motion for a new trial, shall be submitted to opposite counsel for examination, and to the judge, or judges for signing, and also the provision requiring the judge or judges to endorse thereon auy extension of time that may be given for signing such bill of exceptions, are mandatory. Therefore such bill of exceptions must be submitted to opposite counsel at least ten days before th expiration of the statutory period of fifty days, and to the judge, or judges, at least five days before the expiration of such period; and unless both of these conditions are performed, the judge or judges, have lost jurisdiction over the subject matter, and are without authority to sign the b:11 of exceptions, or to extend the time for that purpose. If such judge or judges, acting within the statutory period, extend the time for signing a bill of exceptions, but do not endorse such extension thereon, jurisdiction is in that case lost also; and any subsequent allowance or signing the same is without authority and for that reason void. Judgment affirmed. 3730. G. W. Buchanan et al. v. Joseph Baker et al. Error to the circuit court of Monroe county. BY THE COURT: The right of appeal from the final decision of the trustees in a proceeding for the vacation of a township road provided by section 4683, Revised Statutes, is intended to give the probate court jurisdiction to hear the case upon its merits, and order another view of the road, or | make any other order that may be just and reasonable in the case. Judgments of the circuit court and court of common pleas reversed and that of the probate court affirmed. 3875. The City of Canton v. Christian Wagner. Error to the circuit court of Stark county. BY THE COURT. The following notice, under section 2304, Revised Statutes, is sufficient both in form and substance: "NOTICE. "CANTON, OHIO, April 9, 1891. "To Christian Wagner: "You are hereby notified that a resolution was adopted by the council of the city of Canton, Ohio, on the 30th day of March, 1891, declaring it necessary to open and improve Dueber avenue, from Ohio street to Fairfield street, by grading and graveling the same and by lawning, fagging and curbing the sidewalks, in accordance with plans, profiles and specifications on file in the office of the city civil engineer. "The expense of said improvement to be charged per foot front upon the lots and lands abutting on said improvement. By order of the council. "H. G. SHAUB, City Clerk." Judgment of the circuit court is reversed and that of the common pleas affirmed. 4753. The state of Ohio v. Samuel Knight and James Gibson. Exceptions to the ruling of the court of common pleas of Wood county. BY THE COURT: A prosecution against a county officer for soliciting a bribe outside of his county must be in the county where the bribe was solicited, and not in the county where he holds office Exceptions overruled. 3421. Frederick W. Morlock v. The Wood land Avenue and West Side Street Railway hoga county. Judgment affirmed. Company. Error to the circuit court of Cuya-, 3832. The Bellaire Stamping Company v. The Buckeye Glass Company. Error to the circuit court of Belmont county. Judgment affirmed. 3880. The Stannahan Bros. Catering Co. v. Frank R. Coit. Error to the circuit court of Portgage county. Dismissed for failure to serve defendant with copy of the plaintiff's brief. 3904. Margaret Peoples v. Elizabeth A. Glennan. Error to the circuit court of Muskingum county. Judgment affirmed. Nancy J. Wilson. Error to the circuit court of 3931. The Lima Electric Railway Co. v. Allen county. Judgment affirmed. Motion Docket. 2577. Leo A. Brigél et ux. v. Edmund W. Kittredge et al. Motion by plaintiff to dispense with printing record in Cause No. 4772 on the general docket. Motion allowed. 2583. James Steel et al. v. Samuel Swartz et al. Motion by plaintiff for leave to file supplemental printed record in Cause No. 3947 on the general docket Motion allowed. 2584. James Steel et al. v. Samuel Swartz et al. Motion by defendants to dismiss Cause No. 3947 on the general docket. Moticr overruled. 2585. The City of Cincinnati et al. v. Joanna Connor. Motion by Jones & James for leave to file printed briefs on behalf of plaintiffs in Cause No. 4862 on the general docket. Motion allowed. 2586. Frank L. Sikes v. Commissioners of Scioto County Motion by plaintiff to advance Cause No. 4333 on the general docket. Motion allowed. 2587. Pearl Harmon v. The State of Ohio Motion for leave to file a petition in error to the circuit court of Jackson county. Motion allowed. 