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during their deliberation, receive public pay. A great proportion of every session, in every state, is employed to consider whether they will pay at all, and in what mode. Let us suppose fifteen hundred persons deliberating on this subject. Let any one make a calculation; and it will be found that a very few days of their deliberation will consume more of the public money, than one year of that of the general legislature. This is not all, Mr. Chairman. When general powers shall be vested in the general government, there will be less of that mutability which is seen in the legislation of the states. The The consequence will be a great saving of expense and time. There is another great advantage which I will but barely mention. The greatest calamity to which the United States can be subject, is a vicissitude of laws, and a continual shifting and changing from one object to another, that must expose the people to various inconveniences. This has a certain effect, of which sagacious men always have, and always will make an advantage. From whom is advantage made? From the industrious farmers and tradesmen, who are ignorant of the means of making such advantages. The people will not be exposed to these inconveniences under a uniform and steady course of legislation. But they ave been so heretofore.

Sir, it has been said, that by giving up the power of taxation, we should give up every thing; that requisitions ought to be made on the states, and that then, if they be not complied with, Congress should lay direct taxes by way of penalty. Let us consider the dilemma which arises from this doctrine. Either requisitions will be efficacious or they will not. If they be efficacious, then I say, sir, we give up every thing as much as by direct taxation. The same amount will be paid

the people as by direct taxes. If they be not efficacious, where is the advantage of this plan? In what respect will it relieve us from the inconveniences which we have experienced from requisitions? The power

of laying direct taxes by the general government, is supposed by the honorable gentleman, to be chimerical and impracticable. What is the consequence of the alternative he proposes? We are to rely upon this power to be ultimately used, as a penalty to compel the states to comply. If it be chimerical and impracticable in the first instance, it will be equally so when it will be exercised as a penalty. A reference has been made to concurrent executions, as an instance of the possibility of interference between the two governments. But it may be answered, that under the state governments, concurrent executions cannot produce the inconvenience here dreaded, because they are executed by the same officer. Is it not in the power of the general government to employ the state officers? Is nothing to be left to future legislation, or must every thing be immutably fixed in the constitution? Where exclusive power is given to the union, there can be no interference. Where the general and state legislatures have concurrent power, such regulations will be made, as may be found necessary to exclude interferences and other inconveniences. It will be their interest to make such regulations.

It has been said, that there is no similarity between petty corporations and independent states. I admit that, in many points of view, there is a great dissimilarity, but in others, there is a striking similarity between them, which illustrates what is before us. Have we not seen in our own country (as has been already suggested in the course of the debates,) concurrent collections of taxes going on at once, without producing any inconvenience? We have seen three distinct collections of taxes for three distinct purposes. Has it not been found practicable and easy for collections of taxes, for parochial, county and state purposes, to go on at the same time? Every gentleman must know, that this is now the case, and though there be a subordination in these cases which will not be in the general government, yet in practice it has been found, that these differ

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ent collections have been concurrently carried on, with convenience to the people, without clashing with one another, and without deriving their harmony from the circumstance of being subordinate to one legislative body. The taxes will be laid for different purposes. The members of the one government, as well as of the other, are the agents of, and subordinate to, the people. I conceive that the collections of the taxes of the one will not impede those of the other, and that there can be no interference. This concurrent collection appears to me neither chimerical nor impracticable.

Gentlemen compare resistance of the people to collectors, to refusal of requisitions. This goes against all government. It is as much as to urge that there should be no legislature. The gentlemen who favored us with their observations on this subject, seemed to have reasoned on a supposition, that the general government was confined, by the paper on your table, to lay general uniform taxes. Is it necessary that there should be a tax on any given article throughout the United States? It is represented to be oppressive, that the states who have slaves and make tobacco, should pay taxes on these for federal wants, when other states, who have them not, would escape. But does the constitution on the table admit of this? On the contrary, there is a proportion to be laid on each state, according to its population. The most proper articles will be selected in each state. If one article in any state should be deficient, it will be laid on another article. Our state is secured on this foundation. Its proportion will be commensurate to its population. This is a constitutional scale, which is an insuperable bar against disproportion, and ought to satisfy all reasonable minds. If the taxes be not uniform, and the representatives of some states contribute to lay a tax of which they bear no proportion, is not this principle reciprocal? Does not the same principle hold in our state government in some degree? It has been found inconvenient to fix on uniform objects of taxation in this state, as the back

parts are not circumstanced like the lower parts of the country. In both cases, the reciprocity of the principle will prevent a disposition in one part to oppress the other. An honorable gentleman seems to suppose that Congress, by the possession of this ultimate power as a penalty, will have as much credit, and will be as able to procure any sums, on any emergency, as if they were possessed of it in the first instance; and that the votes of Congress will be as competent to procure loans, as the votes of the British commons. Would the votes of the British house of commons have that credit which they now have, if they were liable to be retarded in their operation, and perhaps rendered ultimately nugatory as those of Congress must be by the proposed alternative? When their vote passes, it usually receives the concurrence of the other branch, and it is known that there is sufficient energy in the government, to carry it into effect. But here, the votes of Congress are, in the first place, dependent on the compliance of thirteen different bodies, and after non-compliance, are liable to be opposed and defeated, by the jealousy of the states against the exercise of this power, and by the opposition of the people, which may be expected, if this power be exercised by Congress after partial compliances. These circumstances being known, Congress could not command one shilling. He seems to think that we ought to spare the present generation, and throw our burdens upon posterity. I will not contest the equity of this reasoning, but I must say that good policy, as well as views of economy, strongly urge us even to distress ourselves to comply with our most solemn engagements. We must make effectual provision for the payment of the interest of our public debts. In order to do justice to our creditors, and support our credit and reputation, we must lodge power somewhere or other for this purpose. As yet the United States have not been able, by any energy contained in the old system, to accomplish this end. Our creditors have a right to demand the principal, but would be satisfied with a punctual payment of the interest. If

we have been unable to pay the interest, much less shall we be able to discharge the principal. It appears to me, that the whole reasoning used on this occasion shows, that we ought to adopt this system, in order to enable us to throw our burdens on posterity. The honorable member spoke of the decemviri at Rome, as having some similitude to the ten representatives who are to be appointed by this state. I can see no point of similitude here, to enable us to draw any conclusion. For what purpose were the decemviri appointed? They were invested with a plenary commission to make a code of laws. By whom were they appointed-by the people at large? No; my memory is not infallible, but it tells me they were appointed by the senate and composed of the most influential characters among the nobles. Can any thing be inferred from that against our federal representatives? Who made a discrimination between the nobles and the people?—the senate. Those men totally perverted the powers, which were given them for the purpose above specified, to the subversion of the public liberty. Can we suppose that a similar usurpation might be made, by men appointed in a totally different manner? As their circumstances were totally dissimilar, I conceive that no arguments drawn from that source, can apply to this government. I do not thoroughly comprehend the reasoning of the honorable gentleman, when he tells us, that the federal government will predominate, and that the state interests will be lost; when, at the same time, he tells us, that it will be a faction of seven states. If seven states will prevail as states, I conceive that state influence will prevail. If state influence under the present feeble government has prevailed, I think that a remedy ought to be introduced by giving the general government power to suppress it.

He supposes that any argument with respect to a future war between Great Britain and France is fallacious. The other nations of Europe have acceded to that neutrality, while Great Britain opposed it. We

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