5 Argument for Petitioner. session or under his control any of the drugs, a number of exceptions are made, among which is one in favor of those having possession of drugs which may "have been prescribed in good faith by a physician, dentist or veterinary surgeon registered under this Act." Apart from the difficulty of applying provisions relating to one offense to another separate and distinct offense, there are two other very good reasons why the good faith provision in the above exception can have no reference to or influence in construing the exception in favor of registered physicians provided for by sub-section (a) of § 2. The first is the decision of this court in United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. S. 394, in which it was determined that the provision of § 8 against having drugs in possession must be construed as leveled at only those required to register and entitled to register and to procure order blanks; and consequently the good faith provision can have no reference to the dispensing and distribution of drugs to people in general, because they are not entitled to register or to procure order blanks. Second, an exception to the having drugs in possession cannot be imported into the exception in favor of registered physicians dispensing or distributing the drugs. The two things are entirely different in the considerations which govern them and in the gravity of the act as tending to impair the revenue features of the law. A person entitled to register, but not registered, having the drugs in possession, may very well be considered as presumptively engaged in their clandestine distribution, and therefore to be protected in their possession only by a good faith prescription, and the good faith of the prescription as to him be matter of proper concern. A registered physician, on the other hand, dispensing drugs to patients and keeping the record required, is above board at least, whatever the motive for dispensing the drugs, and no harm can accrue to the administration of the law by Argument for Petitioner. 268 U.S. his act, or if harm come, it is infinitesimal, and not worthy of consideration under the maxim de minimus non curat lex. If the exception found in § 2 stands alone, and is not influenced by anything except the general purpose of the law, what dispensing or distribution of drugs to patients may be reasonably considered as "in the course of his professional practice only?" That question, we submit, cannot be answered by the application of any hard and fast rule. It is the business of the physician to alleviate the pain and suffering of patients as well as to effectuate their cure. If we are to believe the literature on the subject, the suffering of an addict caused by deprivation of his customary drug is as intense as any suffering caused by disease. It is perhaps more so in the insistent demand for relief. Why should not the physician in the course of his ordinary practice take cognizance of that fact and administer temporary relief? It is, we submit, a strained construction of the law to hold that the language in question was intended to prohibit such an act, especially in view of the fact that the entire frame-work of the law shows that it was intended, not to regulate health and morals, but to make regulations with respect to the drug traffic which would keep it above board for the benefit of States and municipalities which do have authority and duty in that direction. The indictment states no offense even under the construction of the Narcotic Act prevailing in the lower courts. There is nothing in it to negative that the drugs here were dispensed in good faith in the ordinary course of professional practice. It is a well-known fact that one of the means of treating addiction to morphine, or any of the habit-forming drugs, is the administration of diminishing quantities of the drug until the addict is finally weaned away from the habit. In United States v. 5 Argument for the United States. Behrman, supra, it was only the extraordinary quantity of the drug dispensed that enabled the court to find in the acts charged in the indictment an infraction of the law. If the mere catering to a diseased appetite in the matter of narcotic drugs, even where such catering has no tendency to impair the revenue features of the Narcotic Act, or so slight a tendency as to be negligible, be held to be within the prohibition of that Act, then the said Act to that extent is clearly unconstitutional. The Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General Donovan, and Mr. Harry S. Ridgely, Attorney in the Department of Justice, for the United States. The writ of certiorari should be dismissed on the ground that it was improvidently granted. The sole question now presented is whether the indictment states an offense which Congress had the constitutional power to create. Neither in the trial court nor in the Circuit Court of Appeals did petitioner in anywise assail the validity of the indictment. It was his duty to have raised the alleged constitutional issue in the trial court, and in the event of an adverse ruling, availed of the statutory right to bring the case here for review on writ of error under § 238 of the Judicial Code. Ex parte Riddle, 255 U. S. 450, 451; idem 262 U. S. 333, 335; Goto v. Lane, 265 U. S. 393, 401; Pickett v. United States, U. S. 456, 462; Magnum v. Coty, 262 U. S. 159, 163; Lutcher & Moore Lumber Co. v. Knight, 217 U. S. 257, 267-268; Sou. Power Co. v. Pub. Ser. Co. 263 U. S. 508, 509; Grant Bros. v. United States, 232 U. S. 647, 661. 216 Petitioner contends in substance that if the indictment and the statute upon which it is founded be construed as charging the administration of drugs merely to gratify the appetite of an addict, such an offense is beyond the power of Congress to create. This is precisely what the |