2588. Jones Henline et al. v. William T. Reese. Motion by defendant for additional time to file printed briefs in Cause No. 3707 on the general docket. Motion allowed. 2589. Elmina Kutz, v. The Gennessee Oil Comany et al. Mot on by plaintiff for temporary injunction in Cause No. 4884 on the general docket. Motion overruled. 2590. S. L. Mooney et al. v. W. V. Campbell et al. Motion by plaintiffs to extend time to file printed briefs in Cause No. 3987 on the 1 general docket. Motion allowed and time extended to April 1, 1896. New Cases. New cases filed in the supreme court since March 4, 1896. 4883. James R. Pollocl v. The City of Mansfield. Error to the circuit court of Richland county. Donnell & Marriott, for plaintiff. Bell, Brinkerhoff & Mengert, for defendant. 4884. Elmina Kutz v. The Genesee Oil Co. et al. Error to the circuit court of Hancock. county. Pendleton & Whiteley, for plaintiff in error. George H. Phelps, Pendleton & Whiteley, for defendants in error. 4885. David K. Moore et al. v. Clara Thompson. Error to the circuit court of Columbiana county. James A. Martin, A. G. Smith, for plaintiff. F. L. Wells, for defendant. 4886. Harriet W. McAlpin v. Alexander Clarke et al. Error to the circuit court of Hamilton county. Nelson Sayler, Matthew & Cleveland, for plaintiff. Morrow & Oldham, Paxton, Warrington & Boutet, E. R. Donohue, Matthews & Cleveland, for defendants. 4887. John W. Davis, Auditor v. The Cincinnati Camp Meeting Ass'n. Error to the circuit court of Clermont county. Nichols & Nichols, Parrott & Parrott, for plaintiff. J. R. Woodlief, Wm. W. Prather, for defendant 4888. The C. C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Mathew Johnson. Error to the circuit court of Cuyahoga county. Goulder & Holding, John F. Dye, S. Ó. Bayliss, for p'aiutiff. Charles E. Pennewell, Billman & Billman, for defendant. 4889. The Findlay Rolling Mill Co. et al. v. The National Bank of Commerce, Cleveland. Error to the circuit court of Hancock county. Jason Blackford, J. A. & E. V. Bope, M. B. Gary, for plaintiff. H. F. Burket, for defend ant. 4890. John W. Morris v. The C. H. & D. R. R. Co. Error to the circuit court of Miami county. A. R. Byrkett for plaintiff. R. D. Marshall, for defendant. 4891. S. V. Smith, Receiver v. W. P. Johnson et al. Error to the circuit court of Portage county. S. P. Walcott, Cole & Douthitt, | for plaintiff. Frank Higley, for defendants. 4892. Emma B. Carch v. John P. Carch, Ex'r, et al. Error to the circuit court of Montgomery county. Gottschall & Brown, for plaintiff. Rowe & Shuey, Young & Young, for defend ants. 4893. The Toledo Consolidated Street Ry. Co. v. Casper Rohmer. Error to the circuit court of Lucas county. Smith & Baker, for plaintiff. J. H. Southard, for defendant. 4894. Jacob Zetler, Jr. v. Cornelia Z. Krumm et al. Error to the circuit court of Franklin county. George L. Converse, Thos. E. Steele, for plaintiff. 4895. W.-B. Longsdorf, Constab e v. Thomas McBee. Error to the circuit court of Richland county. Bell, Brinkerhoff & Mengert, for plaintiff. Bowers & Black, for defendant. 4896. W. M. Ampt, on behalf etc. v. The City of Cincinnati et al. Error to the circuit court of Hamilton county. W. M. Ampt, for plaintiff. Foraker & Prior, Fred. Hertenstein, for defendants. New cases filed in the supreme court since March 11, 1896. 4897. Alexander P. Patton v. The P. C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. Error to the circuit court of Franklin county. Paul Jones, Florizel Smith, for plaintiff. Watson, Burr & Livesay, for defendant. 4898. Calvin A. Judson, receiver v. Stephen B. Richards, Adm'r et al. Error to the circuit court of Columbiana county. Ambler & Son, for plaintiff. Carey, Boyle & Mullins, for defendants. V. 4899. Rev. Abraham Vandersall et al. Jacob B. Turner et al. Error to the circuit Court of Fairfield county. Brasée & Brasee, Ritchie & Esher, for plaintiffs. al. 4900. James Nemecek v. Julia Mahoney et Error to the circuit court of Lorain county. W. B. Thompson, E. G. Johnson, for plaintiff. William Stroup, for defendants. 4901. Isaac B. Jashenosky v. Stern & Co. et al. Error to the circuit court of Franklin county. John S. Friesner, for plaintiff. 4902. Frederick W. Stock et al. v. Walter Collins. Error to the circuit court of Franklin county. John S. Friesner, for plaintiff. 4903. Edwin Brown v. Althea Carey et al. Error to the circuit court of Wyandot county. Thomas Beer, T. E. Grissell, for plaintiff. 