The highest discoveries in art and science comprehensible to all.

vincible ignorance. The discovery of the square of the hypothenuse being equal to the square of the other two sides of a triangle, could not be known but to another Pythagoras: the human mind could not be susceptible of perfectibility; in a word, there would be truths reserved for certain men only. Experience, on the contrary, shews us, that the most sublime discoveries, clearly represented, are conceivable by all. Hence arise that astonishment and shame we perceive when we say, there is nothing more plain than that truth; how was it possible I did not perceive it before? This is doubtless sometimes the language of envy, as in the case of Christopher Columbus. When he departed for America, the courtiers said, nothing is more ridiculous than such an enterprise: and at his return, nothing was more easy than such a discovery. Though this be frequently the language of envy, is it never that of the heart? Is it not with the utmost sincerity, when suddenly struck by the evidence of a new idea, and presently accustomed to regard it as trivial, that we think we always knew it?

If we have a clear idea of the expression of a truth, and not only have it in our memory, but have also habitually present to our remembrance all the ideas of the comparison from which it results, and if we be not blinded by any interest or superstition, that truth being presen ly reduced to the plainest terms, that is, to this simple proposition, that white is white, and black is black, is conceived almost as soon as proposed.

An ordinary understanding sufficient to discover unknown truths.

In fact, if the systems of Locke and Newton, without being yet carried to the last degree of perspicuity, are nevertheless generally taught and understood, men of a common organization can therefore comprehend the ideas of those of the greatest genius. Now to conceive their ideas (43), is to have the same aptitude to understanding. But if men can attain those truths, and if their knowledge in general be constantly in proportion to the desire they have to learn, does it follow that all can equally attain to truths hitherto unknown? This objection deserves to be considered.

CHAP. XXIV.

THE UNDERSTANDING NECESSARY TO COMPRE HEND THE TRUTHS ALREADY KNOWN, IS SUFFICIENT TO DISCOVER THOSE THAT ARE UNKNOWN.

A TRUTH is always the result of just comparisons of the resemblances or differences, the agreements or disagreements, between different objects. When a master would explain to his scholars the principles of a science, and demonstrate the truths already known, he places before their eyes the objects of the comparison from which those truths are to be deduced.

But

Reason why few persons discover unknown truths

But when a new truth is to be sought, the inventor must in like manner have before his eyes the objects of comparison from which that truth is to be deduced: But what shall present them to him? Chance; the common mother of all inventions. It appears therefore, that the mind of man, whether it follow the demonstration of a truth, or whether it discover it, has in both cases the same objects to compare, and the same relations to observe; in short, the same operations to perform*. The understanding necessary to comprehend truths already known, is therefore sufficient to discover those that are unknown. Few men indeed attain the latter; but this is the effect of the different situations in which they are placed, and that series of circumstances to which is given the name of chance; or of the desire, more or less cogent, that men have to distinguish themselves, and consequently their greater or less passion for glory.

* I might even add, that it requires more attention to follow the demonstration of a truth already known, than to discover one. Suppose for example, it be a mathematical proposition; the inventor in this case is already acquainted with geometry: he has its figures habitually present to his memory; he recollects them, as it were, involuntarily; and his attention is solely employed in observing their relations. With regard to the scholar, those same figures not being habitually present to his memory, his attention is necessarily divided between the trouble of recollecting the figures, and of observing their relations.

The

Influence of the passions in sharpening the understanding.

The passions can do all things. There is no girl so stupid that love will not make witty. What means does it not furnish her with, to deceive the vigilance of her parents, to see and converse with her lover? The most stupid frequently become the most inventive.

A man without passions is incapable of that degree of attention to which a superior judgment is annexed: a superiority that is, perhaps, less the effect of an extraordinary effort than of habitual attention.

But if all men have an equal aptitude to understanding, what can produce that difference we find between them?

NOTES.

NOTES.

1. (page 132.) IF men, and especially the Europeans, say the Banians, always in fear and mistrust of each other, are ever ready to go to war with one another; it is because they are still animated with the spirit of their first parents, Cutteri and Toddicastrée. This Cutteri, who was the second son of Pourons, and destined by God to people one of the four quarters of the earth, turned his steps toward the west. The first object he met was a woman named Toddicastrée. She was armed with a chuchery, and he with a sword. As soon as they perceived each other, they attacked and fought together for two days and a half: the third day, tired with the combat, they parlied, they loved, married, and lay together they had children, that, like their progenitors, are always ready to attack when they meet.

2. (p. 159.) That the most witty and the most thoughtful are sometimes melancholy, I allow; but they are not witty and thoughtful because they are melancholy, but melancholy because they are thoughtful. In fact, it is not to his melancholy but to his wants that a man owes his discernment: want alone draws him from his natural indolence. If I think, it is not because I am strong or weak, but because I have more or less interest to think. When they say of misfortune that it is the great teacher of man, they say nothing more than that misfortune, and the desire to be freed from it, oblige us to think. Why does the desire of glory frequently produce the same effect? Because glory is to some a want. Moreover, neither Rabelais, nor Fontenelle, nor Fontaine, nor Scarron were esteemed melancholic, yet nobody denies their superiority of wit, greater or less.

3. (p. 184.) What I here say of goodness may be equally applied to beauty. The different ideas we form of it arise, almost

always,