Envy of literary characters.

Every great talent is in general an object of hatred, and hence that eagerness with which we purchase those pamphlets that lash them so furiously. Why else do we read them? It cannot be a desire to improve our taste (15); for those writers do not pretend to the abilities of a Longinus or Despreaux; not even to enlighten the public. Let him who cannot compose a good work never pretend to amuse himself with criticising those of others.

The impotency of producing any thing good makes a critic; his profession is humble. If such writers as Desfontaine please, it is as comforters of the stupid. The bitterness of satire is the proof of genius.

To blame with rancour is the praise of envy. It is the first eulogy an author receives, and the only one he can draw from his rivals. Men applaud with regret it is themselves only they would find praiseworthy. There is scarcely any man who cannot persuade himself of his own merit; has he common sense? he prefers it to genius: has he some petty virtues? he gives them the preference to great talents. We despise all that is not self. There is but one man who can believe himself free from envy; and it is he that has never examined his own heart.

The protectors and panegyrists of genius are youth (16), and some few learned and virtuous men. But their impotent protection (17) can give a writer neither credit nor consideration. Yet, what is the common nourishment

Genius of merit stifled by envy.

nourishment of talents and virtue? Consideration and praise. Deprived of this subsistence, they both languish and die the activity and energy of the soul is extinguished; as the flame expires that has nothing to nourish it.

In almost all governments, talents, like the prisoners of the Romans, condemned and given up to wild beasts, become their prey. Is genius despised at court? Envy does the rest (18) it destroys the very seed of genius. When merit is continually obliged to struggle with envy, it becomes fatigued, and quits the ground, if if there be no prize ordained for the conqueror. We love neither study nor glory for themselves; but for the pleasures, esteem, and power they procure. Why? Because in general, we are less desirous of being estimable than esteemed. Most writers, anxious only for the glory of the present moment (19), and to flatter the taste of their age and nation (20), present them with nothing but ideas adapted to the present day, and such as are agreeable to men in power, from whom they can expect money and consideration, together with an ephemeral success.

There are men, however, who disdain the glory of a moment; who, transporting their imaginations into futurity, and enjoying in advance the eulogies and respect of posterity, fear to survive their reputation (21). This motive alone makes them sacrifice the glory and consideration of the present moment, to the hope of, sometimes

The love of glory and truth subordinate to the love of happiness.

sometimes a distant, but greater glory and importance. These men are rare: they desire the applause of none but worthy citizens.

What were the censures of the Sorbonne to Marmontel (22)? He would have blushed at their applause. A garland woven by stupidity cannot sit easy on the head of genius. It is like the new ornament with which they have crowned the square house in Languedoc. The traveller, as he passes, says, "Behold the hat of Harlequin on the head of Cæsar."

Let it not be imagined, however that the man most solicitous for a durable reputation, loves glory and truth for themselves. If such be the nature of each individual, that he is necessitated to love himself above all things, the love of truth must be in him always subordinate to the love of his happiness. He can only love in the truth the means of increasing his own felicity. Therefore he will pursue neither glory nor truth in a country and under a government where they are both despised.

The result of this and the preceding chapter, is, that the fury of envy, the desire of riches and talents, the love of importance, glory, and truth, are never in man any thing else than the love of power (23), disguised under those different denominations.

CHAP.

Of Justice.

CHAP. VII.

OF JUSTICE.

JUSTICE is the preserver of the life and liberty of the citizens. Each one desires to enjoy his respective property; each one therefore loves justice in others, and would have them behave justly toward him. But who is solicitous to be just toward others? Do men love justice for the sake of justice, or for the consideration it procures? That is the object of my inquiry.

Man is so often ignorant of himself: we perceive so much contradiction between his conduct and his discourse, that to know him we must study his actions and his nature.

In morality, as in religion, there are a few sincere, persons, and a great many hypocrites. A thousand men adorn themselves with sentiments not their own, and which they cannot have. When we compare their conduct with their discourse, we find none but knaves that would make dupes. We ought in general to mistrust the probity of those who pretend to extraordinary probity, and set themselves up for ancient Romans. There are who appear really virtucus at the moment the curtain is drawn up, and they are going to perform a great part on the theatre of the world. But behind the scenes how many are there who preserve the same character of equity, and are always just ?

CHAP.

The savage has no idea of justice.

CHAP. VIII.

OF JUSTICE CONSIDERED IN THE MAN OF NATURE.

To judge of man, let us consider him in his primitive state, in that of a ferocious savage. Does the savage love and respect equity? No: it is force he regards. He has no idea of equity in his heart, nor any word to express it in his language. What idea can he form of it, and what in fact is injustice? The violation of a convention or law made for the advantage of the majority. Injustice, therefore, cannot precede the establishment of a convention, a law, and a common inte

What convinces me of the love which the ancient Romans had for virtue, is the knowledge of their laws, and their manners; without this knowledge, the virtue of the modern Romans would make me suspect that of the ancient, and I should say with Cardinal Bessarion, on the subject of miracles, that the new make the old doubtful.

will not pretend to love justice We allow without blushing, that any thing but our happiness in

The man just, but intelligent, for itself. Is he without fault? in all our actions we never have view; but we always confound it with that of our fellow-citizens. Few place it so happily.

rest