4904. Robert Young v. Francis M. Brown. Error to the circuit court of Logan county. James Keruan, for plaintiff. E. J. Howenstine, W. Clay Huston, for defendant. 4905. Paul Raymond v. The Toledo, St. L. & K. C. R. R. Co. et al. Error to the circuit' court of Lucas county. Hurd, Brumbach & Thatcher, for plaintiff. Brown, Geddes & Tyler, for defendants. 4906. Thomas C. Platt president of U. S. Express Co. v. William R. Colvin et al. Error to ihe circuit court of Allen county. Cable & Parmenter, Harmon, Colston, Goldsmith & Hoadley, or plaintiff. Walter B Ritchie, for defendants. 4907. Jacob Hines et al. v. The Board of Commissioners of Richland county. Error to the circuit court of Richland county. J. C. Laser, for plaintiff. 4903. Clinton Crane et al. v. The Lewis and Talbot Stone Co. et al. Error to the superior tiffs. Paxton, Warrington & Boutet, Goebel & court of Cincinnati. C. W. Baker, for plainBettinger, Frederick Hertenstein, for defend ants. 4909. The Metropoliton Life Ins. Co. v. Martha Gierl. Error to the circuit court of Lucas county. George B. Boone, for plaintiff. Merrill & Hone, for defendant. 4910. George Wetzel, Adm'r v. The L. S. & M. S. Ry. Co. Error to the circuit court of Mahoning county. R. B. Murray, A. J. Wolfe, W. S. Anderson, M. A. Norris, for plaintiff. Thomas W. Sanderson, for defendant. ago, that we were publishing a reprint of the Western Law Journal, Western Law Monthly, and other periodicals. He had then never had an idea of such a work. Recently and about the time our first volume appeared he announced that he would do the same thing. Under the circumstances we can honorably reprint his circuit court reports. This week we reprint, in full, nearly all of the general laws passed by the legislature at this session. The amendments of present sections of Revised Statutes are arranged in the order of the section numbers. Next week we will print all the additional new laws, and thus our readers will be supplied with the work of the legislature to date. Two new judges have been authorized for the subdivision composed by Lucas, Ottawa, Sandusky, Erie and Huron counties, and one for that composed of Clinton, Greene, Montgomery and Warren counties. Similar bills are contemplated for other subdivisions where of Ohio Decisions subsequent to volume 3. delivered, the dockets are overcrowded, and as the temper express paid, to subscribers, $2.50 per volume. Bound Volumes. Bound copies of Vol. 1, Vol. 2 and Vol. 3 of the Ohio Decisions can be had at $2.50 per volume, if bound in full sheep, or $2.25 per volume in half sheep. Bound volumes of Vol. 1. OHIO LEGAL NEWs (Toledo Legal News) will be furnished at $2.00 per volume. Bound copies of Vols. 1, 2 or 3 of Ohio Decisions, or of the LEGAL NEWS will be sent in exchange for the advance sheets, at $1.00 per volume in full sheep or 75 cents in half sheep. of the legislature is favorable to such relief, they will probably be passed. Progress in this line will be made, and eventually there will be a resident judge in each county. EGREGIOUS BLUNDERS. The German editor of the Bulletin, complains that last week, we showed up the errors, in his proposed reprint of the Western Law Journal, but admits that we were correct in our claims. If it were only once, or occasion-` ally, that he makes such blunders, they would not deserve attention, but it is an every week's occurrence. We have a further evidence of the way his mind is constantly addled, in his sample pages of Western Law Monthly, accompanying his issue of March 30. On the first . Entered at the Postoffice, Norwalk, Ohio, as second page, after the title of the first case, he says class matter. NEW CIRCUIT COURT REPORTS. "Affirmed by Supreme Court, see Sheldon v. L. S. & M. S. Ry. Co., 29 O. S., 214." The facts are that the case referred to is not the same case We announced last week that we were is not on the same subject, and in no sense afseriously considering a reprint of the Circuit firms the case reprinted. There are many other Court reports, in which the original ten vol- mistakes in his reprints. We shall refer to umes were put in one, to sell at $2.50. This them hereafter. As we said last week, we we can easily do, by omitting the overruled have no fear of that kind of competition. We have had a great many letters from attorneys encouraging the enterprise. We repeat what we then said, that "if our Columbus rival believes in plagiarizing every publication we attempt, we shall be compelled to practice The following answers to the Query pubretaliation." We announced several months lished by us recently have been