part of the governor, are made, not directly by the public authorities, but by the private party on whose complaint the prosecution is instituted. They are informed, moreover, that it has been the practice of those who have filled the executive chair, in some, if not in all instances, of prosecutions for this offence, to require that the party, on whose application the requisition is granted, bear the expense of its execution. This practice has no doubt proceeded upon the principle, that these prosecutions are so far of a private character, as to justify the executive in imposing this condition, with a view to save the public treasury from an unnecessary burden.

Whatever may be the reason for it, the Commissioners are constrained to believe that it should not exist. Its tendency is, to convert the officer with whom the requisition is intrusted, rather into a private than a public agent; and cases are within the knowledge of the Commissioners, which fully justify them in recommending a system of regulation by which this practice shall be discontinued. It has frequently happened, that the person to whom the requisition has been delivered has gone with it to a remote state, and on the strength of its possession, has negociated for a settlement of the debt, out of the fraudulent contraction of which it arose, and holding it as a rod over the party, has wrung from his fears a compromise of the prosecution. Nor is this to be wondered at. Prosecutions of this nature seldom spring from the mere love of justice, but ordinarily are rather prompted by a spirit of revenge, or what is perhaps more frequently the case, of cupidity. The officer, therefore, who takes the requisition, at the expense of a private party, will naturally act for the promotion of the interests of his employer, rather than from the mere desire to enforce, in his public relation, the process of the law. He will do this, from no motive corrupt in itself perhaps, but because his own interests are equally involved in the success of a compromise, with those of his employer.

The Commissioners do not propose to restrict in any degree, the discretion of the executive or the manner of its exercise, in this or any other criminal case. But, believing as they do, that the highest considerations of policy require the exclusion of every motive of private interest, in the execution of this, more than in that of any other legal process, they propose by this chapter, that where a requisition is granted, it shall be executed, as it is presumed to be issued, for the public good alone, and that the public treasury shall

therefore answer for its execution; and that the officer to whom it is intrusted, shall be prohibited, under the penalty of a misdemeanor, from receiving any compensation, fee or reward, for any act or service in respect to it.

§ 906. When the governor shall demand from the executive authority of a state or territory of the United States, or of a foreign government, the surrender to the authorities of this state, of a fugitive from justice, the accounts of the persons employed by him for that purpose, must be paid out of the state treasury.

§ 907. No compensation, fee, or reward of any kind, can be paid to, or received by a public officer of this state, for a service rendered or expense incurred, in procuring from the governor the demand mentioned in the last section, or the surrender of the fugitive, or for conveying him to this state, or detaining him therein.

§ 908. A violation of the last section is a misde

meanor.

nor, and forfeits five hundred dollars to the party aggrieved, recoverable in a civil action.

This section is taken from 2 R. S., 3d ed., 658, sec. 29. The reasons for it cannot be better expressed, than by quoting the language of the revisers, in introducing the corresponding provision in the revised statutes. Revisers' Notes, 3 R. S., 2d ed., 783. "No subject," say they, "has given rise to so much irritation in our neighboring states, or is so likely to occasion difficulty in our own, as the arrest and carrying away of fugitives from service. The act of congress vests the very delicate power of determining upon the right of a human being to personal liberty, in any magistrate of a county, city or town corporate, wherein a seizure shall be made." That congress have no right to compel the state courts or magistrates to execute the laws of the Union, is sufficienly established. (See, on this subject, the case of Prigg v. the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 16 Peters, 539-674.)

"The case presented in the foregoing sections, is one where the legal knowledge, firmness and independence of our highest judicial officers, seem required, as well to protect the defenceless, as to insure confidence in the decision, and give effect to the claim. The provisions here offered, conform substantially to the act of congress referred to, but vary the details, so as to afford the utmost opportunity for a fair investigation, and to check any abuse of such a claim."

§ 911. The person alleged to be entitled to the service of the person claimed as a fugitive, is designated in this title as the claimant, and the alleged fugitive as the defendant.

§ 912. The application must be founded on proof, by affidavit, setting forth, minutely and particularly, the grounds of the claim to the services of the fugitive, the time of his escape, and where he then is.

Taken from 2 R. S. 3d ed. 654, sec. 7.

§ 913. If the court or magistrate be thereupon satisfied of the existence of the alleged facts, he must issue a warrant to the sheriff of the county where the defendant is, commanding him to take the defendant, and bring him before the court or magistrate issuing the warrant, at a specified time, to answer the clain.

Taken from 2 R. S. 3d ed. 653, 654, sec. 6.

§ 914. The sheriff must thereupon execute the warrant, by arresting the defendant and taking him according to its command, before the court or magistrate by whom it was issued.

Taken from 2 R. S. 3d ed. 654, sec. 8.

915. The court or magistrate must proceed to hear the allegations and proofs of the parties; and must, if required, allow a reasonable time to either party, to produce further necessary proof.

Taken from 2 R. S. 3d ed. 654, sec. 9.

§ 916. If time be allowed, as provided in the last section, the court or magistrate must commit the defendant to the custody of the sheriff of the county, for safe keeping, or may discharge him from actual custody, upon his giving a written undertaking, executed by sufficient sureties, to the effect that the defendant will appear before the court or magistrate, at a specified time and place, to abide the decision of the claim, or that the sureties will pay to the claimant, the sum spe

cified in the undertaking, and which must be an amount deemed sufficient by the court or magistrate.

Taken from 2 R. S. 3d ed. 654, sec. 9.

§ 917. If, upon the hearing of the parties, the court or magistrate be satisfied that the claim is not sustained, the defendant must be discharged; and the claimant thereupon forfeits to the defendant one hundred dollars, recoverable in a civil action. The defendant may also recover in the same action, his costs and expenses in resisting the claim, and the damages he may have sustained.

§ 918. If the claim be sustained, the court or magistrate must grant to the claimant a certificate, stating that it satisfactorily appears that the defendant, (describing him by his name, age, size, and personal appearance,) owes service or labor to the claimant, (stating his name and place of residence,) and allowing the claimant, or his agent named in the certificate, to take the defendant, and convey him to the place of residence of the claimant.

§ 919. The defendant must thereupon be delivered to the claimant, or to his agent named in the certificate, who may remove him through and out of this state, on the ordinary route, to the place of residence of the claimant.

The last three sections are taken substantially from the original revised statutes, 2 R. S., 1st ed. 560, 561, sec. 10