When attorney-general must bring action.

§§ 231-304.

affd. 224 N. Y. 555, 120 N. E. 863; Matter of Chauncey (1920), 191 App. Div. 359, 181 N. Y. Supp. 653.

§ 231. Receiver trustee of property.

Section cited.-Matter of French (1918), 181 App. Div. 719, 168 N. Y. Supp. 988, affd. 224 N. Y. 555, 120 N. E. 863.

§ 232. Receiver's title to property.

A receiver of a cemetery corporation takes only such title to and powers over the property as the corporation possessed under the statute. Matter of Chauncey (1920), 191 App. Div. 359, 181 N. Y. Supp. 653.

Section cited.-Matter of French (1918), 181 App. Div. 719, 168 N. Y. Supp. 988, affd. 224 N. Y. 555, 120 N. E. 863.

§ 239. General powers of receiver.

Power of courts to authorize receiver of insolvent railroad corporation to borrow money to maintain and operate railroad; priority of receiver's certificates over preceding mortgage and other liens. on railroad property.--When all the property of a railroad corporation is temporarily in the immediate control of a court of general jurisdiction and in the possession of a receiver, and it appears necessary to expend a sum of money not then available to reasonably maintain the property in its integrity as a railroad, the court may not only authorize the receiver to borrow the money for such expenditure, but may exercise the power which it possesses in equity over the property so within its control and make the certificates of indebtedness therefor a lien thereon. If it is necessary to enable the receiver so to borrow the money and it appears to be of sufficient importance to the public and the persons directly interested in the property, such receiver's certificates may be made a lien prior to all other liens on the property of the corporation. Equity may require that the lien of a judgment of foreclosure and sale, like that of a mortgage, be subordinated to that of receiver's certificates issued to raise money for the maintenance and preservation of the property. Although power exists in the court to act in the cases mentioned without consent and without notice, the authority so granted is subject to review when the parties interested and opposed to the exercise of the authority are properly before the court, and those who take receiver's certificates must be deemed to have taken them subject to the rights of parties who have prior liens upon the property, and who have not, but should have been, brought before the court. Central Trust Co. v. Pittsburg, S. & N. R. R. Co. (1918), 223 N. Y. 347, 664, 119 N. E. 565, 570, revg. 179 App. Div. 607, 168 N. Y. Supp. 702.

The appointment of a permanent receiver of a dissolved membership corporation neither vests in him the personal right of its creditors to enforce the liability of directors under section 11 of the Membership Corporations Law nor does it enable him to assert or enforce the rights of the corporation under section 239 (1) of the General Corporation Law. Fordham v. Poor (1919), 109 Misc. 187, 179 N. Y. Supp. 367.

Section cited.-Matter of French (1918), 181 App. Div. 719, 168 N. Y. Supp. 988, affd. 224 N. Y. 555, 120 N. E. 863; Eckman v. Lindbeck (1917), 178 App. Div. 720, 165 N. Y. Supp. 145.

§ 304. When attorney-general must bring certain actions.

When attorney general not justified in bringing action in name of people against VOL. X-50

officers and directors of private foreign corporation. Opinion of Attorney General (1919), 21 State Dep. Rep. 59.

§ 306. Appointment of receivers of property of corporations.

Suit by stockholder for injunction and appointment of receiver; right of action to recover books and papers or to oust officer who refuses to perform his duties.— A complaint in an action by a stockholder against a corporation asking for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver but not for dissolution, which does not allege that the plaintiff is an officer or director authorized to maintain the action under section 306 of the General Corporation Law, or that demand has been made that the corporation bring an action against the president who it is charged has appropriated its books and papers and refuses to perform his duties, or that such demand would be fruitless, fails to state a cause of action, and the court is without power to appoint a receiver pendente lite or by final judgment. While a corporation may in a proper case maintain an action to recover its books and papers or to oust an official who refuses to do his duty, no such cause of action is vested in a stockholder in the absence of an allegation of refusal by the directors to sue. Soloway v. Junius Coal & Wood Co. (1919), 186 App. Div. 879, 175 N. Y. Supp. 1.

