113. "Alienable rights," are those which we have to most kinds of property, as house, lands, money; but the right of a prince over his people, of a husband over his wife, of a master over his servant, is generally and naturally unalienable.

114. The distinction between alienable and unalienable rights, depends upon the mode of acquiring the right: if it originate from a contract, and be limited to the person by the express terms of the contract, or by a personal condition annexed to the right, then it is unalienable. In other cases it is alienable.

115. Perfect rights may be asserted by force, or by course of law; imperfect rights, cannot.

Ex. A man's right to his own property is perfect, and if it be injuriously taken from him, he may compel the aggressor to make restitution; but in elections or appointments to offices, where the qualifications are prescribed, the best qualified candidate has a right to success, yet if he be rejected, he has no. remedy. Here the right is imperfect.

116. Wherever the right is imperfect, the corresponding obligation is so too; but there is not less guilt in the violation of an imperfect obligation than of a perfect one: for an obligation being perfect or imperfect, determines whether violence may or may not be employed to enforce it, and nothing else.

116. Positive precepts, being often indeterminate in their extent, commonly produce an imperfect obligation.

117. Negative precepts, being generally precise, constitute a perfect obligation.

Illustration. The fifth commandment is positive, and the duty resulting, imperfect: the sixth is negative, and inposes a perfect obligation.

OF GENERAL RIGHT.

118. The general rights of mankind are a right to the productions of the earth.

119. Since the productions of the earth are to be applied to the support of human life; all waste and misapplication must be contrary to the Divine intention and will.

120. Men have a general right also to use and destroy another's property, when it is necessary for their preservation to do so; as a right to take without, or even against, the owner's leave, the first food, clothes, or shelter, they may meet with, if they are in danger of perishing without them: a right to pull down a house in order to stop the progress of a fire, &c.

121. Restitution is due when in our power, because the laws of property are to be adhered to, so far as consists with safety; and because restitution, which is one of those laws, supposes the danger over.

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CHAPTER III.

Of Relative Duties-Of Property-Of Promises -Of Contracts-Of Falsehoods Of Oaths Of Wills-Of Charity Of the Duties towards Dependants-Of Professional Assistance-Of Pecuniary Bounty Of Resentment -Of Gratitude-Of Slander-Of MarriageOf the Duties and Rights of parents and Children.

OF RELATIVE DUTIES.

122. Virtue obliges us to avoid whatever would be grievous to any of our fellow-creatures, if it be not necessary to procure some greater good; and also that we labour to promote the happiness of all about us to the utmost of our

power.

123. The rule of loving our neighbour as ourselves, is a summary view of social virtue, which, at the same time that it gives the rule, suggests the reason.

Illustration. It is evident that our conduct is to be determined, not by considering who the person is, with regard to whom we act, but what the circumstances of his case are.

OF PROPERTY.

124. The institution of property has many ad⚫vantages: it increases the produce of the earth;

none would cultivate the ground, if others were admitted to an equal share of the produce; it preserves the produce of the earth to maturity; it prevents contests; and it improves the conveniency of living.

125. Great inequality of property, abstractedly considered, is an evil; but it is an evil which flows from those rules concerning the acquisition and disposal of property, by which men are incited to industry, and by which the object of their industry is rendered secure and valuable.

126. The foundation of our right to property, is the law of the land.

Illustration. It is the intention of God that the produce of the earth should be applied to the use of man, which cannot be fulfilled without establishing property: it is consistent therefore with his will that property be established; and that the law should regulate the division, and consequently "consistent with the will of God, or right," that I should possess that share which these regulations assign me.

127. The right being traced to the will of God, it appears that my right to an estate does not depend upon the manner or justice of the original acquisition; or upon the justice of each subsequent change of possession.

Illustration. It ought not to be impeached because the estate was taken possession of at first by a family of aboriginal Britons, who happened to be stronger than their neighbours; nor because the British possessor was turned out by a Roman, or the Roman by a Saxon, &c. from whom, after many interruptions of fraud and violence, it has at length devolved on

me.

128. The owner's right does not depend on the expediency of the law which gives it to him.

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Observation. One farm descends to the eldest son, another separated from it only by a narrow stream, to all the children alike. The right of the claimants under both laws of inheritance is equal; though the expediency of such opposite rules must be different.

Objection. It seems to follow then, that a man has a right to keep or take any thing which the law will allow him to keep and take; which may authorize much dishonesty.

Example. If a creditor upon a simple contract neglect to demand his debt for six years, the debtor may refuse to pay it : Would this be right where he is conscious of the justice of the debt? If a minor contract a debt he may avoid it by pleading his minority, which could not be just where the bargain was originally just.

Answer. In such cases a man converts to one purpose, a rule of the law intended for another. The law, to which the first part of the objection applies, was provided to protect men from antiquated demands; therefore, if a man be ignorant of the demand made upon him, he may conscientiously plead this limitation, because he applies the rule of law to the purpose for which it was intended. Again, to preserve the young from the practices and impositions to which they are liable, the law compels the payment of no debts incurred within a certain age, nor the performance of any engagements, except for such necessaries as are suited to their condition. If, therefore, a young person has been imposed on, he may honestly avail himself of the privilege of his non-age to defeat the imposition: but if he shelter himself under this privilege to avoid a fair obligation, he extends the privilege to a case not allowed by the intention of the law.

OF THE OBLIGATION OF PROMISES.

129. The obligation to perform promises is deduced from the necessity of the case, to the wellbeing, or the existence, of human society.

130. Men act from expectation, which in most cases is determined by the assurances and engagements they receive from others; and without a dependance upon them, they could not judge of, much less anticipate, future events.

131. Confidence in promises is essential to the