received: cases. ANSWERS TO QUERY. Roe made three promissory notes secured by mortgage of real estate, due respectively in 1891, 1892 and 1893. The payee endorsed them to Gilsey before due, and for value. After the note of 1891 matured, the payee pays to Gilsey the amount due upon it, and receives the note without any agreement or understanding about its use expressed by the parties. And Gilsey, understanding the transaction to be payment, no release is entered upon the mortgage. The payee afterward reissues the same by placing it in the hands of Hills as collateral security for a debt then created. When the note due in 1892 matures, the payee lifts it as in the case of the first one, and afterwards, puts it in the hands of a third person as collateral security for a debt then created. Now, all the notes having matured, and the last one remaining unpaid, Gilsey forecloses, and the holders of the notes of 1891 and 1892 assert their claims under these notes, and contend for priority against the note due in 1893, held by Gilsey. Quacre: Among the three holders, how should the proceeds of the sale be distributed? The above hypothetical question is presented in the OHIO LEGAL NEWS, Vol. 3, No. 21, page 109, issue of March 7, to which question, I give the following opinion: This presents a peculiar question, involving a point of law which has never been fully passed on in this state. It will not be disputed that when the notes and mortgage came into the possession of the payee, that the notes were then subject to priority in the relation in which they became due. It is a well established principle of law that whenever a series of notes are given, secured by mortgage they shall be paid out of the mortgaged property according to the order in which they mature. by his act, that the mortgage notes will be paid out of the proceeds of the property mortgaged. This, then, is the situation of the parties, when Gilsey becomes the owner of the notes. In Gilsey's hands before any further proceedings take place, the notes hold their priority as above mentioned. Now, then, comes the equitable distinction. It is to be presumed that when the note of 1891 became due, Roe failed to pay it, and the payee thereupon took it up and afterwards put it in circulation as payment of a pre-existing debt. The second note coming due in 1892 was taken care of in the same manner, and given as payment of a pre-existing debt to 'another party. Now, is there anything in this transaction which would change the priority of the notes? As before stated, when the payee endorsed the notes to Gilsey, he warranted those notes and the mortgage. Then would it be just and equitable that he he permitted to set up an estopel to his own warranty. It would amount to this, if the payee could take up the 1891 and 1892 notes when they respectively became due, and still hold them as prior security to the one remaining in the hands of Gilsey? For illustration, supposing in the above case that after the payee had repossessed himself of the 1891 and 1892 notes, it should be discovered that Roe had become insolvent and that the mortgaged property was insufficient to pay all the notes, would it be reasonable to allow the payee to come in with his notes as prior security in violation of his implied-representation to Gilsey? Or, in other words, would it be equitable to allow the payee to appropriate the very property he had previously transferred to secure Gilsey's claim? It seems to be the prevailing opinion of the text writers, and the authorities wherever this question has been discussed, that an endorser disposing of mortgage notes, cannot impeach his endorsee's, claim to the mortgaged property. This, then being the ruling of the courts, it is certain that after the payee had taken back, or, in other words, lifted the 1891 and 1892 notes, he did not obtain therewith, the prior equities of Gilsey. An equity had Now does the transfer of these notes by endorsement from the payee to Gilsey in any way effect their original priority? It does not appear whether or not the mortgage was assigned with the notes, but for the purpose of this question, that would be immaterial. The mortgage security would follow the notes as an incident. The endorsee is entitled to the ben.fit of a security whether the mortgage is assigned to him or not. Let us see what liability the payee incurs by endorsing the notes here intervened which must follow the notes to Gilsey. By endorsing the notes, the payee into whose hands they might thereafter be represents