrimony than their sword, have had their children provided for,-numerous individuals toiling in the east, in the Company's service, have been cheered on in their arduous task by the prospect of provision being made for their children, if their talents entitled them to it. But that it may be seen the manner in which the patronage of the Court is diffused, I take a classification of writers appointed during the last five years. APPOINTED from the COMPANY'S COLLEGE at HAILEYBURY. Many orphans and others, whose misfortunes and merits were their only claim, have received appointments from donors whose names they have never yet learned, and to whom they were perfect strangers. G .... Sons of Company's Naval Service Officers No. 42 vate Gentlemen 110 Total...... 226 APPOINTMENTS from the LONDON BOARD for CANDIDATES. Sons of Clergymen Do. his Majesty's Army and Naval Officers .. ... No. 7 10 16 10 36 Total...... 79 Do. ditto Army and Navy This patronage which now operates as a reward for past efforts or deeds of the donor, and an approbation of existing merit, as well as a stimulus to future exertions for the receiver, is like the tributary streams of a mountain torrent, which circulate over a country but to beautify and fertilize it; but which, pent up in its rocky channel, would not only idly run its course to the ocean, but frequently overflowing its banks, prove formidable sources of evil and danger. I need say no more as to the Reviewer's unjust statement, it would have been well if he had adhered to his intention, "not to deal with mere assertion, when no facts were before him respecting patronage ;"* they are now before him and open to his criticism. The crown possesses through the President of the Board of Control, a direct patronage, equal to that of the chairman or deputy chairman of the Court, which is equivalent to that of two Directors, in addition to the appointment of judges, bishops, the officers of the king's army and the king's navy in India; there is also vested in ministers, through * Page 98. the president of the Board, other powers, viz., permission to grant licenses to free mariners; the president acts independent of the Directors in recommending officers of the Indian army for the honours of the Bath; countersigns warrants and letters-patent relating to the see of Calcutta; warrants of approbation of governors and commandersin-chief, also warrants of dismissal of any public officer in India, and although the Court of Directors may recall a governor, assigning criminatory reasons as the cause, the Board of Control may convert them into commendatory reasons, though the recall must take place. The indirect patronage of the crown is also very great : it is true that the nomination of the governor-general, the governors of the presidencies, the commanders-inchief, and members of council in India, is vested in the Court of Directors, but a negative is placed on the nominations of the Company, by means of a power granted to the King to recall, by an order under his sign-manual, any of the civil or military functionaries in India. Now, although this measure was in all probability designed for the purpose of securing the services of men best qualified for the stations which they were called on to fill, yet it appears from the evidence before Parliament that the crown has for some time taken advantage of the controlling power vested in the King, and swayed the general and higher patronage of the Court of Directors. Mr. Courtenay says, that the appointment of governors, &c., is generally by a compromise between ministers and the Court of Directors; the Court consenting to a particular appointment, on condition that the next nomination shall be at their own disposal. But if we look at the names of the distinguished and talented individuals who have filled the most exalted stations in India, since the days of Lord Teignmouth, we shall find that, however great their abilities, they were more indebted to their Whig or Tory friends than to the former, no matter how splendid. It would be a libel on the Court of Directors to say that they would not, if they had the power, always select men like Elphinstone, Malcolm, Metcalf, Bayley, or Jenkins, to fill the posts of governors, or governors-general, instead of Lord Clare, Sir Frederick Adam, Mr. Lushington, or Lord Amherst; no matter how great the general knowledge of the gentlemen alluded to. These remarks are not made invidiously towards the latter named individuals; I have as little doubt that the Marquis of Cornwallis, Marquis of Wellesley, Earl Minto, Marquis of Hastings, and Lord William Bentinck, or Sir E. Paget, Lord Combermere, Lord Dalhousie, or Sir E. Barnes, owed their appointments to the Ministers of the day, and not to their great energies or talents, as I have in any of the preceding cases. I merely mention the circumstance to shew the vast extent of patronage already enjoyed by the crown in India, every governor-general, governor, commander-in-chief, judge, bishop, &c., appointed under its influence, necessarily swaying the opinions of an immense number of subordinates abroad, and of relatives, friends, and connections at home. Those who thoughtlessly yield assent to the idea of pulling down the present system of Indian home government, would do well to attend to the declaration of Earl Grey when assigning one of his important reasons for bringing forward the Reform Bill, viz. to prevent the exercise of a government of patronage in England, substituting therefor one of moral influence; while the proceedings, with regard to the civil list, prove that the power and prerogative of the crown is considered as already sufficiently extensive, consistent with due security for the liberties and happiness of the people. Whether the Court of Di |