Use of highways regulated.

GENERAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC LAW.

(L. 1917, ch. 655.)

§§ 1, 11, 12.

§ 1. Short title.

Repeal of the provisions of the Highway Law relating to motor vehicles was not effected by this law. Opinion of Attorney General (1917), 12 State Dep. Rep. 478.

§ 11. Stopping, turning, passing and waiting of vehicles.

Safety zone between street car and passing vehicle.-So long as a safety zone of seven feet is maintained between a street surface car and a passing vehicle, the statute is fully complied with and the vehicle need not necessarily come to a stop. Opinion of Attorney General (1917), 12 State Dep. Rep. 481.

§ 12. Right of way and operation of vehicles.

Right of way at intersection to vehicle approaching from right construed; contributory negligence; failure to give right of way.-Under the provision that "every driver of a vehicle approaching the intersection of a street or public road shall grant the right of way at such intersection to any vehicle approaching from his right," the words "grant the right of way" mean that at such a crossing the driver of one vehicle has an affirmative duty to keep out of the other's way. This requires him to slow, to stop, and if need be to reverse, if otherwise the crossing vehicles are likely to come into contact. Such a rule cannot be set aside by a jury, where these two elements appear-full view of the vehicle approaching from the right, and the entire failure to take any steps to keep out of its path. Where this duty to grant the right of way is completely ignored, the driver is guilty of contributory negligence preventing a recovery. Brillinger v. Ozias (1919), 186 App. Div. 221, 174 N. Y. Supp. 282.

The fact that the driver of an automobile has the right of way at a street intersection does not excuse him from the duty of alertness and doing what he reasonably can avoid a crisis. Hood v. Stowe (1920), 191 App. Div. 614.

Collision at intersection of streets; failure of driver having right of way to look to the left; negligence and contributory negligence; when occupant of car not chargeable with negligence as matter of law. While the General Highway Traffic Law which regulates traffic at street intersections where traffic officers are not stationed provides that "every driver of a vehicle approaching the intersection of a street or public road shall grant the right of way at such intersection to any vehicle approaching from his right," it does not mean that the driver having the right of way may heedlessly cross the intersecting street without giving any attention to vehicles from his left. Hence, where the driver of an automobile, having the right of way at the intersection of the street, continued without looking to his left and was struck by the plaintiff's car, which was coming from that direction and which he could have seen if he had looked, he is properly chargeable with negligence. But the plaintiff also is chargeable with negligence barring a recovery where it appears that he saw the defendant's car which had the right of way approaching the intersection of the streets with unslackened speed over a slippery pavement on a dark night and attempted to pass in front of said car

§§ 13, 14, 19.

Use of highways regulated.

because he was somewhat nearer the street crossing. But a verdict in a separate action in favor of the plaintiff's wife, who was riding with him at the time of the collision, will be affirmed, for the negligence of her husband is not imputable to her, and this, although knowing that her husband saw the defendant's car, she made no outcry. By keeping still under the circumstances and relying upon her husband's judgment, she was not negligent as a matter of law. Ward v. Clark (1919), 189 App. Div. 344, 179 N. Y. Supp. 466.

Injury by automobile approaching vehicle from behind; duty of driver attempting to pass other vehicle going in same direction.-A verdict of no cause of action was properly set aside and a new trial granted where it appeared, without dispute, that the plaintiff while driving up hill in a phaeton on the proper side of the road had the rear wheel of her vehicle struck by the defendant's automobile coming from behind, with a result that the phaeton was overturned, it appearing also that the defendant with proper care could have avoided another automobile coming down the hill without injury to the plaintiff, by merely slackening the speed of the car and dropping in behind the plaintiff's vehicle. The duty of seeing that the roadway is clear in passing vehicles going in the same direction is upon the person attempting to make the passage. Pratt v. Burns (1919), 189 App. Div. 33, 177 N. Y. Supp. 817.

