Bruff v. Ives.

hollowed out so as to conform to the desired shape of the lips or cutters. The first claim should be construed in connection with the specification, and in view of the actual invention and of the state of the art, and is for a combination of clamping jaws with its described dies and a rotative die, the two sets of dies so acting in conjunction as to draw, that is, to form into shape the lips, and shaped relatively to each other, substantially as shown. The essential feature of this claim is, that the described combination should so co-act that the actual and necessary result should be to draw the lips, which result is to be attained in substantially the same way in which it is accomplished by the patented machine, which is, the drawing of the lips against the ends of the jaws by the rotative and forward action of a die, the ends of the two sets of dies being formed relatively to each other so as to shape, and not merely to turn over, the lips under the action of the rotating die. If the jaws and die are shaped relatively to each other so as to accomplish this result, they are within the patent, notwithstanding a variation in form from that which is described. The patent is not, therefore, broad enough to include the Cook mechanism, because the result of the coaction of the Cook dies is not to form into shape or plate out the lips, but is generally to twist the lips into a position from which they can subsequently be drawn out into the proper shape. And, although the Swan dies in the Cook machine might accomplish the drawing-out result, that fact does not permit their unauthorized use in the combination, because the Swan dies were unknown, and did not, apparently, exist, previously to their invention by Swan.

If the plaintiff is the exclusive owner of the mechanism described in the first claim, it is not denied that he has an exclusive right to the process described in the second claim.

Let there be a decree in favor of the plaintiff, for an accounting, and a reference to a master.

Thomas L. Livermore and Benjamin F. Thurston, for the complainant.

Charles R. Ingersoll and John S. Beach, for the defendant.

Yerrington v. Putnam.

HENRY A. YERRINGTON

VS.

HENRY W. PUTNAM. IN EQUITY.

Where a bill of review is filed to set aside a decree of the court, made in a suit between the parties, the court will grant a rule to show cause why the former decree should not be reversed, and the injunction granted should not be suspended, only : (1) When the original decree shows upon its face that it is contrary to law; or (2) upon the allegation and prima facie proof of the existence of material facts, which, if known, would have hindered the decree, and which the complainant in the bill of review did not know at the former trial, and could not have discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence.

(Before NIXON, J., District of New Jersey, April, 1877.)

NIXON, J.

The bill is filed in this case to set aside a decree of this court, heretofore made in a suit between the parties.

The defendant being in court, an application is now made for a rule to show cause why the former decree should not be reversed, and the injunction granted should not be suspended until the further order of the court.

There are two grounds only on which the court will grant a rule in such cases: (1) When the original decree shows upon its face that it is contrary to law; (2) Upon the allegation and prima facie proof of the existence of material facts which, if known, would have hindered the decree, and which the complainant in the bill of review did not know at the former trial, and could not have discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence.

I have examined the bill, and do not find any reason therein alleged, which would authorize the court to grant the rule asked for.

T. C. Nye, for the complainant.

P. E. Havens, for the defendant.

Andrews v. Spear.

WLLIAM D. ANDREWS ET AL.

VS.

O. E. SPEAR.

SAME VS. JOEL B. BASSETT.

SAME VS. SWEET W. CASE.

SAME US. ANTHONY KELLY.

SAME VS. WILLIAM L. NICHOLLS.

SAME VS. ROBERT L. Platt.

SAME VS. STEPHEN PRATT.

SAME VS. OTIS A. PRAY.

SAME VS. CYRUS L. SNYDER.

Where a number of suits, involving the same questions, and brought by one complainant, are pending, it may be ordered, on a proper consent being filed, that one of the suits be tried, and that the others abide the event of that one, and on a decree being made in that one, like decrees may be entered in all the other cases.

Andrews v. Spear.

This course is as proper in equity suits as in actions at law. (Before NELSON, J., District of Minnesota, April, 1877.)

NELSON, J.

These suits were brought to test the validity of a patent for an alleged new and useful improvement in wells-commonly known as the "drive well"; for damages for its infringement; and to restrain the defendants from further manufacture and use. The bill of complaint, in some of the cases, alleges the manufacture of the drive wells, and, in others, the use. Issue has been joined in all the cases. The same solicitors appear for all the defendants, and agree to enter a stipulation in writing, that judgment may be entered in all the cases, if the final decision in one shall be in favor of the complainants. It is admitted that one case of each class, when decided, will dispose of all the others of the same class, and that the testimony relating to the issues in one suit of a class will apply to all of the same class.

In view of these admissions and proposed stipulation, it would be manifestly unjust for the court to compel each defendant to incur the expense of preparing for hearing and argument, if it can be avoided. It is not unusual in actions at law, and the reasoning applies equally to equity cases, to grant such applications. The plaintiffs are not injured thereby, but rather benefited, for they are relieved from the trouble and expense of preparing numerous causes for hearing, where only the same questions are involved. The court can interpose a check to the argument of a multiplicity of these issues, irrespective of any concessions made by the parties, with a view to prevent useless waste of time and expense, and this application is within the spirit, if not within the letter, of section 921 of the Revised Statutes of the United States: "Sec. 921. When causes of a like nature, or relative to the same question, are pending before a court of the United States, or of any territory, the court may make such orders and rules, concerning proceedings therein, as may be conformable to the usages of courts for avoiding unnecessary costs or delay in the administration of justice, and may consolidate said causes when it appears reasonable to do so."

Henderson v. Cleveland Co-operative Stove Co.

When the solicitors for the defendants sign and file in court a consent that judgment may abide the event of a trial in one case of each class, the following order may be entered : “That all the causes abide the event and final determination of the one of that class which the plaintiffs may elect to prepare the evidence in, and set down for hearing and argument, and that whatever decree may be finally rendered in the cause set down for hearing shall be entered in all the causes of that class, and either party shall be at liberty to have the records therein made and entered accordingly, unless, upon proper showing, additional and lately discovered evidence, relevant to the issues, which could not be procured and submitted in time, should be brought forward, and a rehearing asked and granted for that reason."

Davis, O'Brien & Wilson, for the defendants.

John Y. Page, for the complainants.

JOSEPH C. HENDERSON

vs.

THE CLEVELAND CO-OPERATIVE STOVE COMPANY. IN EQUITY.

Courts will protect a patentee to the full extent of his actual invention, by giving such a construction to the patent as will uphold it, if possible, and will bear in mind that specifications and claims are frequently drawn by persons unaccustomed to the use of accurate legal phraseology.

Where a claim of the patent appears to be for a result, produced substantially "in the manner and for the purposes" described, the claim will be construed to be for the mechanism, set forth in the specifications, by which the result is produced, and not for the result itself.

The principle, of construing a claim for a result to be a claim for the means by which the result is produced, is applied to all cases where a result is claimed, whether there is any reference to the specifications in the claim

or not.