to Gilsey that they are worth their placed. face value, and that Roe, the maker, is perIt is a well settled rule of law that an asfectly able to pay them, and that they are cov- signor can assign no more thau he possesses, ered by a valid and subsisting mortgage. and it is an equally well settled rule that a perThis, in fact, is the warranty which the endorse-son taking a promissory note after it becomes ment implies, and further, the payee represents due, takes it subject to pre-existing equities. Therefore, whether the notes were assigned or ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS endorsed by the payee, to parties holding them And Damages for Living in a State of Adultery. for pre-existing debts, nothing passes but the title of the payee. The holders of the notes could claim no further rights than the payee possessed at the time of the transfer. Accordingly, it is my opinion that the 1893 note should be first paid out of the mortgaged propperty. The next question to determine is, which of the other two notes should be first paid? It would appear from what already has been stated that the payee, after he took up the 1891 note and circulated it again, was in substantially the same position, in regard to this assignee, or transferee, as he was with Gilsey. When he took up the 1892 note, he could not dispute the right of the last transferee to claim payment out of the mortgaged property, by having the note which he, the payee, held-the 1892 note, brought in as a superior claim to the one last transfered. Then if this be true, the party taking the 1892 note as collateral security for a pre-existing debt, would take subject to prior equities; or, in other words, simply the assignor's interest. On this consideration, it is reasonable to presume that after the 1893 note was paid, then the 1891 note should be paid before the one of 1892. WM. G. PHARE, Of the Cleveland Bar. [Stark County Common Pleas.] MYERS V. RAYNOLDS. [CONCLUDED.] tiff to prosecute her business of art decorating It is a maxim of the law that, that to which a man consents cannot be considered an injury to him. If therefore you find that the If correctly stated Roe paid no part of the plaintiff knowingly, although it may have been three notes secured by mortgage. only passively done, suffered, permitted or connived at the alleged improper advances, attenPayee indorsed them for value to Gilsey who tions and presents from the defendant to his was at their maturity when Roe failed to pay wife, and at their alleged improper relations required to take them up, as indorser. His so far as the same is charged in the petition, right was to have immediate payment of these your verdict must be for the defendant, notwithstanding you might be satisfied that the notes out of the mortgage security. The per-defendant by means of the conduct charged, sons to whom the 1891 and 1892 notes were had alienated the love and affection of the turned over as collateral security, by the terms of the query, only got these notes after their maturity and were clearly charged with the duty of making immediate collection of the debt as evidenced by these notes. Not to have done so is sufficient negligence on their part to lose them their right to have the notes paid out of the security in the order of their dates or maturity, as against Gilsey who has done nothing. Out of an insufficient fund arising from sale of the mortgaged premises the notes should be paid in the inverse order, i. e. Gilsey's 1893 note and interest, the 1892 note and interest then the 1891 note and interest. EMORY A. PRIOR. Cuyahoga Falls, O., March 12, 1896. plaintiff's wife. The law will not tolerate a husband passively or actively conniving at his wife's conduct with another, and then aid him in recovering damages for that to which, by his conduct, he has consented. If the law would so permit, such men might seek to use tion for damages, and to make money out of their wives for the purpose of laying a foundatheir alleged misconduct. Therefore, whatever you may find to have been the relations between the plaintiff's wife and the defendant, if you find that such relations were consented to, or knowingly permitted, suffered or connived at by the plaintiff, then he cannot recover in this action. This is wholly regardless of what you may find to be the actual facts as to the conduct of the plaintiff's wife and the defendant, for a verdict for the defendant upon this ground would not necessarily determine that he was innocent of having alienated the |