§ 13. Signals.

Collision between two automobiles at street intersection; when instruction that defendant was obligated, as matter of law, to give warning of approach to street intersection constitutes reversible error.-Where, in an action for personal injuries resulting from a collision in the night time at the intersection of two streets in the borough of Brooklyn between two automobiles operated by the defendants, it was conceded that the collision was occasioned by the negligence of one of the defendants, and the contest between them, and there was an irreconcilable conflict in the testimony of the defendants as to rate of speed, warning and the relative position of the automobiles as they reached the street intersection, it was reversible error for the court to instruct the jury that there was an obligation on the defendant, as matter of law, to give some warning of the aapproach of his automobile to the street intersection. Thompson v. Fischer (1919), 188 App. Div. 878, 177 N. Y. Supp. 491.

§ 14. Speed regulations.

Prosecuion for driving on city streets at speed of more than one mile in four minutes; reckless driving.-Where the act of defendant in driving an automobile on the public streets of a city at a greater speed than one mile in four minutes was not only in violation of a local ordinance but also violated the provisions of this section, which prohibits reckless driving and makes the same a misdemeanor, defendant may be proceeded against under either provision of law, but under section 1938 of the Penal Law it is improper to render two different judgments of conviction against him. People v. Fitzgerald (1917), 101 Misc. 695, 168 N. Y. Supp. 930.

§ 19. Motorcycles, bicycles and similar vehicles.

Violation of subdivision 3 by carrying boy upon handle bars of bicycle. Ward v. Baumann (1919), 187 App. Div. 898, 174 N. Y. Supp. 924.

Violation of subdivision 4 by failing to have light upon bicycle. Ward v. Baumann (1919), 187 App. Div. 898, 174 N. Y. Supp. 924.

A proposal to raise money by temporary loan which is not included in the tax budget, is in violation of this section. People ex rel. Moody Engineering Co. v. Hamilton (1919), 108 Misc. 585, 178 N. Y. Supp. 702.

§ 6. Funded debt.-A funded debt shall not be contracted by a municipal corporation, except for a specific object, expressly stated in the ordinance or resolution proposing it; nor unless such ordinance or resolution shall be passed by a two-thirds vote of all the members elected to the board or council adopting it, or submitted to, and approved by the electors of the town or county, or taxpayers of the village or city when required by law; provided, however, that a funded debt contracted by a city of the second class for the building of a school building, or for the construction or reconstruction of a school building shall require for its passage only a majority vote of all the members elected to the common council adopting it. Such ordinance or resolution shall provide for raising annually, by tax, a sum sufficient to pay the interest and the principal, as the same shall become due. Whenever bonds have been issued and sold, prior to January first, nineteen hundred and eighteen, pursuant to this section, by a city of the second class, located in a county having a population of not less than two hundred thousand nor more than two hundred and fifty thousand, the proceeds or any part thereof may be used for any purpose for which bonds may be issued if authorized by a two-thirds votes of all the members elected to the common council and such action of the common council is ratified by a two-thirds vote of the members of the board of estimate and apportionment of such city. (Amended by L. 1910, ch. 677 and L. 1918, ch. 210.)

§ 20. Reissue of lost or destroyed bonds.-The board of estimate and apportionment of a city of the first or second class, and the governing board of any other municipal corporation, may issue or cause to be issued to the owner of bonds of the municipality which shall have been lost or destroyed new bonds to replace the same, if the owner shall give to the municipality security to be approved by such board to indemnify the municipality against loss or damage that may be incurred by it on account of the bonds so lost or destroyed. If such board shall refuse to issue or cause to be issued, new bonds, in a case above provided for, the owner of the bonds so lost or destroyed may apply to the supreme court at a special term to be held in the