Reply of Brennus to the Roman ambassadors.

The pretended love of justice of nations, is therefore nothing but a real love of power.

To confirm this truth, suppose the neighbours of two rival nations to be fully employed with their own affairs, and not able to take any part in the quarrel, what then happens? The most powerful of the two nations, without any appeal to justice, or regard to equity, carries fire and sword into the country of its enemy. Force then becomes right and uniserable is the condition of the weak and conquered.

When Brennus at the head of the Gauls attacked the Clusians, "What offence, said the Roman am"bassadors, have the Clusians given you?" Brennus laughed at the question. "Their offence, he replied, "is the refusal they make to divide their country with "me. It is the same offence that the people of Alba, "the Fidenians and Ardeans formerly gave you, and

66

"

lately the Vienians, the Falisci, and the Volsci. To avenge yourselves, you took up arms, and washed away the injury with their blood; you subdued the people, pillaged their houses, and laid waste their ci"ties and their countries: and in this you did no wrong "or injustice: you obeyed the most ancient laws, which "give to the strong the possessions of the weak; the "sovereign law of nature, that begins with God, "and ends with animals. Suppress, therefore, O Ro"mans, your pity for the Clusians. Compassion is yet unknown to the Gauls: do not inspire them with

"that

Conquerors despise justice.

"that sentiment, lest they should have compassion on "those whom you oppress."

Few chiefs have the boldness and candour of Brennus. Their language is different, but their actions are the same; and, in fact, they have all the same contempt of justice (27).

The history of the world is a vast collection of reiterated proofs of this truth (28). The invasions of the Huns, the Goths, the Vandals, the Suevi, and the Romans; the conquests of the Spaniards and Portuguese in both Indies, and lastly our croisades; all prove that nations in their enterprizes consult force, not justice. Such is the picture which history presents us. Now the same principle that actuates nations, must necessarily, and in like manner actuate the individuals who compose them. Let the conduct of nations, therefore, elucidate that of individuals.

CHAP. X.

INDIVIDUALS, LIKE NATIONS, ESTEEM JUSTICE SOLELY FOR THE CONSIDERATION AND POWER IT PROCURES THEM.

Is not a man, with regard to his fellow-citizens, pearly in the same state of independence, that one

Parallel between the conqueror and the robber.

people are to another? Man then loves justice (29) merely for the power and happiness it procures him. To what other cause, in fact, except to the extreme love of power, can we attribute our admiration of conquerors (30)? "The conqueror, said the pirate De"metrius to Alexander, is a man, who at the head of "a hundred thousand soldiers, takes at once a hun"dred thousand purses, and cuts the throats of a hun"dred thousand citizens; who does on a large scale, what "the robber does on a small one; and who, by being "more unjust than the latter, is more destructive to "society." The robber is a terror to an individual. The conqueror, like the tyrant, is the scourge of a nation. What makes us respect Alexander and Cortez, and despise Cartouch and Rassiat. The power of the one, and the impotence of the other. In the robber it is not properly the crime, but the weakness which we despise (31). The conqueror appears as invested with great power; we would be invested with the same power, and we cannot despise what we wish to attain. The love which man has for power is such, that in all cases the exercise of it is agreeable to him because it makes him recollect his possesssion of it. Every man would have great power, and every man knows that it is almost impossible to be at once constantly just and powerful. Man makes, without doubt, a better or worse use of his power, according to the education he has received. But be it as good as it may, there is no great man who does not commit some acts

of

The love of equity is subordinate to the love of

power.

of injustice. The abuse of power is connected with its existence, as the effect with the cause. Corneille says,

Qui peut tout ce qu'il veut, veut plus que ce qu'il

doit (32).

He who can do whatever he will, wills more than he ought.

This verse is a moral axiom confirmed by experience; and yet no one refuses a great place for fear of exposing himself to the temptation of injustice*.

Our love of equity, therefore, is always subordinate to our love of power. Man, solely anxious for himself, seeks nothing but his own happiness. If he respects equity, it is want that compels him to it (33).

If a difference arise between two men nearly equal in power, each of them, restrained by a reciprocal fear, has recourse to justice; each of them submits to its decision; that he may interest the public in his favour, and thus acquire a certain superiority over his adversary.

But let one of these two men be greatly superior in power to the other, so that he can rob him with impunity; and then deaf to the voice of justice, he does not litigate, but command. It is not equity, nor even the

* This must be understood with limitation: many men have refused power, from a fear of temptation, and a consciousness of their own weakness.

The love of power the sole motive of action in all governments.

appearance of equity, that determines between the weak and powerful; but force, crime, and tyranny. It is thus that the divan gives the name of seditious to the remonstrances of the impotent, whom it oppresses.

To show still more clearly the great love that men have for power, I shall add but one proof to the foregoing, which is the strongest.

CHAP. XI.

THE LOVE OF POWER, UNDER EVERY FORM OF GOVERNMENT, IS THE SOLE MOTIVE OF MAN'S AC

TIONS.

UNDER every form of government, says M. Mon"tesquieu, there is a different principle of action. "Fear in despotic states, honour under monarchies, "and virtue in republics, are the several moving prin"ciples."

But on what proof does M. Montesquieu found this assertion. Is it quite evident that fear, honour,

*Fear, says M. Montesquieu, is the moving principle in despotic empires. He is mistaken. Fear does not increase, but weakens the spring of the mind. I can admit nothing for the active principle of a nation, out the constant objects of the desire of almost

and